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By investigating the subjectivities of Chinese student-returnees (haigui) from 
Australia who pursue careers in the Shanghai financial market, this thesis explores the 
tensions resulting from the Chinese state’s engagement in contemporary financial 
capitalism. The thesis approaches financial expertise as an empirical object of analysis 
to ask how subjectivity is produced within the process of Chinese financialisation and 
how this impacts upon the Chinese state in the current conjuncture of capitalism. 
In the wake of the global economic crisis, the financial expert has often been portrayed 
as the faceless figure of a technocracy whose growing power has undermined and 
partially eclipsed the legitimacy of democratic representation and the state 
sovereignity, as happened in Greece in summer 2015. Yet, globally circulating 
narratives lack an analytic lens that can look beyond a western-centric view of 
capitalism. In China, despite the severe financial crackdown—which also begun in the 
summer of 2015—the state still seems firmly in control. To investigate the 
distinctiveness of Chinese financialisation I adopt a genealogical method that traces 
the history of expertise—and the figure of the expert—since the first period of Chinese 
modernisation, in the mid-nineteenth century. I argue that the contemporary 
production of experts marks a discontinuity within Chinese modernity. While in the 
modern period experts trained abroad were always considered strategic for the state 
political project, now such figures (haigui), even if still fostered and encouraged to 
return to China by state policies of education and migration, are pushed aside and 
considered superfluous to this same project. 
The findings in this thesis are based on ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai, which 
included qualitative, semi-structured interviews with haigui from Australia as well as 
participant observation in brokerage rooms (branches of securities companies). These 
empirical investigations show that these returned financial experts are frequently 
unable to step into their preferred roles as consultants and mediators. They find 
themselves faced with a state securitised environment that they cannot penetrate, and 
a Chinese ecology of financial expertise dominated by guanxi (connections of 
influence within the party-state, often disguised). A common means by which haigui 
cope with this professional impasse is to turn to autonomous, self-managed investment 
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in the stock market, abandoning their claim on expert advisory roles. Such autonomous 
financial action is not a path they would have necessarily sought. 
Since its inception in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, I argue that the Chinese 
state has used the stock market as a means of securing social legitimation by providing 
a prearranged space where the disaggregated and vulnerable subjects left behind by 
the dismantlement of the collective work units of the Maoist period (danwei) can 
congregate. 
The two Chinese stock markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) serve as devices from which 
some may derive a living or even wealth in the context of a dismantled welfare state. 
Once they enter the stock market arena, the haigui are assimilated into a pool of low-
end, non-expert actors of Chinese mass financialisation, the so-called “scattered 
players” (sanhu) of the market. The investment strategies of haigui thus acquire the 
same characteristics of informal expertise and contingent practice associated with the 
sanhu. The thesis shows how the officially sponsored “Chinese dream” has taken the 
form of a “stock fever”—an irresistible tide which is sweeping these subjects towards 
a commitment to making money at all costs. Investing in the stock market gradually 
becomes, for the haigui as for the sanhu, a self-referential activity. The state gradually 
disappears from the horizon of their subjectivity, so that the stock game, the dream of 
enrichment, becomes absorbing and substitutes for other alternatives. As the language 
of money supplants and obliterates other loyalties among the haigui, the state risks 
losing its grasp on the subjectivity of these dethroned experts, who become first 




After spending 2008 studying Chinese in Beijing on a scholarship I had received from 
the University of Bologna, I returned to China in 2010 to take up work with the Istituto 
Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO), a publicly funded Italian research institute, 
which had a newly opened section in Shanghai. It was affiliated with a Chinese 
university, and I was collaborating with Chinese colleagues in the management of 
different projects. It was an enjoyable atmosphere and experience, although I 
remember that during work breaks, I rarely had the company of colleagues for a stroll 
around the block. During lunch, my Chinese colleagues would remain in the office, 
bent over their desks, seemingly overloaded by work. Typically they ordered their 
lunch to the office and ate it in front of the screen. I felt guilty—my work did not seem 
to be as hard as theirs. One day, I noticed Miss Fang, the administrative executive who 
had been working with me on a cultural project report, was staring at some data on her 
screen. At first I was worried that I had forgotten that we had to finish some financial 
reporting, but when I asked Miss Fang what she was looking at, she replied she wasn’t 
in fact working—she was mai gupiao (“buying shares”) and investing some of her 
money on the stock market. Her answer was unexpected, as she seemed an unlikely 
candidate for such activity. She went on to explain that her father, back in Anhui (a 
slightly rural province in the Chinese hinterland) had encouraged her to invest in this 
way. He had apparently made quite a lot of money in the past, though this had not been 
the case for Miss Fang, who had had no luck and didn’t really know how to invest. 
Though repeatedly disappointed, she kept rolling the dice.   
This and similar episodes had sparked my curiosity to explore some of the distinctive 
features of the Chinese stock market which would later form part of the object of this 
thesis. After the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had struck, my Shanghai salary—
which had been pegged at the Chinese standard of 500 Euros per month—was cut 
when the Italian research institute I was working with was shut down as a result of the 
new austerity measures implemented by the Monti government in Italy. After losing 
my income, despite the booming post-Expo Shanghai economy, my own financial 
situation had become precarious and the economic anxiety of finding a new job to 
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enable me to continue my studies in China weighed heavily upon me. Finally, after 
months of job seeking, I realised that the only jobs available were low-paid casual 
opportunities with foreign companies trying to set up business in China. Furthermore, 
competition was fierce—many young professionals in Shanghai like me had been 
driven from Europe by the collapse in employment opportunities there following the 
GFC. It was very common for foreign companies to entice young compatriot 
professionals with Chinese language skills into an internship or other precarious 
contract in the Shanghai job market, dangling the prospect of entry into lucrative 
careers. 
To a certain extent this dynamic was re-producing the geography of Europe’s own 
unemployment situation in Shanghai. Young professionals from the economically 
most disadvantaged European countries lacked the support of the scholarships and 
networks of their French, German or British colleagues, whose national governments 
were investing public funds in them in order to increase national cultural capital. 
Despite the emphasis on globalisation, the rise of transnational professionalism in a 
new global division of labour, and the subsequent emergence of Shanghai as a vibrant 
global city, I still found myself unhelpfully entrenched within the “provincial,” 
“parochial” mind-set of Italian companies abroad. In addition to this, following the 
financial crisis in Shanghai it wasn’t just young European unemployed professionals 
like myself looking for new career prospects in China, but also laid-off traders and 
brokers from the most powerful and prestigious US financial institutions such as Meryl 
Lynch and Lehmann Brothers. Even for these, the Shanghai financial market didn’t 
live up to its publicity as a new “promised land,” and they could not hope to match the 
salaries that they were previously used to in the USA.  
In this thesis I argue that through the process of financialisation China is constructing 
a new mode or form of capitalism (Keith et al. 2014). I argue that the state is the 
primary mobiliser of a new Chinese economic life leading to financialisation. By the 
term “financialisation,” I refer to a shift in the economy which has seen an increase in 
the influence of financial intermediation—performed in China mainly by the state 
through its policies and its agencies—together with a rising tide of financial 
calculations and assumptions spilling into everyday life. My observations do not 
consist of a macro-economic or structural inquiry into Chinese market specificity in 
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order to argue for an exceptional economic model. Instead, in order to grapple with 
some of the distinctive features of Chinese financialisation, I look from an alternative 
angle, one which focuses on a particular subjectivity: that of the haigui (a Chinese term 
meaning “student returnees”) from Australia. The haigui in my study are Chinese 
students who have gone to study in Australia in order to acquire a measure of financial 
expertise and, at the encouragement of the Chinese state, have then returned to 
Shanghai to advance a career in the Chinese financial market. Through the empirical 
investigations outlined in this study, I will show how these returned aspiring financial 
experts are frequently unable to step into their preferred roles as consultants and 
advisors. Faced with this disappointment, more than half of my interviewees tend to 
cast off their “expert guise” and resort instead to autonomous, self-managed 
investment practices in the stock market.1 I show that once they enter into the Chinese 
“stock market arena” (Hertz 1998), the haigui join the low-end, non-expert actors in 
Chinese mass financialisation known as the sanhu (“scattered players”).2 The sanhu 
consist of a heterogeneous group of investors—mostly lay investors and financial self-
learners—who resort to the stock market as a way to make “extra money” in the face 
of their precarious social and labour conditions. The investment strategies of the haigui 
then acquire the characteristics of informal expertise and contingent practices 
associated with the sanhu. 
I suggest that an approach to Chinese financialisation, which takes as a premise the 
subjectivities generated by it, provides a critical method for the study of the 
particularities (specificity) of financialisation in China.  This unique financialisation, 
I argue, provides a lens to grasp the heterogeneous and polychromic form of 
contemporary capitalism. Capitalism is rooted in its universal foundations and 
commonalities (Chibber 2013; Streeck 2010)—i.e. the role of capital accumulation, 
the constant tendency to profit growth, as well as capital’s tendency to “subsume 
traditional relations of social exchange under the money economy, and its subsequent 
critical instability, and continuous change” (Streeck 2012, 5). Yet, the emerging 
                                                 
 
1 23 haigui were interviewed for this research and 11 of them were investing or had done so at least 
once.  
2 My investigation of sanhu took place in brokerage rooms in both Shanghai and Shenzhen where I 
engaged in participant observation and I have interviewed 9 investors.  
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integration of territories and social orders under the over extending frontier of capital 
has not translated into a homogenous order but in a deeply fragmented, discontinuous 
and heterogeneous one. The way capitalism is constantly mutating and renovating its 
cartography seems to displace most attempts to categorise this transformation by 
definite patters. The contemporary capitalist order has both surpassed the world system 
theory—according to which capitalism transformed hierarchically on centre-periphery 
model (Amin 1976, 1977; Wallerstein 1974, 1979; Frank 1967) and exceeded meta-
narratives that attempt to portray capitalism through singular spatial, sectoral, and 
institutional diversity within and across national models (Schmidt 2000, 2009; Peck 
and Theodore 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Wolfgang Streeck, drawing from Karl Polanyi points out that “If the economy is an 
‘instituted process’ (Polanyi [1957]1992), it follows that capitalism, being a specific 
kind of economy, must be based in an institutionalised social order by and into which 
it is formed and organised. Social orders, however, “differ in space and change over 
time” (Streeck 2010, 5). Streeck reminds us that “private property, free markets, wage 
labour, joint stock companies, and modern finance emerged in or spread to different 
historical contexts and local traditions, institutions and power structures that could not 
but imprint themselves on the ways in which capitalism became ‘instituted’ in different 
societies” (5). Such an account successfully supplies evidence of capitalism’s 
historical and geographical diversity, yet when exploring the Chinese case—
characterised by deep internal regional and local heterogeneity, the overlapping of 
multiple labour and production regimes (Rocca 2007), and strong interrelations with 
other forms of capitalism—the search for “an ‘essential’ form of institutional-cum-
macroeconomic coherence” seems futile (Peck and Zhang 2013, 387).  
Thus, I seek to conceive the Chinese capitalist configuration in a way that goes beyond 
simplistic taxonomies and accounts for the multiple forces and agents that characterise 
the Chinese capitalist galaxy. I recognise the strong role of state institutions and state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), the legacy of the Maoist era, and the role of state 
sovereignty as the leading force behind profound institutional economic and social 
transformations that unfolded from the time of the economic and opening reforms. 
These factors provide a basis for the subsequent rise and entrance of financial capital 
in colonising everyday life. I suggest that the Chinese variation of capitalism can be 
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understood, as suggested by Streeck, as an e pluribus unum (2010), one among the 
various different capitalisms which “became and remain different”, in spite of the 
cross-national commonalities. This specificity is ultimately denoted by a contre-jour 
presence of the state, which as a dark shadow—scarcely visible against the gleaming 
backdrop of its calls to enrichment, harmony and dreams— propels its population 
along prearranged trajectories, without flaunting its power.  
I advance the thesis that Chinese financialisation has been directly mobilised by the 
state as a governmental device. I also contend that Chinese mass financialisation has 
been a state project directed primarily at financialising human capital (via higher 
education including study abroad) and encouraging financial acquisition via stock 
market trading as a reaction to an increasingly contractualised labour market and 
vanishing welfare state. Arguing for such distinctiveness, however, does not mean 
rehashing the mainstream view that posits China as an exceptional model in which the 
state exerts a strong visible hand in the economy. Indeed, mass financialisation in the 
West also involves an on-going role for the state in financial regulatory systems 
(Dardot and Laval 2014; Mirowski 2013), the active role of the state in the 
restructuring of the welfare state toward a reliance on global financial markets (Dixon 
2014), and the simultaneous use of financial innovation, market-based practices and 
technologies to pursue statecraft objectives (Lagna 2015). Yet, as I will explain in the 
course of the thesis, in the Chinese case these processes cannot be explained as a 
gradual withdrawal of the state from its traditional function or as a response to 
declining productivity, such as that which characterised the transition from the Fordist 
era in most Western countries (Aglietta 1979, 2000; Boyer 2000), with a subsequent 
and gradual expansion of credit and people’s indebtedness (Lazzarato 2012; Graeber 
2011; Martin 2002). Even more than elsewhere, financialisation in China cannot be 
cynically dismissed as “a convenient word for a bundle of more or less discrete 
structural changes in the economies of the industrialised world” (Dore 2008, 1097). 
Yet, everywhere, financialisation as a device and product of global capital’s operations 
works boundlessly, colonising everyday life. It enacts pervasively through actions that 
capture conduct, emotions, and orientations that subsume everyday life in a process of 
valorisation, in the form of biopower (Fumagalli 2007; Martin 2002; Langley 2008; 
Lazzarato 2012; Marazzi 2010). Under financialisation, individuals are encouraged to 
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internalise new norms of risk-taking and develop new subjectivities as investors or 
owners of financial assets. It is indeed paramount to recognise the biopolitical 
dimension of financialisation and the way “finance has become, in Foucauldian terms, 
a technique ‘governmentality’” (Van der Wende 2014,102). However, while seeking 
to map the power of financial capital, it is important to be cautious in analysis of 
financialisation that considers governmentality exclusively from a decentralised 
perspective and a diffuse form of power. Foucauldian studies on governmentality have 
investigated the political technologies that have been invented to make the social 
governable in particular ways (Atkin 2010). However, despite the fact that 
technologies of government may be enacted beyond the state, Foucault also argued 
that such technologies are produced and are co-extensive with the state’s search for 
legitimisation. As I will argue in this thesis, such caution is particularly valid when 
examining the Chinese state. 
As highlighted by Wang Yingyao, Chinese financialisation “presents an extreme statist 
case in which the state not only ‘directs’ but ‘owns’ the economy” (Wang Yingyao 
2015, 604). In China the omnipresence of the state in the economic sphere “poses 
challenges to the central presuppositions of the existing literature on financialisation” 
(604). Indeed, when considering the form of capitalism emerging in China, the debate 
remains open. For example, when seeking to situate China within the variations of 
capitalism, Jamie Peck and Ju Zhang (2013) point out the following: “the meaning of 
the Chinese ‘model’ often lies in the eye of the beholder: while Arrighi (2007) was 
able to determine post- or alt-capitalist possibilities in China, the Economist (2011) 
was until recently dismissive of claims that the country’s development might represent 
an ‘object lesson in state capitalism’, in favour of an affirmation of its own worldview, 
that China’s remarkable success [is attributable to] an odd and often unappreciated 
experiment in laissez-faire capitalism” (358). 
From such contrasting perspectives it is clear that the Chinese model cannot really fit 
any pre-determined analyses. I argue that in the complex assemblage of knowledge, 
power and practices that speaks of financialisation, China offers an additional context 
to observe how financial power is creating a new financial configuration within the 
heterogeneity of contemporary capitalism. In China the state has developed a specific 
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financial aim, which largely differs, for instance, from other Asian developmental or 
planner states, or European Union or Anglo-Saxon neoliberal states.  
Yet, while discussing the Chinese state in this thesis, I also want to step back from a 
unitary and rigid conceptualisation of “the state.” I share Julia Elyachar’s concerns 
with the challenges of “how to write about the state.” In her “Mappings of Power” 
(2003), she writes of the Egyptian state. Although the context of her work was 
different, she felt it necessary to specify that “when writing of ‘the state' some will 
surely find it unsatisfactory” and that “there is no doubt that the state is changing, and 
that our categories have benefited from deconstruction” (598). However, “rather than 
trying to definitively resolve ongoing debates about ‘the state,’” Elyachair suggests a 
different direction which calls for more research on the forms of power that are 
emerging at the interstices of the state, and other financial organisations, institutions, 
and—here I add—subjectivities. In particular, in this research I examine the specific 
configuration of Chinese financial capitalism by looking at the interplay between 
financial power and state sovereign power and at the subjectivities produced out of 
this relationship. 
By following the route of both the haigui and sanhu in acquiring the financial expertise 
necessary for participation in Chinese financialisation, I show how the role of state 
power—the way it is transforming under financialisation, its “tensions,” 
“fragmentation” and inherent contradictions—is both reflected in, and appears a 
constituent part of the production of these subjectivities. Crucial to the thesis advanced 
in my work is the development of an understanding of the way the state has been 
equipped with a new financial apparatus and expertise—and how this is marked by 
multiple tensions that shape its distinctiveness. Thus, before I enter into the core 
argument of this thesis, it is first necessary to provide an overview of the different 
components constituting what I call the shaping of a “Chinese ecology of financial 
expertise.” As I will explain below and elsewhere in this thesis, a Chinese financial 
ecology of expertise has emerged from the state’s embrace of financialisation as a 
means of self-management. As Wang Yingyao writes, financial means have gradually 
substituted fiscal means to manage the Chinese state’s ownership of assets, and public 
investments (Wang Yingyao 2015). In this configuration, the basis of the Chinese 
financial apparatus remains firmly within the authority of the state, and the Chinese 
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stock market—with sites in both Shanghai and Shenzhen—can be defined as the 
“fund-raising tool of the government” (Hsu 2016).  
The Chinese financial system is dominated by a large banking sector still mainly 
controlled by the four largest state-owned banks, the “Big Four,” all of which have 
become publicly listed and traded companies in recent years; the government is the 
largest shareholder and retains control of these institutions. 3  The China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), whose members are appointed by the State Council, 
the highest government body, regulates other banks. Furthermore, in contrast to 
Western economies where the stock market is typically smaller than the bond market, 
the Chinese stock market has a level of capitalisation that has achieved almost forty-
four per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).   
Owing to its high annual turnover rate and volatility, global commentators describe 
some components of the Chinese stock market as a “crazy casino” (The Economist 
2015). The way in which the stock market has been instituted and configured 
represents the distinctive way China has accommodated financial capital. Since its 
inception, the stock market has been organised into two different share classes (A and 
B shares), the former denominated in the local currency (the renminbi) and at the 
disposal of local investors (the sanhu); the latter denominated in foreign currency (US 
dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen). This division has 
strategically enabled the government to be in the position of creating a Chinese zona 
franca where foreign investors can participate, observing and exchanging information 
within the Chinese stock market, while at the same time the government preserves an 
exclusive Chinese space for Chinese investors only, in a new form of domestic 
deposits. The stock market is regulated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)—another institution that depends on, and is appointed by, the 
State Council. The role of the CSRC is to oversee China's nationwide centralised 
securities supervisory system, regulating the trading, issuing, and settlement of stocks, 
fixed income securities, and securities funds, and supervising the conduct of 
shareholders and securities brokers. Ultimately, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) also 
                                                 
 
3 These are the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China and the Agricultural Bank of China. 
9 
touches on financial regulation through its share holdings in the Central Huijin 
Company, the main class of state asset management companies that are also the state-
owned financial holding companies, enabling the state to perform as a main 
shareholder in the market (Wang Yingyao 2015). 4 
As suggested by Aihwa Ong (2015), taking the Chinese case as a major example, an 
ecology of expertise refers to a knowledge milieu in which the strategic deployment of 
financial funds and assets territorialise and code crisscrossing relations of convergence 
and competition to shape a financial state (55). In welcoming the logic of financial 
capital, I argue that a new Chinese ecology of financial expertise is created when the 
state looks to financial assets operations to sustain itself. Notably, this ecology 
suggests the making of a financial apparatus in which the expertise guiding decisions 
around financial costs and benefits follows an endogenous, centralised and centripetal 
rationale. However, I use the concept of a “financial ecology of expertise” to address 
more specifically the shaping of a Chinese financial state whose decision-making 
matures whilst fostering the rise of Chinese formal and informal financial experts. 
Throughout the thesis, I demonstrate how, in this financial ecology, the relationship 
between the state and the financial subjectivities it fosters is constantly intersected by 
unpredictable, contingent and ever-evolving financial capital flows.   
Through a genealogical inquiry, I illustrate how the contemporary role of the state in 
fostering foreign experts, while necessary for the state project of financialisation, is 
marked by both discontinuities and continuities with its modern past. I suggest that, 
while the policies the government adopts to acquire financial expertise and foster new 
experts for its agenda mark a continuity with the traditional role of the Chinese state 
since the first period of modernisation, under financialisation a discontinuity is 
apparent in the recognition of the same experts educated abroad. 
Under financial capitalism a new hierarchy of knowledge disrupts and complicates 
national state control over labour. I engage with theorists of cognitive capitalism to 
demonstrate how the haigui navigate a new regime of accumulation, where knowledge, 
                                                 
 
4 Huijin has grown its asset to nearly 23 times that of U.S.’s largest financial holding company—
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
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to be understood as human “know-how” (not only the technical but also cultural, 
linguistic, and relational skills), “becomes the basic source of value as well as the 
principal location of the process of valorisation” (Moulier-Boutang 2012, 57; see also 
Corsani et al. 1996, 2013; Morini 2007, 2010; Fumagalli 2007, 2011; Vercellone 
2007). In this knowledge regime, the relation of capital to labour is marked through 
“the hegemony of knowledge and by a diffused intellectuality” (Vercellone 2007, 16). 
I will show how, if financial education appears as a device for the filtering, selection 
and return of labouring subjects such as financial experts, it is also the case that the 
making of these experts escapes, exceeds and resists any enclosed form of learning 
functional to the state project. 
Through the notion of “circuit,” I provide an analytical framework for examining the 
social, economic and political forces that shape the haigui’s migration process in its 
different stages. This allows an investigation into the manner in which the Chinese 
state manages the dictates of global financial capitalism and the related transformation 
of education. State policies of migration and education, together with the dispositif of 
financialisation, are enacted at the departure points—spurring the students to invest in 
their (human) capital, and to add value to their knowledge by studying abroad, as a 
contribution to the country and their personal career. At the same time, students’ 
families are compelled to invest in them. This sort of investment promises alluring 
rewards to the returnees, for instance by being granted a hukou (a Chinese resident 
permit) for the city of Shanghai, the most globalised and financialised mainland 
Chinese city. 
However, the discontinuity of the role of the state becomes even more evident once 
the notion of the circuit of capital valorisation is applied to the haigui’s foreign 
expertise, becoming “value in motion” (Harvey 2013, 37). In the circuit, “forces 
independent of the magnitude of value affect the degree of effectiveness of capital, its 
expansion and its contraction” (Marx 1978, 124). From my analyses of the China-
Australia-Shanghai circuit, it emerges that the main independent force at work is the 
state. The role of the state, in deploying its polices of migration and education, is 
manifest at the departure, along the trajectory and at the terminus of the study abroad 
circuit.  
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However, the state emerges not only as a promoter but also as an obstructer of the 
circuit as it fails to welcome the haigui into its state controlled financial institutions. 
Marx (1978) explains that “circuits of capital proceed normally only as long as its 
various phases pass into each other without delay … [unless] unsaleable stocks of 
commodity obstruct the flow of circulation” (133). Due to the obstruction of the state 
at the point of return, the investment of the haigui abroad is derailed and can no longer 
flow smoothly or continuously through the circuit, but rather stacks at the borders, idle, 
as “unsaleable stocks of commodity” (see above). I argue that these subjectivities 
reveal the contradictions and tensions inherent in the Chinese state’s embrace of 
financial capitalism and its attempt to foster financial labour.  
Furthermore, when faced with this failure of welcome, the haigui discard their original 
ambition and commitment to work under state financial institutions, and instead adopt 
the practices of everyday investors, plunging in to the domestic stock market, and 
unifying with the multitude of scattered mass investors. The stock game, the dream of 
enrichment, becomes absorbing and substitutes for other alternatives. In particular, as 
the language of money supplants and obliterates other loyalties among the haigui, the 
state risks losing its control over the subjectivity of these rejected experts, who first 
become indifferent and alienated and then develop into potential political subjects. 
Chapter outlines  
Chapter 1 underlines that the present Chinese state’s attempt to make China one of the 
strongholds of contemporary capitalism suggests a [high] degree of continuity with the 
earliest years of China’s path to modernisation. I discuss how Chinese modernisation 
was shaped by the attempt of the government to foster foreign expertise while 
maintaining its grasp on the whole process of insertion. This attempt emerges as a 
constant paradigm. From the second half of the nineteenth century, the rationale that 
defined China’s early efforts at transition to modernisation sought to empower China 
while maintaining a regime of independence and forcefully protecting its autocracy. 
This approach can be best understood in the well-known slogan developed by one of 
the main intellectuals and reformers of the epoch, Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909): 
“Chinese culture/knowledge as a basis (ti) and foreign culture/knowledge as a tool 
(yong).” 
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I claim that, in similar ways, this dynamic can also be observed in the way the Chinese 
state has actively embraced and shaped the financial market, and in its use of foreign 
financial expertise. I investigate how the Chinese financial regime is shaped by the 
strenuous attempts of the state to enhance its global power within financial 
capitalism—seeking to acquire what is formally and universally considered financial 
expertise—while also using the financial market to exert a firm control over the 
population through a process of mass financialisation. Thus, I look at the state’s 
attempt to control formal and informal financial expertise, and focus on the cracks and 
fissures that emerge as a result of the irresolvable incompatibility of the two.  
Through my findings, chapters 2 and 3 stress the contradictory nature of state policies 
that seek to lure the haigui back to China. I show how, once back in China, the haigui 
become frustrated, as they are unable to valorise the expertise they acquired abroad. 
The returnees become the holders of an expertise, which is, at the same time is 
encouraged and marginalised. Within the Chinese financial ecology of expertise, the 
state prefers to promote locally graduated peers with appropriate state-led guanxi 
(connections of influence within the party-state, often disguised). So I ask—is the 
Chinese state taking a risk by smoothing the way for the financial expertise learned 
abroad, and dealing with the returnees as a new subject acting in the Shanghai 
financescape? Indeed, the growth of financial expertise is certainly unavoidable and 
no country willing to position itself within the global circuits of capital can advance 
without financial experts with an international background. However, in China, the 
unwanted side effects are quickly neutralised within the traditional approach of what 
is referred to as to the Zhang Zhidong basis/tool (ti/yong) distinction of 
“Chineseness/foreign expertise.” Here, the domestic logic of the guanxi or personal 
relationships system prevails and the expertise becomes ancillary in order that the 
existing structure of power remains unaltered.5 This approach is also reminiscent of 
the “red and expert” policy implemented in the first decades of the People’s Republic 
in which experts were acknowledged primarly for their political commitments, and 
only afterwards for their technical expertise. 
                                                 
 
5 In Chinese, a qiaomenzhuan is “a brick picked up to knock on the door and thrown away when it has 
served one's purpose,” i. e.  “a stepping-stone to success.” 
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To trace the Chinese state’s continuity within this tradition, chapter 2 in particular, 
explores Chinese policies of migration and education as analytical factors. These will 
enable an understanding of the distinctiveness of the Chinese state’s role in shaping a 
new financialisation of everyday life. I investigate the kinds of subjectivities the 
Chinese state is producing through the interplay of these factors. As an example of one 
of these subjectivities, Chinese returnees embody some of the state’s contradictory 
moves and therefore also demonstrate the impossibility of addressing the entire suite 
of measures taken by the state within a unitary logic. Once in the Shanghai financial 
market, the returnees find that their foreign acquired expertise is a risk for their 
appointment to the status of Chinese financial experts. This does not occur because 
their role as experts is contested in the regime of “risk societies” (Beck 1992, 2002, 
2006; Giddens 1994, 1999), but rather as a result of Chinese “anti-modernity 
modernity” (Wang 2008), that is, how “Chineseness” has resisted and contaminated 
global modernity and how “Chineseness” has worked to reshuffle global modernity. 
Within the Chinese financial market, what makes expertise risky is the instability and 
uncertainty arising from social economic and political alliances with the state and those 
who participate in the market game (Lash and Arnoldi 2012). In Chinese “anti-
modernity modernity” (Wang 2008) the state always selected and filtered foreign 
knowledge under its supervision and only then proclaimed itself as the main agent of 
the process of modernisation. 
Without doubt, Shanghai is the best place to grasp the distinctiveness of Chinese 
financialisation. Chapter 4 concerns Shanghai, which I describe as the cradle of what 
I will describe as Chinese “multiple modernities” and site of the biggest Chinese stock 
market. Shanghai is at the same time both the Chinese global city and the financial city 
par excellence and it is also the city attracting the highest number of haigui across the 
whole country. Through financial expertise learned in countries such as Australia, 
these haigui are seeking to become the ones who will be in charge of representing 
China in a “premiere” position in the global capitalist order. However, as I have 
already stated, after arriving in Shanghai, their expectations are flustered. Instead of 
having the opportunity of establishing their careers as crucial intermediaries of the 
state, working as representatives of its global financial ambitions, their jobs consist of 
technical and administrative tasks that keep them “at a distance” from their desired 
managerial and executive roles. Once in Shanghai, they are frustrated by the lack of 
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job opportunities and find themselves embedded in a process of mass financialisation 
where the expertise they have attained abroad doesn’t count. In the face of such an 
impasse, many haigui resort to the stock market to supplement their income and job 
precariousness. In this move their financial expertise merges with that of other 
actors—the so-called “scattered investors” or sanhu. These subjects are the holders of 
“informal expertise” who, living in precarious social and labour conditions, participate 
in Chinese financialisation as a substitute for a vanished welfare state.  
Chapter 5 stresses how the subjectivities of the sanhu reveal further characteristics of 
the distinctive features of the Chinese financial state. Following the launch of China's 
opening and reform policy in 1979, the stock market was set up by the state as a dual 
function device structured to deal with domestic and foreign shares separately. In this 
system, the state sets aside the domestic shares (A shares) for the common people, who 
are encouraged to invest in shares as a substitute for the shrinking welfare state. By 
inducing what I call “mass financialisation” the Chinese state sought to control its 
citizens by regulating their participation in the financial markets and by inducing in 
them to a stock “fever,” a craving for stocks (Hertz 1998). Since Deng Xiaoping’s 
opening reforms (gaige kaifang), a further distinct characteristic of Chinese 
financialisation was that the opening of the stock markets was conceived as a 
governmental project to seek state legitimation by encouraging people to invest, that 
is, as a “get rich” scheme. The state arranged for the opening of the stock market to 
ordinary people in order to guarantee a new source of economic order, as a substitution 
for the erosion of social and economic stability caused by a shrinking welfare state. 
However, through mass participation in market practices and their associated irrational 
market behaviours, the scattered players (sanhu) have proven to be a disturbance to 
the state control over shares. Through their unpredictable behaviour and significant 
numbers, the sanhu have become an untameable force and have acquired a potentially 
subversive power in the face of state efforts control the market. Furthermore, when the 
haigui merge with the heterogeneous multitude of the sanhu they assume some of the 
characteristics of these lay investors. Once the haigui realise that their own 
international expertise is not being valued, many react by adopting the practices of 
everyday investors, plunging into the domestic stock market, where the expertise they 
learned abroad does not necessarily apply. Instead of wanting to advance their work 
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career, seeking to be employed by one of the state financial institutions, they use the 
stock market as a new means of social and financial mobility. 
In chapter 6, the final chapter of the thesis, I argue that, in China, the stock market 
suggests the creation of a new redistributive model in which the category of financial 
labour is at stake. While the haigui seem constrained to reject their formal training as 
financial workers, the sanhu, through practices of self-learning and socialisation, 
respond to a new context in which the traditional concept of waged labour seems to 
evaporate. The Chinese financial market becomes a site in which to observe and trace 
the crisis of financially-skilled labour—as a form of productive labour in the classical 
wage relationship—within current global capitalism. As argued by the theorists of 
financial capitalism and financialisation the meaning of “financial labour” is becoming 
increasingly opaque. Not only have the categories of labour and life become 
increasingly blurred (Martin, Rafferty and Bryan 2008, Lazzarato 2012, Haiven 2014, 
Dasgupta 2013) as “communication … [and] the transmission of information [have] 
become both a raw material and instrument of work” (Marazzi 2008, 50), but also the 
very category of financial labour seems to have become “reduced to the status of data” 
(Rossiter 2015), re-managed and re-arranged according to the specific time-space 
coordinates, risk factor and system of codification of a given financial environment. 
For some of the haigui, investing in the stock market in their free time becomes almost 
the first strategy to gain extra money. In doing this, they begin to act like the informal 
experts and metamorphose with the mass of scattered investors known as the sanhu. I 
show how in this configuration, the inter-subjectivity between these two subjects, 
becomes a mirror: while the haigui are influenced by the sanhu’s enthusiasm for their 
informal investing activities’ potential to make “fast and easy money,” conversely the 
sanhu view the haigui as successful, international self-made subjects who, while 
investing like them, further legitimate their activity.  
This encounter equally reflects the subjection of the haigui and sanhu through the 
power of money—even if it occurs along a different path. Admittance to the social 
means of production, from which both appear deprived, is replaced with the hope of 
directly accessing money, which also carries a whole set of psychological, emotional, 
affective, and existential forces. Through their collective actions, the haigui and the 
sanhu have the capacity to shape market trends and to disturb the state control over 
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shares. The stock market becomes the site of an arm wrestle between the financialised 
state and these financialised subjects seeking to acquire financial profits. In particular 
I show and how this tension is exacerbated during moments of financial crisis (such as 
the one escalated in the summer of 2015).   
Ultimately, I highlight how this situation presents us with complex political subjects 
whose discontent makes them potentially unruly, but whose subjection to the money 
relation ensures their energies will continue to be directed through the financial market 
rather than into solidarities with other social subjects who could potentially yield a 
genuinely revolutionary class. Through its analysis of the tensions experienced by the 
aforementioned financial subjects, this thesis aims to provide an indication of the 
potential frictions in the Chinese entry into global capitalism. Such frictions may arise, 
firstly, in the discontinuity between global financial expertise acquired abroad and its 
local implementation; and, secondly, through the blurring of identities among the 
agents of contemporary capitalism caused by the disruption of financial capital and 
financial labour. 
Stubjectivity, genealogy, ethnography 
The first methodological question I had to ask when initiating this research was how 
to position myself as a foreign researcher, specifically from the West, while attempting 
to retain a “native point of view” over the stock market. Furthermore, how could I 
grasp the Chinese characteristics of the stock market and what are the terms I should 
use to describe a complex institution which, as put by Ellen Hertz, was created over 
four centuries of Western capitalism (1998, 5)? Keeping in mind Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
discourse on the matter of “translation” in the social sciences (2007), but being careful 
to avoid an essentialising singular “Chinese” way of doing research, I engaged in a 
modest process of translation, avoiding fixed categories from the Western stock 
market, and engaging with specific differences in what constituted the Shanghai 
financial institutions. My first attempt at listing the elements and the subjects 
participating in what Hertz calls the “stock market arena” (1998) evidenced a deeply 
entangled social body, crossed with multi-layered tensions and contradictions: 
modernity and tradition, global and local, west and the rest, knowledge and expertise, 
central/local (Shanghai as a global city and postcolonial site, in conflict with the central 
state in Beijing), formal and informal practices, public and private, and regulated and 
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unregulated norms that characterise the Shanghai stock market. A key challenge was 
therefore how to keep taking into account these multiple layers that constituted 
Chinese financial capitalism within my particular field of research. 
As I stated above, the subjectivities of the haigui and of the sanhu provide an excellent 
site to examine these tensions. Drawing from Foucault’s notion of subjectivity, I 
maintain there is an oscillation between two sides of the subject: subjection as well as 
self-constitution (Foucault 1982, 212). That is to say, the shaping of the subject—both 
governed by others and at the same time governor of him/herself—always inheres 
within itself the terrain of struggle. The observation of the subjectivities of this study 
within the Shanghai financial market which, following Aihwa Ong (2008), I define as 
a “high-tension zone,” allows me to capture a dysphasia in the political economic 
discourse within which the subjectivities are embedded and constituted, along with 
instances of their resistance against these same discourses. I consider the production 
of subjectivity the result of “endless processes of construction of identities that are to 
a greater or lesser extent, but never completely, constrained by the contingencies of 
the particular historical moment in which these are inscribed” (Ball and Olmedo 2012, 
87).  
I argue that the subjectivities of both the haigui and the sanhu not only embody the 
process of making and unmaking local Chinese modernity and a system of knowledge 
production that is represented in the dialectic between Chinese knowledge and foreign 
expertise; they also embody novel forms of control that characterise contemporary 
financialisation, particularly its calculative, risk-taking rationale. In order to take 
account of all these forces, this research has relied on a diversity of sources. I found it 
necessary to go beyond the traditional ethnographic framework which often confines 
the researcher to a position of observer interviewer, and risks reducing the object of 
study through a merely “empiricist” approach (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003). For 
instance, Susan Greenhalgh has expressed frustration when faced with the tendency of 
anthropologists to focus on the disciplining of the individual while “the other side of 
biopower,” which represents a range of historically specific techniques of discipline, 
security control and management and regulation of the population that arise with 
modern politics languish in “disciplinary obscurity” (2003, 210). These latter 
techniques, in fact, do not allow a socially- and locally-based participant observation.  
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I adopt what Foucault has defined a “genealogical method.” In his terms, this is an 
“anti-method” or “effective history” which debunks the assumption underlying 
conventional historiography that there are “facts” to be interpreted, and which rather 
claims that facts are themselves constructed out of the researcher’s “will to truth” 
(Sembou 2015 quoting Foucault 1982, 79). For Foucault, a genealogy allows us to dig 
into past relationships of knowledge and power, to abandon the presumption of looking 
for “a truth” and transcending any “a priori” assumption about reality, whatever these 
are: sovereignty, the state, the market or subjects.6 These latter in particular are what 
Foucault (1977) refers to as being constituted through discourses.  
In this thesis, a genealogical approach allows an inquiry into how Chinese 
financialisation took shape while “conditioned by certain forms of power and certain 
forms of knowledge and temporalised interactions between these powers and 
knowledge” (Koopman 2008). My account of the past will not consist of an informed 
and singular conception of temporality (discontinuity), but will develop a historical 
documentation through which an array of select memories from the past and multiple 
temporalities account for both continuities and discontinuities. Mainly in the first two 
chapters, but also through the frequent historical recalling in the rest of the thesis, I 
have engaged in this genealogical exercise through archival research and consultation 
of secondary sources. This provides a background to recognising how the institution 
of the Shanghai financial market, as well as the subjects who act in it—in this case the 
haigui and the sanhu—take shape alongside the repeated patterning of the dialectic 
between Chinese knowledge and foreign expertise. Beginning with the second chapter, 
I inquire into my main subjects, the Chinese returnees who have graduated from 
Australian universities and are now seeking a career in the Shanghai financial market. 
I do this through a process of interviewing, participant observation and informal 
                                                 
 
6 For Foucault, rationality and truth are elements with their own history, and not constant and universal 
values. As a tribute to Nietzsche, in his later life, Foucault abandoned a structural and holistic vision of 
history that was proper to Marxists and Hegelian philosophers. He believed that every aspect of our 
experience has a history: even the things we consider as solid and outside of time are crossings from a 
historicity that is neither linear nor progressive. The subject, the truth or rationality are not universal 
values that allow us to assess, from the outside, the progress of history, but elements that change over 
time, different in each subsequent configuration. The task of Foucault's genealogy is therefore to write 
a “genesis” capable of describing the almost sudden emergence of some phenomena which, like 
madness, is not constant or always accompanying human nature, but historic features and quotas, which 
can just as well dissolve as suddenly as they appeared (Cremonesi 2008, translation mine). 
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conversation, mostly conducted on occasions such as the series of networking events 
organised by the Australia China Alumni Association (ACAA) in Shanghai. 
My status as an Australian PhD candidate was extremely useful for my research. I was 
able to become a member of the ACAA and access its network, participate in its social 
events, and become part of a community in which the returnees and I were almost like 
peers. All of us had lived in Australia as international students, and so shared a 
common experience: how it was a great opportunity, but also how expensive living 
costs were, the difficulties in finding accommodation, the strict visa regulations, and 
so on. This worked to create a bond, enabling me to become friends with some of the 
haigui and share with them some of my experiences in Shanghai, a place where none 
of us were native.  
Furthermore and interestingly, in the eyes of haigui, my status as an Italian was 
considered closer, more familiar to them than if I had been an Australian. As I have 
been told several times, “both of our cultures are old” in opposition to the view held 
of Australia, which was considered a “young” country. The networking events were 
also great occasions to engage in informal conversations with haigui and to arrange 
further meetings for interviews, usually in restaurants and cafes close to their offices. 
In this sense, interviewing outside work places was also a precautionary measure to 
allow my interviewees to feel more comfortable to speak on issues, which would 
otherwise put them under pressure in the workplace, such as their relations with their 
superiors and colleagues (McDowell 1998). My interactions with subjects align with 
the observations of Kamala Visweswaran (1994, 51), who argues that researchers need 
to “begin to shape a notion of agency that, while it privileges speaking, is not reducible 
to it”, and to consider that “resistance can be framed in silence, a refusal to speak.” For 
Visweswaran, exploring and advocating for a feminist methodology, silence is often 
used interchangeably with “omission.” In the context of discussions of personal career 
aspirations, financial practices and Chinese government policies, subjects will 
inevitably hesitate to offer full disclosure. It is incumbent on the interviewer to take 
into account patterns of omissions and silences from an interviewee. 
Yet, while my interviewee sample was composed of an almost an equal number of 
females and males (11 female and 12 males), I found the male subjects generally more 
reserved and aloof, with more incidents showing signs of impatience during our 
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conversations. In particular I noted that this tended to occur as soon as they were made 
aware that I was a student of cultural studies and therefore not useful to their 
networking ambitions. In this sense, these male returnees matched the description 
made by other scholars engaged with the ethnography of finance who have pointed out 
how elite subjects, such as financial bankers or brokers, are often too busy to dedicate 
time to the interviewer if they don’t perceive any form of personal advantage 
(McDowell 1998, Zaloom 2006 et al.). By contrast, most of the female interviewees 
were more enthused to participate in a conversation and get to know me as a potential 
new friend in Shanghai. With the exception of chapter 1, accounts of interviewees and 
conversations with haigui are featured in every chapter of the thesis. Names of haigui 
have been changed. 
Access and observation of the brokerage rooms and interviews with sanhu (featured 
in chapter 5in particular) were made possible thanks to the support of Chinese friends 
and institutions. In particular, Professor Xiao Ming from the Shanghai University 
helped me to get in touch with the managers of several securities companies, while the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) provided me with a desk and resources 
for research. Furthermore, my friend Xu Daoheng assisted me with some of the 
interviews with sanhu in the brokerage rooms. His presence was particularly useful in 
making investors feel comfortable, and also aided in better codifying and 
understanding slang expressions that, without adequate explanation, would have 
remained incomprehensible to me. After my first interviewing experiences on my own, 
I found that many investors were suspicious of my role in a space that was already 
charged with an acute sensitivity, as feelings of anger and frustration over the loss of 
money were often arising.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I also use techniques of discourse analysis to explore what in 
Chinese is defined as “financial literature”: a range of “how to manuals” instructing 
on how to invest in the stock market, together with a number of blogs and microblogs 
that are typically written by non-professionals and used by the sanhu to build their 
informal financial expertise. Discourse analysis offers a way to identify the particular 
kind of language (general discourse) involved in the formation process of making 
informal financial expertise. This literature served me well, especially in exploring the 
world that dominates Chinese finance and what I have referred to as the 
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“financialisation of everyday life,” leading to the creation of the “stock fever” 
phenomenon, in which, soon after their arrival in Shanghai, the haigui participate. The 
existence of the sanhu as counterpart to the haigui reveals the multifarious levels of 
tension present between formal and informal expertise, and between expertise and 
institutions. Although the haigui do not consider the expertise and knowledge coming 
from these manuals and media discourses as valuable in the same sense as the sanhu, 
it remains clear that they were certainly influenced by them and were interested in 
drawing from them to test out some informal practices in order to compare them with 
their own expertise.  
Developing a method to understand the precarious equilibrium and the contingency of 
the stock market has required a degree of flexibility in order to take into account 
unexpected factors such as the Chinese financial crisis in 2015. Thus, this research has 
avoided a false urgency in simplifying the complexity within both the fields of the 
economy and social science, a process of abstraction that, as demonstrated by Mitchell 
(2002), would have led to a general misinterpretation. The approach I developed in the 
course of my research works against the tendency to attribute infallibility to any pre-
determined methodology and expertise. Instead, it privileges an analysis of what kinds 
of subjects and subjectivities are produced through the transformation of global 
financial capitalism, and how these subjects simultaneously evade, rework, and 




Governing modern Chinese experts 
Introduction 
Across the world, financial experts have been depicted as the architects of the global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, their expertise, which is linked to market-based 
performance, has been called upon as part of the rescue option (Martin 2015). In the 
post-crisis “recovery” period, a financial rationale, based on “austerity” has been sold 
as the only economic strategy and long-term solution for a stable social order. Societies 
and “everyday people” have been financialised: calculative financial logic has 
penetrated every level of society, and behaviours purely motivated by economic 
calculations have come to dominate. As witnessed in Greece, a new financial 
rationale—in the form of the technocratic governance of the European Community 
(EC), European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) troika—
has undermined and partially eclipsed the liberal democratic representativeness of 
Western states.7 In this configuration, an analysis of financial expertise has been an 
important element in discussion of the extent to which some of the fundamentals of 
the democratic state have changed in the West.  
In this thesis I argue that an analysis of financial expertise, embodied in the subjectivity 
of the financial expert, provides a strategic point of entry for a critical engagement 
with Chinese financialisation. Since the summer of 2015 China has experienced one 
of the most severe financial crises since the adoption of a “socialist market economy” 
in 1978. Yet globally circulating narratives have failed to look beyond a Western-
centric view of capitalism when critiquing the Chinese one-party system, its lack of a 
free market, and its lack of a neutral financial supervisory authority. These discourses 
do not account for the specificity and tensions which arise from Chinese 
financialisation, which, as I will argue, emerges instead from strong state intervention 
                                                 
 
7 “Financial capital is the bitter enemy of democracy” (Varoufakis 2016). 
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in both the economy and society and embodies a distinctive model within the 
heterogeneous configuration of capitalism.  
In this chapter, I trace a Chinese genealogy of expertise as a means of gauging a 
Chinese capitalist paradigm. This developed along a different path from the Western 
capitalist paradigm (described as an “industrious revolution” instead of an “industrial 
revolution”) and diverges from the principles and rhetoric of Western laissez-faire, 
free market performance according to which the epistemic autonomy of financial 
discipline had to be detached from the political sphere. This genealogy highlights the 
most recent iteration of Chinese financial experts through a focus on Chinese students 
returning home after studying finance abroad. In particular I will show how the 
production of their subjectivity can be best explored along a spectrum of continuities 
and discontinuities with the production of the “expert” throughout the Chinese process 
of modernisation. Although the Chinese state has always fostered the training of 
experts abroad as a means of advancing its political project throughout the period of 
modernisation, in recent times—since the Chinese embrace of contemporary global 
capitalism—this state practice has started showing serious cracks and fissures. 
By employing a genealogical method to explore the role of China’s financial experts I 
am able to highlight three main characteristics. Firstly, Chinese expertise was not 
shaped by purely Chinese domestic dynamics, but resulted from the dialectical 
relationship between Chinese knowledge (Chinese universality, “Chineseness”) and 
foreign expertise. In the quest for a local variety of modernity, expertise imported from 
abroad (scientific and technical methods originating in the industrial revolution) had 
to be accommodated to the domestic configuration in order to preserve the 
predominance of “Chineseness.” During the first period of Chinese modernisation 
(1861-1895), the relationship of these two categories was clearly fashioned by Zhang 
Zhidong (1837-1909, an eminent Chinese politician and entrepreneur) into a binary: ti 
(lit. “body,” i.e. Chineseness) and yong (“tool,” i.e. foreign expertise), with the “body” 
as the foundation and the “tool” taking an ancillary role at the service of the foundation. 
However, as soon as the modernisation process began to spread, the border between 
the two categories—knowledge (Chinese universality, “Chineseness”) and expertise 
(foreign, practical competences)—shifted and was increasingly contested.  
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Secondly, modern Chinese experts have always been implicated in the framework of 
Chinese political structures. In this sense, I demonstrate how their role can help in 
linking characteristics of contemporary complexities and conflicts with those that 
arose at the time Chinese knowledge first encountered foreign expertise. Even after 
the reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping, the gradual process of “depoliticisation” of 
the party-state (Wang 2008) and China’s embrace of global capitalist forces, a 
continuity with the Chinese “body” remains. Experts must still be first committed to 
Chineseness and then to their actual expertise, a situation in line with the inheritance 
of the Maoist ideal of being “red and expert.” This is particularly evident in the way 
new education reforms have sought to associate the figure of the expert, particularly 
the economic expert, with the state’s political agenda. As a consequence, experts 
educated under the new reforms are compelled to allign with the dictates of a 
“neoliberal” rationality (characterised by internationalisation, competitiveness, 
entrepreneurship, and self-reliance), while at the same time they are urged to show a 
commitment to nationalism and patriotism (Hoffman 2010).  
Thirdly, the Chinese education reform, in an attempt to shape new everyday 
perceptions linked to patriotic commitment, has emphasised the aesthethic values that 
“re-fashion” Chineseness. These see a shift from an attachment to communist ethics 
(which are emptied of meaning through the process of depoliticisation) and are 
anchored in a new conceputalisation of Chinese capitalist power. In this thesis, 
aesthetics is understood—using Michel Foucault’s terminology—as a technology of 
power that is adopted (in this case) by the state to deploy Deng Xiaoping’s idea for a 
new Chinese homo oeconomicus with Chinese ideals of beauty. Aesthetics transcends 
educational apparatuses and extends to the whole population, through the spreading of 
a “Chinese dream,” a national call for a bright and beautiful future of wealth and 
opulence safeguarded by the state. Chineseness is conveyed by what I call an 
“aesthetics of technocracy”: an exaltation of the state’s technical and managerial 
power visible in urban development, architecture, finance, technology—all powerful 
symbols of global capitalism. This aesthetics of technocracy is employed by the state 
to gain social legitimation from people from multiple classes, different geographical 
areas (rural, urban), and different labour regimes (rural, industrial, post-industrial), 
who are all encouraged to participate in, at least symbolically, an imposed 
modernisation. As a governmental device, the aesthetics of technocracy “dazzles” the 
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Chinese population. This applies to the very behaviours and ways of living of 
individuals who are encouraged to stress their uniqueness, creativeness, and private 
resourcefulness. The “beauty” of a crowd of efficient, smart and self-managing 
subjects, positioned in a neat environment of shiny steel and glass surfaces, is an image 
which celebrates opulence and enrichment to the point of producing “stock fever”—a 
craving for stocks that has lured the Chinese population and shaped the rise of 
everyday Chinese investors. 
The shaping of Chinese expertise 
An understanding of Chinese expertise initially relies on comprehending how such 
expertise is interwoven with uneven and hierarchical relationships that define 
knowledge production in the world at large (Said 1994). Indeed, “knowledge 
production is one of the major sites in which imperialism operates and exercises its 
power” (Chen 2010, 211) and in such a configuration the category of the West has a 
great responsibility. As suggested by Kuan Hsing Chen, the West “has been able to 
enter and generate real impacts in other geographical spaces without experiencing the 
same type of intensity of impacts from outside … Western-centrism has constituted a 
solid structure of desire and knowledge, a structure that is indeed difficult to shake 
loose” (222). Yet Chen warns that while recognising that the West has entered the 
history of Asia, and China, and actually become a part of it, this has not led to a 
totalising project. “Rather than continuing to fear reproducing the West as the Other, 
and hence avoiding the question altogether, an alternative strategy posits the West as 
bits and fragments that intervene in local social formations in a systematic, but never 
totalising, way. The local formation of modernity carries important elements of the 
West, but is not fully enveloped by it. Once recognising the West as fragments internal 
to the local, we no longer consider it as an opposing entity but rather as one cultural 
resource among many others” (223). 
Therefore, in proceeding with an exploration of the local formation of Chinese 
expertise, this work will consider Western as well as foreign influences (by that means 
accounting for the role of Japan in shaping Chinese modernisation), but will not credit 
such influences with a totalising universalist value. Rather, such foreign influences 
emerge as just one contribution among many in China’s historical formation. I will 
therefore describe the shaping of Chinese expertise as being the result of a negotiation 
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between Chinese knowledge and foreign expertise. Before outlining the Chinese 
genealogy of expertise, a brief explanation of expertise as it is conceptualised in the 
West will contribute to an understanding of what Chen defines as Western/foreign 
“fragments” and how they have contributed to the production of expertise in China. 
In the West the notion of expertise is commonly related to, and yet different from, 
“knowledge” in its more holistic and tacit form (Polanyi 1966). Expertise emerges 
from a specific knowledge that only develops after theoretical knowledge has been 
experienced or put into practice in a particular situation (Polanyi 1966). Such 
knowledge can also be acquired through a process of certification and institutional 
legitimation. An expert is considered to be someone who has—and is recognised as 
having—a particular ability, skill or technique, based on study, research, training and 
also experience in a particular field (Collins and Evans 2008). With the emergence of 
social, political, and environmental crises, experts have come to be regularly present 
within governmental teams; they figure prominently as the promoters of particular 
measures and policies. 
At the commencement of the nineteenth century, nation building and economic 
construction started to transcend the agency of the “state and its government.” Such 
development involved the assemblage of many actions, devices, and fields, and their 
production of governing techniques to manage the population while enabling 
individuals—including experts—to dominate and establish their power through social 
institutions, discourses, and practices. In particular, economic calculability and 
rationality became a resource which the state constantly drew on in order to undertake 
and experiment with new directions of governance. The figure of the expert emerged 
when expertise became embedded within new technocratic apparatuses that had to 
order, measure, manage, control and calculate resources and populations. In this sense 
the expert emerged at the moment when modern governance started operating and 
deploying fields of knowledge to the ends of power. As suggested by Timothy 
Mitchell, drawing from Simmel, it was within the project of modernisation, that 
expertise assumed a special “character of calculability” (Mitchell 2000).  
A century later, the expert was still celebrated as a key figure for the legitimation of 
projects of modernity. Aalthough experts had started to be partially credited with the 
planning and design of the fatal weaponry of World Wars and with failing to foresee 
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the financial crisis of 1929, the faith in and the authority of expertise was still 
recognised. As stated by Philip Mirowski (echoing Karl Polanyi), “[there is a need] to 
buttress the role of experts, render the theory of the economy available to the 
populace….and have individuals subjectively acknowledge their allegiance to a 
system which they can see the point of, even if they don’t fully understand where it is 
headed” (Mirowski 2004, 83). 
In contemporary societies, however, the former high opinion of experts on the part of 
the general populace is eroding. A number of bench tests have jeopardised such faith. 
Current conditions have left individuals feeling precarious and vulnerable in the face 
of natural and economic catastrophes. For example, the humanitarian crisis of, an 
eathquake and/or economic breakdown, can lead to a distrust in calculable analyses 
because they were unable to prevent, control and protect individuals from such risks. 
As a consequence institutions, professional bodies, private and/or public agencies, and 
international organisations, originally credited with being the holders of specific 
expertise, gradually lost their authority as they became more and more untrustworthy. 
As explored in the works of Ulrich Beck (1992, 1994, 2002, 2006) and Anthony 
Giddens (1998, 1999), we are living in “risk society” at a time when subjects are 
increasingly sceptical about the role of experts. 
If, as Beck (2002) argues in the case of Europe, the state fails to maintain the role of 
citizens in decision-making at the same time as protecting them in terms of economic 
security, national culture, and political autonomy, I argue that a different perspective 
should be adopted in the case of China. In China, where the experts never enjoyed a 
status as high as their Western colleagues, the consequences of their professional 
failures did not affect the socio-political configuration in the same way. In China, 
expertise has been fashioned and still functions in a context where the state strongly 
promotes what Wang Hui (2008) calls an “anti-modernity modernity”—a term that 
describes how, Chinese knowledge was historically, characterised by a kind of 
intellectual, humanistic and holistic perspective that had constantly to negotiate and 
contest any particular foreign expertise. 
In Wang Hui’s terms, Chinese modernity is a cohesive universality, and involves the 
ambition to cling to tianli (“heavenly principles,” that is, Chinese universal principles). 
Such modernity confined Western culture (or gongli “common principles,” or axioms) 
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to a specialised expertise which was in opposition to Chinese holistic and general 
knowledge; it was viewed as an excess as against Chinese self-sufficiency (Russo and 
Pozzana 2011).8 There has thus been an endless attempt to draw a distinction between 
zhongxue “Chinese knowledge” and xixue “Western knowledge” (in Zhang Zhidong’s 
words), the latter merely considered a transient expertise and one that had to be 
dispensed with as soon as the temporary job it was being used for was achieved. This 
was in order to prevent Chinese culture from transitioning from tianli to gongli. This 
tension forms the basis of Chinese “anti-modernity-modernity.” The dialectic between 
Chinese knowledge and foreign expertise has over time resulted in multiple outcomes 
and has meant the Chinese definition of modernity is constantly changing. Knowledge 
categories, initially self-sufficient and entirely Chinese—such as tianxia (lit. 
“everything under the heaven”), a Chinese cultural concept that denotes the known 
world as being associated with political sovereignty, or tianming (lit. “mandate of 
heaven”), a theocratic legitimation of autocracy—have therefore had to negotiate with 
Western and modern categories. Such dialectic has triggered a struggle for authority. 
In the epoch of the first contact between China and the West (in the eighteenth century 
and first half of the nineteenth century), experts were not key figures, but played the 
ancillary role of consultants to merchants. As early as 1793 the first envoy to China of 
King George III, George McCartney, presented to the then Chinese emperor, 
Qianlong, a set of British state gifts (elaborate clocks, globes and porcelain). When he 
did so the Emperor replied to this effect: “Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in 
prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need 
to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce” 
(Robbins et al., 2011). 
In other words, Chinese interest in modern (Western) science and technology was 
minimal, as was the country’s interest in other foreign precepts such as liberty, 
nationalism, or freedom of commerce. In later times, as Chinese intelligentsia came to 
                                                 
 
8 Tianli (heavenly principles) can be related to Zhang Zhidong’s ti (“body, fundamentals”), and gongli 
(common principles) to Zhang Zhidong’s yong (“tools, practical devices”). Simply, Zhang Zhidong’s 
terms derive from the Buddhist and Neoconfucian tradition, Wang Hui’s tianli (heavenly principles) is 
a key word in the oldest native philosophical tradition, while gongli (common principles) was a 
neologism coined during the first period of modernisation (2008b). 
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prominence, scholars looked at what appeared to them as “the ugly face of the West” 
(imperialist expansion, social inequities of capitalism, social unrest) and advocated for 
a diverse form of modernity (Lin 2013). In the Chinese journey towards modernisation 
Western categories like economics, nation state, free-market capitalism, freedom, and 
universalistic science have had to be de-Eurocentralised and have come to be 
understood through a self-reflexive process which views Western principles through 
the lens of Chinese historical and philosophical specificities of modernity. 
Contemporary historians and scholars now advocate for the de-Eurocentrisation of a 
modern master narrative (Frank 1998, Pomeranz 2000, Arrighi 2007). As discussed by 
Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue (2002), such a de-Eurocentralised narrative is 
constructed using the history of China as well as the West (or any particular countries). 
“Chineseness,” they claim, is prominent; it is not just an “alternative” of the Western 
narrative. China has made a significant contribution to the world’s development into 
modernity and knowledge production. According to Kenneth Pomeranz, China’s 
history of economic development has progressed along a different path to European 
development but it has proven to be equally productive if not even more productive. 
He argues that: “The ‘skill-oriented production method’ used in East Asia was not 
inferior to the capital-oriented method of production used in Western Europe in 
generating economic growth, at least until the onset of the industrial revolution” 
(Pomeranz 2000 paraphrased by Wong 2013, 95).  
Similarly, Kaoru Sugihara, in his study of Japan’s development path in the eighteenth 
entury, argued that due to a scarcity of land, this was founded on labour-intensive 
technologies and labour-absorbing institutions and can be described as an “industrious 
revolution” (2003). Following this, Giovanni Arrighi highlights how China followed 
a similar path to Japan and how the Chinese state was the primary agent that 
successfully enabled the development of labour intensive technologies and maintain 
access to the land for the majority of peasants. Unlike the Western “industrial” path, 
the East Asian “industrious” path was characterised by a disposition to mobilise and 
advance human rather than non-human resources. For this reason, the Chinese model 
should be recognised as having generated a distributive process based on a labour-
intensive development that did not generate the need for territorial expansion to create 
new resources (as instead through accumulation by dispossession, whereby cheap 
labour force is generated from colonial domination). Arrighi has argued that China’s 
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growth strategy, until the mid-1990s, followed the East Asian path of accumulation 
without dispossession, “resulting therefore in only a partial proletarisation of the 
peasantry, in part the outcome of a dynamic agricultural sector” (Mohanthy 2012). 
Thus, one should remember that even if the industrial revolution overcame the 
industrious revolution, the Chinese state’s persistent capacity to negotiate the technical 
and social division of labour, advance the expansion of education, but also subordinate 
capitalist interests to the national interest, represents an important feature of the 
modern Chinese pattern of development. I argue that such a modern alternative path 
remains crucial to investigating the contemporary making of Chinese financialisation. 
 
Foreign formal and informal expertise for a new Chinese state 
For Zhang Zhidong—the author of the motto “Chinese culture as a basis, Western 
culture as a tool”—“Chinese culture” mimics a renzhi system, that is, a system of 
imperial paternalism in the hands of state officers, commonly called the “father-mother 
of the people” (fumuguan). Renzhi (lit. “government by men”) is a flexible government 
system which is able to respond to new contingencies and social/political 
configurations. This is possible because of the wisdom and common sense of the 
individual state officers. On the contrary, its opposite, fazhi (lit. “government by law”) 
(He 2001, 600-601), is a formal codified law which recalls the Western Rechtsstaat or 
Etat de droit (lit. State of Law). Although the latter has been accepted in China and 
considered by many reformers as an unavoidable step towards the formation of a 
modern Chinese state, it has never really supplanted renzhi.9 
 
The first encounters between Chinese knowledge and foreign expertise were framed 
within the practices of renzhi. Lin Zexu (1785-1850), an envoy of the imperial Court, 
attempted to ban the British trade in opium within the borders of the empire, 
maintaining his own outlook and understanding in the face of an unprecedented 
situation. In order to gather information about the British aggressors, Lin Zexu 
questioned Chinese sailors, Christian converts, and a few translators active in Canton, 
all people that were now-and-then sporadically in contact with the Western aggressors. 
                                                 
 
9 Even during the Cultural Revolution fazhi was identified as the main incubator of a new bourgeoisie 
and therefore repudiated. 
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At that time these people were considered the first (informal) experts. 10 Through these 
consultations Lin learned about British warships, weapons, military and navigational 
techniques, and how to prepare an adequate coastal defence. This expertise, though, 
remained largely unrefined, peripheral, and not further investigated. As a consequence 
it posed no challenge to the traditional, cultural and mental frame of the empire 
(Spence 2013). Besides a few unrefined interpreters, no other experts were called 
upon, even when Chinese officers dealt with the arrival of the British in Shanghai in 
1842. Officers fluent in Mandarin applied a set of measures to “control the Barbarians” 
(yiyi), an activity they had engaged in for centuries, and one they fulfilled with no 
special expertise (Chesneaux, et al.1977, 96). 
 
Once the powerful and superior British weaponry defeated the Chinese empire, 
however, a Chinese army was created to protect valuable assets. At this moment a new 
agent appeared, the mandarin-entrepreneur (resourceful high officers who later 
developed into state industry managers, like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang and Zhang 
Zhidong) and their agents (mainly British and German engineers hired from abroad). 
Accordingly, the imperial magistrate, a office with two thousand years of history 
behind it, was unexpectedly called to negotiate with Western industrialists. With the 
imposition of the rationale of capitalistic profit onto traditional ideology of “the 
direction of the century” (jingshi), that is, state administration (Guo and He 1999, 164), 
Chinese knowledge was deeply compromised. Western managerial expertise, 
constrained as it was by state officers, was subsumed smoothly into state political 
goals; its potential threat to state power was thus defused but this did not come without 
the contamination of the traditional forms of governance and a mutation of its actors. 
At this initial stage, the predominant expertise, formally represented by Western 
engineers in spite of its growing importance, ended with the establishment of hybrid 
industrialisation carried on by “officers” (guanban). This was the first stage of 
experimentation with a state form of capitalism, albeit primeval, and prefigured the 
time when the Chinese empire was eclipsed. 
                                                 
 
10 Under orders issued by Lin Zexu Yuan Dehui translated passages of Emerich de Vattel’s Le droit des 
gens (“The Law of Nations”). See Hung Eva Tsoi Hung & Judy Wakabayashi 2005. 
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Soon after this period the first challenge to Chinese knowledge occurred when Chinese 
modernist intellectuals blamed such knowledge as the main cause of Chinese 
backwardness. This criticism led to the fall of imperial absolutism and its replacement 
with a constitutional monarchy (1898) (Kwong 2000). The emergence of new 
institutions from the West and reformed Japanese Meiji, such as free newspapers, 
public opinion, parliament, trade unions, political parties, forced the state to embrace 
a new administrative apparatus, which was borrowed from abroad but tailored 
domestically. In this configuration, the acquisition of Western knowledge became 
central. In Wang Hui’s terms “from the controversy of Eastern and Western cultures” 
to “the debate on science and metaphysics,” the affirmation of the autonomy, special 
status, and internal values of culture was incorporated into a rationalised classification 
of knowledge (Wang 2008a). Among many other measures, a radical change in 
Chinese knowledge production was initiated when the new parliament approved a 
radical education reform (1905). This system abolished the mandatory use of an out-
dated classical Chinese (Hayohe 1984). A two-thousand years system of education, 
based on the memorisation of Confucian classics, vanished and Western science and 
technology and foreign languages took its place and an intellectual and productive 
milieu nurtured with foreign ideas took the place of the mandarins (Chinese officials 
of the empire). Of great importance was the need to produce subjects capable of 
mastering disciplines considered necessary for the state project of modernisation. 
Despite all these rapid developments a commitment to Chineseness was maintained; 
for example, the emperor was retained, even if seriously reduced in his prerogatives. 
In Zhang Zhidong’s terms, the competition between body (ti) and tool (yong) reached 
its acme when the second seriously undermined the first, but with the first still 
retaining the capacity to resist. Overall the foundation of the fundamentals of Chinese 
politics and philosophy was eroded. 
In what appeared to develop as a compromise, a foreign expertise emerged which was 
partially attributable to knowledge generated in the Far East; that is, Meiji Japan 
became the preferred site for the formation of Chinese experts. As a consequence some 
of the most outstanding intellectuals studied abroad: Luxun in Japan, for example, and 
Sun Yatsen in Honolulu (Chang 1980). Soon philosophical and political thought 
became preferential subjects, from Darwinism to parliamentarism. Binomial “mister 
science” (sayensi xiansheng) and “mister democracy” (demokelaxi xiansheng) became 
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the basis for a re-engineering of Chinese knowledge. The validity of Zhang Zhidong’s 
motto was problematised when the foreign “tool” exceeded its sphere and intruded into 
the hegemonic Chinese “body.” With the collapse of the Chinese empire (1911), 
“foreign things” became hegemonic and Chineseness deteriorated into a symbol of 
backwardness. In particular, during the May Fourth Movement (1919), professors and 
students put an end to the search for a peculiar Chinese modernity extracted from a 
negotiation between foreign things and Chineseness (Wang 2008b).11 The “closing up 
of the Confucius shop” deprived the country of valuable traditions. In the eyes of the 
local intelligentsia, the Chinese people were described as “disunited as a bowl of loose 
sand” (Sun 1943), or a “blank sheet of paper” (Mao 1966).12 For instance, Liang 
Qichao, one of the most important intellectuals and reformers of the late Qing dynasty, 
highlighted how China was inundated with a deluge of Western and Japanese 
modernised things from Jesus Christ to toothpaste, light bulbs to steamships (Rickett 
2015). He denigrated China’s traditional culture and its boasted centrality. At the same 
time Lu Xun, the leading figure of Chinese modern literature, defined traditional 
society as “a cannibalistic society” (see Lu 1960) and with his words robbed Chinese 
culture of any charm. In this vein an exposure to foreign things deprived of traditional 
identities harmed Chineseness to the point of it being difficult to reclaim traditional 
Chinese knowledge (Masi 1968). 
This changed, however, during World War One when members of the Chinese 
intelligentsia found themselves shocked by the horrors of the event and the cracks and 
fissures in “Western civilization” it represented. This resulted in a more problematised 
and detached view of Western knowledge. At this time native intellectuals 
reformulated ti/yong in new terms: revolution in Western terms, yong, and the Chinese 
way of revolution, ti. In other words, foreign things provided the tool (modernity 
through revolution) but what counted most was their Chinese domestic translation and 
accommodation. Consequently, Mao identified the main revolutionary agent in the 
                                                 
 
11 I refer here to a multitude of thinkers (Tan Sitong, Gong Zizhen, etc.), who conceived modernisation 
in spiritual and cultural terms, and not in terms of economic development and strength. In their 
reflections they sourced traditional Chinese values such as “non belligerency” and “community of 
property,” in order to heal the “evil of the Chinese souls”) See Zhou 2013.  
12 Through the label kongjiadian (“shop of Confucius school”), Lu Xun and other revolutionaries 
mocked the precepts put into circulation that had been preached by traditionalists.  
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peasantry (not in the urban working class) and converted the urban revolution into a 
rural uprising. In this way he channelled the Western revolution along an indigenous 
track. This re-indigenisation of the Chinese revolution relegated “foreign things” to a 
peripheral position. Despite a brief period during which the Soviet approach to 
modernity prevailed (1951-1958), the Chinese communist movement continued to 
reclaim its own formulas and ideologies, and proceeded to distance itself from the 
Russian experience as well as the European left (Wang 2009,4). In the first Maoist 
attempt to implement an alternative path to industrialisation (the Great Leap Forward, 
1958-60) and modernisation (that is, one positioned in the countryside within the 
abodes of the People’s Communes), one key factor prevailed and this was a refusal of 
traditional Soviet-style expertise in favour of a new kind of indigenous expert. Here, 
the relation between knowledge and expertise shifted again. The “red and expert” (you 
hong you zhuan) directive (Ishiyama 1998) aimed at fostering new subjects who were 
technically competent, politically motivated, committed to the revolution and 
repudiated the ideal of a personal career. Expertise remained a public good and did not 
fall into private property; in fact the very idea of a personal position was discouraged 
(for instance, books were not signed by the authors but by institutions).  
Soon after the death of Mao (1976), a wave of depoliticisation hit the party-state. This 
process originated from the failure of the Cultural Revolution to ensure the politics of 
the “mass line” and led the party to an increasing stratification and bureaucratisation.13 
The CCP lost its legitimacy as the “people’s representative”. Its aim of achieving a 
reputation as an alternative political organisation among the population and outside 
the state remained unrealised. The revolutionary subject ceased to have a political 
                                                 
 
13 The mass line was a polititical, organisational and revolutionary method developed and advocated 
by Mao Tse-tung during the Chinese Revolution and predicated on the notion of “from the masses, to 
the masses”. It proposed a reiterative method, aimed at advancing the interests of the masses towards a 
proletarian revolution. Each phase comprised a three step process: 1) gathering the diverse ideas of the 
masses; 2) processing or concentrating these ideas from the perspective of revolutionary Marxism, in 
light of the long-term, ultimate interests of the masses (which the masses themselves may sometimes 
only dimly perceive), and in light of a scientific analysis of the objective situation; and 3) returning 
these concentrated ideas to the masses in the form of a political line which will actually advance the 
mass struggle toward revolution. Because the mass line starts with the diverse ideas of the masses, and 
returns the concentrated ideas to the masses. 
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definition as an anti-capitalistic core group (the workers) able to absorb other strata of 
the population: “[Politics was transformed] in factional struggles, whose binarism 
eliminated the possibilities for autonomous social spheres, and transformed political 
debate into a means of power struggle” (Wang 2006a, 686).  
With Deng Xiaoping the party leadership “transformed itself” and emptied its ranks of 
proletarian elements. It reclaimed the developmentalist policies of the fifties, which 
were previously dismissed by Mao through the “revolutionary line of development.” 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) allowed elements of a market society to 
emerge. China shifted from being a leader of socialist revolution to becoming a 
thriving centre of capitalist activity, and a Third World anti-imperialist nation to being 
one of imperialism’s strategic partners. Because the marketisation reform was actively 
promoted by the state, “multiple aspects of the state power, in the name of 
modernisation and reform, collapsed into the economic sphere” (Wang 2006a, 694). 
The four modernisation principles Post-Mao (sige xiandaihua)—industry, agriculture, 
research and development, and the military (1978)—along with Deng Xiaoping’s 
concept of a well-off society (xiaokang shehui) (1979), started a new economic project 
to accommodate global capitalist accumulation. The Chinese state strategically started 
to foster a “new quality of population” renkou suzhi (a slogan that marked a social 
distinction and promoted the importance of urban citizens) to replace the old 
“committed,” “red and expert” man. The abandonment of the main revolutionary aim 
and alterations to the class base of the party led to a new governing rationale. Deng 
Xiaoping’s slogans, “let some people get rich first” and “to get rich is glorious,” 
encouraged people to enrich themselves but also incited a new biopolitical project of 
development. Renkou suzhi implied a mutation of the state’s interventions with 
different classes of the population. In this process, Chinese sovereign power became 
increasingly governmental, and involved the creation, fostering, and management of 
lives (see for instance Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). The launch of economic 
reform (jingji gaige) and the “opening up” of the country (duiwai kaifang) initiated 
questions about the government as a rational power defined by self-discipline and self-
entrepreneurship. 
Among others, David Harvey (2005) and Wang Hui (2003) describe this juncture as 
the form of a Chinese neoliberal turn. Aihwa Ong theorises Chinese neoliberalism in 
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the form of a technique of governance enabled by “graduated sovereignty,” meaning 
that, for instance, in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), populations are governed by 
techniques and laws different from those used in non-special economic zones and their 
expanded areas (Ong 2006a, Ong and Zhang 2008). In this line of argument, which 
stresses the centrality of the Chinese state, I propose how, from Deng’s reforms 
onwards, the new population management system represented a key feature of the 
Chinese regime’s strategy for capitalist development and global ambition. The Chinese 
state’s “visible hand” in carrying this reform represents a partial denial of what is 
erroneously considered, according to a mainstream narrative, an embrace of a 
neoliberal turn (arguing for a new competitive subject as a result of economic 
liberalism and a resurgence of laissez-faire economic doctrine). I argue that the 
Chinese nurturing of a new self stands not only as a case for the re-reading of the role 
of the state in global contemporary capitalism but also as a re-examination of 
neoliberal doctrine. In this chapter I therefore suggest that the Chinese case illustrates 
what authors such as Philip Mirowski and Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval have 
argued—that, even in the West, neoliberalism does not involve a withdrawal of the 
state but rather involves state action that enforces and naturalises market imperatives. 
In China, the rise of a neoliberal economy and of a neoliberal subject (by the 
privatisation of public services like welfare and education, the rise of financialisation, 
depoliticisation, and so forth) appears to be deprived of the camouflage offered by 
concepts such as free market, free trade, or deregulation. Given this background, I 
argue that the Chinese capitalist configuration (characterised by strong state 
involvement and persistent authoritarianism together with the dismantling of the 
collective units and the attributes of a socialist market economy) is distinctive and 
embodies a particular kind of neoliberal rationale within the heterogeneous 
configuration of capitalism. 
It is interesting to notice how, in the context of the opening reforms, some of the 
fundamentals that normally mark a “neoliberal turn” in an advanced society, acquire a 
different meaning in China. For example, privatisation generally implies individual 
decision-making and self-action, but in Chinese and in the Chinese context, 
“privatisation,” or siyouhua, as well as “liberalisation,” or ziyouhua, have substantially 
different meanings. Siyouhua is mainly linked to property, as in siyou caichan “private 
assets” and/or siyouzhi “private property,” while the concept of ziyou, which means 
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“freedom” (most likely because of the concurrence of a more appreciated counterpart: 
jiefang “liberation”), is constantly given a negative nuance in being linked to the idea 
of liberty as an arbitrary choice ziyou fanlan (“free hand”), egoism, indifference to 
others, and alien origin. These concepts mark egoistic, individualist assumptions that, 
as underlined by Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang, can act as “political dynamite” (Ong and 
Zhang 2008). In comparison “marketisation,” or shichanghua, is devoid of negative 
connotations. In China the market has never been the “bogeyman” of the state. 
In this context a new subjectivity emerges from “the interplay between the power of 
the Chinese state and the power of [a new neoliberal] self” (Ong and Zhang 2008, 3). 
In addition to the efforts of the state to compete on a global scale through capital 
investment—of which a significant part is directed at fostering human capital through 
higher education and training opportunities—there is also an emphasis on boosting 
new talents through a call for self-discipline and self-choices. Gradually the Chinese 
population was charged to shift from being “passive savers” to being actively engaged 
in risk-taking activities, thus adapting to a new financialisation process. Leaving aside 
the debate on the term “neoliberal order,” this thesis will additionally investigate how 
the reforms in education undertaken by the state in the last century have impacted the 
Chinese process of financialisation. 
Knowledge, economy, and education  
As a prelude to what I later define as a Chinese “financial turn,” I now analyse the 
latest trends in Chinese education. I argue that an analysis of the educational reforms 
will shows how a transformation of knowledge production acts as a device to foster 
and filter new Chinese subjects, in particular the new Chinese financial expert. As 
indicated in the genealogy outlined above, mapping knowledge transformations can 
be key to observing features of the Chinese state within global financial capitalism and 
the production of new subjects. In the discussion below I demonstrate how educational 
reforms again recall the dialectic of ti and yong, which consisted in the state’s partial 
adoption and partial rejection of some of the global dictates that have invested the 
internationalisation and homogenisation of universities in the face of globalising 
processes. 
In the last two decades new initiatives were implemented by the Chinese state in order 
to introduce a new education system which complied with the dictates imposed by the 
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World Trade Organisation (WTO) and were supported by other powerful institutions 
such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
the World Bank. These dictates are evident in one of the major documents published 
by the World Bank a few months before China’s entrance into the WTO. The 
document, China and the Knowledge Economy, Seizing the 21th Century, states how 
China should “build solid foundations for a knowledge-based economy by updating 
the economic and institutional regime, upgrading education and learning, and building 
information infrastructure … (needs to) raise the technological level of the economy 
by diffusing new technologies actively throughout the economy, improving the 
research and development system, and exploiting global knowledge” (Dahlman and 
Aubert 2001). 
Despite being a document about China, the term “knowledge economy” has until now 
been one rejected by the Chinese state. Although the Chinese government has actively 
worked to boost human capital, and its entrepreneurial and risk-taking abilities in order 
to engage in the information technology industry, the term rarely appeared in official 
Chinese documents. In fact the word “China” and term “knowledge economy” form 
two ends of a dualism that has been imposed on China by external stakeholders; the 
merging of the two elements has actually been identified as a challenge for the country. 
Although China openly received the World Bank document, it is worth noting that a 
search for the term “knowledge economy” (zhishi jingji) on the Chinese internet leads 
to very few results; in fact the term is almost absent and actually substituted with 
another term, “new economy” (xin jingji) (Baike 2014b). I thus suggest that the 
concept of knowledge economy when applied to China actually acts as what Derrida 
terms a “constitutive outside” (Derrida 1988). It avails international actors to include 
the Chinese economy in their “developmentalist” superiority and to acknowledge the 
“Chinese economy,” because the adoption of such a term means people will have had 
to to change their opinions of China as the factory of the world. 
 
The imposition of labels from outside sources emphasises the need to launch the 
country into a developed post-industrial, post-Fordist society, and to shape it in its 
advanced and cutting edge formation. It is important to note, however, that China has 
not gone through a gradual transition into the knowledge economy. On the contrary, 
in its contemporary capitalist order, its different labour regimes (manufacturing, 
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agriculture, industrial and post-industrial activities) still co-exist, as do its different 
ownership models (state-owned, public-private enterprises, private-foreign 
enterprises) (Rocca 2003). I also hypothesise that a reason the Chinese government 
does not openly refer to the knowledge economy is because it fears it will be perceived 
as a precocious measure. It would be disingenuous for the state to claim the country 
was in a knowledge-based stage when a large proportion of the population is still 
employed in industry and agriculture. Despite the Chinese government’s reluctance to 
use this label, its strategic investment in human capital has improved the situation of a 
particular sub-group of the population, namely, people in the urban middle class. As I 
will demonstrate in following chapters, particularly chapter 4, Shanghai, as China’s 
main global city and site of the research that has informed this study, has emerged as 
a pivotal example of the way the state has sought to foster and promote a new class of 
knowledge workers, in particular financial experts. One of the strategies the Chinese 
state adopted to encourage the emergence of new knowledge workers was to promote 
knowledge as a shortcut to the attainment of economic and social emancipation. As 
stated by Barry Naughton: “perhaps the most fundamental requirement of an aspiring, 
well-functioning market economy like the Chinese one is that an individual is able to 
feel secure that she/he will be able to reap the income created by her/his investment 
(in education), so long as that investment succeeds in creating new output and income” 
(Naughton 2007, 193). 
According to Naughton, the Chinese state’s investment in human capital—still 
depicted as one of the main factors leading to an increase in the productivity of China’s 
economy—is triggering a positive transformation of people’s subjectivities as it 
encourages individuals and households to invest a substantial part of their savings in 
education. Investments in higher education commenced in the mid-1990s and at that 
time benefited universities in upper class urban areas. This meant there was a shortage 
of education funding in the peripheral urban areas and rural areas which in turn 
contributed to a widening of the gap in the division of labour between urban knowledge 
workers and rural workers (Naughton 2007, 198). An examination of China’s current 
division of labour shows that there has been a rapid shift away from a socialist system 
where labour allocations were centralised and higher wages were given to those with 
more experience. During the Deng reforms an income-reward was introduced, and 
functioned according to market competition; it promoted skills and facilitated the 
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emergence of the new expertise of those educated according to what the current 
knowledge economy dictated. These changes started to create an increasing income 
disparity in society, advantaging people of the urban classes. Through this process the 
Chinese state undertook what can be called a process of “differential inclusion,” a 
hierarchical system of differentiation that included and excluded segments of the 
population from certain rights and privileges (for instance, better access to more 
advanced educational or health services in the cities). This is so even though the term 
“differential inclusion” was initially coined and employed to define a set of policies 
and techniques enabled by the nation state to filter and control the skilled/unskilled 
migrant labour force and its access to citizenship (De Genova 2012, Mezzadra and 
Neilson 2010, Andrijasevic 2009). I suggest that, in China, differential inclusion is 
implemented not through the crossing of international borders but by segmenting the 
population according to valuations made of individuals, groups, and communities such 
that some are determined to be more worthy and deserving due to their entrepreneurial 
capacities. This will be examined in chapter 3, where I will study how the system of 
hukou works for an intra-national bordering process. 
The existence of a hierarchy is evident when examining the Chinese ruling class and 
elite which have been able to take advantage of economic reform. A case in point is 
party members who, while their positions within public administration did not change, 
enjoyed a remarkable increase in their income, especially in urban contexts (Naughton 
2007). The Chinese ruling class has been able to invest largely in education for itself, 
upgrading its technocratic apparatus with new experts, economic specialists, and so 
on, following a princeling lineage. The pinnacle of this hierarchical and class-based 
divisional development was when, in the mid-1990s, the Chinese Ministry of 
Education selected particular universities that mimicked those abroad that were 
influenced by neoliberal governments (in particular, Thatcher’s and Reagan’s). These 
universities fostered an entrepreneurial approach to education to foster a new Chinese 
elite. Gradually, at a national level, business and management schools within the 
universities became the most popular in China and the typical curricula included 
accounting, finance, and business studies (Li, Matlay and Zhang 2003). The most 
significant change was not just the addition of new courses and subjects into the 
formally traditional curricula but a shift away from the acquisition of specific 
professional skills towards a broader aim to develop students’ general personal 
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qualities. This meant the focus was to improve people’s personal qualities in terms of 
their capacity to adapt, to communicate and engage in creativity, to take risks, and to 
demonstrate entrepreneurial behaviours (Li, Matlay and Zhang 2003, Warner 2009). 
In these ways China has moved towards internationalisation and a realignment with 
global dictates, something which has been made possible through the adoption of the 
mechanism of “differential inclusion” which restricts the development of knowledge 
workers to the urban middle class, and so confines self-managerial practices to a few 
segments of the population susceptible to, and better able to respond to, the appeal of 
a newly re-fashioned Chineseness.  
 
A new education 
The “new economy” of China is a representation of a country that has been able to 
respond to international wishes for it to align with a knowledge-based, 
internationalised, skilled labour regime. On the one hand, this has involved the 
fostering of new experts who have the necessary skills to operate in a new arena and 
to self-manage their activities. On the other hand, these experts have been able to 
demonstrate a commitment to Chineseness as a means of preserving a uniquely 
Chinese manifestation of a new knowledge economy. While the Chinese state manages 
the transition to a “new economy,” it has had to deal with a lot of uncertainty and 
caution. As already mentioned, initially China saw internationalisation as an excess, 
and as a necessary evil. Since the Chinese entrance into global capitalism, however, 
the need for the state to have competent operators available to interface with similarly 
competent personnel abroad is seen as not only an inescapable obligation but also a 
potential source of internal instability. Consequently, even if, according to the 
guidelines of the Educational Reform Plan, Chinese higher education indubitably “has 
to go global” (2010), it is also characterised by doubts and fears. Issued by the Ministry 
of Chinese Education, Chapter 16 of the Educational Reform Plan claims Chinese 
education must open up to the world: “Efforts should be made to attract more world-
class experts and scholars to teaching, research and managerial jobs in China, and 
invite high-level professionals and academic teams from overseas in a planned way. 
… More outstanding Chinese students shall be attracted to serve the nation after they 
have finished their studies in other countries and regions” (Outline of China’s National 
Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development 2010, 34). 
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In order to perform on such a scale, a range of devices need to come into play, from 
recruiting foreign teachers to sending Chinese students abroad and developing courses 
taught only in English (Wang Xiaoming 2015, 245). In this process Chinese education 
needs to instigate joint research programs with foreign institutions (especially those in 
the Anglophone area), encourage the writing of academic papers in English, and aim 
to achieve a good position in global rankings. In terms of writing publications in 
English, academics also need to increase their percentage of quotations in the ISI Web 
of Knowledge, which evaluates a country’s share of academic papers (China is actually 
second only to the USA in terms of the number of publications in English and the 
number of quotations in ISI; and its percentages in the latter are increasing).14 As stated 
by Wang Xiaoming: “two major factors combine to unwittingly make teaching in 
English—or Englicisation of campus activities—the foremost component of 
internationalisation: the government’s ignorance and misperception regarding the 
global education landscape and the root cause of the crisis of higher education, and the 
mechanism of bureaucracy that makes and promotes policies” (Wang Xiaoming 2015). 
The emphasis placed on English education by the Chinese state and its enthusiastic 
adoption by students, professors, and administrative staff (in replacement of an out-
dated attitude towards Russian and Soviet culture) confirms the perception that English 
is viewed as the language of globalisation. Since the education reforms, some 
researchers’ and professors’ salaries have depended on their performance in terms of 
the number of English publications they produce and their capacity to be 
entrepreneurial and externalise their expertise in industries outside the university. 
These academics are beholden to the global dictate “publish or perish” as well as to 
the imperative to take on consultancy roles and conduct industry interface (Do 2013). 
China thus seems to be aligning with the global transformation of higher education 
and thus “not … immune to the impact of economic globalisation >and is@ now on the 
brink of channelling some of the most dynamic, and therefore destabilising, tendencies 
                                                 
 
14 This condition is particularly true when examining the emphasis on and government investment in 
economic outputs for scientific disciplines. It suggests that the Chinese government is pursuing a 
technocratic path which views science and technology as a way to boost the country’s economic 
development.  
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of neoliberal marketisation” (Ross 2009, 189).  
 
Indeed there is a clear correlation between the transformation of universities and the 
transformation of labour: universities are increasingly following a “knowledge-based” 
market where knowledge is not only a new means of production but also a new term 
for labour exploitation. Students are constrained in a “market-based” educational 
frame, whereas their “educational investment” is also meant to provide a “self-training 
attitude” that should later become a constitutive element of their living labour. In fact 
China is now producing one the world’s largest pool of research and development 
workers and the number of graduates and doctorates in science, engineering, 
mathematics, information technology, and computer science is higher than in any other 
country (OBHE 2013). Universities are contributing to the production of an unusually 
large share of patents—although it must be emphasised that many of these are highly 
dubious (Kroll 2011)—and are receiving approximately half of their research and 
development (R&D) money from private enterprises. In this context, experts in these 
fields, mainly university professors, are increasingly orienting their activities towards 
profitable research topics in order to arrive at patents which produce income that can 
contribute both to the funding of their universities and their personal expenses. This is 
especially occurring in the fields of applied science such as IT, software production, 
audio-visual technology, chemistry, biomedicine, and engineering.  
 
As I will highlight later in this thesis, such “self-making” dictates foreground an on-
going transformation of China towards a more financialised sociey. In only a few years 
these new principles have become an intrinsic part of students’ and young aspirant 
knowledge workers’ imaginaries. This raises a question: should these new workers’ 
attitudes be anchored to local configurations? Indeed the global dictate of education as 
tool (yong) has been embraced to advance Chinese knowledge as a body (ti). Although 
new Chinese subjects educated under these reforms share in the neoliberal ideologies 
defined above (self-management, competition, risk-taking attitudes), they do not 
necessarily embrace neoliberalism’s political project in universal terms. In order to 
address, coordinate, and finance their education, the Education Ministry has developed 
a widespread network of agents. The Deans of universities are in fact appointed by the 
state rather than by the staff of universities and thus these Deans channel state policies. 
Furthermore, student associations, which encourage student participation and act as 
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sites where students gather including shalong “saloons” (web forums for discussion), 
are led by young CCP leaders. As I will argue in the following chapters, Chinese 
students are actually being indoctrinated into a Chinese-specific configuration of 
neoliberalism that responds specifically to China’s particular political and cultural 
needs. The shift in education towards the development of personal qualities also 
facilitates state control over people’s independence and autonomy. This includes the 
promulgation of ideas about self-management and an emphasis on not compromising 
one’s loyalty to the regime. In other words, beside the cultivation of operative 
capacities, the development of a personality committed to Chineseness is required. In 
the rest of this chapter I will show how the state is actually intervening by routing the 
new Chinese knowledge workers’ training towards rules of good behaviour, good 
attitudes, and rules of morality that conform to the existing political and economic 
frame and enable its reproduction. 
From aesthetics of education to aesthetics of technocracy 
In order to understand the conduct of people under the new educational system, in their 
efforts to foster new self-entrepreneurial and competitive subjects, committed to 
political and patriotic values, it is important to examine another key influencing factor, 
which is aesthetics. The National Guidelines for Medium- and Long-Term Educational 
Reform and Development 2010–2020 highlights the government’s effort to make use 
of education to create a new subject tuned in to state policies: “the fostering of young 
talents or professionals shall command a central position and no effort shall be spared 
to produce high-caliber professionals and top-notch innovators with steadfast faith, 
moral integrity, rich knowledge, and superb abilities. … We will foster the sense of 
all-round development and make an effort to bring forth high-caliber professionals that 
are well developed morally, intellectually, physically and in aesthetics” (The National 
Guidelines for Medium- and Long-Term Educational Reform and Development 2010–
2020, 2010, 11). 
 
In this effort, the plan says, “we will strengthen aesthetic education and foster students’ 
interest in appreciating beauty and cultivate their spirits of humanity” (25). Education 
therefore should improve students’ personal qualities through an all-round, holistic 
development program, which instils in them “high-caliber” skills and “superb” 
expertise that can be applied within a wide range of situations. Moral commitment and 
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aesthetics should stand out. Lisa Hoffman clearly associates moral commitment with 
its patriotic meaning. In Patriotic Professionalism in Urban China (2010), Hoffman 
describes how the Chinese higher education system is fostering individuals with 
professional and entrepreneurial commitment, but at the same time a morally justified 
patriotic faith towards China. In making this argument Hoffman recalls the Maoist 
terminology of “red and expert” (that is, the promotion of technical skills alongside 
communist ethics), and claims that such a model is still active and does not clash with 
recent developments but is actually suitable for accommodating the dictates of 
neoliberalism: “professional subjecthood, in other words, exhibits neoliberal elements, 
Maoist era ideals and expressions of patriotism, and periodic authoritarian measures—
a configuration and social formation that is not accounted for in many definitions of 
neoliberalism” (Hoffman 2006, 552).  
 
Aesthetics is one of the means through which the state conveys such moral 
commitment, but it is questionable why an education in aesthetics promotes moral 
commitment.15 A study of the history and genealogy of aesthetics, a concept firmly 
grounded in the Chinese intellectual landscape, shows it has been emphasised by an 
array of Chinese maîtres à penser (or mentors such as Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, 
Cai Yuanpei, and others) since the beginning of the twentieth century.16 All of these 
thinkers had hoped that the reclamation of local aesthetics would preserve the Chinese 
project of modernity against the slighting towards Chinese dignity in its confrontation 
with the West (Pohl 2009). When China was exposed to the influences of the West a 
new aesthetic education was initiated. This education involved a four-part manifesto 
which sought to merge traditional national elements, classical Chinese philosophies, 
Marxism, and Western theories.17 The aim was for a re-visitation of aesthetics that 
mimicked the Schillerian formulation of education with its philosophy of practical 
                                                 
 
15 A striking example is the simultaneous use and beauty of Chinese writing. 
16 These were classical scholars with various degrees of knowledge of the West and the Modern World. 
They were considered the first generation of Chinese Modern Intellectuals. 
17 This appears in a book entitled Modern Aesthetics System, published in the 1990s and edited by Ye 
Lang (1938-), a leading aesthetician at Beijing University. The book, written collectively by a group of 
young aestheticians with no individual author identified, was intended to work as a basic textbook for 




subjectivity that had been promoted by intellectuals from Cai Yuanpei to the more 
recent Li Zehou (1930- ) (Liu 2000, XIII).  
Aesthetics was possibly the only element of traditional education that went untouched 
by the doubts cast by the May Fourth movement (1919) when Chinese traditions were 
questioned. For example, Cai Yuanpei maintained that aesthetics was a theoretical 
support for Chinese “self-understanding” (Pohl 2009), and after his appointment as 
Minister of Education he added aesthetics to the Chinese state educational curricula 
(Cai 1988, 174). Aesthetic education, as a way to learn the culture of Chinese beauty 
as an “agnostic religion,” represented an element “in between” the emerging Chinese 
ruling class and the Western bourgeois elite, while allowing for a preservation of 
cultural belonging. Chinese communists also stressed a link between aesthetics and a 
Chinese path to revolution, because traditional aesthetics, familiar to the majority of 
people, can be used to embellish revolutionary contentment.18 As part of this project 
Liu Kang outlines a genealogy of aesthetics in order to distinguish the complex set of 
values and meanings of Chinese Marxism, otherwise seen as monolithic, from Western 
Marxism. Liu Kang (2000) also recognises the value of seeking “culturalism” through 
aesthetics and sees this as a way to construct modernity in non-Western countries. 
Culture must now bear the burden of not only solving the paradoxes of Western 
modernity but also reaffirming and empowering China’s own national identity (2000, 
5).  
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (1949), the Chinese 
state, following the example of Mao during the time of guerrilla warfare, once again 
resorted to traditional aesthetics and not to the “vanguard” (like, for instance, the 
Soviet one), as a way of better preserving Chinese domestic content. As a component 
of Chineseness, aesthetics has always been at the disposal of politics, and has actually 
supplied a framework for the contingent political configuration and the safeguard of 
political power. This long history of exalting aesthetics explains why it is now used in 
the educational curricula as a strong means of advocating Chinese pride. The reformed 
                                                 
 




educational system aims to meld students into experts who are competent, patriotic, 
and capable of promoting an aesthetic of excellence.  
In current day China this development of experts seems a priority, and applies not only 
to developing students but the whole population as well. The use of aesthetics in this 
way can guard against people’s disenchantment with and disengagement from the 
status quo. As I have already stressed, since a wave of depoliticisation swept post-
Maoist China, the previous anchor of Chinese pride, the political and ideological 
supremacy of Chinese Marxism, was demolished. The Chinese state, “politically 
deprived of its nationalist self-glorification” (Zhang 2008, 29), became “increasingly 
dependent on a cynical pragmatism and opportunism as its sole force of legitimacy” 
(29). In comparison a developmentalist and technocratic state would have risked 
revealing a cultural meaninglessness and this would have resulted in a disengaged 
population lacking any kind of patriotism. In the political lineage from Deng Xiaoping 
to Jiang Zemin the forging of a homo oeconomicus as a new subject had to be 
integrated with aesthetics.  
Aesthetics, therefore, started to assume the value of a technology of power to regulate 
people’s conduct through the creation of a Chinese dream of opulence. In its more 
contemporary form this aesthetics of Chineseness has progressed into an “aesthetics 
of technocracy.” I draw this term from Gartman (2000), who, following Pierre 
Bourdieu and the Frankfurt School in stressing a causal relationship between art and 
class interests, used the concept “aesthetics of technocracy” in a study on the 
establishment of modern architecture in Central Europe. The rationalist and 
functionalist style of architecture appealed to the tastes of an emerging professional 
and managerial bourgeoisie in order to acquire social legitimisation when it was clearly 
opposed to traditional aristocratic tastes. In a similar way, in China the aesthetics of 
technocracy has produced a fascination amongst the ruling class for hi-tech as a 
powerful symbol of global capitalism that is nevertheless associated with Chineseness, 
as conveyed in its presentation, utilisation, and reformulation. 
The aesthetics of technocracy has been the winning choice among a range of possible 
aesthetics because of its ability to operate on a range of levels. It represents the most 
modernised side of Chinese society and is glorified for its excellence (smart cities, 
magnetic levitation trains, skyscrapers hundreds of meters high, the widest net of 
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business on line, and so forth). But technocracy also carries a mimetic value because 
it camouflages the ruling class and disguises them as experts (with “technical 
expertise,” τέχνη but not necessarily “power,” κράτος at their disposal). The aesthetics 
of technocracy spread smoothly across China and became the epitome of modernity. 
It has the capacity to transgress boundaries amongst the educated and to spread across 
society, including both urban and rural populations, rich and poor people, learned and 
ignorant. But aesthetics is actually a bivalent device because it promotes practices of 
both inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the beauty of technology is the common ground 
for the whole population. Rural villages, with their houses ostentatiously bristling with 
TV and cell phone antennas, show that having technology is a symbol of status, even 
amongst the peasantry. At the same time, this common ground segments people into 
different groups. Urban middle class people, more familiar with technology, draw a 
distinction between themselves and the rest of the population, and this creates tensions 
in their efforts to distinguish themselves and to be noticed. For instance, the aesthetics 
of architecture and, for example, skyscrapers—new, modern, clean, and straight in 
their structure—keeps growing within Chinese cities, and they stand in sharp contrast 
to the old historical buildings, which are considered dirty and messy. As symbols of 
modernity, the new tower blocks, equipped with features such as lifts and centralised 
heating, displace people to a number of kilometres from their previous abodes in 
downtown areas; they are thus relegated to “ghost cities” that now dot the 
countryside.19 
Furthermore, this new aesthetics requires that any signs of the past are condemned to 
demolition (besides a few very ancient and monumental structures). As I will examine 
in chapter 4, this can lead many contemporary Chinese subjects, including the 
returnees or haigui who provide a privileged focus of my study, towards an oblivion 
about the past. The dictates of aesthetics call for the constant and hectic activity of 
demolition and construction and the deporting of old inhabitants no matter how well 
they can embrace newer technologies and ways of being. They also create financial 
                                                 
 
19 Throughout the Chinese countryside the Ghost Cities in China have resulted from huge real estate 
development projects, with no public services, commercial networks and connections. These projects 
are often the result of speculative investments coming from the government and have been called as a 
blatant manifestation of the incoming housing bubble.  
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interests, a connection between local governments and an emergent and enriched 
entrepreneurial class, while nourishing the aspirations for a new quality of urban 
subjects, busy with social relationships and hi-tech ways of communicating and 
imagining (Visser 2010). 
The ongoing mantra used during the Shanghai Expo of 2010, and translatable into 
English for a foreign audience as “Better city better life,” was in the Chinese version 
“city makes life more beautiful” (chengshi rang shenghuo gen meihao). In the Chinese 
version the urban is associated with “better,” with an improvement of aesthetics and 
an improvement of living conditions. Within this environment, at the subjective level, 
aesthetics becomes a technology of the self—that is, the spread of the Internet and the 
use of electronic devices from the mobile smart phones and palm screen. All these 
devices contribute to new knowledge production but they put the population able to 
afford them in a state of continuous stimulation and hedonistic excitement. Thus 
individuals are called to discipline themselves in order to take part in such an aesthetic 
space and in order to feel included and empowered by a sense of belonging. Upgrading 
new software, together with quick and efficient access to information, the immediate 
capacity to use data or transmit it as short messages and/or images, are the dominant 
requirements that have to be carried out at the highest speed possible. In this way 
aesthetics becomes technologically specialised, developing a culture of speed and an 
entertaining image of the self. This deeply characterises the new rhythms of Chinese 
professionals whose everyday activities are constantly dictated by these moves: 
downloading apps, checking the latest news, recording information, and making 
pictures. It is now common for workers to make a picture of the person they meet, 
instead of exchanging business cards at work meetings, so the contact is instantly 
digitalised. This has created aesthetically strenuous competition, a battlefield where 
empty spare time (while squeezed on the metro in rush hour or waiting for the bus, or 
during the lunch break) has to be optimised in order to capture everything in new or 
visually attractive ways, for instance by ensuring that every new product of the “self” 
(tag, picture, selfie, comments, video) becomes viral. 
Yet in order to understand how Chineseness is deployed aesthetically, it is necessary 
to analyse the graphic characterisation of a number of Chinese websites. The preferred 
Chinese aesthetics on websites is excessive, overloaded and congested by obsessive 
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advertisements and pop ups that fringe the content. This aesthetics of opulence aims 
at pleasing the visitor and emphasising wealth and its associated enjoyment. The sites 
select colours which are highly symbolic in terms of Chinese traditions (most Chinese 
websites are lavishly red, the symbol of joy, and yellow, the symbol of wealth). The 
Chinese versions of facebook, twitter, msm, youtube—they remain obscured by a 
Chinese firewall—are named, respectively, weibo, renren, qq, and youku. It has to be 
noted a fever of social media was only allowed to be released if one condition was 
met: that foreign expertise embodied in these tools was converted and translated into 
a domesticated netscape. In this process, the tool, in coming from abroad, acquired an 
“informal” Chinese value. Through its “adaptation” by foreign experts it was filtered 
and divorced from its previously recognised global features. In this process “the tools” 
(yong) coming from abroad were, once in China, subsumed within a space where the 
border between formal and informal expertise was blurred. In chapter 5, I show how 
the desire for electronic devices has also been reproduced in the use of software to 
invest in the stock market. This software is available for free download on any smart-
phone and has no restrictions. Everyone can thus, potentially, become an investor, an 
informal financial expert. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have employed a genealogical method to illustrate the shaping of 
Chinese expertise. I have highlighted how a recurrent theme characterises the rise of 
the modern expert: the dialectic ti and yong (Chinese knowledge as a “body,” and 
foreign expertise as a “tool”), and its inflection towards the categories formal and 
informal. In particular, I have shown how every time foreign expertise has threatened 
the maintenance of Chineseness, the expert emerged as a paradigmatic figure, bringing 
foreign expertise into China as an informal thing, and in turn being formalised 
according to the local contingent political project. One of the most emblematic cases 
recurs during Maoism, where the expert has to be first “red” (committed to political 
values) and only then “expert.” Thus, I have argued that despite the process of 
depoliticisation which has neutralised communist values in the wake of the Chinese 
embrace of global capitalism (from Deng’s reforms onwards), the Chinese state is still 
seeking to shape the “morally” committed expert in a continuity with the modern 
tradition. In place of revolutionary values, experts are now fostered within a new 
educational reform that, on one hand, aims to foster “neoliberal subjects” 
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(characterised by internationalisation, competitiveness, entrepreneurship, and self-
reliance), while on the other, urges them to show a commitment to nationalism and 
patriotism (Hoffman 2010). I have shown how one of the preferred ways the state is 
shaping patriotically committed subjects is through “aesthetics.” The value of 
aesthetics appears in educational reform, reiterating a modern tradition of educating 
Chinese students to Chinese superiority in beauty. It also appears as a technology of 
power, addressing the whole population through a Chinese dream based on Chinese 
technocratic power as a symbol of a global capitalism, discernable in contemporary 
architecture—specifically, urban skyscrapers—and the display of high-tech and 
financial power. 
Building upon this foundation, in the following chapters I show how student returnees 
(haigui)—holders of a formal body of expertise from abroad and hoping for a career 
in the Shanghai financial market—are called back to embrace and embody the state 
aesthetics of technocracy. However, once they return they find they are unable to 
become technocrats (that is, experts provided with decisional weight). In the context 
of increasing financialisation, the “Chinese dream” of beauty and opulence that is 
officially nurtured by the Chinese state intervenes as a glittering disguise, and appeases 
potential conflicts by providing a space for action and the embrace of modernisation 
(contemporary urban spaces, IT technology, and so forth). 
In the following chapters I aim to show how haigui, fostered by the state to perform 
as financial subjects to strengthen the Chinese embracement of financial capitalism, 
emerge as dynamic and enterprising managers of themselves. The desire for 
independent enrichment, self-affirmation and social recognition as autonomous 
experts often outweighs their desire to pursue the kind of second-rate employment they 
can find in financial and/or state institutions. I observe how this very dynamic arises 
in the arena of the Shanghai financial market where, caught in a fever of enrichment 
and the potentials of the stock exchange, the haigui tend to put aside their desires to 
expend their capacities formally, that is, as consultants or project managers in 
precarious and lowly-respected positions, and alternatively aim to strengthen their 
expertise informally by becoming self-investors, or brokers of themselves. Yet, in 
plunging into the ocean of mass financialisation, these experts risk dismissing their 
qualifications by merging with a crowd of scattered informal investors (sanhu) who 
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As outlined in the previous chapter, the dialectic between Chinese knowledge and 
foreign expertise that was a feature of Chinese modernisation mirrored the tensions 
between the state’s conflicting needs to safeguard its domestic configuration (hinged 
on Chineseness) and to import alien expertise from abroad. In addition to the question 
of knowledge and expertise, this chapter traces a further genealogy through a focus on 
Chinese returnees. These are Chinese students who were encouraged by the state to 
become holders of foreign expertise abroad, and to bring it back as part of the state’s 
modernisation project. 
Firstly, I will show how the returnees are key figures in the making of modern China. 
Time spent abroad was seen to give returnees the skills to contribute to a modern China 
and to become politically influential. Starting with Republican China (1912), students 
were sent to Japan and Europe to learn the “secrets” of modern nationalist strength. 
Later, in the 1920s, the burgeoning CCP sent students to France in order to nurture 
Marxist intellectuals as elite party members. During Maoism, the returnees were 
exalted primarily for their political commitment and subsequently for their conformity 
to the Maoist principle of “the red and the expert.” Describing how the status and 
experiences of contemporary returnees break with this tradition, this chapter evaluates 
a program that fosters and educates talent abroad in order to shape loyal and committed 
experts in a China characterised by increasing depoliticisation.  
Secondly, I discuss how contemporary state policies of migration and education that 
facilitate the return of Chinese students from abroad are interconnected to 
governmental discourses and practices that breed new subjectivities shaped by 
neoliberal notions of competition. The resulting subjects have flexible skills and 
knowledge, can self-manage, and are individuals with an understanding of the self as 
market actor. Here, the returnee no longer belongs to a state-sponsored elite, but is a 
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self-financed student who autonomously decides to study abroad in the hope of a better 
career upon return to China. In order to characterise this shift, I explore how 
contemporary returnees belong to a new Chinese middle class, and are held up by the 
state as the best representative of ren suzhi, a new “high quality subject.” This subject 
must display, on the one hand, self-managerial capacity, cultural capital, consumerism, 
and middle class lifestyle choices. On the other hand, she must be a responsible citizen 
who is loyal to the state. Yet, as I show, the meaning of “middle class” in China is 
ambiguous and discloses multiple contradictions. The reforms that have gradually 
decentralised the power of the CCP have given rise to new capitalist productive forces 
and complex relations of power in which the borders between public and private, state 
and market, professionalism and state protectionism are constantly contested. This is 
especially the case in the provinces, from where the majority of returnees I interview 
for this research hail. 
Due to the ambiguous nature of the middle class to which they belong, the returnees 
are displaced, uncertain, and frustrated subjects, in search of personal and social 
success. They are therefore particularly vulnerable to government “at a distance” 
(Miller and Rose 1990). Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose define this concept as the 
emergence of discourses and practices that “employ the language of expertise to 
discipline and shape the economic or social conduct of diverse subjects without 
shattering their formally distinct or ‘autonomous’ character” (1990, 14). In the case of 
returnees who adhere to such conduct while they study abroad, the concept of “at a 
distance” also acquires the further meaning of its literal sense. These discourses have 
the effect of harnessing the returnees to China, even as they study abroad. One example 
of these discursive formations is the “how-to manual,” a widespread literature in 
China, which portrays the returnees as indispensable intermediaries in business 
relations between China and the world. While the professional success of the returnees 
varies according to the disciplines in which they are trained and the contingencies of 
their return, my fieldwork shows that those specialising in finance in Shanghai are 
among the most dissatisfied due to the low-scale jobs they obtain. Shanghai returnees 
expect to embody the role of high quality subjects (ren suzhi) who will lead the 
country’s economic development. In reality, their “operating range” is controlled 
through “differential inclusion,” a state approach designed to domesticate global 
capitalism. As an example of this strategy, in this chapter I observe the case of science 
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and technology parks in secluded areas. These special urban economic zones are 
crucial devices for situating and managing returnees and their foreign expertise in 
protected areas.  
Thirdly, I highlight the contradiction between the state’s urgent need to acquire 
financial expertise at the current juncture of capitalism and the low-scale employment 
that returnees with financial expertise are able to obtain. In little more than 20 years, 
the Chinese regime has, almost from scratch, built its own version of a market 
economy, complete with a new banking system, a credit system, a stock market, a 
security commission, and global financial representative organs. As I have pointed out 
in the introduction to this thesis, the financial expertise of the returnees contrasts with 
the ecology of financial expertise the party-state seeks to protect. In this sense, the 
conflict between the financial approaches that the returnees have learned abroad and 
local configuration of finance acts as a sequel to past conflicts between foreign 
expertise and Chinese knowledge. I therefore argue that the precarious labour 
conditions and frequent underemployment of the returnees is not due to a glut in the 
labour market but is instead the result of a deliberate structural marginalisation and 
exclusion from the state’s ecology of financial expertise. Consequently, those state 
policies that appear to foster internationalised, competitive, and self-entrepreneurial 
labouring subjects emerge as a paradox. The entry to the selected elite promised to 
these subjects at the finish line of their circuit of migration does not await them.  
I will show how the Chinese state resorts to a tradition of expertise, subjected to the 
political needs of the state, as an extrema ratio to protect its own ecology of financial 
expertise. Case studies in this chapter and throughout the thesis show how the 
production of the subjectivity of the returnee unchains an array of reactions, from 
resilience, to indifference, to feelings of rejection. The returnees I interviewed wished 
to go beyond a subordinate role in their workplaces to become organisers and 
managers of their own projects. In conclusion, I argue that through observation of 
returnees as contrasting, problematic, and disjointed agents, who are equipped with 
financial expertise, as well as an analysis of the broad historical and social changes in 
which these subjectivities appear, we can grasp the tensions and fissures emerging 
from the state project of fostering talents abroad and subsequently bringing them 
home. These subjectivities reveal the contradictions inherent in the Chinese state’s 
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embrace of financial capitalism. On one hand, the state needs to produce subjects for 
financial capitalism who are entrepreneurial, inclined to risk-taking, and practices of 
self-management; on the other, the state sees these subjects as potential threats to its 
hegemony.  
Fostering Chinese talent abroad the historical context 
In this section I present a genealogy of the returnee. I trace how, historically, returnees 
have been key figures in the shaping of modern China. In particular, I highlight how 
returnees play the role of intermediary agents at times when China has been confronted 
by an external power. Since the first century AD, China has been compelled to deal 
with foreign influences. For instance, when Buddhism arrived in China around 50 AD, 
the Chinese Empire sought to maintain local creeds of Confucianism and Taoism 
through strict supervision of the new religion. In a visual domestication of foreignness, 
Buddhist temples were obligated to imitate Confucian and Taoist architectural 
structures.20 At the same time, the Empire fostered the first study abroad program to 
form a limited number of experts, charged with grasping a better understanding of the 
exterior religion, to be inserted later into the culture “under supervision.” Chinese 
students who were sent to Central Asia and India to receive instruction in Buddhism 
and collect sutra (Buddhist texts) found, on their return, a pre-arranged space in which 
to pass on their learning; they enjoyed imperial acknowledgment but were segregated 
from the population (see Bokenkamp 2007). In this way, the destructive potential of 
Buddhist precepts (such as the chastity of monks which was totally in opposition to 
the Confucian desire for a large population) was confined and inhibited in order to 
preserve the benchmarks of Chinese rule and ensure the subservience of religion to 
political power.  
Centuries later, during the Mongol domination of China (1271-1368), the supremacy 
of Chineseness was again at stake. The Mongol rulers spoke a range of other languages 
including Mongolian, Turkish, Persian, and Tibetan, but not Chinese. As these 
languages became official, they were inserted into the Chinese education framework, 
                                                 
 
20 This occurred with some hybridisation. For instance, pagodas—tall structures with upward-curving 
roofs on each of several stores—were an architectural feature imported from Indian Buddhist 
architecture. 
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which (for a few) included a period of language study abroad. Consequently, the 
language in which Chineseness was expressed (classical Chinese, previously the only 
official language) risked being overshadowed. In order to preserve classical Chinese 
as a stronghold of Chineseness, the few Chinese students who ventured to the central 
Asian steppes or the Tibetan plateau to study the new official languages became lettrés, 
members of the Confucian intelligentsia who spontaneously confined the languages 
not related to Confucianism to a purely accessory role, thereby preserving the 
supremacy of Confucian knowledge (Brokaw 2007) even if not its original language.  
During the long period of the Chinese Empire, from the Ming (1368-1644) to the Qing 
(1644-1911) dynasties, China’s foreign interaction lay mainly within the East Asian 
region. Through the tributary system, the Chinese state created systemic stability 
through which to maintain its centripetal hegemony.21 The interchange and economic 
channels it fostered and maintained with neighbouring countries involved an 
appeasement model that allowed the “celestial Empire to adjust its foreign relations 
within diverse theatres of operation for two millennia” (Andornino 2006, 5).  
After the fall of the Empire and the establishment of the Republic of China (1912-
1949), the state regularly sent students to modern countries to study natural sciences, 
economics, politics, military science and medicine. The aim was to discover the 
“secret” of modern strength and apply it to China. In the nineteenth century, as a 
response to the rise of Western imperialism, the Chinese state was inevitably 
compelled towards social, technological and political transition. It turned towards the 
discursive apparatus of “the modern West” (Sakai 1998), which was proposing and 
imposing itself as the universal value for “the rest.” At this time, Western missionary 
organisations, convinced of the superiority of Western civilisation based on Christian 
beliefs, organised most of the study abroad for Chinese students. Students who were 
educated within this framework were encouraged to acknowledge European 
                                                 
 
21 Contrary to other tribute systems around the world, the Imperial Chinese version consisted almost 
entirely of mutually-beneficial economic relationships. Member states of the system were politically 
autonomous and, in almost all cases, independent as well. The tribute system facilitated frequent 
economic and cultural exchange, and the various dynasties of Imperial China deeply influenced the 
culture of the peripheral countries and also drew them into a China-centered, or sino-centric, 
international order. The Imperial tributary system shaped foreign policy and trade for over 2,000 years 
of Imperial China's economic and cultural dominance of the region. 
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superiority. Sun Yatsen, the founder of the Chinese Republic, was one of these students 
“initiated into Western knowledge” (Roux and Bergére 1999) by attending the 
American Congregationalist Oahu College in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
During the Republic, Chinese students were lured precisely by the possibility of 
mastering and importing “Europeanisation” into China (Luo 2015). Students were sent 
to the West as “well placed agents” to learn modern techniques and, once back in 
China, to transpose, translate and adapt them to Chinese ways. The process of 
extracting expertise from the European self-celebratory frame was considered an 
advantageous element for creating a “Chinese alternative modernity” (see chapter 1). 
This was not unprecedented in East Asia. In Meiji Japan, modern Western techniques 
had been locally adapted and integrated to the benefit of the country. For instance, the 
modern Japanese navy brought together Krupp canons with bushido, the samurai code 
of ethics. 
A key document was Kyōiku Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education), which offered 
the best synthesis of the kokutai (the soul of the nation), a mix of Meiji principles and 
Confucian ethics (Horio, 1988). Consequently, most Chinese students went to Japan 
rather than to Europe. From a Chinese perspective, Japan was viewed as a new frontier 
in which to learn necessary techniques and expertise, but also as a concrete example 
of how another Asian country was transforming itself through adopting and re-
engineering foreign expertise. At the beginning of the twentieth century, around 
15,000 Chinese students were studying in Japanese universities (Samarani 2004, 11). 
There, they experienced a novel form of learning. Japanese schools were organised 
according to very different educational principles, such as the rejection of purely 
mnemonic teaching, which had been the dominant pedagogical model in China for 
centuries. At the same time, Chinese students were stunned by the huge gap between 
Japan and China. Japan, a country which in Chinese eyes had received everything from 
China, including philosophy, religion, and its writing system, had suddenly become 
richer, better respected and more feared than China. Grasping the secrets for building 
a rich and powerful modern country in Japan motivated many Chinese returnees to 
lead China down a similar path of development. The dismantling of the Chinese 
Empire, a political form unsuited to attaining these goals, appeared inevitable. The 
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wave of returnees from Japan can therefore be considered a paradigmatic case in the 
genealogy of Chinese returnees.  
During the Republic, the Chinese also looked to outside expertise from the US. The 
Chinese educational system underwent a dramatic change due to a local fascination 
with the philosophies and writings of John Dewey (1859-1952), the American 
pedagogue whose approach to education was based on social reformism (Chomsky 
1995) and the concept of the “humanism of work.” Dewey’s pedagogy was devised as 
a foil for Soviet Bolshevism and Japanese expansionism. He attempted to conjoin 
classical and professional studies through the insertion of classical knowledge into 
professional curricula. His aim was the development of attitudes and abilities in 
students over and above factual knowledge. He attracted hundreds of Chinese students 
to American universities and channelled many intellectual resources toward his 
pragmatic approaches. Some of Dewey’s students at the Centre for Chinese Education 
at Columbia became important personalities during the Republic and were pioneers or 
founders in many fields, holding important positions in government offices, 
universities or research institutions. A prominent example was Zhang Bolin who 
served as chairman of the National Advisory Council. These students constituted the 
first Chinese Students Returnees’ Association and were among the instigators of the 
New Culture and the May Fourth Movements.  
Around the same time, French and Chinese communist and anarchist groups launched 
“work-study” programs for Chinese migrants who could fund their studies through 
work in French factories. The educational schedule addressed Western knowledge, 
with a concentration on politics. As Jonathan Spence describes them: “The work-study 
programs … sought to mix advanced education with a morally rigorous, even ascetic, 
life-style” (2013, 310). The result was a complex melange of science, technology and 
political theory and praxis. Thousands of young Chinese, mostly belonging to the 
lower classes (peasants, workers, petty bourgeoisie), volunteered for the program in 
France where, besides working and studying, they became “active in local labour 
agitations” (310). 22  These programs directly contributed to the revolutionary 
                                                 
 
22 During this wave of the study-abroad movement, the number of Chinese students in France increased 
from less than 200 before 1919 to more than 1,600 in 1920. 
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intellectual and socio-political reform movements that occurred in China in 1917–21, 
and which were directed toward national independence, emancipation of the 
individual, and rebuilding society and culture. From their stay abroad, students 
extracted knowledge and first-hand experience of Western capabilities and, at the same 
time, an understanding of the cracks and fissures opened up by political party and 
trade-union actions in the West, and the ensuing social unrest they caused. Among 
these young Chinese were some of the most prominent future Chinese revolutionary 
leaders including Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.  
Following the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the foundation of the CCP in 1921, and 
initial CCP-Kuomintang (KMT) cooperation (1924-1927), a surge of students 
travelled to the Soviet Union to study revolutionary theory and military know-how.  
Many outstanding cadres for the CCP, including Liu Shaoqi, Qu Qiubai and Ren Bishi 
were trained at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, which was 
founded in Moscow in 1921 as one of several universities, which accepted students 
from Asia (Li 2006). After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the 
study-abroad system was directed at producing “red and expert” graduates; that is, 
skilled professionals loyal to the political system. The main destination of study 
became Moscow where students learned modern sciences and Soviet-style Marxism-
Leninism. However, in the 1960s the split between China and the Soviet Union—
which prevented Chinese citizens from travelling to Moscow—and the Cultural 
Revolution, which stigmatised and punished experts as a group harmful to society, 
undermined the “red and expert” project. 
When the Cultural Revolution was abandoned, the project of a socialist egalitarian 
education was also abandoned. As I mentioned in chapter 1, the end of the Cultural 
Revolution should be taken as the inception of the party’s depoliticisation. Claudia 
Pozzana and Alessandro Russo (2006) have linked the outcome of the Cultural 
Revolution to an impasse in the socialist foundations of the state. Their thesis is that, 
through the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese state underwent the same process that 
provoked the historical failure of the socialist model (as in the French Revolution), 
namely, the incapability of including the political claim of egalitarianism in the state’s 
governmental power structures. Transposing it to China, the authors suggest reading 
the Cultural Revolution as the moment in which the Chinese state realised the 
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impossibility of conferring equal conditions on all citizens as a single community. The 
socialist state was not able to protect the rights of unbound subjects, and thus 
reactivated the old categories of the ancient regimes (classes, corporations, 
households). This entailed a rearrangement of the ideological apparatus—in which 
education, of course, played a central role—and a new political existence for the CCP, 
which began embracing technocratic and economic calculative practices as the basis 
of its political legitimation. From this moment, a small percentage of the population—
a select elite with technical skills and expertise—came to be in charge of the 
development of the rest of the nation, selecting, in turn, segments of population to 
address specific tasks. The market-oriented reforms started by Deng Xiaoping in the 
late 1970s led to a new relationship between migration and education, knowledge, and 
expertise. However, the real increase and acclamation of returnees sprang up only a 
few decades later.  
Contemporary returnees and the figure of the haigui 
As I will explain later in this chapter, since Deng’s reforms, state discourses on power 
and knowledge that emphasised “a new quality of population” (renkou suzhi), 
encouragements to get rich, be internationalised, and become entrepreneurial, 
accompanied previous state policies of mobility (such as the aforementioned work-
study programs). These latter were deployed through laws aimed at directly ordering 
territory and the population, and therefore carried a sovereign form of power. 
However, along with China’s conversion into “the most friendly capitalist country in 
the world” (Guthrie 2012), the context in which the returnees had to operate was 
marked by an historical caesura. A new governmental apparatus emerged to shape the 
subjectivity of a new student who expected to go abroad and then return to glory in 
China.  
From the 1990s, student mobility was conceptualised as “student migration,” as it was 
mostly driven by the students’ own initiative, becoming “more open-ended, less 
predictable, and possibly exerting a more profound long-term impact on society” 
(Xiang and Shen 2009, 516). As Xiang Biao and Wei Shen conclude in their study on 
international student migration and social stratification in China, “student migration 
began as a state project and evolved to become a ‘societal’ phenomenon” (2009, 516). 
By the end of 2010, there were 1.27 million Chinese international students studying 
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overseas, including 946,400 people enrolled in higher education programs, from 
bachelor degrees to post-doctoral courses (Hao and Welch 2012, 245; Ministry of 
Education 2011). In order to deal effectively with the risk of a disastrous brain drain, 
and to encourage returnees back to their motherland, the state tightened policies to 
manage the return of these students from abroad. 
At this juncture, the Chinese state plays several roles—lawmaker, planner and 
bestower of the all-important hukou (resident permit). State policies seeking to 
systematically attract Chinese students (both state- and self-funded) back from abroad 
started from the 10th Five-Year Plan in 2000-2005, when a significant part of the 
nationwide human resources policy was formulated in order to increase numbers of 
new global talents (including both Chinese returnees and foreigners). State measures 
were further intensified under the subsequent Five-Year Plan (2006-2011), which 
launched the slogan “studying abroad, encouraging return and securing free 
movement.” These policies—aimed at recruiting new returnees to strategic sectors like 
science, research, finance, and IT—were mostly expressed in the form of a national 
middle- and long-term development plan, for instance, in the National Plan for 
Medium and Long-term Scientific and Technological Development (2006-2020), the 
National Plan for Medium and Long-term Human Resources Development (2010-
2020), and the National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and 
Development 2010-2020 (State Council, 2006, 2010a, 2010b). Additionally, the 
launching of the Thousand-Talent Program in 2010, was targeted at graduate returnees 
from provincial areas.23 Since then, local governments, particularly in the major cities 
like Beijing and Shanghai, have been in competition to secure themselves the largest 
number of foreign-educated employees. To do this, they have made an urban hukou 
available to all returnees who have worked for at least two years in a major Chinese 
city upon return.  
                                                 
 
23 The Thousand Talent Plan aimed to attract about 1,000 high-level foreign-educated skilled Chinese 
or foreigners to develop innovatives, mostly scientific projects, in China. The recruits were expected to 
work at national research centres or laboratories, central government and state-owned financial 
enterprises, top scientific foundations, and in leading innovative projects to boost China’s development. 
By July 2010, the Thousand-Talent programme had already recruited 622 high-skilled international 
professionals (1000 plan, 2010). Among those, only 20 people were foreign experts (non-Chinese), the 
rest comprised Chinese returnees, of whom 448 held foreign passports (Hao and Welch 2012). 
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The importance of the hukou cannot be underemphasised. The hukou, in all of its 
varieties (temporary, permanent, etc.) has always been an instrument to filter and 
differentiate a range of workers according to expertise. From the late 1950s, the hukou 
was employed by the Chinese state to control the allocation and the distribution of the 
labour force amongst various locations, regions, branches and professions. With the 
launch of the 1978 reforms, a new category was created, “the migrant worker.” 
Through allowing people a temporary permit to flow from the countryside to work in 
the cities, the state was able to supply and control a low cost urban labour force. In the 
cities, migrant workers are subjugated as series B citizens, with none of the rights to 
which urban residents have access—such as free compulsory education, urban 
employment guarantees, public housing, free medical services, and retirement 
benefits. Despite joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China resisted 
the pressure of “conformity to international standards,” which called for the abolition 
of the hukou so as to create a more flexible labour market and reduce “population 
immobility, economic irrationality, market segmentation and retardation” (Wang 
2004, 118). In fact, the hukou remains one of the main measures to control worker 
mobility according to the contingencies of domestic labour requirements and it 
remains a critical issue for anyone wanting to move from their birthplace. As Jie Hao 
and Anthony Welch underline, “[e]ven for domestic university graduates, it remains 
extremely difficult to transfer their hukou to Beijing or Shanghai for employment, 
regardless of where they were born or what kind of hukou they hold, even from 
provincial capital cities or wealthy cities such as Suzhou or Hangzhou. But overseas 
graduates with international qualifications have much better access to hukou transfer” 
(Hao and Welch 2012, 252). 
In China, which has achieved the record of sending more students abroad than any 
other country, the decision to study abroad is often motivated by the hope of obtaining 
an urban hukou in Shanghai, Beijing, or another big city upon return. As I elaborate in 
this chapter and the next, most returnees do not come from big cities like Beijing or 
Shanghai, but from medium-sized and small provincial cities. For returnees, the 
promise of an opportunity to live in the most attractive globalised Chinese cities, 
together with the potential surplus value that their international education could offer, 
is a “return to the future” which is “driven by enterprise rather than by nostalgia” 
(Xiang 2013, 2).  
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By the mid-2000s 90 per cent of the almost 200,000 students studying abroad were 
“self-financing students” funded by their families and not by state scholarships 
(Constant et al. 2013, 113; Xiang and Shen 2009, 516). The biggest change occurred 
between 2001 and 2002, when returnee numbers grew by almost 100% (Zweig, 
Changgui and Rosen 2004 in Louie 2006, 3). At this time, a new word was coined to 
refer to “high skilled graduates from abroad,” the term haigui 海龟; it quickly became 
liuxingyu (a fashionable/colloquial term). Literally meaning sea-turtle, it is a word 
play on the homophone haigui 海归, meaning “returnees from overseas.”  
A new middle class, governed “at a distance”  
In order to understand the desires, dispositions and expectations that have shaped the 
subjectivities of the haigui in the last decades, I now investigate the social background 
of the haigui. As one of the key incentives to encourage haigui to return is a hukou in 
a big Chinese city, the haigui use their study abroad period to advance their social 
mobility, and to upgrade their social status or class from citizens of second- or third-
tier cities to citizens of first-tier cities. Most of the haigui I encountered during my 
fieldwork were from industrialised small to medium-sized cities in developed 
provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, provinces that are among the wealthiest in China. 
In fact, in my fieldwork I found no records of haigui with working class or peasant 
backgrounds. In these provinces, the new political administrative decentralisation and 
the restructuring of systems of production that came out of Deng’s reforms, favoured 
the rise of a market-based rationale and a partial privatisation of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), which had been previously regulated through a centralised system. 
The benefit of public investment favoured the rise of infrastructure, as well of the 
location of numerous industries. Managers of these SOEs, as well as party cadres of 
provincial government agencies, were “faced with the imperative to commercialise 
their activities” (Goodman 1998, 42).  
During this transition, China witnessed the emergence of a new class. The “middle 
class” started to be invoked in government discourses at the time when the party 
decided that, besides its economic role, a new class had to be created to address 
problems of social security. As a consequence of the increasing economic inequality 
brought about by reforms that left behind the peasant and worker majority of the 
population (formerly considered model citizens, they became “disadvantaged 
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groups”—ruoshi qunti), the party feared a threat to social stability (Hai 2010). Hai Ren 
argues that “government officials, policy experts, and scholars advocate for the growth 
of a middle class as necessary for balancing the contradictions between economic 
growth and social stability produced by the economic reforms” (115). Thus, this new 
class carried a performative function and power, which was to grant the CCP new types 
of’ social legitimacy.  
This class was created top-down. It acquired the value of a normative category and 
was made intelligible through systematic uses of statistical surveys, or what Susan 
Greenhalgh calls “numerical inscriptions,” such as tables, figures, charts, and 
equations used by population scientists, state planners, and government bureaucrats 
(Greenhalgh 2003 quoted by Hai 2010, 115). The Chinese Academy of Social Science 
(CASS), with support from the central government, carried out a survey on Chinese 
social stratification in over 12 provinces and 72 cities, counties, and districts, and 
formally signed off on the introduction of the term jieceng (stratum). The more neutral 
sociological term “stratum” was a strategic substitution for the term jieji (class), a term 
deeply charged with political meaning. In the early 2000s, the middle class was 
officially declared as a stratum of “innovators” and “modernisers” in Jiang Zemin’s 
theory of “The Three Represents.”24 
The term “middle class,” zhongchang jieji, has not disappeared from the Chinese 
vocabulary. Besides governmental and official discourses, it is still commonly used in 
Chinese newspapers and is used by the population, especially by those who self-
identify as middle class. However, the literal translation for zhongchan jieji, which is 
“class having middle property,” situates it in a political grey area. In Chinese, the word 
zhongchan originated at the intersection of zichan (“capital assets,” which also figures 
in zichan jieji, or “class with capital assets,” which is the Chinese iteration of the 
bourgeoisie) and wuchan jieji (“class with no property” or the proletariat). This 
political ambiguity is also reproduced in the definitions of property. In China, 
alongside guoyou (state/public) and siyou (private property), a hybrid feigongyou 
                                                 
 
24 The Three Represents stipulated that the CCP had to be the representative of advanced social 
productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the overwhelming majority.  
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(“non-public”) form is present, which connotes private economic activities carried out 
with public funds. 
I suggest that, on the one hand, the multiple and ambiguous nature of this definition 
averts the risk of homogenising this class with any pre-established categories. Even if 
the Chinese middle class resulted from a top-down approach in the form of a 
preemptive measure (Hai 2010), one should remember what Edward P. Thompson 
said, that “class is not a ‘structure’ or even a ‘category’ but something which in fact 
happens (and can be showed to have happened) in human relationships” (Thompson 
1963 quoted in Zhang 2012, 4). On the other hand, I argue that the ambiguity, which 
surrounds the term middle class, or the middle “stratum,” is also its weakness, as it 
denies its members any official recognition in the form of professional associations 
and organisations, representative media, and political parties.25 Due to its political 
“impasse,” the Chinese middle class is the one most targeted and therefore most likely 
to respond to the neoliberal governmental techniques that have characterised Deng 
Xiaoping’s quest for a renkou suzhi (new quality of citizens). Luigi Tomba argues that 
urban middle class citizens are the ones who better respond to the three governmental 
objectives to create “new quality citizens”: “(1) the making of new subjects who are 
autonomous enough to choose what to consume (and therefore stimulate economic 
growth and China’s integration in the global market) but also responsible enough to 
actively contribute to the maintenance of social order; (2) the creation of subjects who 
will govern themselves at the level of their residential communities without the need 
for government intervention; and (3) the benchmarking of social aspirations and 
behaviours, with the creation of models for individual self-improvement” (Tomba 
2009, 593). 
The three objectives respond to a new governmental rationale that promotes 
autonomous consumption behaviours that are inter-linked with social responsibility 
and political docility. The resulting middle class is therefore perfectly apt to 
“strengthen Chinese civilization as well as guarantee social and political stability in a 
                                                 
 
25 The so-called Eight Democratic Parties, allied with the CCP since the foundation of the PRC as 
members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), are supposedly 
representatives of the non-communist patriotic sectors of the Chinese society (entrepreneurs, medical 
doctors, Taiwan ‘compatriots’ etc.), but have never had any substantial role.  
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time of growing economic inequality and social complexity” (Tomba 2009, 593). In 
the absence of an autonomous political role “what is perhaps more crucial for 
understanding middle class formation in China, are the cultural aspects that 
characterise the acquisition of cultural capital, consumption, lifestyle choices” (Li 
2008). In her studies on youth in Dalian, a mid-sized city in China’s third richest 
province, Liaoning, Vanessa Fong has noted that the rapid changes that characterise 
the class stratification system in urban China have opened up new spaces for younger 
generations “to imagine themselves sailing to the top of Chinese society on their own 
particular strengths” (Fong 2007, 89).  
Accordingly Li Zhang describes the Chinese urban middle class as one In Search of a 
Paradise (2012). This is because, within new urban spaces, the “increasingly 
globalised nature of the media, language, and educational pilgrimages available to 
young Chinese citizens ... encourages them to aspire to belong to an imagined 
developed world community composed of mobile, wealthy, well-educated, and well-
connected people worldwide” (Fong 2011, 6). Haigui, as urban citizens, grow up in a 
space congested with the semiotics of media, advertising, and real estate that influence 
their life choices and future ambitions towards the achievement of the Chinese dream. 
This recalls the “aesthetics of technocracy” that I discussed in chapter 1, and which I 
will discuss further below. Many haigui from Australia I encountered in my research 
sought their reward through privileged access to the propelled “Chinese dream.” Liu, 
who is from Wuxi, a medium city in the Jiangsu province, was one of the first haigui 
I interviewed in Shanghai. He told me that, “ever since I was young I have wanted to 
get into the government and to contribute to help China to improve its economy, to 
become richer.”26 
In such a context, an important role is played by the expansion of higher education 
learning opportunities provided by private and overseas educational institutions or 
educational agents, minban (literally “run by people,” which is a euphemism for 
“privately-run” and disguises that they are not state-run). Over the past two decades, 
these institutions have offered market-oriented courses, often in partnership with 
                                                 
 
26 Interview with Liu, 4 March, 2013, Shanghai 
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countries and regions with developed economies and advanced technology, such as 
Australia or the US (Mok 2009). As I outlined in chapter 1, China’s embrace of the 
“knowledge economy” and its adherence to WTO regulations requiring that it open up 
its higher education sector to private and overseas competitors in the for-profit sector 
has led to the emergence of a transnational education industry.27 Despite this, the 
government still protects the state education sector through interventionist policies and 
local Chinese education remains a public system run by the Ministry of Education. 
By overriding the meritocracy of a public exam-based educational structure, a myriad 
of private academic brokers and agencies provide opportunities to pursue a university 
degree abroad to failing or mediocre students who cannot enter Chinese universities, 
but have the money to pay for private programs. After obtaining a degree abroad, these 
students can return to China with university certification and re-present themselves as 
valuable candidates in the domestic job market. I will talk about how educational 
settings influence the choices of students who leave China to study in Australia in 
particular in the next chapter. Here, however, I am more interested in investigating the 
reasons for return rather than departure. The haigui’s ambition of being potential 
experts at their “return” is what makes them the main subjects of this thesis. Most of 
the haigui I met during my fieldwork in Shanghai told me that they had always wanted 
to return to China after their studies. As reported by other studies, China, in the eyes 
of the returnees, “is an attractive magnetic field” (Ye 2002, 10). It is a country “with 
great potential for development and one shouldn’t miss the opportunities to be part of 
it” (Wong, Wang and Sun 2006, 298). Even for the sole haigui with whom I talked, 
who had thought to change their plans and remain abroad after graduation, the idea of 
“non return” was an uneasy one that conflicted with their sense and/or duty of 
belonging. As Chun, a haigui from Changzhou, in Jiangsu, who had studied in 
Melbourne told me: “After I finished my studying in accounting I had thought of 
remaining in Australia. I also got a job for a year, but then I was missing China too 
much. I want to try a career here in Shanghai. It is more important for me.”28 Wang, 
originally from Yangzhou, another medium city in Jiangsu province, was freshly back 
                                                 
 
27 See “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running 
Schools implemented by the State Council in 2003” (State Council 2003, Chapter 1, Article 3).  
28 Interview with Chun, 17 May, 2013, Shanghai.  
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from Brisbane where he studied economics. He told me that after he finished his study 
he felt a bit lost in Australia, not knowing what job to do or where to look. “After my 
study, I couldn’t really understand how things work in Australia, who to ask. I didn’t 
have any connections, no one was giving me any tips, supporting me. I thought it was 
tiring and confusing. So that is why I decided to return here in China. Here I feel more 
secure, protected and what I want is to find a job here in Shanghai. You know, I prefer 
Shanghai to Brisbane.”29  
Wang’s experience reveals that he did not consider his educational experience abroad 
an open door towards a new future abroad, but a strategic means, a fifth wheel, to 
advance his social mobility in China. In this sense, Wang was responding to the state’s 
call to go back and be committed to a pre-arranged and secure future. As I will outline 
later, Wang’s family and personal connections played a big role in this path. The 
“commitment” to return prevented him from even attempting to face some of the 
obstacles encountered in a foreign country, which he nevertheless still considered less 
interesting than China. As soon as Wang encountered a few obstacles he quickly 
retreated, and the option of staying in Australia was rationally dismissed. There were 
few incentives for him to endure the exhausting search for a full time job or resident’s 
permit in a foreign country, when multiple stimuli and pressures were calling him 
back.  
Haigui like Wang respond to governmental techniques that address their citizens “at a 
distance.” In the words of Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose these are defined by 
discourses that employ the language of expertise to discipline, “shape the economic or 
social conduct of diverse and institutionally distinct persons and agencies without 
shattering their formally distinct or ‘autonomous’ character” (1990, 14). I will show 
the haigui's return to China to follow such a call of “conduct” is nurtured by the allure 
of the state’s language, built around “expertise” and the “aesthetics of technocracy.” 
In that moment when the haigui respond to this call of “conduct” from another country, 
the concept of “at a distance” overlaps with a literal physical distance. In her studies 
on diasporas, Sara Kalm analyses how state authorities make an “effort in addressing 
                                                 
 
29 Interview with Wang, 12 April, 2013, Shanghai. 
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territorially absent citizens as members of the national collective” (2013, 380). I would 
suggest that the promise to students of becoming “experts” when they return from 
abroad should also be read as a channel through which the state harnesses Chinese 
subjects outside its territorial borders. This recall is equally manifested through the 
influence on Chinese students wielded by Chinese national education institutions, 
families and Chinese media that do not diminish when the students are abroad. 
Among the pressures to return, family plays an important factor. Most of the haigui I 
interviewed, female in particular, mentioned that they had to come back to China in 
order to stay close to their families. Even the few established professionals who had 
built solid alternatives abroad, and had successfully found a well-paid job and obtained 
a foreign residency, abandoned everything because of familial pressure. I repeatedly 
heard haigui saying that when their parents were getting older, it was their 
responsibility to assist them, at the cost of sacrificing their own plans. Li, a haigui from 
Zhejiang province, told me: “You know, in China we are not free to live wherever we 
want, it is our duty plan our future with our parents. This is because of the one child 
policy. If I had brothers and sisters it would have been different.”30 The choice of the 
only child’s education assumes a strong relevance for the whole family and its future 
life. Mary Crabb (2010), in her study on the educational choices made by Chinese 
middle class families, found that in investing in their children’s education abroad, 
middle class families perform a “‘melodrama’ of mobility that acted out in a political 
economy of love where expenditures of time and money were not just rational 
investments but expressions of long-lasting affective bonds between parents and 
children” (398). In this way, middle class families also hope that the efforts put into 
“financial and affective investments made in the education of their only children will 
one day pay off” (398). 
However, this family agreement, while seemingly reached autonomously from state 
intervention, cannot be framed outside official configurations. It is intimately tied to 
state policies and agendas that encourage subjects to invest in education as an 
instrument for self-determination and which will augment their future careers. The 
                                                 
 
30 Interview with Li, 23 April, 2013. Shanghai.  
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rewards offered by special programs that attract students back to China function as a 
powerful and reassuring bulwark against improvised drift or unexpected opportunity 
while abroad. Paraphrasing Sara Kalm (2013), it is evident that government 
technologies that stretch beyond national borders are able to maintain an influence 
over rights and duties of their citizens, even when they are abroad. Furthermore, by 
providing an urban hukou in big and sought-after cities like Beijing or Shanghai, the 
state makes an even more explicit and specific deal with its citizens as it promises to 
upgrade them to urban citizens merely in exchange for their return. This is the way in 
which the “myth of return” is generated, strengthening nationalist loyalties even 
amongst those who have emigrated.  
As Xiang Biao points out, “territory-bound sovereignty” and “flexible transnational 
mobility” work together instead of exclusively, where the Chinese state “regulates 
mobility through mobility not by blocking but by facilitating movements” (2013, 16). 
By enabling students’ mobility, the Chinese state nationalises their transnational 
moves. Thus, the emergence of the haigui is encouraged but, at the same time, 
constantly monitored and re-domesticated. The return is “a mobility of such a kind 
that it tames mobility, fitting in and out the framework of nation state” (Xiang 2013, 
17). The haigui circuit of migration is pre-designed by the state to act strategically 
towards the creation of future labouring subjects and subjectivities. In this sense, the 
consolidated binomial student migration leads to the emergence of “designer 
migrants” which in turn supports skilled labour circulation in a burgeoning global 
knowledge economy (Robertson 2013). I suggest, however, that a better perspective 
to adopt in analysing the subjectivity of the haigui is the one of “flexible citizen” (Ong 
1999). Aihwa Ong refers to flexible citizenship as a set of processes that respond to 
the “regime of flexible accumulation” (3) that is characteristic of global capitalism. 
She explains that mobile subjects “respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing 
political-economic conditions … in their quest to accumulate capital and social 
prestige” (6). The “flexible citizen” is, then, strategic, opportunistic and seeks 
economic advantage and social mobility through their membership of multiple nation 
states (Roberston 2013, 80). 
The idea of the flexible citizen not only interrogates how the bond between citizenship 
and nation state has shifted in contemporary capitalism, but also stresses how this shift 
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has been marked by a mobility that is fundamental to the “regime of flexible 
accumulation.” I suggest that mobility is a factor that enables “the fantasy of a just-in-
time and to-the-point migration,” which aspires to follow the multifarious ways 
neoliberal capitalism shapes its daily workings (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 202). 
The fantasy points out the impossibility of an effective implementation of state 
policies, which are too slow and too rigid in responding to rapid and flexible 
transformations in global capitalism. Ultimately, however, the Chinese state is not 
invested in flexibility, and instead strategically and strictly controls an organised 
“supply” of competitive skilled subjects confined to their sphere of action. Looking at 
Chinese state policies directed towards haigui, one could easily observe how the latter 
have strategically evolved in response to a demand for new highly skilled labouring 
subjects. 
From flexible citizens to flexible haigui  
The haigui have been key figures in the Chinese urban landscape. As “high quality” 
citizens, the haigui have been promoted in official state campaigns, the media and in 
academic discourses. In 2002, just prior to the 16th National Congress of the CCP, a 
report employed the term haigui as an official category. The party’s intention was to 
mark the emergence of the haigui group as a key indicator of China’s major 
achievements over the preceding five years (Wong, Wang and Sun 2006, 294). 
Chinese government institutions, such as the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
and other state-related research centres, have published numerous studies on haigui 
thereby acknowledging their fundamental role as valued and valuable committed 
talents supporting the country’s development (Li 2007). One of the most prominent 
exponents of the haigui’s key role in China’s development is Wang Huiyao, who is 
himself a successful haigui holding multiple business and economic degrees from 
some of the most prestigious universities in Canada, the UK and the US. Wang Huiyao 
holds a senior fellow position at the prestigious Harvard Kennedy School, yet his 
career take off was not abroad but in China. After his return to Beijing in the late 1990s, 
he built a new field of study that reflected on his personal experience as a haigui. His 
Wikipedia page, available in both English and Chinese, states that he has published 
over 30 books and 100 papers on haigui (Wang, n.d.). 
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It was his experience of overseas education rather than his actual business knowledge 
that positioned him as a top Chinese expert in talent recruitment and haigui. In Beijing 
he founded the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG), a think-tank and research 
institute that serves as a consultant to the Chinese government on the implementation 
of haigui polices and as a research centre for global business media and international 
government agencies such as the OECD. Moreover, in 2015 Wang Huiyao was among 
the top Chinese scholars and experts receiving appointment certificates to the 
Counsellors Office of the State Council from the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. As 
stated on the CCG website “Dr. Wang was the only representative from a Chinese 
think tank included in this select group” (Centre for China and Globalisation, 2015). 
Wang’s success is connected to the “bridging function” haigui are expected to embody 
once back from abroad. This bridging function is central to the policies aimed at 
reversing the Chinese “brain drain,” in favour of “brain circulation,” where emigrants 
who acquire experience and expertise abroad can benefit their home country 
(Saxenian, 2006; Chen 2008). From a Chinese perspective, Wang is considered a 
strategic expert with solid connections and a reliable source of information coming 
from the most powerful political American centres. He is an adviser to the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing and the Director of China 
Overseas Friendship Association of the Ministry of United Front. He acts as a trusted 
intermediary. On his English-language Wikipedia page, Wang wears a suit, has a 
fashionable haircut, a calm self-confident expression, a smiling face, a relaxed posture 
and presents a globalised cosmopolitan image. On the think-tank website, he appears 
in a picture with premier Li Keqiang, where he conforms to the austere aesthetic 
tradition of CCP leaders. Together with the premier, Wang stands still and rigid, a red 
Chinese traditional painting in the background. In this image, Wang matches the 
attributes that define the Chinese aesthetics of technocracy that I described in chapter 
1. He personifies both powerful and prestigious expertise within the Chinese political 
structure and the celebrated aesthetics of an influential state technocrat.  
Of Wang’s astonishing number of publications, only two are in English: Globalising 
China: The Influence, Strategies and Successes of Chinese Returnees (2012) and 
Entrepreneurial and Business Elites of China: The Chinese Returnees Who Have 
Shaped Modern China (2011). These present an inventory of success stories from top 
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overseas returnees who have made noteworthy contributions to the Chinese economy 
and have been rewarded for choosing to return. One of his books consists of 
biographies of what he calls “the men and women elites who mattered” (Zhang, Wang 
and Alon 2011, xxv). In the list a few names, mostly from successful internet-based 
companies, are often mentioned. Robin Li, co-founder of China's most popular search 
engine, Baidu; Wang Zhidong, founder of the biggest Chinese online media company, 
Sina; Charles Zhang, chairman and current CEO of Sohu, the second most popular 
internet company in China; Deng Zhonghan, co-founder of China's largest multimedia 
semiconductor technology company, Vimicro Corporation; and Zhou Yunfan, co-
founder of China's largest online alumni club, ChinaRen. 
It is undeniable that in the last twenty years these haigui have been strategically 
encouraged to deploy the expertise they brought home to start their own innovative 
businesses. These “technopreneurs” (gaokeji qiyejia) represent a successful wave of 
haigui who seized the moment when China opened up to new emerging global 
economic models and a knowledge information economy, which it nevertheless 
adapted and domesticated. The much-celebrated success of these haigui is undeniably 
constituted by multiple factors including their experience of the global market, their 
entrepreneurial talent, and the support of the state. In addition, Chinese internet-based 
companies benefit not only from the large size of the Chinese domestic market, but 
also of the exemptions and protection they are granted from global competition—
because of the Chinese language factor and national censorship regulations. Yet, I 
would argue, a key point in the success of this wave of returnees remains their function 
as “decant ponds.” These haigui rejected a mere “bridging” role and instead embodied 
a “filtering” role between the West and China. The haigui decant the foreign content 
they bear, exposing it to a filtering process which removes any elements unwanted by 
domestic configurations of knowledge and expertise. These haigui have consciously 
and unconsciously skimmed off and discard unsuitable parts of foreign elements in the 
process of conforming to the Chinese aesthetic of technocracy. Through this modality, 
this wave of haigui, in search of the state’s acknowledgment and the granting of a new 
social economic status, achieved the approval of the state because they strengthened 
national belonging, and supported the state’s attempts to preserve patriotic values 
congruent with the “dream of Chinese renaissance” (zhongguo fuxing zhimeng).  
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An uncomfortable “bridging function” 
As explained by the examples above, the haigui emerge as highly relevant figures 
because they are specialists in the economic sectors that modern China is developing. 
Alongside their technical expertise, it is also their international experience and 
familiarity with foreign business environments that confer on them additional value as 
indispensable intermediaries and consultants. The haigui are perceived to be the best 
qualified to represent China in international forums, trade negotiations and scientific 
symposiums, or to introduce foreign business and technical innovation into the 
country. In addition, the same capacities required to smooth contacts within the 
professional milieu (self-management, mastery of foreign languages, familiarity with 
international customs and etiquette, personable manners) are promptly exported to 
business tout court, and even used to camouflage Chinese flaws and shortcomings. As 
evidence of this, and as Wang Huiyao’s writing from the depicts the haigui as the best 
intermediaries for developing Chinese business relationships and projects with the rest 
of the world. Titles from this seemingly limitless genre include China Migration Tide: 
How China Can Keep its Talent Home, National Strategy–Talents Change World 
(2012) and Talent War–The Competition for the Most Scarce Resources in the World 
(2009) (Wang Huiyao 2014). 
Moreover, the haigui play further roles in additional fields. Most foreign companies 
and financial institutions seeking business in China are favourably disposed to relying 
on haigui because they studied in their countries of origin and can speak their foreign 
language, while still understanding local customs, which all serves to facilitate 
networking with Chinese contacts. Above all, the haigui can explain how to do 
business in China. Conversely, Chinese companies that expand their business out of 
China entrust haigui with various communication roles. International agencies like the 
World Bank or the OECD, as well as international media outlets, often report on the 
hunger for “reassuring” news on the Chinese economy. Such reports reflect anxieties 
and frustration emanating from official financial data released by the Chinese 
government—which is often depicted as unreliable—and the scepticism surrounding 
murky investment procedures in China. Despite the extension of business and cultural 
exchange, the establishment of joint-ventures and intensive merger and acquisition 
operations, reassurance is never sufficient. 
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The mantra coming from foreign media (see in particular Forbes 2009), international 
institutions such as the UN (see United Nations Chronicle 2013), multinational 
corporations operating in China, and from entrepreneurs seeking to establish their 
businesses has been distrust of Chinese ways of operating. This can be imputed to 
protectionist barriers against foreign investment—for instance, the peculiar structure 
of the Chinese stock market, as I will detail later, means foreigners are only allowed 
to buy a small percentage of Chinese stock shares. The distrust is also due to the 
persistence of insider trading, the lack of national supervisory authorities 
with impartial and transparent powers, the lack of protections in terms of intellectual 
property rights, the unreliability of national statistics, the pervasiveness of guanxi, and 
the prevalence of employee job-hopping. Against the backdrop of this lack of trust, the 
haigui acquire an increasingly prominent role.  
At the time of China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, international institutions also 
started celebrating the role of the haigui. Several reports and working papers from 
international organisations such as the UN and the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) stressed the importance of talent acquisition as a 
crucial competing factor for Shanghai’s candidature as a global city (see IMD 2000): 
“Despite economic and trade liberalisation, one major critique for Shanghai and other 
Chinese cities is a lack of openness. This stems from the tight control under the ruling 
communist political system. Openness is not only reflected in economic terms, but also 
socially and culturally. However, the lack of human capital for Shanghai is in fact a 
national phenomenon” (Shen, 2010).  
According to this discourse, the lack of human capital in Shanghai is a bottleneck for 
sustainable economic development in China (McKinsey 2005). Yet, as I will specify 
below, the Chinese job market is incapable of absorbing such an abundance of human 
capital. Especially in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, there is an excess of haigui 
who cannot find suitable job positions (Zweig and Han 2011). Successful haigui in 
Wang Huiyao’s book differ from the ones I interviewed in Shanghai. Most of the first 
wave were expatriated in the late 1980s, and returned to China in the late 1990s or 
early 2000s. At this time, China’s participation in globalisation was still an emerging 
phenomenon. Consequently, haigui with novel expertise from abroad were still 
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considered a necessary asset for leading the pioneering projects of Chinese 
marketisation. Furthermore, during those years, the haigui were still few in number.  
The scenario has drastically changed today. If we look at the numbers, China has sent 
1.92 million students and scholars overseas since 1978, but, as of 2007, only 630,000, 
around one quarter, have returned to China, a figure that nevertheless represents a 
remarkable achievement for the government’s “call to return” policies (Xinhua 2011). 
In contrast, from 2009 onwards, the current total number of haigui was over 600,000. 
This increase has been largely due to the financial crisis in developed countries, where 
Chinese students were hoping to undertake their careers but were forced to return to 
China because of rising unemployment rates in those countries. By the end of 2014, 
the number of Chinese students who had studied overseas and returned to China 
reached more than 1 million (Global Times 2015). During the local internet boom, the 
returnees were haigui “sea turtles riding waves ashore” because of their successful 
careers in startup companies (China Daily 2004). Now, they have been downgraded to 
haidai “seaweed,” a word with the same pronunciation of ‘‘return from overseas and 
wait for a job” and which moreover “conveys the image of floating around without 
being able to settle” (Shen and Xiao 2009, 516). The prestige of the haigui has 
depreciated because of their increased numbers and increased competition, which 
results in fewer success stories. An article published in China Daily (2004) explained 
how in recent years “many employers are chagrined to find out that some of those put 
on a pedestal turned out to be high on rhetoric and low on performance. This is coupled 
with a new wave of students who basically gilded their resumes by attending less-than-
reputable overseas schools or easy-to-get certificate programs. They have been blamed 
for the sudden drop of quality of sea turtles.” The authors offer eight tips to the haigui: 
 
1. Get rid of the sense of superiority and be prepared to compete on 
an equal footing; 2. Don't limit the choice of your job location to the 
few metropolises; 3. Don't calculate your salary request by the cost of 
your overseas education, but by the market rate of the position you're 
seeking; 4. Don't assume that the area of specialty that you majored in 
is still in high demand when you graduate; 5. Fluency in foreign 
languages alone does not usually constitute a full slate of job skills. 
One needs hands-on experience in a specific field; 6. Be ready to adapt 
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your Western way of thinking to the Chinese way of making things 
happen; 7. Knowing the market is not just window dressing. It is 
essential. Developing what you're best at regardless of market needs 
may land you in a dead end; 8. Be prepared to make a leap of 
confidence and settle down in China. Managing a business by ‘remote 
control’ from abroad is not practical. (China Daily 2004) 
 
The “depreciation” of haigui is hardly surprisingly within the context of contemporary 
capitalism. One could say that China’s accelerated transition towards a knowledge 
economy and immaterial labour, at least in urban areas, has inevitably led to a 
precarious job market and unemployment, which many other countries are 
experiencing under late capitalism. Increasing numbers of young people are struggling 
to find and keep jobs, regardless of the qualifications they hold. Following Marx, one 
could say that there is nothing new in these circumstances, as they have accompanied 
every capitalist transition. As Marx writes, “the surplus-population becomes the lever 
of capitalistic accumulation,” a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of 
production (Marx 1967, 784). 
Yet, I argue, in the case of the haigui we encounter a different condition to that of an 
army of surplus labour. It is certainly true that the surplus of haigui within the Chinese 
market has caused a devaluation of their earning potential in the labour market and in 
recent years they have been less sought after. However, this is not always the case. 
What at first glance might appear to be a labour surplus due to a surfeit of haigui can 
also be the result of a state-driven “exclusion” of haigui from certain job positions, 
particularly in state-controlled enterprises. Most haigui in the past have joined foreign-
owned or private enterprises and universities, while only a few have been able to enter 
the CCP and government bodies. According to data compiled by the Nangfang 
Zhoumo (Southern Weekly) in 2014, only a tiny percentage of 169 officials at 
ministerial level or above have studied overseas. Furthermore, the Global Times 
reported: “Employers’ concerns over political orientation of and information breach 
by overseas returnees are allegedly among the factors that prevent the entry of these 
talents into the party or the government. Li Miao (pseudonym), a student from Renmin 
University of China, planned to join a master's course on national conflict overseas 
and work in a committee on minorities after returning to China. But his wish was 
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quenched when his dean told him that it was difficult for an overseas returnee to work 
in an organ concerning state security” (2015). 
In this respect, I will argue that a hierarchy of factors (discipline in which expertise is 
attained, location of study, desired job positions, year of return) determine the success 
of the haigui once back in China. One of the findings of my research is that the haigui 
who have studied in Australia (which as I explain in chapter 3 is categorised as a Level 
C country for study abroad) and are seeking a job in the financial sector (a sector which 
is particularly susceptible and subject to government control) are located at the bottom 
of the haigui hierarchy.  
In the next section, I will show how the jobs my interviewees expected to find upon 
their arrival in China had already been allocated to a locally-graduated elite. The 
inability to find their desired jobs represents a first rupture in the haigui’s recall from 
abroad, which reveals it to be a false enticement. The effects of this cannot be 
underestimated. In fact, I maintain that the state fostering of study abroad policies 
serves a political purpose far more than an economic purpose, and that is to preserve 
and enhance Chineseness during the absorption of foreign content. I will show how 
this strategy is implemented through the creation of laboratories for the domestication 
of foreign expertise such as science and technology parks.  
From financial education to creative destruction 
One of the main devices for the Chinese regime’s selective governance of the 
oversupply of skilled human capital is the science and technology park. These 
institutions have been particularly active in attracting Chinese haigui in management 
and in research and development. The Chinese launch of the science park as a 
laboratory of hi-tech innovation and creativity explicitly referenced the Silicon Valley 
model (Guigu, the Chinese name for “Silicon Valley,” which also means “hi-tech area 
for the development of patents”). Gradually, these hubs appeared on the edges of all 
Chinese university campuses (Macdonald and Deng 2004). In the last decade, new 
government offices in charge of the management and administration of science and 
technology parks solely for haigui have developed ex novo. In this sense, the state has 
enlarged itself with additional functions to tailor a specific and cultivated returnee 
labour force from abroad. Chinese governments at various levels have established 
more than 110 returnee entrepreneurial parks throughout the country, and “by 2008, 
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over 8,000 start-up businesses had been established in these parks with over 20,000 
Chinese haigui involved” (Wang 2014). Zhongguancun, a suburban area in Beijing 
that is known as China’s Silicon Valley, has more than 9,800 haigui and approximately 
4,350 tech ventures (Zhao and Zhu, 2009; Chen, 2008). By adopting these parks as 
drivers for local economic growth and as an environment for the clustering of 
innovation and creativity, China has followed the example of public administrators 
and city planners worldwide. As defined by the International Association for Science 
Parks and Areas of Innovation (IASP), science parks are “an initiative for the 
establishment and growth of technology-based enterprise formally and operationally 
linked to at least one centre of technical expertise, an organisation which provides 
management support for its tenant companies” (IASP 2000). 
The discourse of creativity has been equally promoted internationally as an engine for 
economic development and growth (UNESCO 2004). In these parks, innovation and 
creativity (in an impressive variety of Chinese equivalents: chuangyi, chuangzao, 
chuangxin, chuangzuo) are the theoretical keystones of technical and economic 
development. According to the Chinese vulgate— i.e. the Chinese version of 
Wikipedia, Baike (2014a) — the concept of “creativity” is deeply rooted in Chinese 
tradition. One of the first manifestations is in the works of the Chinese philosopher 
Wang Chong (27-97 BC) who, like Confucius, wrote his history “with creativity,” in 
order to accommodate old content for his contemporary context (Wang 1962). 
Contemporary use of the word “creative” in China is understood as part of the 
“cultural,” a term which is historically compromised, and easily strays into politics. 
“Creative,” instead, is unsullied by historical or political connotations and refers 
directly to the income-earning economy (O’Connor and Gu, 2006, 275). “Creative” 
could be used to refer to the huge state investment funds for industry, while culture 
seems to be condemned to a permanent scarcity of investments. The transition from 
“Made in China” to “Created in China” reveals the Chinese embrace of an abstract 
creation that nevertheless constitutes the contemporary economy in its financialised 
form.  
As I will show, an increasing number of haigui are attracted by discourses of creativity 
and innovation, and are therefore drawn to the parks. The Zhangjiang High-Tech Park 
in Shanghai, one of the first of its kind, was established in 2000 within the Pudong 
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Special Economic Zone (SEZ), a zone set up to favour foreign investment, free market-
oriented economic policies, and a flexible regulatory and administrative setting with 
financial incentives. (In chapter 4 I will explain how the Pudong zone has assumed a 
crucial role in the launch of Chinese financial capitalism.) Thanks to its status as an 
SEZ, Zhangjiang High-Tech Park has, since opening in 2000, been able to attract 2200 
multinational and domestic companies and investments totalling 10 billion yuan. A 
proliferation of incubators, sponsored by Chinese government bodies, mix with 
numerous large Chinese and multinational companies (Walcott 2002). Among them 
are Revlon, GE, IBM, Novartis, AstraZeneca, QIAGEN, Linyang Electronics and, 
Lixiang Energy. Companies here are engaged in research and innovation in high-tech 
sectors such as Internet technology, software development, pharmaceuticals, and 
genetic testing. In contrast to earlier SEZs established along the coast, Zhangjiang 
entails a new and different regime of governance. This zone largely transcends the role 
of an investment site. As stated by Ong: “in contrast to the first Chinese SEZ, where 
the emphasis is on low-tech production and cheap labour, Shanghai and its 
surroundings are to become urban jewels in the Chinese capitalist crown, the sites of 
the stock market, high technology and urban glamour” (2009, 108).  
The Zhangjiang park could be considered one of the most experimental, as well as 
most exclusive spaces, in Chinese finance, a jewel that shines in that “Chinese 
capitalist crown.” It represents an exclusive and glamorous oasis in which foreign and 
Chinese capital and labour are invested in cutting edge research for the future with few 
legal restrictions. But an oasis can also be a “golden cage.” Here, the logic of 
“graduated sovereignty” or “differential inclusion”—and therefore “exclusion from 
the rest”—guarantees a filtered and bordered pre-determined space for foreign agents 
and haigui. This is paradigmatically reflected in the subjectivity of the haigui, where 
the embrace of exclusivity is expressed as an idealised, existential dimension. On the 
community blog of the Chemistry Worldwide association, a Chinese haigui graduate 
from the University of Boston talks about his experience in the Zhangjiang park. With 
enthusiasm he encourages more haigui like him to join his workplace: 
 
Not long ago, you could often see a scene like this in a Legend Square 
restaurant near the metro of Zhangjiang High Tech Park (Zhangjiang): 
A table of “sea turtle” (haigui) and “earth turtle” (natives) drug 
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discovery scientists arguing over the key mechanism of a specific G 
Protein Coupled Receptor (GPCR) while enjoying their beers. Someone 
in the group suggests asking a friend from across the street, who is an 
expert in that area, to comment on their discussion; when they realised 
the person they are looking for is seated in the same restaurant… 
However, lately it is becoming less likely to have these interesting 
chance encounters. Where did the people go? Is Zhangjiang suffering 
from a lack of talents? Absolutely not. Over the last six months, the 
French franchise supermarket Auchan, Chamtime Square, and Huizhi 
International Business Centre have all started to operate in the area. 
Zhangjiang scientists now have more dining choices so the chances for 
them to bump into each other have decreased. After ten years of high-
speed, centralised development, Zhangjiang is now dense with global 
R&D centres, top Chinese Universities and research institutes, and 
thousands of start-ups. As you can see, even Zhangjiang’s shopping 
malls kept up with the pace of development. So to the scientists and 
industry talents, even if you think you don’t like Chinese food or fear 
that Chinese shoes won’t fit your feet; please do not hesitate to come to 
Zhangjiang. You will witness the growth of the drug discovery and IT 
technology fields and you won’t even have to give up your familiar 
comforts from home. (ACS 2015) 
 
Multiple layers emerge from this comment: the friction between haigui and locally 
graduated experts and the enthusiasm of working and living in a technologically 
advanced, dynamic, non-place detached from the rest of the city. Ultimately, the 
perception is that such a heterotopia is an advantage, a space of oblivion from 
traditional notions and practices of belonging. After their return, the haigui are 
excluded from their former modes of belonging to the point of fearing them. After their 
experience abroad, their Chineseness is lived as an alien element to refuse, feeding a 
further psychological estrangement at odds with the enticements the state confers in 
order to attract them back. Therefore the park welcomes them, and ensures them the 
protection of a favourable and friendly environment. As proudly stated in the science 
and technology park introductory manifesto (in the introductory page of the park’s 
website): “Talents are key to building Shanghai Science and Technology Innovation 
Centre. Among them, the overseas high-end technological talents are an important part 
… With the improvement of development environment, the intention of overseas 
talents who return to China and apply for a job is also under transition at the same 
time. They previously considered foreign companies more and now turned to domestic 
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enterprises, and also changed from employment type talents into entrepreneurial type 
ones” (Zhangjiang 2015). 
According to the park’s records, 4500 overseas students work in 550 enterprises. These 
students have been persuaded to return to Shanghai by a government program called 
the “Thousand Talents Program” which confers privileges like those of the urban 
hukou. (I talk more about this program in the next chapter.) The Zhangjiang high-tech 
park model has been reproduced in other Chinese cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Suzhou, and foreign expertise is provided by the haigui. For some 
(Naughton 2007; Saxenian 2002) the state policy of brain circulation has been 
successful, as haigui can contribute to knowledge upgrades and best practice 
technological transfers. Referring to the Chinese context, Saxenian suggests that prior 
episodic knowledge from developed commercial markets can enable returning 
entrepreneurs to transfer the relationships and the processes of technological 
entrepreneurship to a new institutional context and build partnerships with distant 
customers (2006). 
However, this is not always the case. Chen Yun-Chung argues that, while in other 
countries brain circulation might succeed, China poses multiple obstacles. His findings 
from an extended study of Zhongguancun Park in Beijing reveal a different scenario 
to the one described by Saxenian. He states that “only experienced haigui, who manage 
transnational networks and have local institutional connections have sizeable impact 
on technological development” (2008, 14). In my case study of haigui employed in the 
financial sector, I drew similar conclusions. In the following chapter, I highlight how 
it is local liaisons in the form of guanxi (connection of influence within the party-
state), not technical competences, which play a determinant role in the capacity of 
haigui to situate themselves in the Shanghai financial market. At this particular 
juncture, which is characterised by financial capital accumulation, the Chinese state 
has had to quickly update itself with a new apparatus of expertise. Mainly coming from 
abroad, financial expertise is now considered the most prominent among the array of 
expertise in the science and technology parks. In less than 20 years, China had to 
furnish the Chinese market with a new banking system, a credit system, a stock market, 
a security commission and global financial representative organs, almost from scratch. 
Alongside the process of capitalisation the ascendancy of shareholder value 
84 
outweighed and gradually surpassed the potency generated through trade and 
commodity production. China is therefore in need of new financial instruments to 
increase its capital market.  
The website for Zhangjiang announces that “financial development is key for the 
success of the park. Financial firms have to settle in the park, providing important 
support for Zhangjiang hi-tech park to become a science and technology venture 
investment centre and science and technology financial innovation centre” 
(Zhangjiang Park 2015). There, I met Qian and Jianguo, two haigui with degrees from 
the University of Queensland working in a Chinese venture capital firm. In contrast to 
their colleagues in other sectors, Qian and Jianguo were not thrilled by their jobs at 
Zhangjiang Park.31 They told me that their salaries were low, and that they wanted to 
move as they saw little opportunity for a career there. During our conversation, they 
expressed their frustration as they had expected a more exciting job than the one they 
presently held which consisted of statistical analysis and company evaluations. 
Furthermore, they told me that decisions regarding which firms they would fund or 
support were ultimately made by government officials. They told me that Chinese 
venture capitalists must carefully consider the government factor in every move they 
take. In contrast, they were eager to free themselves from such constraints, to 
experiment and do other things like building new financial tools for higher investment 
return and optimising the company for higher investment performance.  
Like their peers employed in other sectors, they were equally aimed at self-
entrepreneurship, and were thus willing to flow into the park and contribute to the 
grand projects pre-arranged by local administrations (at regional, provincial and 
municipal levels) to welcome them. The parks are indeed attractive to haigui as sites 
where they can converge. However, both Qian and Jianguo were unable to achieve 
their hopes to within the state pre-arranged projects (where political conditioning and 
profiteering largely contaminate the technical sides), so they could not find a 
challenging career. For them, the park was a dead-end from which they wanted to 
escape. Despite the promise of cutting edge, innovative and creative workplaces 
                                                 
 
31 Interview with Qian and Jianguo, 8 June 2013. Shanghai.  
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offering invaluable potential—Zhangjiang is one of the top science and technology 
parks in China—and being hired for their acquired expertise, recruits with a financial 
degree from abroad were overlooked, disregarded, and unhallowed in their desire to 
communicate or put into action their skills or creativity.  
The failures the haigui encounter are manifold. They had to face their lack of 
awareness that development projects launched in the science and technology parks 
were primarily the result of local political alliances, and resource allocations that were 
developed accordingly. They also had to face the fact that technical solutions for 
driving financial development forward were matched with a “creativity” which 
amounted to a fetish worshipped by neoliberal discourse, but did not necessarily mean 
imaginative and inventive work. Finally, this lack of awareness was compounded by a 
sense of entitlement to innovative jobs, which turned out to be largely unattainable. 
Finance, writes Max Haiven, is often depicted as an incredibly creative sector, offering 
and requiring “a staggering reactor of human creativity, a playground of the mind” 
(2014b, 113). Yet, he suggests, the hollowness of the term allows it to transmit and 
reinforce the implicit neoliberal orthodoxy (Haiven 2014a, 132). For this reason 
“[s]ome of the finest and most refined minds of each successive generation are cherry-
picked by hedge funds, investment banks, and their institutional periphery to dream up 
ever more rapid, cunning, and diabolical ways to make money out of money” (Haiven 
2014b, 113). Yet, in China, the haigui trained abroad in finance are the ones who suffer 
the most painful disillusionment. The training to which a new and expanded neoliberal 
education is predisposed, culminates in the rationality of “creative finance,” which is 
brutally undermined by the contradictions unfolding in that term “creative.” For 
Haiven, the contradiction lies between finance’s particular institutional creativity and 
its systemic anti-creativity. To be sure, the vast majority of work in the financial sector 
is profoundly uncreative (endless number crunching and paper pushing, meticulous 
research on economic sectors and investments, frenetic digital trading and power 
brokering (2014b, 113). 
Instead, creativity, in addition to being, as outlined before, a channel of realignments 
and reallocations of political influence and a neoliberal fetish, also involves “the 
constant need to revolutionise renew and recast” (Haiven 2014a, 131). It is, therefore, 
the bitter enemy of the contemporary Chinese political configuration, which is ruled 
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by compromise, bargaining and collusion. In its refusal to be seriously applied, 
financial creativity unleashes an irredeemable contradiction. An example is the 
“creative destruction of wealth” that the sector keeps reproducing, and which financial 
turmoil in China in the summer of 2015 seems to confirm. I will discuss this issue 
further in chapter 5. Nevertheless, here this argument serves to anticipate how the 
Chinese state has tackled such a “contradictorily creative” paradigm in the drive for 
economic growth and financialisation. Such a “contradictory nature” is embodied in 
the subjectivities of the Chinese haigui. 
Yet there is more to it than this contradiction. In the following chapters I will argue 
that the underemployment of haigui is more the result of the Chinese state’s concern 
to defuse and prevent haigui knowledge from weakening the grasp of the ruling class. 
In so doing, the state’s power over the financial market, which I define in the form of 
an ecology of financial expertise, is seeking to acquire financial expertise through a 
dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. Many the haigui with a financial degree are 
strategically included in the confined space of science and technology parks. However, 
if the haigui’s expertise is utilised through technical and subordinate tasks, it is also 
filtered and neutralised in its “creative” potential. In this sense the haigui remain 
excluded from taking the managerial and entrepreneurial positions they aspire and 
have been trained for. This highlights the contradictions in the production of haigui 
through policies that foster them aboard and bring them back. In the next chapter I will 
show in more detail how competition with the bearers of guanxi—those professionals 
who have privileged access as members of the ruling class—excludes haigui from a 
large segment of the job market.  
Finally, in order to join the global capitalist order, the Chinese state has produced a 
way to learn from the existing and established rules, and re-engineer them, thereby 
orchestrating its operations gradually, differentially, and selectively. In continuity with 
the dialectic foreign expertise/Chinese knowledge, the creation of science and 
technology parks has been a powerful strategy to domesticate foreign expertise, to 
make Shanghai a “financial” global city and in turn to advance the Chinese position 
within financial capitalism. China has become a powerful global player. However, this 
is a game in which lesser players are not mere pawns. Players like the haigui are new 
subjectivities, living in between and across these new contingent configurations, while 
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In this chapter I have investigated how the study abroad policy implemented by the 
Chinese state ends in the partial exclusion of the haigui with a degree in financial 
studies from a local and domesticated ecology of financial expertise, a milieu over 
which the state is seeking to preserve its control. First, through reference to a 
genealogy of Chinese student returnees, I highlighted the existence of continuity in the 
Chinese study abroad policies. Ever since the launching of the Chinese modernisation 
project in the nineteenth century, the shaping of experts has been functional to the 
satisfaction of state political needs. In the Maoist period, returnees were leveraged to 
the status of politically committed experts, necessary for accommodating foreign 
knowledge, but without posing a risk to the maintenance of Chineseness. 
Subsequently, I have also stressed how a caesura marks this genealogy. Since the 
depoliticisation following Deng’s reforms wiped out old political commitments such 
as unconditional faith in the socialism and supremacy of Maoism, the formation of 
experts has been inspired by the self-entrepreneurial, self-management practices 
required of China’s alignment with global capitalism.  
Secondly, by sketching the political features of the middle class, to which most haigui 
belong, I have shown how this class is vulnerable to the power of the party-state, but 
also animated by an abiding loyalty to it, while nurtured by a Chinese dream of 
enrichment. As members of this class, the haigui represent the “high quality 
population” (renkou suzhi) that Deng Xiaoping wanted. I have highlighted how the 
state has adopted a contradictory strategy towards this “high quality population.” 
Through governmental devices that govern the haigui at a distance, the state 
encourages the haigui to return by promising them access to the Chinese dream and to 
the aesthetic of technology. Through the strategy of “differential inclusion” the state 
contains haigui operations within exceptional and experimental areas like the hi-tech 
and science parks in order to domesticate foreign expertise.  
Thirdly, by drawing from both the literature and from the interviews conducted during 
my fieldwork, I have also shown that for haigui, and those with financial degrees in 
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particular, expectations regarding their careers are often deluded—at least on the 
evidence of their first few years back in China. Against their expectations, they are 
unable to unleash their financial creativity as a motor of development either for their 
country or for their own personal success. Instead, the haigui are constrained within a 
domestic ecology of financial expertise, which denies them access to decision-making 
and managerial positions.  
In this chapter, I have therefore maintained that while the state is seeking to foster 
expert subjects abroad for financial capitalism, once they are back it does not promote 
them to the status of technocrats. In the next chapter, I offer a specific observation of 
the subjectivities of the haigui who have studied financial-related subjects in Australia 
to demonstrate how jobs are reserved for the bearers of guanxi. As a response to this 
denial of jobs the haigui experience displacement, uncertainty, frustration, and 
ultimately renunciation of the domestic pre-arranged frame that allegedly welcomes 
them. I will argue that the tensions and frictions that develop for the haigui upon their 
return to China reflect the tensions and frictions that define the state’s involvement 
with contemporary financial capitalism. 
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Chapter 3  
Circuit of expertise 
Introduction  
Defined by creativeness, freedom, and fast money-making opportunities, nowadays a 
glamorous financial career has become part of the dream of an increasing number of 
Chinese students at home as well as abroad. Finance is one of the most sought-after 
disciplines to study abroad. In this thesis, from among the several possible choices 
available to haigui to shape their financial expertise abroad—in which the USA and 
the UK are the most sought after destinations—I examine the migratory regime 
between China and Australia. This chapter concerns Chinese returnees (haigui) who 
take a university degree in Australia (sometimes in economics or business 
administration, but mostly in accountancy, statistics and other applied financial 
disciplines) and return to Shanghai to look for a job in the financial sector. From this 
chapter onwards, when I refer to haigui, I will be referring to returnees from Australia. 
These are the subjects of my case study, whom I investigate in the final stage of their 
journey, when they return to Shanghai, the cornerstone of Chinese finance. I consider 
this stage of return not only to be the acme of the students’ circuit (China-Australia-
China/Shanghai), but also the most illuminating for shedding light on the inner 
conflicts of contemporary Chinese financialisation.  
In this chapter, three analyses are executed. The first, through the notion of circuit, 
provides an analytical framework for examining the cultural, social, economic, and 
political forces that shape the haigui’s migration process in its different stages. I define 
these stages as: motivation to migrate abroad, selection of Australia for studying, 
selection of finance as a discipline of study, and selection of Shanghai as a city to 
which to return. The migratory regime between China and Australia is “produced” by 
a new hierarchy of knowledge and skills under financial capitalism, whereby financial 
education is leveraged as a device for the filtering and selection of new Chinese 
labouring subjects, namely, financial experts. I argue that the relationship between the 
two countries under this regime offers a method of investigating the manner in which 
the Chinese state interacts with the dictates of financial global capitalism and its 
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hegemonic modes of education—partially adopting and partially refusing those 
dictates.  
Australia appears a convenient space for self-investment abroad because it provides 
an enticing allure: an English speaking education, an Anglophone business 
environment and a modernised and globalised setting. However, by examining the 
background of haigui, I demonstrate that migrating to Australia is not the result of a 
free and preferential choice but, rather, proceeds from an impasse, whereby a low score 
on the national university entrance exam (the so-called gaokao) prevents students from 
attending the top domestic universities in China, or prestigious universities in the US 
or UK. Furthermore, haigui study abroad is often financed through a creditor/debtor 
arrangement that is characteristically “Chinese,” that is to say, it is not only a monetary 
deal but a deal which carries many “non economical bonds,” such as pressure from the 
family, a need to show gratitude towards benefactors, and the necessity to return and 
repay the family as a patriotic duty.  
The second line of analysis undertaken in this chapter, demonstrates how these factors 
set students up for disappointment in the Chinese labour market. Once they return to 
Shanghai, the financial expertise that the haigui acquired in Australia often tends to be 
a “blunt weapon” because it is ineffective in fostering social mobility and economic 
gains. I show how this tension at the end of the circuit is due to a domestic 
configuration of power that poses multiple obstacles to the arrival of haigui in 
Shanghai. Shanghai is China’s global city par excellence in terms of finance and the 
site of the Chinese stock exchange. It is thus the most coveted location for haigui. In 
this city, however, haigui are confronted with fierce competition and an established 
social network—with its accompanying social privileges—that defines China’s 
ecology of financial expertise and is hard to penetrate. Here, financial institutions are 
mostly backed by the state, and are similarly hard to penetrate. In these circumstances, 
the most important asset for haigui is not their expertise, but their ability to establish 
social and political connections (guanxi). I highlight how this impasse reveals an 
intrinsic and contradictory dimension in the unitary nature of the state. It shows a 
process of “fragmentation” among its various apparatuses: the state education-
migration nexus which shapes the policies encouraging the haigui to migrate and 
return (ministry of education, local education offices, universities) conflicts with the 
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state finance nexus, which is a financial ecology that cannot easily accommodate 
expertise learnt abroad.  
Ultimately, given that the fieldwork for this study was conducted in Shanghai in 2013, 
this chapter situates the circuit of migration and education in a post-financial crisis 
climate. I observe how, at that particular time, amidst the popular distrust arising from 
the failure of financial expertise to predict the crisis, representatives of Australian 
university finance departments and business schools in Shanghai were organising 
promotional events to prevent a decrease in the flux of Chinese students to Australia. 
At such occasions, the business schools deployed a rhetoric aimed at restoring the 
image of their educational product, and at re-establishing a morality within which to 
teach future business leaders. I show that even if the haigui actively participated in the 
events organised by their almae matres, they were not interested in confronting or re-
habilitating their own expertise in the face of the crisis, but were there just for 
networking purposes. More significant than their frustration at not being able to 
advance their careers was their drive for self-realisation. At the end, the expertise they 
developed during their circuit to Australia and return to China was now unwanted and 
dismissed—not only for its incapacity to enhance a career, but also by a new rhetoric 
calling for a “moral restructuring.” 
The ambiguity of the China-Australia relationship  
In China’ s quest for a prominent role in the global financial scene, Australia’s 
education system—as part of its Anglophone education environment—provides a 
destination in which to obtain a degree to ease access to a globally, competitive market. 
In particular, since China’s recent involvement in the global process of capitalist 
accumulation driven by financial valorisation 32 —and in the wake of the GFC—
Australia’s financial solidity and its offer of economics and finance courses taught in 
English has been highly sought after by Chinese students (Evans, Burrit and Guthrie 
2014). From a Chinese perspective, Australia embodies the imaginary of Western 
                                                 
 
32 This defines the shift in capitalism in which “profits accrue primarily through financial channels 
rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005, 174; Aglietta 2009). 
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education, which still reflects “the symbol of modernity” (Sakai, 1998; Lin 2012). In 
this section, I show that, despite these favourable conditions, the haigui selection of 
Australia as a country of destination for studying is not an ideal one; it is, rather, a 
makeshift, consolatory choice for their incapacity to enter one of the best Chinese 
universities, or the more prestigious universities in the US or UK. Later in the chapter, 
I show how vicissitudes shape the haigui circuit of migration to Australia. Here, 
however, I also show how the outlook of haigui towards Australia might also be a 
reflection of the ambiguous relationship between China and Australia at the national 
level.  
Australia has long appeared to China as a land of opportunity. Chinese pioneers first 
migrated in large numbers to Australia during the nineteenth century gold rushes. In 
the early years after Australia’s 1901 Federation, Australia attempted to overcome its 
European marginality, sought to affirm its Western character or Britishness and, at the 
same time, wanted to assert its status as a nation state distinguishable from nearby 
colonised states (D’Cruz and Steele 2003; Williams 2003). Australia both transcended 
and reproduced an Occidental-Oriental binary, constantly shifting between two states 
of being, provoking hostility among neighbours by its past policy of “whiteness” while 
simultaneously reassuring them of their hybridity and situatedness in Asia, and of their 
policy of multiculturalism (Gibson 1992). In Chinese eyes, Australia achieved its 
modernity in the shadow of its colonial origins and on the margins of the West. 
Australia was considered an intermediary space where Chinese people could gain an 
appreciation of European ways. A brief but intriguing example of this attitude is the 
Chinese renaming of Canberra (officially transliterated in Chinese as Kanpeila) as 
Kanjing. The latter has the same ending, -jing (“capital city”), as Beijing and Nanjing. 
This appears to be a way of making a foreign place seem friendly, but also insinuates 
a metaphorical repossession (Sun 2002).  
On the other hand, from an Australian perspective, China has always represented a 
counterpart by which to measure its lack of Asian-ness. As Ien Ang and Jon Stratton 
explain, if Australia had not opened its borders to the rest of Asia, and shifted from an 
alternative Western identity towards a new Asian one, it probably would have come to 
be defined in terms of what Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in the 1970s, 
called “the white trash of Asia” (Ang and Stratton 1996, 28). While Australia has 
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recognised “Asia (China) as inextricably linked to (Australia’s) critical and political 
objectives,” it has been “unable to secure sufficient distance from the racial 
stereotyping” of Chinese in Australia (Rizvi 1997, 19). Even the policy of 
multiculturalism was produced in an attempt to restore a triumphant representation of 
the national self and seeking to discard part of its shameful, racist past (Ang and 
Stratton 1998). Therefore, the relationship with China was revived in a new fashion, 
reinforced by new economic interests, but still carrying elements of ambiguity due to 
its conflicted past.  
Nowadays, in the changing spatial form of contemporary capitalism (Samaddar 2015), 
I suggest both countries have tended to perceive one another as consolatory and 
relatively safe interlocutors, from which to accede, bring in, and use their reciprocal 
expertise within a regional scale. I maintain that the relationship between China and 
Australia shapes an “acclimated” region. By acclimatisation, I do not suggest a 
pacified and homogenous space where differences and conflicts are absent. Instead, I 
consider the shaping of a geographical and temporal configuration that has created its 
own processes within the parameters of a global division of labour. The China-
Australia relationship is powered by an unbalanced and uneven capitalistic 
development of the two countries and seems to be endorsed by a complementary 
interest rather than a competitive valorisation. In very simplistic terms, Australia 
exports raw materials for China’s industrial expansion and China boosts Australian 
cultural hegemony (English language, a familiarity with globalisation) by encouraging 
Chinese students to enrol in its universities. Yet, as suggested by Prasenjit Duara, 
“while global capitalism encourages the flow of labour, nation states have sought both 
to regulate and curb this flow by responding to a set of other interests including 
domestic affected working class, and constituencies based on racial nationalist 
ideologies” (Duara 2010, 979). 
Within financial capitalism, increasingly characterised by an immaterial and cognitive 
form of valorisation, I will show how a new hierarchy of knowledge and immaterial 
skills complicates and disrupts nation state control over labour. Circulating between 
China and Australia, the haigui embody the tensions produced by the involvement of 
nation states within financial capitalism. Here, if higher education emerges as a device 
for filtering the selection and return of new Chinese labouring subjects, namely, the 
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“financial experts,” these are not necessarily recognised as such. In this chapter, I 
outline the circuit of financial education, concerning Chinese students who attend 
Australian universities and return to Shanghai hoping to find a job in the Shanghai 
financial market. A circuit links the city of Shanghai—with its configuration as a 
special legislative and economic zone with an important role in boosting Chinese 
development—and Australia, as a nation state. A numerical congruence can assist our 
understanding: Shanghai has a population of 24 million; Australia a population of 23 
million. This circuit is designed to shape new emerging experts, and thus future 
labouring subjects, in the form of financial experts.  
Conceptualising circuits 
Nigel Thrift, building on the work of Paul du Gay et al. (1997), argues that cultural 
circuits of capital are motivated by a “thirst for information technology, expertise, and 
all kinds of infrastructure that is self-reinforcing the logic of capitalism” (2005, 26). 
For Thrift, today’s capitalism is “conjured into existence by the discursive apparatus 
of the cultural circuit of capital which, through the continuous production of 
propositional and prescriptive knowledge, has the power to make its theories and 
descriptions of the world come alive in new built form, new machines and new bodies” 
(2005, 11). 
The form of today’s knowledge economy, driving innovation, creativity and flexibility 
has, for Thrift, translated into the development of business schools, management 
consultants, management gurus and media that together constitute the “cultural circuit” 
of capitalism (Thrift 2005, 6), in which countries such as Australia and China 
participate. However, while China and Australia seek to navigate this sea of global 
capitalism—in part by strategically manipulating the haigui to match their own 
interests through the circuits they create—haigui, in their own way, divert from this 
ordained pattern, partly by pursuing their own autonomy and partly by submitting to a 
nationalist re-adaptation propagated by the Chinese state. As I will show, the 
movements of haigui are driven by a thirst for financial expertise that, on the one hand, 
leads them to form new subjectivities, but on the other, can lead to multiple tensions 
such as failed aspirations and a struggle with a self-entrepreneurial rationale that can 
be at odds with the propelled ideology of the Chinese state. Chinese students taught in 
Australia are viewed as strategic assets for positioning China in the global financial 
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environment. Once such students return to China they are recognised as worthy 
citizens deserving rights and privileges. As previously explained, the Chinese state 
encourages the students to return using specific national plans (see chapter 2), and the 
provision of an urban hukou (resident permit).  
The haigui, leaving their country to study abroad, are subjected to a global level of 
competition, triggered by a capital drive for lower wage economies, which has in turn 
pushed many countries to redefine themselves as both knowledge- and finance-based. 
In their analysis of financial capitalism, Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma claim that 
circuits reveal how global financial capital expands to become “precisely the tool of 
integration of multiple different and heterogeneous cultural realities” (Lee and LiPuma 
2002, 208). In order to circulate, financial capital needs infrastructure such as 
information technology, data sets, computer power and talents. Diverse sites, which 
are, or aspire to become, potential landing grounds for financial capital expansion, 
compete in a “global rush for technological training and education paralleling the 
expansion of global equity markets” (2002, 2008). The outcome of such a process, 
however, does not necessarily translate into an increasing homogenisation of 
knowledge in dealing with financial instruments. On the contrary, the multiple, 
cultural, economic and social disparity in accessing, processing and implementing the 
conditions capital expansion requires (information, education and technology), often 
tend to reinforce and reproduce knowledge asymmetries. Significant gaps in the 
distribution of this expertise often remains. 
As potential experts involved in the circuits, the haigui are caught up in the 
asymmetrical forms of knowledge production and patterns of labour relations that 
define China and Australia. I therefore suggest that the production of haigui 
subjectivities—which involves the development of a new financial rationale and a new 
set of career ambitions and expectations—evolves in this gap. The circuit has emerged 
as a new socio-spatial connection, and categories like state, class, nation, race and 
ethnic divisions compete and complement within this new continuum to distinctively 
“situate” a subject. The circuit “forges translocal connections and creates 
translocalities that increasingly sustain new modes of being-in-the world” (Smith 
2005, 236). Accordingly the ambitions, expectations and desires of the haigui are also 
reconfigured through the contingent “socio-economic opportunities, political 
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structures, or cultural practices found at some point in their circuit” (Smith 2001, 5). 
My focus will be on the final stage of the circuit. 
As I have previously underlined, and as I will further discuss in the next chapter (which 
focuses on Shanghai), finding a job in Shanghai with an Australian degree is not easy. 
Competition among haigui has grown dramatically in the last ten years. Shanghai, as 
the most dynamic financial centre, has received most of them (Global Times 2012). In 
particular, in the financial sector, many haigui I met had to wait months before finding 
a position. They had to repeatedly circulate their CV, and attend job interviews, job 
fairs and, most importantly, networking events, the latter “to build connections.” As 
they explained, they faced tight competition. Again, the ones ahead in the queues, the 
ones “deserving” a good job position were their “smarter” peers: the ones who had 
studied at the best Chinese universities, were part of the Chinese elite or had graduated 
from the best American universities like Harvard or Stanford and returned to Shanghai 
in the wake of the unemployment wrought by the financial crisis. As Xue, a haigui 
who graduated from Melbourne University, told me: “So far I have spent 5 months 
sending my CV to financial companies, but I had little luck. You know, the 
competition is very high. There are many haigui who have studied in the USA in 
Shanghai: they are really smart. But also people from Fudan, the best University here 
in Shanghai. They are all very qualified and they have good guanxi.”33 
Xue’s search for a job in Shanghai was impeded by strenuous competition. However, 
in line with other literature on the topic (Xiang and Shen 2009; Hao and Welch 2012), 
my interviewees were deeply deluded by the lack of opportunities given their foreign 
acquired expertise. Instead they expected to be granted a position in a Chinese financial 
institution with privileged labour conditions. Furthermore, a common complaint which 
emerged in most of my conversations with the haigui concerned the difficulty of 
finding a good job in financial institutions without guanxi. Before examining my 
conversations with the haigui, it is important to recall and better elucidate the meaning 
of guanxi. The literal translation is “connection of influence,” that is, a personal 
relationship, often disguised, or even underhanded, aimed at personal gain. According 
                                                 
 
33 Interview with Xue, 12 April 2013, Shanghai. 
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to Henry Yuhai He, guanxi “is commonplace in China, whether in the fields of 
economics, social activities, or one’s personal life, though this practice is condemned 
as a manifestation of ‘unhealthy tendencies’ ... the best guanxi is often provided by 
those from the so called ‘princes clique’, those children of high ranking officials who 
occupy key position[s] in state-operated industry and commerce, army enterprises, or 
private companies” (He 2001, 695-696). 
A widespread rumour among common people, who paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, says 
that “guanxi is the ‘first important productive force’” (He, 696). Consequently, guanxi 
is not simple networking or public relations but is an authoritarian apparatus of co-
option used within the ruling class and based on an asymmetric do ut des (commutative 
contract), with the aim to preserve “the lion’s share” in any field for members of the 
ruling class and their affiliates. The pervasiveness of guanxi splits the population in 
two: those with guanxi and those without, or those with good guanxi and those with 
bad guanxi. And yet the contemporary definition of guanxi should not be essentialised 
or treated in an orientalist manner that is just considered an “orientalist gloss of 
networking” (Gold, Guthrie and Wank 2002). As put by Doug Guthrie, “there is 
nothing fundamentally Chinese about the concept of guanxi, as it is dependent on the 
structure of distributions systems, the structure of opportunities in the market, and the 
formality and stability of market institutions themselves” (Guthrie 2002, 38). 
Indeed, the extent to which guanxi matters is dependent on social and historical factors. 
In China’s communist regime, the praxis of guanxi (that is, an underhanded affiliation 
with the leaders of the preferred party) was common. For instance, the key targets of 
the Cultural Revolution were the zouzipai (people in power within the party who were 
following a capitalist road), who ruled the country using a guanxi network in spite of 
the statute of the party which forbade such favouritism (Ahn 1976). After Mao’s death, 
his inner clique were labelled sirenbang (gang of four) by their enemies in the party in 
order to define them as operating by means of underhanded guanxi-based affiliations 
(Yan and Gao 1996). 
In the transition to capitalism, with the CCP at the helm, a guanxi regime was utilised 
by business lobbies within the party to maintain moral allegiances and efficiencies. In 
this context, guanxi can even be appreciated for its capacity to establish complicity 
(that is, involvement in wrongdoing or conversely involvement in understanding). For 
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instance, Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie and David Wank highlight how guanxi is “an 
element of humanity to otherwise cold transactions [which] comes to the rescue in the 
absence of consistent regulations or guidelines for social conduct” (2004, 3). Willy 
Wi-Lap Lam, in his Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance or 
Regression, provides an illuminating example of the guanxi system at its highest level: 
“The daughter of the premier [Xi Jinping] Qiaoqiao has set up a large real-estate 
business in Beijing and Shenzhen. According to a mid-2012 report by the Bloomberg 
news agency, Xi’s siblings and other close relatives owned ‘investments in companies 
with total assets of $376 million; an 18 per cent indirect stake in a rare earth company 
with $1.73 billion in assets; and a $20.2 million holding in a publicly traded technology 
company.’ Qiaoqiao’s husband, Wu Long, is a wealthy telecommunication executive” 
(Lam 2015, 38). 
The guanxi relationship, based on its members’ asymmetrical proximity to power, 
strong interpersonal links, insouciance for the law and exclusive control over big 
business, emerges clearly. In its contemporary manifestation, guanxi is a pervasive 
system affecting the whole of China and its societies. Therefore, even the haigui need 
good guanxi with “middle-persons,” as the Chinese graduated students maintain 
guanxi with their previous professors and schoolmates, and so forth. Power is 
constantly active in the relationship and its pervasiveness means critics of its 
undemocratic nature remain silent. The example of Xi Jinping (since 2013 the 
Secretary General of the CCP and President of the People’s Republic) represents the 
acme of the guanxi distributive system which lies at the base of Chinese 
financialisation. 
As I will underline in chapter 5, since the late nineties, state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
previously responding to a centralised socialist economic system, were capitalised, 
restructured and re-engineered according to a new shareholding logic. This transition, 
formally narrated within a set of reforms to restructure, privatise and liberalise the 
market, were driven by “guanxi personalist ties within the new cadre-capitalist class 
that blurred the state/market boundary, leading to dispossession and the creation of 
conditions for accelerated capitalist growth” (Nonini 2008, 145). Accordingly, the 
process of financialisation was maintained whilst “preserving the position and 
legitimacy of the CCP, and, since the 1980s especially, consolidating the base of 
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economic accumulation of China’s ‘cadre-capitalist’ class” (Nonini 2008, 156). As 
underlined by Bat Batjargal and Mannie Liu in their extended study on private equity 
in China, “the state often plays [the] role of shareholder investor, fund manager and 
auditor of venture capital firms simultaneously. Thus, the boundaries of legality, 
ownership, and governance of venture capital firms in China are blurred” (2004, 159). 
The authors suggest that considering that a large quota of the “cash” that goes into 
private equity funds comes from government sources, “guanxi relationships with 
government officials are often regarded as a defining factor for securing government 
investments in venture capital funds.” They also add however that guanxi relationships 
are considered “more as a risk-mitigating device in venture capital investments rather 
than practices of nepotism in decision making” (160). 
It is interesting to notice how the presence of guanxi intertwines with and distinguishes 
the concept of risk within the economic sphere. In the Chinese financial market, the 
role of guanxi clashes with the notion of risk as analysed in Western reflexive society 
(Beck 1992; Giddens 1995). If, in the latter, the failure to mitigate risk led to the 
questioning of the role of experts and their expertise, in China, by contrast, what puts 
expertise at risk is the uncertainty arising by a lack of guanxi—because guanxi 
dominates the market and dictates the “rules of the game.” Instead of using their own 
expertise, actors within the Chinese financial sphere are forced to seek a social guanxi 
with the state or with state officials in order to be included “in the game.” These 
relations, though, are unlikely to be stable (Arnoldi and Lash 2011). The outcome is 
that a lack of guanxi can have catastrophic effects.  
The majority of the haigui interviewed in this research indicated very clearly that, in 
order to get the best positions, they believe they have to possess good guanxi: powerful 
parents and/or relatives (possibly with government connections), as well as 
acquaintances made through their almae matres during internships or during training 
experiences in influential Chinese financial institutions. The haigui’s main aspiration 
was to become agents for the expansion of Chinese capital abroad, the facilitators of 
the entrance of Chinese business into the global market. To succeed, they had a number 
of strategies and perspectives. Approximately half of the haigui I met wanted to get a 
managerial position in a state-owned financial institution. Obtaining such a position 
represented for them money, power, and security against financial market instability. 
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However, in such a quest, they unconsciously harked back to what was known in the 
past as the “iron rice bowl”—a state-assigned job in which one worked for one’s entire 
life––the anathema of neoliberalism.  
As explained by Jin, a haigui from Monash University, “working for a state company 
means you are protected because this company is secure, so you will never be sacked 
or in danger.” 34  By contrast, the haigui already working in Chinese state-owned 
financial institutions displayed more complex feelings, many of them expressing 
considerable dissatisfaction with their present job conditions. Xiong, a graduate from 
Macquarie University, indicated that he had managed to get a job as a financial analyst 
in one of the main state-owned Chinese banks, yet he also stated he did not know 
whether he wanted to stay. He did not see any opportunities for career promotion.35 
Many haigui stated that they wished to commence an autonomous career. Li, another 
haigui from Monash University with a degree in economics, said that his aspiration 
was to build up his own business: “This is the only way to earn money, otherwise your 
employers will rip you off. If you work for someone else, she/he will leave you only 
the crumbs. The problem is that to be a successful financial advisor you need 
connections, otherwise you’ll just not be able to do anything, if you don’t get relevant 
information from the government, you can’t plan your moves.” 36  
Overwhelmingly, haigui sentiments were ones of disenchantment and cynicism about 
the career rewards they expected. After a period in Shanghai, where many obstacles 
were encountered, their attitudes changed dramatically as their investment in Australia 
seemed counterproductive. Theoretically, these haigui had invested in a “tailored” 
financial education that should have reflected the current needs of the market and 
prepared them for a kind of occupation that the rhetoric of global education applauds. 
Certainly, they had learnt a set of tools and processes—expertise in risk calculation, 
econometrics, applied finance, accountancy, statistics; as well as a set of personal 
skills—self-determination, self-management, entrepreneurship. But these skills did 
not respond to the “current needs of the Chinese market” and seemed to bring them 
                                                 
 
34 Interview with Jin, 23 July 2013, Shanghai. 
35 Interview with Xion, 6 June 2013, Shanghai.  
36 Interview with Li, 11 August 2013, Shanghai. 
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little personal reward. To use the words of Aihwa Ong, the way haigui apply their 
expertise in the Shanghai financial market has made it a “high tension zone” (2008, 
338). 
The education path followed by the haigui fits the paradigms of the new knowledge 
and financialised economy, in ways suggested by critical analysis that deploys the 
notion of cognitive capitalism (Corsani et al. 1996, 2013; Morini 2007, 2010; Moulier 
Boutang 2012; Fumagalli 2007, 2011; Vercellone 2007). According to the cognitive 
capitalism approach, “the object of accumulation” in contemporary capitalism 
“consists mainly of knowledge, which becomes the basic source of value, as well as 
the principal location of the process of valorisation” (Moulier Boutang 2012, 57). 
Knowledge defines the new conflictual relationship between capital and labour: “the 
production of knowledge by means of knowledge is connected to the increasingly 
immaterial and cognitive character of labour” (Vercellone 2007). As the nature of 
labour is immaterial, the worker is called to valorise her human capital, which needs 
to be capitalised. This occurs by acquiring and updating expertise, by risk taking, and 
by demonstrating behavioural and communication skills—thus subsuming her mental 
faculties, affect and life. This becomes a means of economic valorisation. The concept 
of financial labour and its cognitive features will be explored more fully in chapter 6. 
Mentioning it here, however, allows me to stress the tensions that arise not only by the 
self-forging of the haigui as labour subjects within cognitive capitalism, but also to 
consider how cognitive capitalism is deployed in the Chinese financial market. The 
point is that, even if, as I contend later in this chapter, the haigui had followed 
everything capital requires of them to develop their abstract labour, their type of labour 
still appears “superfluous,” unsolicited and unwanted in the Chinese ecology of 
financial expertise dominated by guanxi. 
Study abroad is simultaneously fostered and nullified by the state and the haigui are 
both solicited and repelled by the competition and guanxi of the financial space at the 
heart of the Chinese configuration. The entire higher education-migration architecture, 
in which the haigui are subsumed, is fabricated using a “neoliberal” rationale (despite 
the inappropriateness of this word for the Chinese context, as discussed in chapter 1), 
which has been embraced since the reform, through internationalisation, new 
knowledge and Anglicisation. However, the same architecture is both contrasting and 
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complementary to the state’s preservation of its ecology of financial expertise. In this 
ecology, almost every financial institution into which the haigui were seeking to 
position themselves was ruled by a financial system dominated by guanxi. The 
expertise learned abroad by the haigui could not, therefore, be applied. The haigui are 
trapped in an untenable position, between the state’s attempts to preserve Chineseness 
against foreign expertise (in a financial ecology operated by high-ranking government 
officials) but also by a conflict of interests between the state’s encouragement of 
education, reforms and regulatory policies and its efforts to preserve the financial 
ecology of expertise. Contradictions among state actions (policies of education and 
education versus financial regulatory policies) and state agencies (Ministries of 
Education versus Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and other state financial 
institutions) should be underlined. 37  Indeed, the state is not unitary, but a 
polymorphous and sometimes even paradoxical entity. Much scholarship, often 
contrasting, has been written about the Chinese state’s transition into a neoliberal 
market economy. As put by Jude Howell, “the proliferation of terms to capture the 
changing character of the state in post-Mao China (as developmental state, 
entrepreneurial and corporatist state, and so forth) masks a … process of state 
fragmentation that fosters contradictory and complex patterns of state behaviour” 
(Howell 2006, 274). 
Therefore, the nature of the Chinese state can be better grasped through a term like 
“fragmentation”—each fragment contributing in different ways but all reflecting the 
same reality. As I described in the Introduction to this thesis, the rise of “shareholding 
management bodies” of the state, which constitutes what I have called the Chinese 
ecology of financial expertise, clashes with and increasingly undermines the “fiscal” 
and more “administrative” functions of the state. However, within this 
“fragmentation,” the CCP acts as a kind of “glue,” which overpoweringly deploys 
ministries, state offices and agencies to promote its political priorities and ensure the 
control of the financial ecology of expertise. Differing functionality of CCP policies 
mean faults appear in state apparatuses and institutions positioned unequally in relation 
to decisions made about key strategies. By comparing the data published by the 
                                                 
 
37 See thesis Introduction for the list. 
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Chinese statistical yearbook, it appears that the spending in sectors like finance, 
defence, real estate, and innovation prevails over agriculture, culture, education, 
justice, and health (China Statistical Yearbook 2014). It therefore transpires that there 
is a power imbalance among institutions that are equal in theory but very different in 
terms of spending. The CCP evaluates the relevance of each sector according to their 
place in the financial ecology.  
Policies of migration and education (as analysed in chapters 1 and 2) in the eyes of the 
ruling class do not impede the CCP’s control of money and power. These policies are 
therefore used instrumentally as a camouflage to show to the world (mostly, 
international institutions like the World Bank and the OECD) China’s efforts in 
international cooperation. Education displays less initiative, being rather more a 
“policy recipient” than a policy maker. With these factors in mind, I will show how 
the multiple tensions the haigui encounter during their China-Australia-China circuit 
and search for valorisation result in this state of “fragmentation.”  
The precondition of circuits 
The precondition for capital’s reproduction is its valorisation. As both living capital 
and living labour, the haigui enter into the circuit with an expectation that they will be 
valorised. But how is the haigui’s living labour reproduced? In their analysis of 
financialisation in the West, Dick Bryan, Randy Martin and Mike Rafferty have 
observed how increasing financial calculations, indebtedness and risk impact peoples’ 
daily lives and households in the form of a burden, and thus alter the way labour is 
reproduced: “the distribution of wages into interest and consumption is driven by the 
competitive calculation of what part of the wage is required for subsistence 
consumption and what part is available to accumulate and service debt” (Bryan, Martin 
and Rafferty 2009, 463). 
Alternatively, I argue that in Chinese financialisation the precondition for labour 
reproduction is a credit relationship with the family or entourage. The main difference 
from the argument advanced by Bryan, Martin and Rafferty is that, in China, contrary 
to other countries, the wave of developing financialisation does not occur steadily, but 
in a feverish manner in which several generations of one family invest and often risk 
large sums of money. This is done in the hope of monetary accumulation in the future. 
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Later in this thesis (particularly chapter 5), I examine this “fever” more closely and 
how it is a distinctive element of financialisation in China. For now, it is enough to 
remark that most Chinese households consist of people who, previously, had carefully 
saved money but are now caught up in the fever of the financialisation process.  
With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the haigui, as a labour force, are trapped 
in a parallel but indispensable circuit, enabled by a form of credit which most of the 
time is granted by the haigui’s household savings—expenditure on education accounts 
for approximately 11 per cent of household income (China Household Finance Survey 
2013). The savings of the household are typically invested in the education of sons or 
daughters, as a form of capital investment that can be justified by the latter’s future 
potential in the labour market. The haigui decision to study abroad does not merely 
arise from their own personal interests, but by a decision made by the whole family—
primarily the parents—who see their efforts as an opportunity for future credit. The 
economic relationship of creditor-debtor is one which initiates the circuit and the 
valorisation of “latent money” (Marx 1978, 132). But credit, to be granted, needs a 
fiduciary foundation, that is, the certainty of future refund. In China, where the 
economic creditor-debtor relationship overlaps with the relationship of parents-
sons/daughters, this certainty, which apparently exists, is anchored in the first place to 
political and cultural elements ahead of economic ones.  
The sense of collective responsibility originates from the “clan”—which is still active 
in Chinese society, and by which is meant the enlarged family, including distant 
relatives, in some cases even neighbours and country people (see for instance Fuligni 
and Zhang 2004). The obligation to come back from abroad accompanies an obligation 
to work in order to pay back the debt. For instance, referring to a widely held 
conception of the family in China, the ubiquitous concept of qing “favour” (in the 
sense of a special or preferential treatment, a partiality) and its many associated 
terms—renqing, “obligation, duty,” qiuqing, “asking for a favour,” qianqing, “owing 
a favour,” to name just a few—is producing an obligation among members of a number 
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of social groups which are sometimes stronger than monetary obligation. 38  The 
commencement of the circuit with the haigui’s move from China to Australia is 
possibly due to invested capital, which is called seed money. However, a contradiction 
characterises the commencement of the circuit. On the one hand, the haigui show 
independence and self-management but, on the other hand, there are the real conditions 
of the move, with its dependency on others. This reality is epitomised in the credit, 
which could be labelled “gluey.” A whole range of moral and ethical obligations 
accompany the economic relationship of creditor/debtor and associate the credit with 
reputation, feelings of thankfulness, sense of duty, and so forth. 
The family is more than a simple unit of reproduction; it acts as a creditor that puts its 
money capital in the life of daughters and sons to produce a surplus value from the 
expertise haigui acquire abroad and can later use in the Chinese job market. This is a 
system of guarantee for the family, a life-long insurance through daughters’ and sons’ 
profitable job positions. Further, families are not left alone to make this choice. As I 
will explain in chapter 4, a patriotic professional commitment (Hoffman 2010) further 
entices the haigui circuit. This is consciously fostered by the Chinese state’s 
proclamation of the Chinese dream, and can be further seen as a guarantee of the desire 
(or at least the sense of duty) among the haigui to repatriate.  
The state’s education-migration nexus promotes this process. Encouraging students to 
come back means harnessing a new skilled labour force. The marriage between hukou 
state policies (that favour successful haigui on their return) and nationalistic, moralistic 
and family bonds is synergetic. If, for instance, a haigui obtains a hukou in Shanghai, 
she or he can then transfer the whole family in his/her place as well as extend certain 
rights (such as medicare and education) to the whole family, within certain limits. This 
investment in knowledge commences with the gaokao, or university entrance exam, 
and it is this which activates a haigui’s circuit and migration. In China, the gaokao is 
the most stringent national exam. Only once a student passes it, can she or he enter a 
Chinese university. However, an unsatisfactory gaokao result will block a student’s 
                                                 
 
38 In 2009 a movie by Liu Guoning, Qianzhai huanqing “Repay a debt with a favour,” is used to describe 
the socially recognised exchanges of obligations that are not-purely-economic. In the movie they are 
portrayed as being extremely popular. 
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entrance into the “good” Chinese universities, and it is in this situation that students 
consider going to Australia as an alternative. The option of studying in Australia is 
ranked far below the most desired possibilities of an Ivy-US education (Harvard, 
Columbia, and others) or the UK equivalent (Oxford, Cambridge, and so forth). 
Australia is also placed behind a number of mid-ranked US and UK Universities 
(Huang 2013). Chinese students with a low gaokao have two options. If they belong 
to a middle class or wealthy background, as did the majority of the haigui I 
interviewed, they can self-fund their studies. If they successfully complete an English 
language exam after high school, they can be granted scholarships funded by either 
China or Australia.39 
Historically, the gaokao was introduced when modern universities began to spread 
throughout China and there was a need for a meritocratic selection. The modern 
foundation of the exam, however, needs to be understood in a larger historical context. 
As outlined in chapter 1, just before and immediately after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic (1949), Chinese revolutionary agents wavered between two 
conflicting approaches to education, either elitist or grassroots education. The 
dichotomy influenced the type of content, the recipients and the goals of the education. 
If the republicans aimed to develop an education based on “science and democracy,” 
that is, the use of technology and modern management practices to promote economic 
development and liberal political thought that was of relevance to emerging bourgeois 
elites; the communists alternatively aimed at the training of Leninist cadres, the 
involvement of mass numbers of workers in mass production, and the promulgation of 
the idea that workers and peasants can liberate themselves from poverty, subjection, 
and class polarisation. After 1949, the Soviet model was privileged and a component 
of the gaokao of 1955 involved a graphical representation of a pyramid with 
instructions on how to spread communist consciousness and technical expertise.  
                                                 
 
39 Those scholarships funded by China, sponsor students to study in Australia and then return to China; 
those funded by the Australian government, have been initiated because of a lack of high-skilled 
labourers and are aim to attract students through the concession of field-specific scholarship. Both 
countries have knowledge policies that foster the acquisition and development of a competitive pool of 
knowledge workers on a global scale. 
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Students admitted to universities, therefore, had to demonstrate they had good cultural 
knowledge and understanding of a whole range of communist virtues. It was only with 
the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution that the gaokao was abolished in 1966. For a 
short period, the admittance of candidates to universities was determined using a new 
system of compulsory support to fellow workers. 40  Students not from worker or 
peasant families had first to work as farmers or soldiers; this was an essential 
prerequisite for acquiring a proletarian spirit of devotion to the people and to the 
socialist motherland. The new system was based on voluntary enrolment, mass 
recommendation, authorisation from superior officers, and ratification of the school, 
and successful students received the name of gongnongbing xuesheng “students from 
the ranks of workers, peasants, and solders.” The gaokao was revived in 1977 when, 
accompanying the rise of the Chinese NEP (New Economic Policy), the State Council 
announced a new law for the admittance of students to universities which was based 
on educational qualifications and the necessity to be prepared for instruction and 
training on how to become elite experts.  
This system, although it has experienced multiple adjustments, is still at work today. 
Even though the gaokao application operates at a national level, it is actually different 
in different parts of the country in terms of level of difficulty and criteria for the 
attainment of full marks. For instance, in 1985 Shanghai was accredited as being an 
independent examination centre. This reflected a disproportionate allocation of 
resources into selective, wealthy, urban “key-point” schools. The more “advanced” 
and modernising education became available for Shanghai citizens, making them 
“more competitive” in the urban and national job markets. This system reinforces a 
wealthy urban elite and it penalises the wealthy classes of the provinces. A city-
provincial hierarchy privileges the predominant economic one—even if very rich, a 
student from the provinces will have major difficulties in accessing Shanghai schools 
because of the hukou. Moreover, if a student from the provinces wishes to enter the 
best universities, located in Shanghai or Beijing, they must obtain far higher marks 
than a Shanghainese peer in the gaokao. The gaokao and the intra-province hierarchy 
                                                 
 
40 In that period, all students after the high school leaving examination first had to compulsory work in 
factories or on farms for a couple of years before applying for university. 
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together, therefore, are obstacles and introduce tensions for the haigui that they have 
to face before leaving their country.  
For Chinese students, taking the gaokao means sacrifice, sufferance, self-discipline 
and strict control—termed chiku (“eating bitterness”), meaning enduring hardship 
(Erwin quoted in Cockain 2012, 107). The gaokao is seen as a trial of strength, and it 
is the general criterion used to judge a person as a “good” or “bad” student, son or 
daughter, and even a good or bad future worker. Although this exam is just a part of a 
young student’s career, it does represent a crucial turning point. Chinese students say 
that if you have not taken the gaokao, your life is not complete (Cockain 2012, 107). 
In China, everyone knows how much pressure a student has to bear at this stage of her 
life. During the period before the exams, hysteria and panic spreads amongst Chinese 
students (it is very common to read about suicides as well as nervous breakdowns in 
Chinese media).41  
Parents, grandparents and close relatives are all involved in supporting their student 
relatives to succeed in this life-making exam. Many invest a great deal in the student’s 
education, through the use of private tutors, private foreign language schools, and so 
forth. Of course, these “investor relatives” want see the results of their efforts. This is 
particularly pertinent because in the absence of an old-age pension or welfare funds, 
the wealthy career of a single daughter or son is the only way to ensure the parents a 
comfortable retirement. With the one child policy, the academic success or failure of 
an only child can often be a family’s “only hope” (Fong 2004). As pointed out by 
Crabb: “This fervency has been intensified by the demographic shift brought about by 
the one-child policy. Parents conjure their visions of the future—dreams and 
nightmares—around the academic success or failure of their only child” (2010, 390). 
                                                 
 
41 In the months before the gaokao, profits soar sky-high from supplements and vitamins like fish-oil, 
ginseng, and other types of foods that are claimed to improve memory and concentration. Furthermore, 
hospital and clinics offer “retreats” where students can get hooked up to an oxygen container in the hope 
of improving their concentration. Restaurants and hotels in close proximity of gaokao schools offer 
special menus, gyms, and study concentration rooms, and are fully booked years in advance by parents 
who do not wish to be stuck in traffic the morning of the exams. A few minutes’ delay could result in 
the student not being admitted into the exam and then the efforts of a whole year would be lost. 
Moreover, wealthy parents promise their children they will receive expensive rewards like an Audi, a 
trip to Europe, or a thousand-Euro Gucci bag to encourage them to study hard (see China Daily, 2013).  
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When living in Shanghai I remember the period of time when the gaokao was 
happening. It seemed that the whole city had to participate in the event. In streets near 
the schools where the gaokao was hosted, parents would go on to the streets to stop 
any traffic that could potentially disturb the examinees. Car drivers slowed down and 
even stopped their engines as a sign of solidarity during peak hours. This might seem 
to be an unusual sharing of solidarity in the hectic rhythm of Shanghai traffic, but the 
gaokao has acquired a national status that affects every Chinese student and every 
family. In this sense, Chinese education is increasingly perceived to lie at the 
intersection between public and private interests (Crabb 2010, 391). 
The whole educational process does not have values per se, but it is conceived to be a 
tool necessary for obtaining a “winning post,” that is, a profitable and prestigious job. 
Unlike the small percentage of students who are incredibly smart and thus guaranteed 
a place in one of China’s most respected universities, most students who end up in 
mid-range universities are at risk of not obtaining a good job and the situation is 
worsening.42 Going abroad arises as an alternative pathway to success and, when 
considering this option, students can relax a little in preparing for the gaokao. Ling, 
who before returning to China obtained her accounting degree in Perth, told me: “After 
I finished high school I couldn’t wait to escape from China, you know. Chinese society 
is so strict, so severe, I should have studied so hard to pass the gaoako, I just felt I 
couldn’t have done that, and I knew I had the opportunity to study abroad.”43 Since 
2010, the number of students applying to take the gaokao has generally declined, as 
the number of students going abroad has increased (Huang 2012). However, although 
this pathway makes a student’s life a little easier, it is associated with cowardice and 
is seen as a character trait many haigui carry.  
Most Chinese haigui I interviewed were not willing to talk about the gaokao. This 
might be because discussing it would mean admitting they left China on account of a 
failure. Significantly, when I asked them: “why Australia?,” I received rather 
ambiguous and evasive answers. For example, “it’s less competitive,” “less crowded,” 
                                                 
 
42 Research has for instance documented the living conditions and lack of opportunities for students 
who attend a second or third tier university in China. These have been described using the neologism 
the ANT tribe, that is students squeezed into dormitories in Chinese universities. See Si, 2009. 
43 Interview with Ling, 12 April 2013, Shanghai.  
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“there is a nice environment,” “I like nature and clean air.” Very seldom did they tell 
me they chose Australia for the quality of its education. Thus, the ambiguous relation 
of China-Australia I described in the first section seemed to be reflected in the unclear 
perceptions many haigui express of Australia.  
Since the commencement of China’s opening and reforms, Australia has emerged as a 
popular country for students to enrol in higher education.44 When the first TOEFL 
exam to recruit Chinese students to English-speaking universities was run in Beijing 
in 1981, just 285 students participated while, in 1987, the number had grown to 26,000 
(Nyiri 2010, 36). By 1987, a study abroad “fever” had gained momentum but, 
interestingly, that same year also saw students in Shanghai demonstrating in front of 
the Japanese and Australian consulates because of new restrictions on student visas 
(Nyiri 2010, 37). By the early 2000s, student migration to Australia significantly 
outweighed other Chinese immigration channels. Between 1995 and 2004, Australia 
received just under 60,000 entrepreneurs, investors, and/or family based settlers and 
immigrants from China, while in the academic year of 2003-2004 alone 50,000 
Chinese students came to Australia (Hugo 2010, Nyiri 2010, 36). According to official 
statistics in March 2014, over 223,000 Chinese students were enrolled in higher 
education degrees in Australia, and made up 31 per cent of foreign students (Australian 
Government 2014). 
As the Australian government has cut funding for universities, it has simultaneously 
sought to market higher education as a business and thus a source of income. 
Enrolments of full-fee-paying international students rose from under 100,000 in 1994 
to over 600,000 in 2010. Globally, Australia is the third-largest provider of 
international education services (after the United Kingdom and the United States) and 
has the highest proportion of international students across all OECD countries—one 
in every five post-secondary students enrolled in Australia is an international student 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011). Overall, the export income for Australia from 
international education represents a significant part of its economy. In 2014, 
international education activity, arising from international students studying and living 
                                                 
 
44 The peak of students travelling to Australia occurred after the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989 
because the Australian government granted protection to Chinese students in Australia. 
111 
in Australia, contributed AUD 17.0 billion to the economy. The majority of this 
income came from Chinese students (Australian Government 2014). 
Australia has sought economic integration with Asia by promoting itself as a 
multicultural nation (Ang 2010, 129), and encouraging “Asian literacy” within its 
education system (Ang and Stratton 1996, 34). This policy was undertaken to 
guarantee and preserve, through education, a cultural and national affiliation with the 
countries of origin of many Asian second-generation migrants, as well as to attract 
new Asian students. Nowadays there are many schools in Australia offering courses 
in Chinese, Thai and Malay, as well as business school MBAs offering specialties in 
international finance and management (Poole 2001). Beside the English language 
exams, most Australian universities do not have strict entrance requirements for 
foreign students. Capacity to pay mainly determines the selection.45 
However, the absence of an entrance test is perceived as a sign of a lower quality of 
Australian universities. As I will show, this might be counterproductive given that 
many students are afraid their education will not be sufficiently highly-valued and 
competitive. In 2011, in an attempt to increase its ranking and attract more elite 
students from China, the University of Sydney started accepting students for admission 
based directly on their scores for the gaokao—a tier-one result and an international 
English language testing score of seven or above. This approach was part of a “five-
year strategic plan” on the part of the university to woo more students from Asia, and 
in particular China.46 
In addition, Australia presents itself as a country which offers “well-rounded 
personality” training, that is, the fostering of cognitive, presentation, communication, 
and social skills considered so necessary for embarking on a business career. Aside 
                                                 
 
45 Foreign students in Australian universities typically need to spend at least 300,000 yuan per year 
(AUD 60,430) on tuition fees and living expenses.  
46 Unlike local students who can have their tuition subsidised or delayed through government funding, 
foreign students are usually required to pay full fees upfront, contributing a significant portion of the 
revenue of Australian universities every year with more than 4,000 Chinese students and 20,000 Chinese 
alumni. The University of Sydney, in particular, already has a close relationship with China. The 
University has established the China Studies Centre, which directs Chinese studies and interacts with 
business, government and activities in both China and Australia. While some have said the university 
is lowering its admission standards to attract more student fees from China, the university says this is 
not the case (University of Sydney 2012). 
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from the development of expertise appropriate for the financial sector, this educational 
approach trains people to speak publicly, to employ successful rhetoric, to be creative, 
to adopt a proactive attitude towards tasks, and to develop a familiarity with a set of 
semiotic codes involving behaviours, manners, dress codes, and so forth. In a global 
financial environment, these features are considered base requirements from which to 
start any career. One of the advertising slogans of the MBA course at Macquarie 
University states that “we develop leaders with a global mindset who create sustainable 
value and are good citizens” (Macquarie University, 2014). For Chinese haigui, the 
hope of acquiring professional skills that are globally translatable “equates to fitting in 
with a neoliberal model of globalisation and competitiveness” (Duara 2010, 979). 
Surprisingly, however, most of the students I met had chosen subjects like accounting, 
statistics and macro-economics—which are very specialised courses. These 
preferences seem to suggest Chinese students are not particularly interested in learning 
how to behave and make a career in a global market using Australian-style expertise. 
Given the above-mentioned “ambiguous” perceptions of education in Australia, the 
education offered by Australian universities seems to lack kudos in the eyes of Chinese 
students studying in Australia. This attitude most likely results from the students 
failing to gain access to one of the top five Chinese Universities, or to prestigious 
American or British universities, all with higher selective entrance requirements. 
While these countries, hosting among the highest-ranked and best-considered 
universities in the world, can usually offer more guarantees for the future careers of 
their students once returned to China (because of their internationally acquired 
prestige), Australia is not able to confer such certainties. Thus, the investment of a 
student—and indeed her family—in the country as an overseas education destination, 
is riskier. An Australian equivalent does not equate with the rewards of an MBA from 
Harvard or Stanford. But in China, this sort of ranking means everything.  
Interestingly, it is China which has most strongly embraced global university rankings 
and has thus contributed to the creation of what Van der Wende (2007) has defined as 
a “cemented” conceptualisation of a world university market, organised according to 
a single “league table.” The research rankings, published annually by Shanghai 
Jiaotong University, were first issued in 2003 and have been defined as the “most 
globally influential” (Economist 2005). When comparing it with the second-most 
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influential index, produced by The Times, clear differences are evident. While there is 
general agreement about the “World Super-League” (leading and well-known 
American universities, that is, Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Berkeley, MIT, and the two 
British universities, Cambridge and Oxford), results vary in relation to the top 20 
universities. The ranking produced by Shanghai Jiaotong privileges the United States 
(the first 17 universities are all American). The Times index has a more holistic 
approach and includes a measure of both teaching and research, while the Shanghai 
Jiaotong index mostly considers the performance of the university in terms of the 
number of publications and citations, especially in journals on nature and science 
(Marginson and Van der Wende 2007; Economist 2005). In turn, the Shanghai 
Jiaotong index privileges universities from English-language speaking countries 
because English is considered the language of research (a non–English-language work 
is less published and cited). Indeed, this preference advantages universities from the 
United States because of a pattern of citation circulation, that is, Americans tend to 
cite Americans (Marginson and Van der Welt 2007, 311).  
From a national perspective, while the Shanghai Jiaotong ranking does not include any 
Chinese university in its top 20 list (The Times has Beijing University at the 15th 
position), this omission could be seen as a tactic of the Chinese government to be a 
fair arbiter that—from an outside perspective—praises the delivery of education by 
countries such as the US and Europe. The ranking is produced to promote a new 
façade, by stimulating new global competitions for leading researchers and the best 
young talents. In dismissing the value of teaching and vocational education in their 
ranking, China mirrors the new policies that favour Chinese academic 
entrepreneurship and that the government has introduced with the most recent 
education reforms.47  
According to studies on haigui returning from Australia (see Hao and Welch 2012) 
and the interviewees for this project, it is clear that, once returned to China, these 
haigui consider themselves low-positioned and low-paid. When being evaluated for a 
                                                 
 
47 As explored in the first Chapter, this is framed within the larger strategy of positioning universities 
as key economic drivers for business development. Such an approach weakens the humanist elements 
considered so important in traditional educational environments.  
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job they are disadvantaged as candidates with undergraduate or postgraduate degrees 
from second- or third-tier foreign universities, as having “gold-plated” (dujin) degrees 
rather than “real gold” (chunjin), which instead can be obtained from the top-ranking 
universities in the USA, the UK, mainland China or Hong Kong. Many of the haigui 
interviewed commented that they were taking their current positions as temporary ones 
and were waiting for a further step. This was generally expressed with both confidence, 
motivated by faith in their future development, and also a sense of resignation for their 
present circumstance. However, while feelings expressed about their general condition 
were not surprising, more surprising was the way the haigui expressed optimism and 
admiration, rather than suspicion or hostility, towards their successful and locally 
graduated peers. In fact, during our discussions, they kept telling me how much smarter 
and better these others were. It seems they considered their achievements 
“unreachable.” But personally, I was disturbed: amongst rivals it seems 
counterproductive to enhance your competitors’ strengths. I often found myself having 
feelings of sympathy with the haigui and anger at the injustice of their situation. I 
wanted to express solidarity, and let them know that I believed they deserved better 
treatment and respect. After all, they had studied abroad, experienced another country, 
and spoke a foreign language. But for them, Australia was considered a closed chapter. 
Though happy to have had the opportunity and luck to enjoy the country, they now 
believed their Australian education did not hold much value for their professional 
careers. Their discussions of the employment situation in the Shanghai financial 
market also negatively impacted on their feelings towards their time in Australia. Their 
views were significantly different when they discussed Australia, from the point of 
view of preparing them for a career, and Australia, from the point of view of personal 
experience. In regard to the latter, the haigui I interviewed expressed both happiness 
and difficulty but, overwhelmingly, they described the experience as valuable. 
Most of the haigui had returned to China because they were unable to find work in 
Australia. Very often, they did not succeed in this pursuit because they were not 
competitive enough to get a job that would sponsor them with an Australian visa. Their 
return was expressed, though, in terms of a free choice, even when it was apparent that 
it was not the case. China was described as a more interesting country which could 
offer many more opportunities. As Xiu, a returnee from Macquarie, told me: “The 
Chinese market is bigger, more dynamic, more exciting. There are more things to do, 
115 
more work to do, here. The Australian market is very small, not so developed. There, 
you know, people leave their office at 5 o’ clock. People in Australia are lazy, they all 
want to go to the pub. Here in China we all overwork, here it is normal to overwork.”48 
As further expressed by Lan, another Chinese returnee who, after having studied in 
Melbourne, had job experience in the UK, “the Australian financial market is not like 
London. There you can really feel a multicultural environment, people from all over 
the world, every race, every background and ages. Instead, Australia is closed, 
provincial and discriminatory in many ways. You have to be Australian, behave and 
understand Australian culture to work there, otherwise nobody is interested in you.”49 
The haigui knew that finding a job and residency in Australia would have meant a 
higher salary and, in most cases, better working conditions. Nevertheless, they told 
me, they favoured the choice of China, claiming it was “more stimulating” and 
“challenging.” Yet returning to China meant facing what they had sought to escape in 
a past in which their failure in the gaokao is ingrained. In reality, their return had been 
marred by loss of hope for finding work in Australia, and now a new cycle of hope and 
expectation was arising—echoing the last, and reproducing the mood first nurtured by 
their original departure from China for Australia. Many haigui I interviewed might 
have wanted to stay in Australia but they were unable to realise this ambition. At this 
point, returning to China and attempting to find employment, this was narrated as a 
“free choice” to bury feelings of failure and disappointment.  
The bond and kinship with Australia nevertheless remained strong, through the 
membership of haigui in various alumni associations. These associations, through 
setting up various organisations abroad, have been able to link haigui with their almae 
matres, the universities where they studied. In China, there are many associations of 
this kind and, with the increasing numbers of haigui, some of them have reached 
membership numbers of 15,000. Some associations are organised informally by haigui 
who wish to share their experience with their fellows; some are set up by the 
universities in order to promote their courses abroad and recruit new students; while 
others are sponsored by foreign companies operating in China that contact the 
                                                 
 
48 Interview with Xiu, 6 June 2013, Shanghai. 
49 Interview with Lan, 14 September 2013, Shanghai. 
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universities in their own countries to recruit Chinese students who have learnt to speak 
their language and thus, potentially, could come and work in them.  
As I will further explain in chapter 4, the enthusiasm students expressed in taking part 
in their alumni associations revealed how important they are in helping them to 
negotiate the difficult environment they faced once back in China. It also showed how 
their identities were still strongly tied to the country in which they had received their 
financial education and where they had, often for the first time, experienced a period 
of their life abroad, far from their families. Being part of the associations allowed them 
to express their feelings of frustration generated by the fact that, once back in China, 
their internationalised “capital” was not really valued as they had wished and expected. 
In particular, soon after their return to China, many haigui frequently attended events 
and meetings organised by the various alumni associations as a means of sharing and 
relating their experiences, including the many social habits they had acquired abroad. 
During my fieldwork, I attended numerous meetings organised by the Australia China 
Alumni Association (ACAA). The association is formed by 34 Australian universities 
and is open to all China-based alumni of Australian universities. As stated by the 
website it was founded to both “promote Australian education via the success of 
alumni” while “supporting alumni in China through business and social networking” 
(ACAA). 
Interestingly, I found that most of the events I attended while in Shanghai were 
organised to enhance Australia’s presence in the Chinese market, rather than to 
promote education in Australia. The biggest event I was invited to—made possible by 
virtue of my status as an Australian university postgraduate student—consisted of 
presentations given by successful Australian-Chinese entrepreneurs who, by creating 
their own companies, could claim they had successfully “made it” in the Chinese 
market. In particular, I was struck by the opening words of the first speaker, a 
charismatic business woman who was now the owner of one of the most popular 
restaurant/café chains in Shanghai which has more than 30 branches. She said: 
“Thanks very much for inviting me, even if, I have to confess, I don’t really have a 
university background, in fact I hardly finished high school.” The speech then went on 
to describe her adventurous landing in the Chinese market, which she described as a 
wild jungle with no rules, no justice. “If you have issues with any Chinese business 
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partners, even if you know you are right, you should renounce your claim! Arguing 
every time with Chinese will drive you nuts.” 
In response to this woman’s presentation, reactions from the haigui were 
condescending and amused. The perception I had was that in such an environment 
everyone shared mutual understandings of their adventurous experiences of foreign 
universities and the Chinese market. They paraded a sense of self-confidence, which 
seemed to be based on their feelings of belonging to a professional and international 
elite. They were proud of their status and their foreign education, and yet within this 
pool of smart, graduated professionals, no one seemed satisfied with their job positions 
in China. Consequently, accounts depicting the Chinese market as “a far west” with 
no regulation and multiple imperfections and difficulties, seemed to make them smile 
and relieved them somewhat of their sense of frustration. Comforted by the niche of 
this meeting, haigui often spoke English to each other, and made jokes about 
Australian accents and food in recalling their time abroad. 
For most of the haigui, the aim of participating in such meetings was for networking 
purposes. Social events, like “Aussie drinks,” were often held by associations in the 
Chinese cities where haigui were particularly numerous (Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, 
and Hangzhou). It was all about exchanging business cards, meeting colleagues in the 
same business, accessing clients, and so forth. In general, everyone wanted to know if 
and how everyone else was “placed” in the job market. Yet, it must be asked, what 
role does the past education that unified these haigui play in this context? The over-
stated qualifications, such as the international global expertise they had acquired 
during their studies, together with their claim that they were obliged to make available 
the knowledge they had acquired to their source university, seemed not to be useful 
once back in Shanghai. This was so, at least to the extent that the association itself did 
not promote particular universities by presenting their different course contents, such 
as the very popular MBA. Nor did it promise to reveal the ideal formula for creating 
an effective and successful global business. Rather, they openly declared how useless 
any business strategy was for dealing with the “wildness” of the Chinese financial 
market.  
In opposition to prizing individual traits such as agency or well-rounded 
entrepreneurial personalities, it was suggested that, for the Chinese market, what was 
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necessary was guanxi and a clear understanding of the work hierarchy. It was 
paradoxical, but Australian business people—unschooled as far as university goes—
were seeking to teach university-educated Chinese students how to do business in 
China, on the strength of their experience as foreigners in the Chinese market. The 
“Chinese way” of doing business, re-proposed to the haigui, represents an exemplary 
case when in the context of a neoliberal regime, “the questions of national economic 
survival and competition in the world economy have come increasingly to be seen as 
questions of cultural reconstruction. The task of reconstructing culture in terms of 
enterprise has involved remodelling public institutions along commercial lines as 
corporations and has encouraged the acquisition and use of so-called entrepreneurial 
qualities” (Besley and Peters 2007, 165).  
Forged by a hegemonic global education narrative of knowledge acquisition followed 
by work in the finance sector, the haigui seemed to be unprepared to cope with and 
navigate the Chinese cultural terrain from which they escaped. There was an anxiety 
shared by many of the haigui looking for a job. They hoped to utilise the global 
expertise learned abroad to gain a competitive advantage, but seemed unable to take 
advantage of that surplus. Their practices of self-promotion and self-valorisation 
encountered resistances when they were rejected in the hostile terrain that was 
nevertheless their country of origin. The migration-education nexus which seeks to 
perpetuate a regime of labour governance in order to produce new skilled experts as 
preferential working subjects was, in the context of Shanghai’s financial market, 
ineffectual.  
In this thesis, I will also argue that the common ground that enabled haigui to be 
fostered and attracted back, although often involuntarily, is a product of the mass 
financialisation of daily life. This means that, under the influence of financial logic 
and by participating in financial markets, individuals are encouraged to internalise new 
norms of risk-taking and develop new subjectivities as investors. Financialisation is 
therefore investigated in Foucaldian terms, in the form of a “governmentality” 
exercised through individuals’ own interactions with new financial technologies and 
systems of financial knowledge (Van der Zwan 2014, 102). I will explain how 
financialisation, as it rises within the context of contemporary financial capitalism, 
also produces heterogeneous and uneven spaces. In this particular case, Chinese 
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financialisation develops according to the knowledge-making of the Chinese state, 
which alongside new financialised self-entrepreneurial risk-taking subjects, is also 
seeking to foster patriotic committed experts. Haigui, as mobile subjects, embody the 
uneven distribution of expertise and differential labour division of contemporary 
financial capitalism, and so are caught up in an interstice of unevenness. They are 
displaced “in between” the two worlds they have experienced: their Australian 
education and the search for a job in the Shanghai financial market. At the end of the 
circuit, when back in China, supposedly with knowledge to utilise, they effectively 
become disqualified.  
What financial expertise?  
Exploring the financial workplace for haigui in Shanghai in 2013 also involved 
examining this environment post financial-crisis. I want to mention an event I attended 
which was aimed at promoting a “new financial culture.” Held in the shiny Shangri-
La hotel in Shanghai, the event was organised by the ACAA and The Melbourne 
University Business School, in order to launch the new master course in financial 
management. The Dean of the faculty of business and economics was the main guest 
that night, and gave a talk entitled “A Little Financial Knowledge is a Dangerous 
Thing.” Many haigui, working and looking for a job in the Shanghai financial market, 
attended and for me this was a good opportunity to make more contacts with haigui 
involved in finance and thus gain further insight into the Australia-China education 
and financial circuit. 
The talk delivered by the Dean concerned the need to develop a new financial literacy 
in response to the financial crisis. His solution was not to question the logic of financial 
capitalism. In his view, the logic and internal functioning of the finance machine were 
considered too obscure to understand. He said: “Even with a PhD in financial 
management, you won’t be able really to understand the cause of the crisis.” In order 
to cope with the volatile risky and impenetrable logic of the financial market, his 
proposed way out of the crisis was to encourage people to participate in finance 
through a process of mass literacy offered by Australian business schools. The idea 
was that the crisis was caused by the financial mismanagement of financially illiterate 
subjects. However, at what level this mismanagement was operating was not clear. 
Given the context of the lecture, the further recommendation was that Chinese students 
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become responsible and financially literate subjects for the development of the future 
financial market and its “sanity.” The way Australian financial education was 
portrayed was as offering a new moral and financial structure in the aftermath of the 
GFC. Post-crisis, business schools across the world worked to create a global façade 
which, as stated by Stefano Harney, had to be “rehabilitated to teach a new morality 
to future business leaders .…. and to restore its imagined relationship with the 
profession understood as business leaders, not mobile phone outlet store managers” 
(Harney 2010, 54). At the moment of the Q & A, though, two haigui among the 
audience asked questions on the very specificity of the Chinese financial market. They 
wanted to make clear how, given the highly state-regulated financial apparatus in 
China, financial experts like themselves had little power to solve the problem or 
educate others about it. After the talk, I engaged in conversation with a group of haigui 
who had graduated from the business school at the University of Queensland. The 
reason they attended the event, they told me, was not to listen to the Dean, but to do 
some networking and to get to know other people with whom they could generate 
business in an international environment. Alternatively, they sought to find new clients 
to educate about their investments. Most of them were financial analysts and advisors 
for both Chinese and foreign financial companies, but technically they were at the 
“bottom of the scale.” Their salary and career depended on their ability to find new 
clients, hopefully ones with significant capital, that they could assist by providing 
various financial services that their companies offered.  
At the time of my fieldwork in 2013, one of the booming activities undertaken by 
Chinese companies who had been hit by the crisis was trying to “recycle” their 
business in the secondary market, which in China endured long after the global 
downturn. With the boom of financial economies, many Chinese companies aspiring 
to make initial public offerings (IPOs) had to compete within a system of 
institutionalised corruption and speculation. An IPO could be obtained through the 
intervention of not only audit companies, but also legal firms and other accounting 
companies with good political connections such that they could ensure companies a 
“protected” way to “go public” (Yang 2013). Every company that wanted an IPO in 
China had to pass through the approval of the China Regulatory Security Commission, 
whose screening committee is often composed of auditors. Companies with the right 
local and political connections could benefit from the input of a government-related 
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audit company which could fabricate the corporate data necessary to be listed. The 
pre-connection phase with politically influential people or auditors, who were 
members of the committee, became a prerequisite for either acceptance or rejection of 
the company in its IPOs. The haigui, as aspiring financial agents, were caught up in 
this corruptive process.  
Another strategy Chinese companies on the brink of collapse used before going public 
is to merge with a foreign company or institution in order to increase their share values. 
The foreign companies in this partnership were attracted to obtaining a position in the 
Chinese stock market after the crash of the Western one. Most of the time, the work of 
the haigui is to recruit foreign companies who are willing to merge with Chinese 
companies in order to undertake IPOs and then to assist them through the process. 
Their salaries were almost entirely dependent on their ability to get new clients and on 
their performance. Their positions, therefore, were extremely uncertain and precarious. 
Yet there was the other side of the coin, money in potentia, that is, if the company is 
successful and performs well post-IPO in attracting investors and making good profits, 
the employee can earn a lot of money.  
As already stated, the haigui could not rely on the political connections provided by a 
solid network of guanxi. Moreover, while they were in charge of evaluating the assets 
of a company and undertook activities of due diligence, these formal financial 
services—for which their accountancy and financial education had prepared them—
were not of importance, but considered secondary to the decisions and power of the 
higher political sphere. Consequently, they were in a vulnerable position and could be 
quickly dismissed. Typically, once a company is listed, its owner has to retain 40 per 
cent of the shares. The remaining 60 per cent goes to individual investors who in fact 
have little ability to evaluate the value of the shares they are buying, especially if these 
are corrupted. The haigui were professionally displaced, especially when confronted 
with the post-crisis moralising discourses produced by the institutions in which they 
had been educated. These institutions had offered them global, cutting edge, 
competitive expertise, which they claimed the haigui could use to build new careers. 
And yet haigui labour does not appear to be allocated; it is not negotiated, but often 
ignored and disregarded. Unless it produces appreciable results, it is self-managed and 
orientated to the product (which remains the only element that can be traded, whilst 
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the working time necessary to produce it can be expanded to infinity without any 
remuneration). 
The new claim promulgated by the education institutions in the association meetings 
sought to re-manage and restructure a previous expertise which had been “polluted” 
by the episode of the global financial crisis. Such discourse clearly needed to be re-
shaped in order to reflect the skills necessary for the ever-evolving and mutating form 
of financial capitalism. However, once amid the battlefield of the Shanghai financial 
market, haigui are not interested in questioning financial logic, or in protecting their 
financial reputation by recovering a compromised moral and/or financial authority. 
Rather, they seek to obtain a profitable and prestigious career position within a 
complex hierarchical system which operates through powerful alliances and personal 
local connections from which they are largely excluded.  
The haigui’s studies in Australia were instrumental in valorising their labour power, 
and important for “selling themselves to capital.” And yet, at the time they finished 
their studies, the Shanghai job market turned out to be a disappointing place to find 
employment using the Australian expertise which had focused on the new ethical and 
austerity paradigm in its own financial sector. In contrast to the universal expertise of 
the global university tailored for the global market, the Chinese financial terrain 
promotes a system based on its own political cultural codes and networks. The rhetoric 
of contemporary global financial expertise, necessary for facing the problems 
emerging after the GFC, was employed by Australian universities to attract Chinese 
students. Yet, in the Chinese context, this logic reveals a weak foundation. The 
haigui’s subjectivities are characterised by resilience and a drive for self-realisation at 
all costs. They are pragmatic, and able to switch from one context to another. Further, 
they are able to silence their personal aspirations, ambitions and the expertise they had 
developed abroad in order to succeed in their current goal, which is, to cling to their 
Chineseness and cultivate their guanxi networks. 
The circuit they had embarked on, initially designed to ensure future economic and 
social stability (for themselves and their families), was instead very precarious. As I 
will show in the following chapters, most of the haigui, despite their expectations of 
high-paid and managerial roles, were instead being slotted for more menial roles by 
their Chinese employers. Amid the challenging realities of return, elements of 
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resilience and adaptability were brought to the fore. The haigui seek to affirm 
themselves in a precarious ecology of financial expertise—and the stock market 
becomes a new proving ground, carrying hope of future financial success and security.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I used the concept of the circuit to explain how, within the parameters 
of financialisation—in which the primary object of value, and consequently 
valorisation, is knowledge—haigui migrate to Australia aspiring to obtain “cognitive 
capital,” which they can use to become knowledge workers, namely, financial experts. 
I have stressed how this move does not come about as the result of a free choice or a 
cost and benefit calculation. Instead, different loyalties (to one’s self, to the family, to 
society, to the state) as well as multiple obstacles intertwine with haigui motivations 
to undertake the circuit and risk deviating from the well-known and proven path of 
valorisation. 
I demonstrated how Chinese students do not choose Australia for purely professional 
and technical reasons. Australia, supposedly a destination many students covet for an 
English-speaking education, an Anglo-Saxon business environment, and a modernised 
and globalised setting, is a “make-do” choice for many Chinese students compared to 
the US and the UK. The thing that sustains students’ motivation for attending 
university in Australia is not enthusiasm but necessity—that is they must study in 
Australia because they are unable to attend the top domestic and foreign universities 
due to their poor performance or failure of the Chinese National University Entrance 
Exam (gaokao).  
This chapter has shown that it is during the final stage of the returnees’ circuit 
(Shanghai in my case study) that the trajectory falls into crisis. At this point the 
returnees—ready to draw a profit from their hard work as students and ready to be 
valorised as cognitive labourers——can discover that their financial expertise is a 
“blunt weapon.” The expertise they acquired from abroad is often disregarded when 
they seek to enter Chinese financial institutions. As detailed earlier in this chapter, the 
haigui often spoke of finding themselves in an unsatisfactory position—when their 
foreign expertise only allows them to find positions that involve subordinate tasks and 
is not valued as a function of their career. An established pattern of social networking 
124 
and social privileges, based on guanxi, dominates financial institutions which are 
mostly controlled by the state. These mechanisms, aimed at reproducing the 
domination of a party-led technocracy, appear insurmountable. In this Chinese ecology 
of financial expertise, where foreign expertise is often dismissed and contested, the 
haigui emerge as cynical and pragmatic subjects.  
In the next chapter I will show how in Shanghai—a city where an overlapping of 
knowledge regimes is at play (the Chinese global and cosmopolitan city, the Chinese 
stock market, the site of global capitalism and Chinese financialisation)—all of the 
frictions that haigui experience during their circuit come to the surface. Shanghai, with 
its multiple identities and futuristic ideals, is a city that mirrors the subjectivity of the 






Shanghai: the returning city 
 
Introduction 
Upon returning to China from abroad returnees become like moths to a flame, and 
gravitate irresistibly toward the shining lights of Shanghai. But why does the city hold 
such allure? For most of the haigui, Shanghai is not a hometown, and nor is it a 
familiar, comfortable place to which to return. It is instead a chosen space in which 
they intend to pursue a new career and expect to be valorised for the skills they learned 
abroad. But again, why Shanghai and not a competitor city in China? In this chapter, I 
will examine some potential answers to these questions through a unique line of 
inquiry. Looking at Shanghai from the haigui’s perspective allows us to linger over 
those foundational features of the city that are strictly intertwined with the production 
of the haigui’s subjectivities. Thus, I link both the city and its subjects in the same act 
of exploration. In this chapter, alongside the observation of the subjectivities of the 
haigui, my analysis also develops from the observation of the city of Shanghai, which 
emerges as an actor itself. Despite not being a direct object of this study, it nevertheless 
“emplaces” ethnography (Pink 2009) and resonates in my way of knowing, 
experiencing, and perceiving the haigui and vice versa. I propose that Shanghai, as the 
preferred destination of the haigui circuit, is the place where the taut ropes woven by 
the multiple factors that fostered and held together the identity of the haigui finally 
snap. 
Firstly, I explore haigui attitudes towards the city. I will proceed by showing how the 
expectations the haigui nurture toward Shanghai as their favourite Chinese city emerge 
in parallel with a general view of Shanghai as the cradle of modern Chinese 
cosmopolitanism and contemporaneity. Shanghai, in haigui eyes, is a vibrant 
cornerstone of financial capitalism, contrasting sharply with their places of origin in 
the provinces. In this promised land, they expect an exciting life and the opportunities 
afforded by being part of a professional elite: clubbing, international brands, and with 
money to be made in the financial market. Interestingly, their fascination with this city, 
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its prominence as a financial site and image as a financial city par excellence, is 
nurtured through a process of oblivion with the city’s past. This contrasts with the 
incumbent policy of the Chinese state to make Shanghai the home of contemporary 
Chinese capitalism. Such obliviousness to the past—a past which I briefly recall in this 
chapter—prevents the haigui from recognising that the flourishing of the city as a site 
of Chinese financial capitalism draws on historical cultural and social layers th have 
enabled the perpetuating of capital accumulation (Harvey 2001). It also derives from 
a history of conflicts and tensions within local and Western capitalism, as well as 
multiple knowledge regimes in which the forbearers of the haigui (previous returnees, 
Chinese translators and intermediary economic agents) played a crucial role. 
Accordingly, the results of my fieldwork show that the role the haigui want to perform 
is still that of a translator and facilitator between different business environments, 
methods and styles-namely those of Australia and China.  
Secondly, I show how their preference for Shanghai is also shaped by a resemblance 
with another possible destination, Hong Kong. Interestingly, although the haigui view 
Hong Kong as an ideal and globalised financial city, they feel more secure in returning 
to Shanghai, and their motherland. Hong Kong is not “Chinese” enough and remains 
the site of an openly cut-throat type of competition, where the haigui fear they will be 
unable to play their international “trump card.” A crucial feature of the haigui is 
therefore revealed. Only in Shanghai they can answer the state’s call for a national 
project and nurture a patriotic commitment. This is what ennobles their search for 
individual richness.  
Thirdly, as a preferred site for the haigui to live and work, I introduce Pudong as an 
emblematic zone. As the most recently developed Shanghai precinct and home of its 
stock market, it is the place in which the tensions between futuristic and historical, as 
well as global and local features of the city, are condensed and revealed. Here, I show 
how the city’s dark sides disrupt the haigui’s strategies for building careers. Shanghai's 
multifaceted fascinations dazzle the returnees, who are constantly distracted and 
become incapable of prioritising the aspects of ambition, career, social life and 
economic strategy they wish to pursue. In the end their goals seem all too often to take 
them to mirages, minefields, and dead-end streets. Their internationally fostered 
financial expertise cannot always be valorised. As their career attempts are often 
127 
obstructed and they increasingly feel marginalised in the Shanghai financial job 
market, many of them resort to self-funded investments in the stock market, mimicking 
the behaviours of another major subject acting in the Shanghai financescape: the local, 
scattered players (sanhu)—the everyday investors who play the market in the same 
search for riches, but equipped only with an informal expertise. Finally, a financescape 
crowded by a highly heterogeneous mass of investors, with contrasting investing 
strategies, cutting swathes liked massed schools of fish finds flaw with the state’s 
financial projects, which are in turn upset by growing instability. 
A sympathetic view 
In the eyes of the haigui, Shanghai is the global, cosmopolitan Chinese city par 
excellence. It is not only the place that hosts the headquarters of finance where they 
project themselves as successful financial intermediaries, but it is also an international 
hub and connection with the world they experienced outside China. Shanghai is a space 
for consumerism where they can reproduce habits and tastes developed abroad. 
Furthermore, Shanghai is a “status” city, a “status” to which these young professionals 
feel entitled.50 Committed to careers in a financial environment, Shanghai appears to 
be the best Chinese destination to apply the expertise they learned abroad. 
Furthermore, as transnational subjectivities carrying both national and transnational 
feelings of belonging (Smith 2000), the haigui in Shanghai approach a city that reflects 
their complex, multifarious and contrasting ambitions and expectations. The 
experience of studying abroad positioned the haigui in a border area between China 
and the Rest, possessing a twofold belonging with one foot abroad and one foot at 
home. Shanghai too, known variously as the “Paris of the East” and “New York of the 
West,” sits astride China and the Rest and shares with the haigui a lack of clear national 
identity (Meng 2006, vii). In Shanghai, the haigui can hop between one identity and 
another; cling onto their Chineseness, develop domestic connections (guanxi) and 
share a Chinese national dream, while at the same time remaining plugged in to the 
community of “global experts” and cultivate foreign habits, eat Western food, buy 
foreign products, enjoy Western-style nightlife, and so on. As I will explain, 
                                                 
 
50 As I have explained in chapter 2, the haigui are already privileged citizens because they have the right 
to obtain a Shanghai residency permit (hukou) once they succeed in finding a secure job. 
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Shanghai’s attraction for them is its place as a “world financial centre.” As Saskia 
Sassen describes this notion, a financial centre: “grounds and instantiates the global 
dimension of trading and its supervision. They are complex and thick environments 
containing systems of trust and cultures of interpretation. Financial centres enable local 
and global collaborations between firms that are key parts of many financial 
transactions and often evolve into cooperative inter-firm networks” (2008, 363).  
Once landed in Shanghai the aspiration of haigui returning from Australia is to position 
themselves as the best subjects to enable an “interpretative” exchange between 
Australian and Chinese firms. Here they expect to find the concentration of capital, 
institutions and infrastructure as well as the circulation of both Chinese and foreign 
financial practices within which they expect to put to work the expertise they acquired 
abroad. 
During my fieldwork in Shanghai, I got in touch with numerous returnees’ associations 
in order to explore how the haigui, as bearers of financial expertise from Australia, 
maintain their links to Australia once back in China. As I have shown in the previous 
chapter, these associations are an important reference point once the haigui arrive in 
Shanghai. Apart from the Australia China Alumni Association (ACAA), I traced 
various other associations founded by previous returnees who, after their arrival in the 
city, shaped those institutions to establish and legitimise their role as foreign-educated 
experts. In modern Chinese history, such associations have often played a role as 
powerful professional lobbies, entrusted with political duties. The first one ever 
created, the Society of Chinese Students in the World, dates back to 1913 and grew 
under the patronage of important personalities. According to its website, the 
association opened with the encouragement of the president Sun Yatsen. Sun was 
himself a returnee, and urged Chinese students from abroad to use their cultural 
authority in order to rebuild the nation, assigning a patriotic value to the study abroad. 
Closed during the Maoist period for being a politically unacceptable link with capitalist 
countries, the association was re-opened in 1985 by Jiang Zemin, who at that time was 
the Mayor of Shanghai. The website highlights how, for Jiang, the association was 
important “to bring about a Chinese renaissance and make Shanghai flourish” 
(ChinaSorsa 2009). Returnee associations seemed to run deep in the veins of Shanghai 
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history and have helped shape the city’s profile as a cradle of foreign knowledge and 
expertise with a key role to play in contemporary China’s rebirth. 
Nowadays, the majority of such associations are created through social media 
networks like weibo or linkedin, and by haigui seeking to create a community with 
which to share their experiences in the city. The most active is the Shanghai Fraternity 
and Harmony Returnees Group. I met Luo, the president, after I had contacted him via 
linkedin and explained to him the nature of my research and interest in meeting haigui 
who had studied in Australia. He was a haigui himself and had funded the association 
after coming back from France where he had studied. The association has its own 
profile on both Linkedin and Sina and can now boast of around 109,000 members. It 
organises social events almost fortnightly in various bars and clubs around the city. 
Luo invited me to attend one of the events of the association, at which, he assured me, 
I would certainly be able to encounter some haigui from Australia with a degree in 
finance. He was right. I attended the meeting, which was organised in one of the fancy 
clubs close to Renmin Guangchang (People’s Square), in the city centre. After I said 
“hello” to Luo, who was welcoming everyone at the door, I grabbed a drink from the 
bar and introduced myself to a group of females, who were standing and chatting just 
behind me. They seemed very excited and they were all dressed up. I said I was from 
Italy and I was studying in Australia. One of them, Lanhua, hugged me with 
excitement, “Oh mate, hello, ” she said, “I have studied in Australia too. Now I miss 
Australia so much.”51 I then asked Lanhua, why and how she joined the association. 
She says that, through the association she could finally meet people who, like her, have 
a more international mind-set. “You know, with my Chinese colleagues, I can’t go 
clubbing or drinking and properly experience Shanghai. They don’t like it, they are 
not used to it. Through  
                                                 
 
51 Interview with Lanhua, July 24 2013, Shanghai. 
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the association I get to know people like me, who want to socialise, stay out at night, 
and have a more open perspective.”  
We started talking about Shanghai nightlife. Indeed, I was quite knowledgeable on the 
topic, which helped us bond, so we became friends. We then spent the rest of the night 
talking about what they missed from abroad and how cool Shanghai was, as they could 
find everything they wanted here, not least—men. All of them were looking to find a 
partner, possibly with money and a good job, they underlined. Lanhua told me she had 
had an Australian boyfriend and she was very excited telling me all about it.52 But then 
they broke up. Now, in China, women like her have the double pressure of not only 
finding a “good” job but also find a future “good” husband. Two other females in the 
group started complaining to me that it is hard for them to fit into the Chinese market: 
not just into the job market but also into the marital one. They were feeling the social 
pressure of getting married and establishing themselves, but instead they were still 
floating around without a clear idea of how to get what they wanted.  
In general, in China, urban-educated, wealthy internationalised women are often 
referred to as “A” women and “left-over women” (shengnü). This is because, per 
tradition in a Chinese marriage, a man should always be wealthier, more highly 
educated, in general better placed (he should also be taller) than a woman. So, usually, 
an “A” man would marry a “B” woman, a “B” man a “C” woman and so on. One of 
the females told me, tracing an imaginary diagonal with her finger, to imagine two 
alphabetic columns representing the two genders: the “A” women are left apart, 
leftovers, precisely because they are too good. Ideally, they would have preferred to 
have a foreign husband but then they knew it would have meant not so much security 
and commitment; on the other hand, Chinese men were “too close minded, too old 
school, too traditional for them.” Therefore, attending networking events was also a 
way to meet other single haigui like them, who seemed the perfect candidates.  
 
Our conversation was interrupted by the voice of Luo, speaking from the microphone, 
                                                 
 
52 Generally, female interviewees were most willing to share with me their personal experiences, their 
narrative of their time in Australia was not limited to the experience of a University degree but it also 
encompassed an emotional side. 
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calling for our attention. Thanking everyone for taking part to the event, he announced 
that the association had reached 109,000 members. He went on to say how important 
the role of the haigui was to China, and stressed how proud he was to have gathered a 
powerful group of people, with such potential for the future, and for the development 
of a new China. I started talking with the Lanhua and her friends again, and asked 
whether they were feeling empowered to be there. One of them answered that yes, they 
knew that they were an asset because for the “first time” in history China could count 
on people with foreign experiences. “First time?” This answer struck me. I wondered 
if it were the case that this current crop of haigui was not aware of the history of China's 
returnees and their role in the Chinese process of modernisation, which throughout my 
studies has been at the crux of understanding their contemporary subjectivities. I was 
puzzled by this impulse to overlook the past, but at the same time sensed it was an 
ingrained trait. 
The haigui vision of their role, as internationalised actors and future assets for their 
nation, comprised no over-the-shoulder glances to a road already travelled. Even if the 
haigui I encountered were conscious of their ability to claim an inherited role as key 
and essential subjects for the development of the country, no such claim was deployed. 
In Shanghai, the Chinese city that so visibly comprises cosmopolitan features from a 
past which includes foreign occupations (strikingly apparent in its architecture and 
multi-facetted culture), such past acknowledgment was discarded. The haigui’s view 
of Shanghai is future oriented. As I will show later in the chapter, the exaltation of 
Shanghai as a city of the future is a recurrent leitmotif common to other haigui I 
interviewed.  
I consider this future exaltation of Shanghai as being part of the haigui’s sympathetic 
view of the city. The sympathy arises from an enthusiastic acclamation of Chinese 
entry into global capitalism. Shanghai's present appeal is founded on a 
contemporaneity which wipes the slate clean of its past. In the hegemonic view 
fostered by mainstream propaganda, Shanghai is a brand-new object, emerging from 
an uprooting of any previous configuration. Only its present nature of internationalised 
metropolis is acknowledged. Shanghai symbolises the launching of “a new China” in 
accordance with the haigui’s ambition to be the main actors in this potential 
renaissance (to recall the rallying cry of Xi Jinping’s government). As a simple 
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example, the haigui embrace the fashionable and updated image of the city, and place 
it on a pedestal of globalised modernity, complete with English-speakers, fully 
equipped IT gadgets, and Starbucks coffee cups. As I will show in the next section, 
here the haigui sense the opportunity to play their roles as mediators in a highly 
internationalised environment. Yet their reasons are contrasting. Their attraction to 
Shanghai also stems from the fact that the city is a domestic and protected environment 
in which they can respond to their patriotic feeling.  
 
Shanghai site of translation and historical configuration  
At a gathering of the China Australia Alumni Association, I first met Xiong, a haigui 
from Australia, who agreed to meet with me for an interview at a Starbucks café in the 
Lujiazui interchange in Pudong. He had been in Shanghai for more than three years 
after having obtained an MBA in Melbourne. Xiong was working for an Australian 
pension fund that was looking for new investment in China. He spoke perfect English, 
and was dressed casually in a tight t-shirt. He told me that he had just gone to the gym, 
a habit he had acquired while living in Australia. He insisted on buying me coffee, 
while he ordered a smoothie. As soon as we sat down, he started sipping from his 
straw, waiting for my questions.  
To begin with, I asked him if he liked his job. He said it was ok, but he had already 
started looking at other companies where he could gain more experience, in particular 
with big Chinese investment funds. He said that working for an Australian company 
in China was nice, and that the environment was really international and more relaxed 
than in most Chinese companies. However, he added, in some respects, it was also 
frustrating, as his boss could not really understand the Chinese way of doing business. 
He said such an understanding would have assured the company more opportunities in 
China: “the private insurance market is huge and booming, especially at this time when 
local governments are looking for new private partners to develop new pension plans. 
They need more flexible plans as the working population is changing.” Yet, he also 
underlines: “It is really hard. Australian companies are not well considered, not well 
connected and so it is very difficult for them to establish in the Chinese market. 
However, Australian funds are looking at China because they know here the potential 
is enormous. Here investments can be potentially more profitable than in Australia; 
they look for high returns investing in Chinese infrastructure. This can be ok, but forget 
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to participate in the new Chinese pension plans. Most Chinese companies do not merge 
or work with Australian ones. What they do with them is just to steal expertise and 
reproduce it on their own, on a bigger scale.” 53 
He told me that the Chinese pension transition to the three pillars system model was 
very tortuous and that there have been many cases of money laundering by local 
administrations. This was particularly true in Shanghai where the project was piloted.54 
Xiong told me that as a legacy of the old “iron rice bowl” mentality, Chinese 
employees expect governments and employers to be responsible for not only their 
incomes, but for their retirements.55 Yet with the dismantling of the old system, this 
expectation has been undermined, with Chinese workers now needing to seek other 
sources of security for retirement, mainly though investment of their own savings—
what is termed the “third pillar.” Xiong said that, in the past, it was very common for 
family elders to live with their adult children during their retirement. Their retirement 
funds contributed to the family budgets, and grandparents took care of the child while 
parents worked. However, times have changed, and in Shanghai in particular, people 
have a mentality increasingly akin to the Western model, where offspring are not 
inclined to want to live with their elderly parents. Xiong added:  
                                                 
 
53 Interview with Xiong, 17 July 2013, Shanghai. 
54  Following pilot projects in Shanghai and Guangzhou, the urban pension system was officially 
launched in 1997 with the announcement of a revised pension policy. Under the socialist system, 
pensions had been provided by state-owned enterprises, but in recent times a social insurance system 
has taken over. The public pension system consists now of three pillars: Pillar 1, a pay-as-you-go portion 
of enterprise contributions (20 per cent of total wages); Pillar 2, an employee’s individual account (11 
per cent of wages, of which 4 per cent is to be contributed by the employee and 7 per cent by the 
employer); Pillar 3, voluntary contributions (China Economic Review 1999). The urban pension system 
has a coverage rate of 50%. Although it is fully funded in principle, pillar 2 has suffered because local 
governments took capital from these accounts to cover pension deficits in the pay-as-you-go pillar and 
to pay out benefits. This led to the problem of “empty accounts.” To remedy the situation, the Chinese 
authorities have taken steps to "refill" pillar 3 through fiscal transfers from the local and central 
government (Pension Funds Online 2015). 
55 According to Henry Yuhuan He: “Daguofan (big cauldron canteen food), a reference to the egalitarian 
practices of the Mao period, implies that there is not much difference in reward whether people work 
hard or not. Hence tiefanfan (iron rice bowl), which means that once one has a job, it will remain secure, 
and the person will enjoy pay similar to that of others regardless of whether or not the job is done well. 
These practices began to change in the Deng Xiaoping period and his policies of reform and the open 
door” (2001, 51).  
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“especially people like me, who had lived abroad alone, we want to be more 
independent; what we want is to buy a house for ourselves.” 
In the process of such social transition, masses of funds have been unlocked from 
extended family coffers, and a reservoir of retirees’ savings helps feed domestic 
financial speculators, both public and private. For instance, at the time of my interview 
with Xiong, the Shanghai municipality had launched a house-for-pension plan: “As a 
possible means to ease the burden on elderly people in an ageing society where people 
are choosing to have fewer or no children. ... Under the program, an elderly person 
who owns a property could deed the house to an insurance company or bank, which 
would determine the value of the property and the applicant's life expectancy, and pay 
out a fixed amount of money every month” (China Daily 2013). 
This plan gave the local financial agencies a chance to dip their hands into retirement 
funds. The significance of all this is that the reforms and their ripples have not been 
part of the experience of foreign investors. The way family relationships have been 
changing and, specifically, the exit of grandparents from nuclear family households 
and the pressures of the financialisation process, are not easily understood from the 
point of view of foreign insurance companies and thus an accessible profit-making 
target has escaped them. Xiong was aware of the way Chinese financialisation works, 
impinging on local social relationships and bringing vulnerable subjects into the 
financial arena. He also seems to be aware that this process was unevenly deployed in 
the differentiated space of financial capitalism and that a gap separates the way this 
uneven deployment was codified in China and in Australia—in legal, anthropological, 
and ethical terms. 
Australian companies want to tap into the money flowing from China’s pension 
reforms, but lack the subtle knowledge and guanxi required. Given that such profitable 
areas of business remain the preserve of Chinese companies, Xiong revealed in the 
interview that he thought his duty was to translate between the two cultures, to put 
business opportunities within reach of his company and bridge the divide between 
Australian companies, unable to understand Chinese business culture, and Chinese 
clients, eager to acquire new expertise and develop more efficient ways of managing 
insurance. So I asked him what he wanted to do next. He replied that his dream was, 
first of all, to stay in Shanghai, earning enough money to buy a house in the city. He 
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would then be well positioned to live a good life and find profitable work opportunities 
as a translator of mutual business habits and ideas between Chinese and foreigners: 
“Foreigners who want to do business all start in Shanghai. This is the city of the 
Chinese future ... but they need Chinese people to guide them, otherwise they can’t go 
far. China is another world, another business environment. They do meetings and 
negotiation in another way here.” 
What Xiong seemed to be suggesting was that Australian (and other foreign) 
companies were having difficulty grasping the way Chinese society works and 
therefore in foreseeing profitable financial investments. In Xiong's mind, this made his 
role indispensable to Shanghai’s future financial development. His role as an effective 
facilitator belongs to the vast area of the immaterial labour entrusted to facilitate the 
inter-cultural communication in the uneven and heterogenous space of financial 
capitalism. In Maurizio Lazzarato’s words, “the role of immaterial labour is to promote 
continual innovation in the forms and conditions of communication” and “to give form 
to and materialise needs, imaginary, consumer tastes, and so forth” (Lazzarato 2014). 
Indeed, as argued by Christian Marazzi, in contemporary capitalism, communication 
and language structurally shape the production of goods and services in the financial 
sphere (Marazzi 2008). In this condition, the task of “translating” remains crucial, as 
an act of mediation that transcends its linguistic meaning and brings into dialogue 
different levels of economy and society that financial capital subsumes.  
Communication and translation between the two contractual business parties (China 
and Australia) appear to be the main features of this facilitation, assigned to expand 
the social spaces exposed to financialisation. Naoki Sakai defines this type of 
translation as “the rendering of all languages into a ‘homolingual address’, i.e. their 
conversion in the ubiquitous language of the valorisation of capital” (Sakai 1997, 4). 
This appears a fundamental concept as, “it is thanks to the language of valorisation 
that capital can be articulated among its radically heterogeneous geographic, political, 
legal, social, and cultural scales. ... Capital as translation is building up its own global 
dimension: the language of value (exchange value in its pure logical form) is the 
semantic structure” (Mezzadra 2010). 
 
In respect of such analysis, a haigui like Xiong, an expert accustomed to the 
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international environment, is a suitable translator of an emerging Chinese market in 
terms that are understandable to Australian companies. Thanks to Xiong’s role, the 
companies have access to information that can enable valorisation of their investments. 
For instance, Xiong described Chinese retirees as subjects “awakened by the reforms,” 
“freed” from their memory of the previous egalitarian welfare system, which had no 
concern for profitability and financial calculations and only worried about social 
support to the weak. Through an act of translation, Xiong converts the figure of the 
retirees—expelled from the active life, marginalised and ousted—into subjects able to 
make individual financial choices and market analysis—and happy to be thus enabled.  
Through such a translation, the mass of retirees are re-defined to be a group of mature 
investors, who have discarded their socialist-system-oriented “vital needs” outlook, in 
order to talk “the homolingual language of value” (Sakai 1997) in their transition to 
the role of profit seekers. Haigui like Xiong seem therefore to consider destitute old 
people as aware and informed brokers, translating a threat to formerly secure 
retirement funds into a business opportunity for Australian investment funds. In turn, 
as I will show in the next chapter, in some of the retirees’ minds too, the memory of 
the Maoist welfare system, ruled by mutuality, solidarity, and subsidiarity has faded 
away to be replaced by an individualist approach to self-sustenance and, they hope, to 
riches. In this process, what is therefore at play is the production of a new financial 
subjectivity: one of the individual, informal, everyday scattered players I will discuss 
in the next chapter.  
Coming back to Xiong’s “translating role,” I argue that his effort to mediate between 
China and Australia is deployed along two different trajectories. Firstly, outwards: he 
translates to the Australian employer the new spaces of investment offered by Chinese 
pension reform. At the beginning of such reform, in 1997, Shanghai served as a pilot 
city in which to carry this new social experiment. In this process, as I have explained 
in chapter 2, returnees like Xiong, with expertise on neoliberal structural reforms in 
the form of the privatisation of services, played an indispensable role. They in fact 
opened a Chinese social context, previously inaccessible (as the socialist pension 
system was), to the speculative operations of foreign capital investors. Similarly now, 
Xiong’s “translating” work consists of signalling and recommending new realms of 
financialisation in “understandable” terms to foreign investors.  
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The second trajectory is towards himself: Xiong’s prestige and career depend on the 
effectiveness of his tips. Besides wanting to qualify himself as a valuable consultant 
in the eyes of his Australian employers, Xiong’s real challenge and intrinsic desire 
were to prove his nose for business and new profitable investments and thus his ability 
to perform as an independent broker. He wants to possess a level of autonomy in his 
role which allows experimentation, so he can be freed from merely belonging to the 
Australian team, and leverage himself as a facilitator of the foreign capital pouring in 
to Chinese domestic markets. Ultimately, Xiong knows that domestically graduated 
financial experts can achieve their career and raise investment funds thanks to their 
guanxi with the ruling class. In the absence of any such network, he seeks to resort to 
his role as foreign capital facilitator and translator, hoping this will play out as his 
trump card. Xiong had hoped to be employed at the service of the Chinese investment 
funds in order to interpret foreign financial standards and expertise. In fact, even 
though the reforms to the Chinese national pension had to be restructured under 
pressure from the international community, this did not simply fit into an exported 
model but was negotiated and applied according to the foreign expertise-Chinese 
knowledge dialectic. 
Indeed, what the analysis of Xiong’s translation work suggests is its embeddedness in 
the historical dialectic, foreign expertise-Chinese knowledge, which I have traced in 
the previous chapters. This might also point to the fact that although Xiong, like 
Lanhua, sees his role of translation as being enabled by the future-oriented nature of 
the city (see second extract of Xiong’s interview) and dismisses the past, he, like other 
haigui, carries a heritage of exchange and confrontation between Chinese domestic 
markets and foreign knowledge/expertise, as well as foreign capital. This heritage has 
historically shaped and preserved Shanghai’s multifarious identity. Consciously or 
inadvertently, contemporary haigui in Shanghai act in a space similar to the one which 
Meng Yue, in her Shanghai and the Edges of Empires (2006), refers to as a space for 
encounters of multiple knowledge production. Meng says, for instance, that since the 
very beginning of the twentieth century (at the dawn of the modern Chinese state), 
Shanghai was an incubator of a “semiotic of modernity,” which signalled “massive 
semiotic exchanges” in fields ranging from finance to publishing as an index of 
modernity (in contrast to industrialisation and mechanical production). It became the 
site of an entire apparatus where new knowledge and expertise coming from abroad, 
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mainly from Japan and from Europe, were gradually metabolised (Meng 2006). Meng 
explains that, key to the emergence of this semiotic, for instance, was the translation 
of foreign books into Chinese, published through public and private institutions. This 
was a paramount project of translation undertaken by the predecessors of the present 
haigui, a multitude of agents with bilateral formation, domestic and foreign, that 
unconsciously performed as semiologists of Chinese modernity.  
Among these predecessors of contemporary haigui, translation (this time to be 
understood in its literal sense) meant the transfer of knowledge from one language into 
another. Yet, even in this literal meaning, translation often manifests a “verticality” 
(when the languages involved are not considered of equal importance), that is, a 
trajectory towards authoritative and prestigious languages from languages devoid of 
such qualifications. In their translations of Western texts, Chinese sensed such a 
verticality. Actually, in imperial China, the foreign works translated into classical 
Chinese had to be pre-emptively considered respectable enough to fit the official 
language of the Chinese court. For instance, in translating into Chinese Adam Smith’s 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chinese title Yuanfu, 
lit. “Origin of Wealth,” 1901), Yan Fu, one of the most celebrated Chinese translators 
of the nineteenth century, was confident that Smith’s work, as a potential contribution 
to the enrichment of the Chinese empire, suited such a requirement. He had no doubt 
that the Chinese language would perfectly perform the task of the difficult translation 
(perhaps, at only the cost of coining some new words). I maintain that Yan Fu’s attitude 
is but another case of the arm-wrestling between Chinese knowledge and foreign 
expertise. Translation into Chinese is the act by which foreign written works, deemed 
to be worthy of translation, are inserted into the local frame and subsumed to 
Chineseness.  
In this last sense, the concept of translation, namely, introducing Western expertise 
into Chinese knowledge, had a profound effect on the Chinese local political and social 
context. As I have discussed in chapter 1, these works would become crucial for the 
redefinition of a new Chinese modernity that, in order to survive, could not but accept 
Western ideas and principles. In the dialectic relations of the ti (“body,” “foundation”) 
and yong (“tool”), this would have set the basis for a new redefinition of social 
relations, their accommodation and struggle, for the emergence of financial capitalism. 
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As I will explain in the following sentences, what links Xiong to his predecessors is 
precisely the inversion of what Yan Fu did: choosing apt Chinese contents and 
accommodating them to the needs and tastes of foreign companies.  
Since their arrival in the city, Xiong and the other haigui have situated themselves in 
these overlapping imaginaries, resulting from the intersections of Chineseness with 
Western modernity and by an arm-wrestle aimed at establishing a new configuration 
of local contemporaneity. Even if unintentionally, the haigui confine the tensions 
arising from the process of transposition of foreign financial expertise within a 
domestic context: again the dialectic of “foreign tool” and “Chinese body.” The point 
is, however, that a description of Shanghai as a forerunner of a linear access to a unique 
modernity pushes the role of the haigui towards simplification and sugarcoating, 
towards an imaginary ohne Eigenschaften (without qualities), an incomplete 
representation of the changes that alter social forms and individual identities (Musil 
1995). They would be seen, for instance, as unable to identify the “invariants and 
constant variants of the primary parameters” in finance upon which any “systematic 
forecasting of the future, especially from present trends in society” is based (Oxford 
Dictionary 2010). Their professional expediency as penetrating and perceptive 
financial advisors might be therefore reduced. As I will explain later in this chapter, 
this attitude towards a “flattened” future is also revealed by their admiration for Hong 
Kong, that exemplary yet inaccessible city created ex nihilo by the British at their 
arrival on the Chinese shore, without any cumbersome past to confront.  
Despite the fact that Shanghai has often been described as a cradle of Chinese 
modernity, (in keeping with official rhetoric), it has been the site of an overlapping of 
multiple knowledge orders that have interacted and passed, but none of which have 
prevailed. Take, for instance, the Taiping revolution (1850-64): its egalitarianism only 
skimmed Shanghai.56 Likewise, the “foreign things movement” did not see Shanghai 
                                                 
 
56 The Taiping army, with a strength of half a million solders, descended the Yang-tse River pointing 
directly towards Nanking, the Empire’s second city (Reclus 1972, 68). In the absence of imperial power, 
the city fell under the control of the Small Sword Society, a secret society linked to the underworld 
(Fujian Shanghai Xiaodaohui dang’an shiliao huibian 1993). The Taiping Revolution was egalitarian, 
and acted according to the Christian dogma of the “brotherhood of Man” (for instance, land taken from 
the landlords was equally divided among all the followers of the revolution, both male and female). 
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as one of the strongholds of this first modernisation.57 Understandably, a damnatio 
memoriae hit the Commune of Shanghai (1967), as a communist modernity.58 Seen in 
this light, Shanghai appears not so much an incubator as an hotelier of modernities, 
both native and outer, and unconcerned as to who occupies its rooms. “Prior to the 
1930s, Shanghai did not confirm the dominance of imperialist or colonialist or any 
order. Shanghai carried within its birth a peripheral element, a subversive, rebellious 
spirit that was ungovernable by either the Qing Empire or the imperialist regime. It 
turned the city into a haven for outlaws, as well as a cradle of anarchists, anti-Qing 
revolutionaries, early Chinese Communists, radical journalists, strikers and 
demonstrators against imperialism. … In this regard, the modern development of the 
city was marked by a plurality of foreign presence and influence that deeply affected 
the urban culture and its urban subjectivities” (Lee 1999, 104). Shanghai also 
constituted “the political anomaly of extraterritoriality” (776). The multiplicity of 
foreign concessions: British, American, and French, and later Japanese (after 1933) 
“meant that internal control of the city always had to be negotiated” (776) by many 
different hands. Multiple presences and multiple perspectives saturated the city. 
Comparing this multiplicity with the present situation of a city consumed in the one-
dimensional pensée unique of the “future-oriented,” “harmonious” and “dreamy,” the 
difference is striking. Meng Yue stages an imaginary dialogue with Micheal Hardt and 
Antonio Negri: “[they] would probably consider Shanghai as one of the nodes of the 
mesh of the ‘empire of capital,’ as well as ‘a global network of the ‘multitude,’ 
contesting capital from every site” (Meng 2006, vii). Meanwhile, authors like Andre 
Gunder Frank, Hamashita Takeshi and Kawakatsu Heita, Peter Perdue and (here I am 
adding) Giovanni Arrighi, would instead situate “Shanghai’s prominence not so much 
                                                 
 
57 Also “Self-strengthening movement” (ziqiang), animated by a series of big enterprises owned by the 
highest officers of the Empire, like the China Merchant Steampship Navigation Company, founded by 
Li Hongzhang in 1872 and stationed in Peking, the Kaiping Coal Mines opened in 1877 near Tianjin, 
the Kiangnan Arsenal in Fuzhou, a national telegraph system owned by Li Hongzhang which linked the 
international cables to Peking and Tianjin and terminated in Shanghai etc. Institutionally, the Zongli 
Yamen (Office for General Affairs, i.e. foreign affairs) and the Tongwenguan (Interpreters College) 
were based in Peking (Spence 1991, 217). Because in Shanghai (for its status as merely a district city) 
there were no high officers, the main actor of the yangwu reforms was lacking, and Shanghai had no 
chance to participate and orient the movement.  
58 For a short span of time, the city was administered by a city council directly elected by local 
assemblies of workers and protected by the minbing (people’s military forces), made by armed workers. 
The council implemented a radical communist program.  
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as a result of Western expansion but the outcome of the internal rotation of the Asian 
world system” (vii), originating with the flourishing of the region under the tributary 
system and a mature market development based on internal trading established by the 
Ming and Qing dynasty (fourteenth-nineteenth centuries).  
What the haigui seem to ignore in particular is Shanghai's turbulent financial history, 
when it welcomed but also resisted Western capital’s landing. For instance, in the 
nineteenth century (at the time of Western capital’s entrance into China), the country 
was enlivened by a widespread network of local informal banks (qianzhuang, often 
translated “money-shop”), which assumed a major role in competing with the 
emergent foreign capital and were particularly active in Shanghai and along the Yang-
tse River.59 Furthermore, the local modern banks, modelled on the Western lines, were 
locally reshaped, through a marriage with the Chinese state Sheng Xuanhuai (1844-
1916).60 The 1897 founder of the Imperial Bank of China perfectly mirrored this 
marriage, in his capacity as both high officer and private entrepreneur. Ultimately, 
domestic finance remained in a subaltern position and the first Shanghai stock 
exchange and the first Chinese stock exchange (1920) were only a flash in the pan 
(Bergère 2002, 163).  
To sum up, what Shanghai’s history suggests—and the haigui tend specifically to 
unconsciously remove—is the complexity, the conflicts and risks associated with 
welcoming global capital. In ignoring these sides of the equation, the haigui abandon 
the possibility of comparing past and present. As expressed by both Lanhua and Xiong 
only the “new” and the “future” catches their eyes. So how is this possible? Shanghai 
still offers a striking contrast on the two sides of the Huangpu River: eastwards, the 
colonial buildings of the Bund, with the first of Shanghai’s banks and financial 
institutions and the first Chinese stock exchange; westwards, the booming new urban 
vanguard area of Pudong—the city’s new financial centre. But only this latter seems 
positively valorised for the haigui. To them, Shanghai is the only Chinese city in 
possession of the financial and cultural practices which they crave. The futuristic shape 
                                                 
 
59 Qianzhuang, lit. “money shops,” an old form of traditional banks which sprang from pawnshops. See 
for instance Bergère (2002, 66).  
60 About Sheng Xuanhuai, see for instance Bergère (2002, 61). 
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of Pudong obscures the past. Chronology is capsized and the past exists not as an 
experience to be meaningfully analysed, but only to glorify the city’s grandiosity and 
to confer upon it a picturesque and historical touch. However, a chasm opens up 
between the haigui’s ideal imaginary and the expectations and opportunities truly on 
offer to them in the city. 
Hua, a returnee from Australia working in a small Chinese fund management 
company, told me that the unsatisfying opportunities provided by the Shanghai job 
market were a real flop. When she arrived, she had been so excited. She expected to 
find a dynamic market full of opportunity. At the beginning, she looked at every 
financial job she could, she sent CVs everywhere, from hedge funds, to futures and 
capital investments, hoping to get a job in investment banking. Now that she has 
become specialised in her job (in charge of financial company reviews), even if she 
really wanted to, she could not easily change sector. “Every part of the market is so 
different to the other and it requires experience and specialisation.” She says “there is 
not such a thing as the financial market. There are several industries and sectors and 
everyone is so different from the other.”61 
She was no doubt right. Yet, in saying all of this, she showed a certain disappointment. 
The reality of her regimented job as an analyst was in sharp contrast with the 
expectations she had about the multiple possibilities of the financial sector in Shanghai 
in her inexperience at the beginning of her job search. Hua’s dashed expectations seem 
to arise from an idealised vision of finance as both an elusive and “amorphous entity” 
(Haiven 2014a, 86), which comprises a glamorous array of activities. Furthermore, 
“[i]n the last century finance has seeped well beyond the borders of a distinct field of 
accumulation and today saturates (and enables) a form of globalised hyper capitalism 
which resonates in its cultural and social registers” (87). 
The pervasive and evasive power of financial capital has colonised many aspects of 
everyday life, nurturing new dreams associated with it. However, in practice, the case 
of Hua shows that once the financial sector is penetrated and a financial job 
“encountered,” it reveals a job market that hosts very specialised, repetitive and tedious 
                                                 
 
61 Interview with Hua, 23 July 2013, Shanghai. 
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tasks. This situation contrasts with the haigui’s understanding of an ideal financial 
environment. At the same time, it also obfuscates their capacity to deal with the 
specificity and distinctive characteristics of the Chinese stock market. As I anticipated 
in the Introduction and I will further explain in the next chapter, part of the 
distinctiveness of the Chinese financial market is the fact that the stock market is 
organised into separated groups of shares (A shares for domestic investors; B shares 
for international investors). This division was established by the party-state soon after 
the opening of the Chinese stock market, with the rationale of preserving a Chinese 
domesticated space, protected from foreign currency participation and speculation. 
Such a market structure of the market that seems to disorient the haigui, uncertain as 
to whether the better option is trying to get a job with foreign financial institutions (for 
instance a foreign bank) or “entering” into the Chinese financial market with one of 
the much sought after state owned Chinese institutions—hoping to be “valorised” for 
their foreign expertise. Neither of these choices seems to be the winning one. Apart 
from a few exceptions—such as haigui working for bilateral China and Australia 
institutions like the Australian Chamber of Commerce, and Australian businesses—
the haigui working in foreign financial companies and foreign banks from Australia 
and elsewhere, were usually operating at the margins, in a subsidiary role. 
Furthermore, as I stressed in previous chapters, the same happens with Chinese 
companies and state owned enterprises, where managerial positions are reserved for 
their locally graduated peers with good guanxi. In the following section I will show 
how, despite multiple disappointments, in the eyes of the haigui searching for an 
identity, Shanghai’s representation matched up with the one formulated by the state 
for its hegemonic purposes, which tugs at their patriotic feelings in order to boost the 
nation’s financial capitalism.  
Shanghai as a site of social re-engineering  
Almost none of the haigui I interviewed took into consideration the possibility of 
locating themselves in any Chinese city other than Shanghai—not even the capital 
Beijing or Shenzhen, the site of the other Chinese stock market. It was rather surprising 
to hear this. After all, it is in Beijing that the final political decisions are taken, and 
Shenzhen, with its stock market, boasts of a promising financial development. Among 
the reasons many haigui offered up when explaining to me “why Shanghai” was that 
Shanghai “is almost like Hong Kong.” Interestingly, for haigui, the supremacy of 
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Shanghai was therefore due to its “resemblance” with Hong Kong. So, my question 
was: “Why didn’t you choose Hong Kong?” I received multiple reasons. One of the 
shared feelings was their sense of intimidation at the prospect of facing “cut-throat” 
and “global” competition, rather than the less daunting “Chinese-like” competition of 
Shanghai. “In Hong Kong everyone comes from abroad, is able to speak English, and 
holds a degree in finance.” In Hong Kong, the haigui cannot play their “international 
card,” while in Shanghai it was their trump card. Ultimately, their status as haigui (in 
the sense of being holders of a resident permit in a status city) in Hong Kong would 
not count. Clearly, such disparity between their “status” in the two cities was also 
enforced by Chinese state policies, not inclined to channel Chinese students from 
abroad to Hong Kong instead of mainland China. Overall, for the haigui, Shanghai 
was a Hong Kong “under control”—a attainable Hong Kong, under the state’s direct 
supervision.  
One should remember that Shanghai’s contemporary “allure” commenced only after 
China’s opening reforms in 1980s, when it regained its relevance as business and 
financial hub. This marked an historical caesura with the downfall of the previous 
communist model and the start of “competition” with Hong Kong. It was during 
Maoist communism that Hong Kong gained its economic and financial supremacy. At 
that time Shanghai, as a site of Chinese and foreign capital exchanges, closed down, 
foreign capital was withdrawn and Chinese entrepreneurs moved elsewhere—
especially to Hong Kong—a secure site of capitalism within a British colony. Hong 
Kong, culturally speaking, was caught in the double bind of divided loyalties. It was 
politically ambivalent between Britain and China and two languages (English and 
Cantonese), and confident only about its role as a strategic economic site, a capital 
catalyst. The point where it began to rival the cultural vibrancy of Shanghai of the 
1930s was during the 1980s and 1990s: that is, precisely the moment when Hong Kong 
felt most vulnerable and dependent.62 Hong Kong was “recovered to the motherland” 
in 1997 with an outburst of nationalistic spirit, when the state presented the re-entry as 
an act of redress over the West, but at the same time Hong Kong remained a “foreign 
body” in the mainland frame. This foreignness (at once a hindrance and a privilege) 
                                                 
 
62 After the Joint Declaration announcing the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. 
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prevents Hong Kong from directly competing with other Chinese big cities. “The 
urban configuration offered by Hong Kong became the new criteria for governing the 
population and the new drive for the economic boom. This turn is well captured by 
Deng Xiaoping’s words in 1992, when, during his visit to Shenzhen, he called for the 
creation of ‘a few Hong Kongs’ (jige Xianggang) along the coast (Ong 2011).  
A “development fever” animated the draconian urban neoliberal path implemented 
around Guangzhou (Canton), Shanghai, and Xiamen with the launch of the new 
economic zones. This urbanisation rush constituted a “learning process” from already 
established Chinese centres whereby “Shenzhen is Hong Kongized, Guangzhou is 
Shenzhenized, and the whole country is Guangdongized” (Cartier 2011, 242, quoted 
by Ong 2011, 24). Despite the reassuring insertion of Hong Kong in a wide region 
including Shenzhen, Guangzhou (Canton) and the SEZs along the coast, its cross-
border collocation and its décalage in terms of capitalistic ripeness is still granting the 
city room to preserve its role as an exclusive zone. In spite of the authoritarianism of 
the Chinese government, Hong Kong still appears elusive, unattainable, and haughty, 
but also glamorously globalised, like an illegitimate son still carrying the stigma of an 
irredeemable sin. Even in the minds of the majority of Chinese, Hong Kong is still 
perceived as an external body, a land of toys where only the wealthy can afford to go 
and enjoy tax exemption and the advantages of a different currency. 
Nonetheless, the Chinese government stubbornly refuses to admit any favouritism 
toward Hong Kong, and instead underlines its role as a “fair father” with no favourites. 
Will Shanghai replace a regained Hong Kong as the country’s main economic and 
financial centre? A Mayor of Shanghai, Xu Kuangdi (1995-2001), in a Hong Kong 
newspaper interview, addressed the issue of Shanghai and Hong Kong as follows: 
“You don’t have to worry about Shanghai replacing Hong Kong; or that because of 
Hong Kong, Shanghai is not going to become a financial centre. They play different 
roles. … In the future, their relationship will be like two good forwards on a football 
team. They will pass the ball to each other and both will do their best to score more 
goals. But they are on the same team—China’s national team” (quoted in Abbas 2000, 
778). 
In the same interview, he conceded that Hong Kong is more international than 
Shanghai. It is a financial centre for Southeast Asia. Not only does it link China with 
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the world, it also serves as a trading market for Southeast Asian countries. Shanghai 
primarily serves as a link between the mainland and the rest of the world. Besides its 
financial and international potential, Shanghai is an outstanding case of a domesticated 
city, fitting “a visionary” urban configuration propelled by the state. In this resides its 
domestic preciousness, which exceeds any other value, including a leading position in 
the global capital circuit. Here the haigui feel they can enjoy a protected financial 
environment which ensures them a connection to the world. In particular, as I will 
explain later in the chapter, in Shanghai they can hang on to their patriotic feelings. 
After I had contacted him through Linkedin, I met Wen at one of the Costa cafés close 
to his office in Pudong. Wen had been in Shanghai for just 3 months after he graduated 
at Macquarie University in Sydney and was working as a business analysis for one of 
the biggest Chinese banks. I asked him if he liked his job. Sitting still in the chair, 
exhibiting a proud posture, he looked at me very attentively and told me: “It is a great 
opportunity and I hope to gain a lot of experience and training. So I can pursue my 
career. I am not interested in salary that much now. You know I had a job offer in 
Hong Kong before coming here. I would have got a much higher salary there, working 
for a British foreign wealth management fund. However, I refused it because the job 
was not what I wanted to pursue. I want to work for China, in Shanghai. Going for a 
Chinese bank is my choice and I want to work for the country anyway.”63 Wen also 
told me that his aspiration was to help Chinese banking to grow. He wanted to realise 
Chinese potentials by attracting foreign funds to make the sector globally competitive. 
He was seeing himself as a conveyor of both economic and structural advancements 
within a domesticised and nationally protected banking industry. In this sense, his path 
towards a successful financial career also embraced a patriotic commitment. Wen was 
not the only one to express this patriotic feeling; throughout the research other haigui 
exhibited the same national commitment. As recounted by Lisa Hoffman in her 
Patriotic Professionalism in Urban China (2010), and as I have underlined in both 
chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, in China, technologies of governing that involve self-
subjected professionalisation do not exclude patriotism, instead they reflect a new 
neoliberal rationality in which the state is not only active in addressing new values but 
                                                 
 
63 Interview with Wen, 5 August 2013, Shanghai.  
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also invoked as a guide to shape one’s responsibility and conduct. I argue that in its 
confrontation with Hong Kong, the haigui attraction towards Shanghai is motivated 
by their call to respond to the state’s call to a national project.  
In the post-Mao transition, Shanghai was labelled as the best city to connect China to 
the World. Shanghai “was chosen by the Chinese state to be the ‘snakehead’ for the 
leading development of the country” (Ong 2006b, 166). In the wake of the economic 
reforms launched by Deng and under the pressure of the wider international 
community, Shanghai was encouraged to promote a new governance for a more 
“efficient” and “participatory” way of governing cities, neighbourhoods, and citizens 
(Ren 2005; Zhang 2002). As reported by Jos Gamble in his Shanghai in Transition, by 
the late nineties “Shanghai had embarked upon one of the most adventurous and 
frenetic” programs of urban renewal that “the world has ever known.” As a result, at 
the turn of the new millennium, “there were 23,000 building sites and some 20 per cent 
of the world’s cranes” (Gamble 2003, ix). Urban land started to be leased to developers 
or users through negotiation, tender, or public auction (Wu 2003, 60) and urban 
governance followed a process of decentralisation which resulted “in fragmented, 
ambiguous and constantly redefined power relationships among various levels and 
branches of government” (Wu 2000, 1366). This process of urban restructuring 
followed a political decentralisation of the previous socialist centralised urban 
governance that was previously characterised by the centrality of the danwei, the urban 
work unit. As I will explore in the next chapter, under Mao the danwei provided more 
than just employment to its members but also welfare benefits and social identity. “The 
danwei was thus the model par excellence of Chinese socialist governance” (Bray 
2005) and it evolved from being a “device for the effective mobilisation of labour to 
one that sought to oversee and administer every other aspect of urban life in a 
comprehensive and all-encompassing way” (Nguyen 2013, 215).  
In order to treat the bruises left by the dismantling of the danwei, a new moral order 
had to be built from scratch. Shanghai became the laboratory for a new biopolitical 
project to foster a new neoliberal self-governed subject. The population was literally 
mobilised in order to huan naozi “change the brain,” that is, change the way of 
thinking. One of the goals of the new reform was to create new community citizens 
and to transform grass-roots organisations, which in the socialist period were 
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traditionally tasked with the administration and surveillance of citizens, into self-
helping and self-servicing communities of governance (Lin and Kuo 2013, 1261). 
Shanghai was one of the first pilot cities to participate in this experiment. In 1996, the 
“urban community” (shequ) substituted the danwei (Xu 2007). The shequ became the 
basic unit for community building, in which services like health, environment, 
education, morality, and policing had to be self-managed at a community level. The 
shequ celebrated a new “good community” governance which carried a substantial 
ethical element, as this was seen as being dependent on raising the moral “quality” of 
urban citizens (Bray 2006, 533). These communities, expressing a new governmental 
strategy, are designated to foster a new “quality of the population” (renkou suzhi) 
which, as I explained in chapter 2, stands as a crucial term in the present Chinese 
political lexicon. It summarises the features of a contemporary urban middle class, 
including a clear-cut political disinterest and a high propensity to consume. In this 
sense, Shanghai, more so than Hong Kong, was recommended as an “exemplary” pilot 
model to be replicated around China, with “exemplary citizens” in a diversified 
complex from political, ethnical, religious, and anthropological points of view. In 
performing this ideal, a self-governed subject was also carrying ideals of patriotism, 
socialist morality, or the party’s ruling principle (Bray 2006).  
As suggested by Gary Sigley, in the process of the reforms, one should not think of 
any “retreat of the party-state” but rather a regrouping of different authorities, sectors 
and social organisations through the “new” party-led leadership and governamentality 
(Sigley 2006, 498). Furthermore, such regrouping should be seen as an attempt to 
institute better “relations between the party and the masses” (dangqun guanxi).64 The 
embrace of a market economy is also aimed at strengthening the social contract with 
the masses. The party sought to favour “mechanisms of competition and individual 
autonomy and initiative, in order to produce an environment conducive to forging 
superior citizens and enterprises” (498). 
                                                 
 
64 Commencing in the 1980s, the reformist side of the party had started criticising “the socialist system 
arguing that administrative intervention was overly heavy-handed and had a detrimental effect on ….the 
masses’ trust of the party, as the target subject of the planned economy was seen as a passive, de-
humanised object of instrumental reasoning” (Sigley 2006, 499). 
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Thus, as I have highlighted in chapter 1, the master narrative that conceives the rise of 
a new neoliberal competitive subject resulting from the biopolitical management of 
life in China appears to be tightly substantiated within a long-term totalising project, 
led by the state (see Greenhalgh 2003). The Chinese state has explicitly attempted to 
reformulate a social contract between the party and the masses. Despite invoking ideals 
of self-entrepreneurship and competition, the party was able to address the masses. In 
this sense, the concept of “totalisation” marks an important distinguo. As Foucault 
argued, “liberalism acquired its modern shape precisely with the formulation of the 
essential incompatibility between the non-totalisable multiplicity of economics 
subjects of interests and the totalising unity of the juridical sovereignty” (Foucault 
2008, 282). Later he stressed how “state modern power has always been 
characterised—even in old Chinese society—by a combination in the same political 
structures of individualisation techniques and of totalising procedures” (Foucault 
1982, 77). Along this line, throughout the opening reforms, the Chinese population 
was at once omnes and singulatum, totalised and individualised. As explained by 
Sigley: “On the one hand, the nation is represented within discourse as the 
conglomeration of the entire population. ... Levels of economic growth and standards 
of living are represented in forms that are readily comparable to those of other nations. 
On the other hand, the overall strength of the nation is intimately tied to the attributes 
and capacities of individual citizen-subjects” (Sigley 2004, 565).  
With its power to redefine the lives of the population, I take Chinese financialisation 
as among the phenomena that perhaps best express the “political bind” that coerces the 
“simultaneous individualisation and totalisation” (Foucault 1982, 785) of Chinese 
biopower. As I will analyse in more detail in the next chapter, the opening of the first 
stock market in Shanghai in 1992, suddenly called a previously “financially passive” 
population to invest their savings in stocks. Thus, the rise of a new financially capable 
citizen-subject who started to participate as an individual investor in the country’s 
financial wealth. I will argue that the Chinese process of financialisation is tightly 
prescribed by “the logic of biopower” which, as Stefano Lucarelli put it, “is the 
production of wealth through the daily use of the population” (2010, 121). Shanghai 
was the city appointed, together with the special economic zones, to boost the reform 
process and “nourish the aspirations of the laobaixing (the common people)” (Gamble 
2003, 11). As expressed by Deng Xiaoping, Shanghai had to “seize the opportunity,” 
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“show more courage,” and “take faster steps” (Deng, quoted in Gamble 2003, 11). As 
reported by the ethnographer Jos Gamble when he returned to Shanghai in 1992 after 
his previous visit in 1989, an improvement in “morale” was visible among Shanghai 
citizens; a new excitement had imbued the population. All of a sudden, the main topic 
of conversation was stocks and shares. “Many people had become busier, and all 
around me there was evidence of increased business and busy-ness” (Gamble 
2003, 11). The inception of Chinese financialisation was then characterised around the 
involvement of the population, in particular the mass of the so called “scattered 
players” sanhu within the rhetoric of national financial power, and personal 
enrichment.  
In the next section, I will show how, in joining the Shanghai financescape, the haigui 
have to confront the sanhu, a mass of scattered and informal subjectivities gripped by 
a “stock fever” (a term I explain in the next chapter). The relationship between haigui 
and mass financialisation is a critical one. As subjects responding to different, 
occasionally conflicting social and existential needs, their conceptions of enrichment 
and self-affirmation experience a dual orientation. However, like all the other sanhu, 
the haigui too, returning to Shanghai and seeking to compete to upgrade their social 
and professional position, embody the attributes of new citizen-subjects 
(individualisation) while also seeking and expecting rewards for their contribution to 
the national upsurge or jueqi (a recently popular term the party rhetoric is embracing 
to celebrate Chinese success) and the country’s financial development (totalisation). 
In particular, the haigui, as I explained in chapter 2, are fostered by the state to become 
successful individuals in the form of experts. Once returned, they expect to affirm 
themselves in the Shanghai financial market with the dream of positioning themselves 
among a wealthy, globally connected, empowered national elite, proud to serve the 
nation. Yet, very often, they end up marginalised at the edge of a protected financial 
ecology of expertise—mere subsidiaries intermediating financial funds, companies, 
and Chinese state-controlled institutions. Many haigui then plunge among the myriad 
of sanhu, the backbone of mass financialisation. In this vast arena, I will show how 
some of them resort to the stock market as a way to make money in the same way as 
other sanhu.  
 
Pudong as a Zone  
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The growing esteem Shanghai enjoys all over the world started roughly with the 
establishment of the Pudong New Area in 1993. Indeed, global capital has drawn a red 
circle around Pudong as a major business and financial centre, in the need to identify 
a convenient landmark and to create an emplacement for its further expansion. As 
stated before, some of the prominent features of Shanghai are here exalted to the 
utmost, and the city is described in terms of contemporaneousness, urban smartness, 
and as an international business and financial hub. Pudong is seen as a stronghold of 
Chinese openness to the outside world, perfectly equipped to respond to a frantic 
development of infrastructure and services, from suspended highways to the magnetic 
train, internationalised by a gigantic logistics apparatus and a growing expat 
community. Pudong is the quintessence of such urban development fever. 
It is no accident that Pudong is the site of the stock market. As suggested by Brian 
Hook (1998), Pudong’s booming development responded to Deng’s regret at not 
having included Shanghai as one of the original Special Economic Zones established 
in 1979. Precisely due to this regret, the opening of the Pudong financial district 
acquired the condition that defines the zone. By the term zone, I suggest not only a 
development pattern for territorial optimisation in which the Chinese state articulates 
its territory, but a Chinese state strategy of governing new urban spaces that has 
characterised the last forty years. The zone has to be identified as a new space of 
production, which encompasses an assemblage of forces playing behind its 
development.  
The development of a physical zone, in Henri Lefebvre’s view, could also emerge as 
an abstract space (the space of bureaucratic politics) that produces, imposes and 
reinforces a spreading of new social ordering among the population (1991). In this 
sense, by understanding Pudong as a financial zone, I wish to underline how finance 
implements a social re-ordering. In such a re-ordering, the Chinese state was on one 
hand called to accommodate a new process of capital accumulation driven by financial 
means, on the other called to foster, filter and control its labouring subjects, according 
to the logic of “graduated sovereignty” (Ong 2006a). I argue that the fostering of the 
haigui, as well as their withering, is one of the most remarkable manifestations of this 
attempt. 
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In Pudong, the Shanghai stock exchange opened in 1992 by the same method the party-
state applied to develop the SEZs. After Deng Xiaoping’s visit in 1992, and within the 
lapse of a few years, the Pudong area of Shanghai across the Huangpu (Whampoa) 
River in front of the Bund was developed into a mini-Manhattan, “following Deng’s 
agenda for it: ‘A new look each year, a transformation in three years’” (Abbas 2000, 
779). Before the establishment of the new Pudong Area, Pudong and the hinterland 
were respectively a suburban area of houses and harbour facilities, and a rural strip of 
scattered villages, and even occasional Christian churches opened by missionaries. 
Pudong suddenly lost its marginality and became the symbol of the Chinese insertion 
into the global economy. 65 
Here the violence of primitive accumulation quickly transformed a few agricultural 
fields into a hub of high-tertiary sectors. The very physical transition to a zone with a 
broad multiple services complex encouraged the attraction of capital investment and 
the recruitment of new specialised expertise into this hub. Finance occupies the zone, 
reproducing the logic of the global financial infrastructure. In the zone, “finance allows 
capital to play the nation state and its populations against one another” (Harvey 2006, 
254-257, quoted by Haiven 2012, 88). Here the haigui have to perform: on one hand 
operating within a global capital “business friendly” environment, on the other 
responding to the logic through which the Chinese state enabled the financial 
infrastructure to operate while protecting its own financial ecology of expertise.  
The stock market building stands as an exception: not so tall and futuristic, it is a glass 
and steel structure, built in the shape of the Chinese symbol for rice. This reflects its 
commitment—as rice has been the basic life sustenance for the Chinese people, so the 
financial market is the contemporary transposition of this relationship in sustaining the 
Chinese economy (Satyananda 2006), for the rich as much as the commoners. In 
contrast, the rest of Pudong embodies the imaginary power manifested by such high-
tech and towering skyscrapers as the Pearl Tower, the Jinmao Tower and the Shanghai 
World Financial Centre (to which very soon one of the highest buildings in the world 
                                                 
 
65 Lit. the “East [bank] of [Huang]pu [River],” is located on a strip of land along the river called Lujiazui, 
lit. the “Beak—i.e. the strip—of the Lu Family.” 
153 
will be added).66 Their vanguard aspects as landmarks of the zone make Pudong a 
window of the global and, as Micheal Keith et al. have noted (2014), have become the 
icon of a global generic urbanism captured in the advertising shorthand of The 
Financial Times (2014, 97), where pictures of Pudong appear among images iconic 
business buildings in cities like new York, London, Tokyo, Paris and Kuala Lumpur. 
In Pudong, I suggest the concept of zone does not only allude to a physical space but 
also represents the haigui’s psychological condition. In this vein, Mark Banks 
describes the status of “being in the zone” as one which has the power to bewitch 
workers into becoming self-disciplined and self-productive subjects. In the zone, under 
neoliberal rule, “workers are willingly seduced and entrained to self-produce, uphold 
and refine the productive interplays of power and knowledge that ensure their 
subjection to the prevailing logic” (Banks 2014, 242). 
The majority of haigui working in finance whom I interviewed in Shanghai were 
gazing at Pudong as a preferential site in which to live, work and overwork. In fact all 
the haigui were telling me how, compared with Sydney, working in Shanghai was 
more challenging, more compelling, more involving and required much more time, 
effort and dedication, where they often end up staying in the office till midnight. As 
underlined by Banks, it is exactly in the zone “that a gratuitous and exalted pleasure—
not to mention elevated status—can be extracted by those workers who revel in the 
narcotic pull of working harder, faster and longer, or glory in their exaggerated and 
excessive labour” (Banks 2014, 250). 
Most of the haigui wanted to live and work in Pudong and would go to Puxi (Shanghai 
city’s historical centre) only rarely. On my side, coming from Puxi, it was a struggle 
to arrange an appointment in Pudong as often it would be when the interviewees had 
finished work, at the peak time, and often in one of the Starbucks cafés above the metro 
line of Lujiazui or Century Avenue, two of the busiest inter-changes in the city. And, 
although we were often meeting at dinnertime, we just had a snack, as often they had 
to go back to the office. Their time was mostly spent in the office, and in the metro to 
commute from the office to their apartment and vice versa. With the time they had left 
                                                 
 
66 The Shanghai Tower or Shanghai Zhongxin Dasha, m. 632. 
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in their apartments, they would just sleep. Even if most of the units they lived in were 
situated in alienating blocks, the haigui still seemed to prefer Pudong’s periphery to 
Puxi. I was often told how they thought that Puxi was too crowded and too dirty and 
that they could not live there. Some of them in fact had hardly ever been to Puxi and 
were surprised to hear that, for me, it was exactly the opposite. 
But if Pudong is now the icon of the contemporary Chinese capitalistic configuration 
and the most favoured location for the haigui, this has entailed one more aspect of 
forgetting: beside the forgetting of history, the forgetting, too, of the dark sides of this 
contemporary configuration. If Pudong embodies the values and the practices of the 
state and the middle class, at the same time, it expels most of the rest of the population, 
to whom Pudong appears fake and negative. To most Chinese, Shanghai does not 
necessarily appear as an international hub, but rather as a 99 per cent Chinese city, a 
walled city of apartheid and segregation, a space of exclusion, modern only in regard 
to its hardware.  
Of 25 million inhabitants, only 20,000 are foreigners (a very small percentage of whom 
can be considered real immigrants, that is, people who move to the city of their own 
accord, as opposed to those sent by foreign institutions or companies). Foreign culture 
and media are confined to sites such as the Starbucks and Costa cafes—segregated 
blocks usually isolate the foreign minorities from the rest of the city. In Shanghai, the 
luxurious compounds and the huge shopping malls split and exclude larger and larger 
portions of the city from the attendance of most citizens; parking lots for BMWs, 
Jaguars, and Ferraris usurp the pedestrian ways and the cycle tracks; working class 
houses are converted into fashion shops or costly restaurants—“something beautiful” 
is often written on boards hanging on the walls of old houses emptied of their previous 
tenants, to explain to the passer-by the purpose of a refurbishment. 
Thus, far from nourishing the desires and aspirations of the laobaixing (the common 
people), as envisaged by Deng Xiaoping’s wishful thinking, what has instead 
happened is their exclusion from modernity, implemented through a “financially 
induced” and aesthetic discrimination, whereby only people conforming to a certain 
fashion and having financial means, with no peasant or migrant features, have access 
to Pudong’s exclusive spaces. In parallel, old people crossing the urban highways out 
of the pedestrian areas, or the porters striving to peddle their overloaded bicycles 
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ignoring the traffic lights, show their extraneousness to the urban configuration of 
contemporary Shanghai. Is it the reality or the perception of the city that attracts the 
haigui? The melting of Chineseness and openness, which is often quoted as a feature 
of the city, is by no means shared across the whole metropolis but, rather, the city is 
divided: most are excluded from this cosmopolitan space.  
For Shanghai, as with Pudong, a décalage between perception and accurate description 
occurs. Pudong could easily be described as a successful transposition from Fritz 
Lang’s Metropolis. Here, the arrangement of spaces is functional to the neo-capitalistic 
logics and aesthetics of work: the predominance of the straight line, both horizontal 
and vertical, is absolute, both in terms of highways or skyscrapers; the territory is 
impassable on foot; the main human activities allowed are company work and 
shopping; everything happens in the interiors, nothing in the outside spaces. By 
contrast, in what remains of old Puxi and the west bank of Shanghai are small 
merchants and shops still visible among the huge buildings, and the daily activities of 
ordinary Chinese are on display—people hanging out their washing above crowded 
footpaths, or playing cards in the parks. But in Pudong on the east bank, white-collar 
workers like the haigui seem to spend their spare time only inside costly malls or 
international chains of bars and shops. The scale of the layout and architecture glorify 
only one human activity: that of making money. Such a one-dimensional existence 
creates barriers to human contact. Only two social relationships seem to prevail: that 
of colleague and that of buyer. At the same time, this condition is favourable to 
inculcating that sense of comfort and safety, which derives from the disappearance 
from view of the diverse and the marginal. Instead, securitised blocks are watched by 
a Grande Armée of tens of thousands of bao’an (security guards) and doormen—
spread across the cityscape, watching night and day. 
If deprived of that seemingly “safe” dimension, the haigui felt dispossessed. They 
never wanted to go elsewhere and, as Xue expressed it to me (see chapter 3), they were 
spending time in shopping malls in Pudong even during the weekends because that 
was their “safety zone,” a “comfort zone,” and a zone of assurance they could not find 
elsewhere. Around them a dimension of uncertainty, of losing ground, was gradually 
interiorised once they experienced the first difficulties, the lack of opportunities, and 
the “hostile” environment of the job market. In fact, the attempt to elbow their 
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competitors was not limited to their jobs. In a conversation I had with Ling (see chapter 
3), besides shopping, going to restaurants and meeting friends in shopping malls, a 
further activity came up: investing in the stock market. Ling told me that whenever she 
has free time, either in the office or at home, she follows closely the market trends as 
she has invested some of her savings in the market, seeking to make some extra money. 
I knew investing in the stock market was a very common activity in China, so I started 
asking other haigui if they too were investing in the stock market. Remarkably, it turns 
out to be a quite common activity, as almost half of my interviewees had either bought 
stocks in the past or were currently “playing” stocks. 
Yet not everyone was open to talking about it like Ling. For other haigui, this activity 
was usually narrated with a certain embarrassment. Most of them were laughing, 
telling me that it was just an entertainment, that they were not taking it seriously. As 
Ling said, “the stock market is a joke in China, the government controls everything.”67 
Why, then, were they doing it? And why that hesitation when I asked them to talk 
about it? The issue did not seem to be about “talking of money” in general. In China 
there is not much reserve in regard to talking money. During the years I worked in 
Bejing and Shanghai I was asked a thousand times: how much was I earning or how 
much was the rent on my flat? Complaining about the rising cost of living in the cities 
was a constant.  
Fei, a haigui MBA graduate from Melbourne University, was working as a financial 
research director in a Chinese company which specialised in mutual funds. In fact, she 
was among the few haigui who were successful and satisfied with their jobs. She had 
that position thanks to a friend she met during their undergraduate studies in Shanghai. 
She says many of the friends she met at the university in Shanghai have good financial 
jobs, mainly in government. In fact, before going to Australia, she attended an 
undergraduate degree in economics at Fudan University in Shanghai, one of the top 
Chinese universities. Fei asked me where I was investing my money. I answered that 
I had never thought about it, adding that this was probably because I never had enough 
money to be “invested.” She looked at me with surprise and said: “Oh right, you 
                                                 
 
67 Interview with Ling, 12 April 2013, Shanghai. 
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Europeans, you care about culture and art, you are dreamers, and you don’t care about 
money like most of us Chinese.” Fei says that for most Chinese people what counts is 
cash. As soon as they have some savings Chinese people invest their money in order 
to make a profit, some financial return; they do not just simply keep money in the 
bank. So when I tested her and asked: where? Was it in the stock market? She laughed 
and said “yes, playing the market is very very common.” Yet, she says “you have to 
know how and where, otherwise you will just be part of the crowd, like old people 
with no knowledge of the market.” For her, and for people with good jobs and 
connections in finance, it is easy to know where to invest, where it is safe. “I can phone 
my friends, who have information from the government.”68 
But what about other haigui, who do not have the same connections? Zheng, a 
Queensland University graduate working for an American company as a junior 
financial advisor, told me that in China, “unfortunately,” investing in the stock market 
is not an activity for financially skilled traders but is “for everyone,” being an investor 
means “being part of the.”69  He was laughing sarcastically when telling me that 
laobaixing (common people) keep investing even if they do not understand anything. 
He told me that this is how things work in China and the government has to keep the 
market open to make everyone happy. He also said, howerver, that now China is 
becoming richer and the sector more powerful internationally, things are changing.  He 
was sure that the market would advance and develop very fast and that Shanghai would 
catch up very quickly with, or even surpass, New York or Hong Kong. He was 
confident, that the state, sooner or later, would solve the problem and remove such 
people. Yet, despite the effects of their disturbance, even Zheng was not renouncing 
the market, which represented an opportunity to make an extra profit out of the 
financial techniques learned abroad (for instance resorting to investment techniques, 
price schemes, and market predictions). Thus, because of “the masses” competing with 
them, the haigui considered “making money through investing” a sort of a taboo. 
The way the haigui talked about stock investing was conflicted. I understood that their 
hesitation was due firstly to the fact that they knew quite well that investment traders, 
                                                 
 
68 Interview with Fei, 7 June 2013, Shanghai. 
69 Interview with Zheng, 22 June 2013, Shanghai. 
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bankers, financial analysts, and other financially-related positions to which they were 
aspiring, were formally barred from playing in the market by insider trading 
regulations. Secondly, as financial experts, “playing the market” put them at risk of 
“losing face” (diu mianzi): debasing themselves to play like “the others” in order to 
gain money and success that should have otherwise been guaranteed by their career 
achievements. Investing was therefore considered almost a “downgrading” activity, 
not a really “challenging,” “audacious,” or “confident” move, but a diminutio capitis.  
Yet, by adopting the practice, the haigui were seeking to affirm their unwanted skills 
and expertise directly by themselves. The Chinese stock market, which, as I will 
explain in Chapter 5, figures as an open arena (Hertz 1998) in which everyone can 
prove her/his ability, seems to be the best opportunity to get their “revenge” as haigui. 
Parading detachment and superiority, they were appealing to the same institution as 
everyone else, secretly proving the efficacy of expertise by their wins. In the stock 
market arena, the levelling of the haigui (potential experts) with the mass of sanhu 
(informal players) reveals the potential fissures produced at the core of Chinese 
contemporary finance. The haigui, originally fostered as strategic figures expecting to 
become experts, and thus included within the state financial ecology, were cast adrift, 
downgraded to a status of individual investors like the sanhu. I argue that such a 
landing place for the haigui results from and reveals the basic contradictions between 
the politics of the Chinese state and its own financial expertise.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have focused my analysis on Shanghai, the final stop in the circuit of 
valorisation of returnees. A list of features makes this particular city an irresistible 
destination for the haigui. In fact, the city is, indeed, in the eyes of haigui, the best 
place to pursue a career which can valorise foreign expertise. The city substantially 
contributes to the haigui’s reproduction: at once alluring, modelling, welcoming and 
rejecting them, in a thick bundle of tensions. I maintain that Shanghai is a crucial site 
where the multiple factors fostering the identities of the haigui are finally disclosed.  
Firstly, haigui have a sympathetic view of the city as the cradle of Chinese modernity 
and the site of the most mature Chinese contemporaneity. Secondly, as a vibrant 
cornerstone of global capitalism, Shanghai is a place to continue the life style learned 
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abroad and to affirm a role as mediator between local and global financial actors. 
Thirdly, in Shanghai the haigui respond to the state’s call to enrichment, acting in an 
environment which is globalised but also nationally protected. I observe that the 
tensions experienced by the haigui are largely based on a multiple processes of 
oblivion. They are oblivious to the episodes in the history of the city not corresponding 
to the contemporary hegemonic vision (for instance, Shanghai as a cradle of the 
proletarian revolution), but they are also oblivious of the dark sides of its contemporary 
configuration (for instance, the expulsion of the population not in line with neoliberal 
dictates, that is, immigrants and the poor). They are isolated in a “special zone” of the 
city, Pudong, the site of the stock market, and an emblematic area in which all these 
alluring elements converge and interact. This multiple matrix of fascinations 
unexpectedly dazzles the haigui who seem incapable of recognising the priorities they 
want to pursue—ambition, career, social life, strategies to make money—and leave 
them unable to admit that their aspirations now seem to be illusory and risky. 
Ultimately, I have shown how this very displacement becomes another point of 
departure for the haigui. Rejecting pre-arranged state placements, the haigui still reach 
for their unreachable role as financial consultants of the Chinese expansion. Many of 
them adopt the informal behaviours of the crowd of local scattered stock players 
(sanhu) who invest in the stock market in search of further enrichment. The chapter 
which follows therefore seeks to define the features and the origin of what I call the 
Chinese financialisation rush, through my observation of the subjectivities of the 





Chapter 5  
The financialisation rush: Responding to precarious labour 
and social security by investing in the Chinese stock market 
Introduction  
As described in the previous chapter, the skyline of Pudong embodies the icon of a 
new and captivating façade that China has paraded to the world. Such a “spectacular” 
façade is meant to celebrate the great leap forward that has seen the country open up 
to the world and gain a leading position in the capitalist order. But, in this new order, 
China also faces new social and political risks such as social discontent, worker 
upheaval, layers of corruption, and environmental scandal. The country has been 
engaged in a “rush”: adopting a new process of financialisation in the form of an 
explosive leap, which has eroded the foundations of the previous social and economic 
order. In this chapter, I advance the thesis that, through the stock market, China is 
“constructing a new capitalism” (Keith et al. 2014); I also argue that the state emerges 
as the primary mobiliser of a new Chinese economic life that has led to this 
financialisation. In addition to providing financial functions, the opening of the 
Chinese stock market was conceived as a policy response to cope with the 
displacement and disruption of Chinese society flowing from Deng’s economic and 
opening reforms (gaige kaifang).  
Firstly, drawing from my ethnographic observations conducted in brokerage rooms 
across Shanghai in 2013, I provide an account of the current phase of Chinese mass 
financialisation. I show how a “stock fever” (gupiaore)—a popular excitement 
motivated by the new opportunity to make money—has produced new kinds of 
subjectivities. Among these we find the sanhu, the scattered investors with little 
financial knowledge. What knowledge they possess is largely gained through informal 
practices of self-learning. They tend to have access to only small amounts of money—
usually less than 10,000 dollars from savings or banks loans—with which to seek profit 
in the stock market. The term sanhu denotes a heterogeneous mass of individual 
investors who play the stock market as a means of coping with precarious social and 
labour conditions. However, many of the haigui who become disillusioned by their 
career opportunities and fail in their attempt to achieve recognition and status as 
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“financial experts” they resort to the stock market in search of an individualised source 
of wealth. In this move their subjectivities begin to meld with those of the sanhu.  
Secondly, I trace the origin of the stock fever from the gradual dismantling of the 
collective urban work units (danwei) through the mid-1990s. Since the opening of 
stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1993, state policy—using a rhetoric that 
aims to imbue the population with a desire of becoming rich through converting their 
savings into stock investments—has stirred up a craving for money, conferring on 
individuals a way of reproducing the connection between labour and social life that 
suddenly that had been displaced with the reforms. Through the process of 
financialisation the Chinese state was able to strengthen the “myths of origin” of the 
contemporary Chinese regime; financialisation acted as the ground upon which 
government slogans such as “To enrich is glorious,” “Wealth is within range,” and 
“Dream a Chinese dream” were formulated. I claim that what is emerging at the surface 
is a neoliberal/financialised subjectivity that is a direct result of the state’s visible hand. 
An analysis of these subjectivities shows that Chinese financialisation has been 
directly mobilised by the state as a governmental device, contrary to financialisation 
elsewhere, which, despite the on-going role of regulatory systems, is often understood 
as a response to the gradual withdrawing of the state (Dore 2000; Martin 2002). I argue 
that the concept of “fever” is a powerful device to address the population and should 
be understood as a distinctive quality of Chinese financialisation. I will show how this 
distinctiveness is crucial to current efforts to rethink China’s post-crisis condition in 
particular. 
Thirdly, by observing the events that led to the last Chinese financial crisis (summer 
2015) and the state management of the crisis aftermath, it appears that a continuous 
arm-wrestle between the sanhu and the state places Chinese financialisation on 
precarious ground. On one hand, the individual investors are reliant on the state’s 
ability to maintain gupiaore or “stock fever” in order to continue their investments in 
the market; on the other hand, their irrational moves and behavioural exuberance 
represent a reclaiming of their own performative and autonomous power. I argue that 
this multitude of investors not only impacts on the state’s efforts to direct the market 
but, in triggering high financial volatility, they also impact upon the state’s social 
legitimacy. In the eyes of these financialised subjectivities, the position of the Chinese 
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state since the gaige kaifang reforms has been legitimised through a conubium—
between a functioning financial complex and a satiation of people’s desires. I 
demonstrate that in this cluster of conflicts, financial expertise is denigrated, by social 
and economic transitions and instabilities. The mass of individual investors, made up 
of formal and informal experts—a crowd of informal sanhu financial experts, among 
who figure some of the haigui interviewed in this study—though fostered by state 
policies, could well turn unruly. In conclusion, I suggest this is an ultimate illustration 
of the precarious equilibrium of Chinese financialisation: the state asks individuals to 
participate en masse in its policies; but the disorganised mass of individual investors, 
among who figure many haigui, through their irrational and mimetic behaviours, 
ultimately jeopardise the state’s policies. Their involvement is far from “tameable” 
and, as they start losing, their outlook toward state financial expertise becomes 
increasingly questioned.  
The Fever  
“The bedrock of financial capitalism is not the spectacular system of speculation but 
something more mundane” (Leyshon and Thrift 2007, 98). 
Just beside a huge construction site alongside Jiangsu Road, the main street that defines 
the edge of Changning district in north-west Shanghai, a group of old women are 
chatting loudly out of a dusty lobby door with their shopping bags on their arms. In an 
animated fashion, they complain about money and their savings—but their 
conversation does not refer to the increased prices of fruit or vegetables at the market 
as the factor that is threatening their financial resources. They instead talk about the 
fall in the stock exchange prices. Indeed, they are not outside a supermarket or a 
grocery shop but outside a brokerage room where, in China, people go to invest in the 
stock market. In Shanghai, there are thousands of brokerage branches of this kind, 
spread all over the city. These companies offer a space where individual investors, the 
sanhu (scattered investors), can buy and sell stocks.  
A popular scene of this kind might appear quite surprising within the pervasive 
volatility of contemporary financial capitalism. The scene becomes even more 
puzzling when considering the characteristics that define the latter—computerised 
algorithms and abstract financial products such as futures and derivatives carrying the 
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value of trillions of dollars. We have already arrived at the point in which the concrete 
image of Wall Street crowded by frenzied brokers is now out of date, and is superseded 
by images of computer screens displaying fragmented graphics and numbers. A more 
encompassing image could perhaps be represented by the “black-box,” where only the 
input and output of code are visible, and there is no knowledge of its internal workings. 
As manifested in the global post-crisis context, the obscured functions of financial 
markets are now being questioned and are under attack. Nevertheless, if the utopian 
vision of a financial boom promising easy money is declining everywhere, in China it 
seems to remain an enduring order.  
Since the opening of the stock exchanges in Shenzhen (1990) and in Shanghai (1992), 
what the Chinese have termed gupiaore (stock fever) has spread throughout the 
population, like a heat wave sweeping the country. This was stated by Mr Feng, an 
early informal investor, now with a long career, who I interviewed in Shanghai. We 
began by talking about the official goal of opening the exchanges, to give Chinese 
people faith in the market and in its capacity to generate wealth. Mr Feng told me that 
people did not know what the effect of the opening of the stock exchange would be: 
“We were excited and scared.”70 After all, small investors only echoed the message 
that Deng Xiaoping gave to the people when, in his southern tour of China in 1992, he 
made this speech during his stopover in Shenzhen: “Securities, stock markets, are they 
good or evil? Are they dangerous or safe? Are they unique to capitalism or also 
applicable to socialism? Let’s try and see. Let’s try for one or two years; if it goes well, 
we can relax controls; if it goes badly, we can correct or close it. Even if we have to 
close it, we may do it quickly, or slowly, or partly. What are we afraid of? If we 
maintain this attitude, then we will not make big mistakes” (Deng, 1994).  
Thus, the entire opening up of the stock and securities market, pushed by the global 
rise of financial capitalism, brought with it an aura of the unknown; participating in it 
was certainly, and authoritatively confirmed as, risky. Mr Feng and the investors of 
his generation were among the first nationals (rather than Western investors and the 
semi-colonial Western presence in Shanghai) who bravely and blindly tried out an 
                                                 
 
70 Interview with Mr Feng, 12 August 2013, Shanghai. 
164 
institution embodying the quintessence of Western capitalism in a post-socialist China 
(Hertz 1998, 5). Mr Feng invested half of his savings, 500 yuan (his salary was about 
forty yuan per month, or five USD). After a few months, he earned ten times its original 
value. He later gradually earned more and more money till he became a dahu (a big 
informal, individual investor who usually invests more than one hundred thousand 
RMB). Thanks to the stock market, he became rich and gained social prestige from his 
status as dahu: now he manages around 300 billion yuan, both for himself and for other 
individual savers. He told me that, because of his long experience, people trust him 
and his clients leave all their money in his hands without even checking what he is 
doing. Mr Feng made a profession out of his experience as an investor; he got a VIP 
private room in one of the securities brokerage houses in Shanghai, where, since his 
retirement, he goes every day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
I was really surprised that despite Feng’s VIP status, his room was small, dusty and 
chaotic, a quite uncomfortable place for an investor of his rank. He told me, however, 
that this is what he likes to do: getting up in the morning, walking to “his office” to 
study the market and planning his next moves. He enjoys this lifestyle, and he does 
not really spend a lot of money, he told me. The only other things he really needs in 
his life are drinking fragrant Chinese tea and smoking good-quality cigarettes. The fact 
that he became rich thanks to his stock market investments did not change his habits. 
On the contrary, his activity as an investor was a way of reproducing the connection 
between labour and social life that suddenly vanished after his work unit dismissed 
him as its public officer.  
After the opening reforms, for people who were unemployed, retired or forced into 
early retirement (with generally low public pensions), the grip of stock fever was 
particularly strong, as it offered a new way to get back into the crowd. This fever was 
and still is accessible: it offers the dream of getting richer, the space for a new social 
interaction, and also keeps people socially and mentally active. An old sanhu who I 
interviewed told me that for a man of his age “investing in the stock market is healthier 
than playing mah-jong.”71 The stock market offered another way to be part of a social 
                                                 
 
71 Mah-jong is a famous traditional Chinese gambling game that involves superstitious beliefs and is 
exclusively played by men. It has a strong role in Chinese history and culture and is often mentioned to 
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life which was quickly becoming redefined by the imposing and pressing rhythm in 
the high-growth urban spaces of Shanghai and Shenzhen after the opening and reforms 
policy.  
I argue that the decision to start investment activities in response to precarious social 
labour conditions unites the informal, individual investors: whether small scale 
(sanhu) or large scale (dahu), or financial experts like the haigui who, equally 
displaced from the lack of opportunities in their workplaces, turn to the stock market 
as a “compensating” alternative to make extra money. In particular, for younger 
generations of investors, a “new” fever was triggered in recent years to “comfort” and 
“regain” people’s trust, which had been negatively impacted by the on-going real 
estate bubble and China’s economic slowdown. Arthur R. Kroeber defines the Chinese 
stock market as “a sideshow: an accidental beneficiary of easier money, and the 
fortuitous recipient of funds from investors fleeing the weak property market and 
seeking higher returns in equities” (2015, n.p.). This is also fed by the practice of 
massive “lending from public sector banks in the form of ‘shadow banking’ activities 
winked at by regulators” (Gosh 2015, n.p.). Individual investors can easily access such 
loans as the “A” shares market lacks the barriers which distinguish between individual 
and institutional investors. Thus, for people in search of high profit, financialisation 
proves to be a widely accessible way to respond to income reduction and salary 
stagnation. 
Among my interviewees is Mei, a haigui graduate from Macquarie University who 
was working in Shanghai as an accountant for a Chinese firm. She told me her salary 
                                                 
 
explain the contradictory nature of the Chinese entrepreneurial ethic: while the Chinese have always 
been keen to scrimp and save money for the long-term sustenance and security of their families, often 
they suddenly risk it all by playing mah-jong. Since the Ming-Qing period gambling, with its possibility 
of bringing financial ruin to entire families, always scared people to death (Basu, 1991). It seems that 
for some sanhu, investing in the stock market has somehow replaced mah-jong, a by now denigrated, 
past form of gambling, substituting for it the authoritative modern power that the stock market evokes. 
Furthermore, here the consequences of losing are less visible: winning or losing money is lived 
individually. In mah-jong, on the other hand, when someone loses, he owes money to his tongzhi 
(comrade) and if he is unable to repay, he will certainly lose face among the community. Losing face, 
diu mianzi, could lead the family into isolation and the man will carry the burden of taking the whole 
family into ruin. Instead, the stock market is open to women (from professionals to housewives) and 
men of all ages. 
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was not high enough, despite having worked the job for almost 4 years. She still was 
not able to make up for the fund her family spent to pay for her living and education 
in Australia, saying it was extremely frustrating: “I have invested so much in 
education, making sacrifice, this is not fair. I feel bad. I wish I could be able to earn a 
better family, and so help my family.”72 Mei was not the only one at such an impasse. 
In Shanghai the average salary of an accountant is 5600 yuan a month (the equivalent 
of almost AUD 1,200). With such a salary it is hard to save the money required to 
invest in education. In the case of Mei, university fees in Australia amounted to more 
than AUD 40,000—the total cost of a three-year Bachelor degree in Commerce with a 
Major in Accounting. This doesn’t include the cost of living, first in Sydney and now 
in Shanghai, where rental prices are skyrocketing. Mei told me her parents were still 
looking for a secure investment property, although they still didn’t know where. Whilst 
Shanghai prices were too high and unaffordable for Mei’s family, meanwhile in her 
hometown in the Anhui province, houses prices were decreasing so much that real 
estate investments were losing their profitability. But what Mei really wanted to do 
was “to be here, in Shanghai, I don’t want to go back to Anhui. One day I’d like to 
have my own house here.” In order to pursue this dream, Mei, told me that together 
with her parents she decided to invest a part of the family savings in the stock market 
and “See what happens; maybe with the money I make investing I will be able to buy 
a house in Shanghai.” Despite the multiple disappointments and the failure of their 
previous investments (in education) to guarantee future profit, Mei and her family 
remained unswervingly committed to looking for other opportunities to make money. 
Thus, the stock market appears for them as a further immediate option as it could 
guarantee flexibility, and they could diversify their investments. Furthermore, Mei 
described the stock market as relatively secure, as she could start with just a small 
amount of money and then invest more.  
During the time of my fieldwork in 2013, the craving for stocks escalated due to a 
commensurate rise in house market prices. Unable to access the property markets, 
people began looking for alternative ways to invest their money and make a return. At 
the beginning of 2013 “millions of working-class and middle class Chinese families 
                                                 
 
72 Interview with Mei, 7 June 2013, Shanghai 
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bet heavily on stocks, often borrowing money to do so and further spurring the rise” 
(Bradsher 2015). Interestingly, more than twelve million new accounts were opened 
on the stock exchange that year. A new generation of investors, like Mei, started 
accessing the market. As reported by the Financial Times, “since 2014 equity market 
fever has spread to China’s universities, where 31 per cent of the country’s college 
students have invested in stock and three quarters of them used money provided by 
their parents” (Noble 2015, n.p.). Kevin Lin suggests that despite the fact only a small 
number of Chinese individual investors have a high-school diploma, which Lin 
remarks is “cynically implying that investors lack of education caused the bubble,” it’s 
China’s new middle class that is “heavily involved in the stock market, acting 
rationally in an irrational system” (Lin 2015, n.p.). In 2015, 37 per cent of the new 
investors were middle-school graduates and the funds students invest come mostly 
from parents eager to invest in their children’s future; often this money comes from 
internships and red envelopes, or lai see (Cantonese for “profitable affairs”)—packets 
of cash that people give as gifts during Chinese New Year (Xie, Stapczynski and 
Cao 2015). In some Chinese universities, there are now student associations 
specifically for students who invest in the stock market. As reported by Reuters “Pan 
Cheng, 21, of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, is president of his 
school’s Stock Study Society. It has about 800 members, roughly half of whom trade 
shares. The society organizes mock stock trading competitions and students offer 
investing lectures. ‘Most of the students have invested less than 50,000 yuan. A few 
have over 100,000,’ said Pan” (Yang 2015, n.p.).  
Throughout the previous chapters I have discussed the extent to which Chinese 
financialisation has shaped students’ education choices, leading them to invest in their 
study abroad, generating new hopes and expectations, while at the same time 
reinforcing state policies that attract and harness the return of haigui to China. In this 
context, both the haigui and their families expect that through the means provided by 
financialisation, they can build up a future financial career and realise the Chinese 
dream of making money. In this sense, by unleashing financialisation, the state 
exercises a powerful governmental device: sustaining the Chinese dream of 
enrichment which, in the case of the haigui, corresponds to a financial career. Notably, 
since 2013, in order to encourage a new rush, the Chinese authorities have purposely 
sustained China’s Shanghai Composite index to increase by 150 per cent in a year, 
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despite the risk of really high volatility.73 As highlighted by the Economist (2015a), it 
was not surprising that, soon after hitting a peak in June 2015, the index suddenly 
plummeted by well over twenty per cent, wiping out more than three trillion dollars. 
The point here is that investors like Mei, and the millions of new account owners like 
her, seemed to have had little memory of what other sanhu witnessed in 2007, just 
prior to the great financial crisis of 2008 in the United States. “During 2007, the 
Shanghai Composite Index more than tripled in value and it was the greatest stock 
market surge in Chinese history. But after hitting a peak, it began to fall 
dramatically. From October 2007 to October 2008, the Shanghai Composite Index 
absolutely crashed. In the end, more than two-thirds of all wealth in the market was 
completely wiped out” (n.p.). 
Despite the precedent of the 2007-8 Chinese stock market bubble and crash that 
temporarily redirected people’s money from the stock market to the house market, in 
2013, during the first year of Xi Jinping’s rule, a renewed stock fever excited millions 
of people to trade stocks once again, showing little or no direct memory of the 
preceding crash. As reported by several analysts, this represented an important and 
“disturbing” precedent in recent stock market history, and an additional element in the 
analysis of Chinese investor psychology. As discussed in chapter 4, here too a form of 
oblivion—which also characterises the haigui approach to Shanghai’s history—
intervenes to overcome the negative consequences of the most recent financial crisis. 
In the clamour and urgency to make money, it seems that only the most mature sanhu 
or dahu had been cautious. In contrast, newer investors like Mei persisted in believing 
in the almost deistic power of the stock market as a magic wand leading to a prosperous 
future.  
Investing as a substitute for an occupation  
Most of the trading rooms I visited both in Shanghai and Shenzhen are organised in 
similar ways: usually sanhu of a diverse age and social background crowd the entrance 
to large open trading rooms equipped with several big screens that display the stock 
                                                 
 
73 The Composite Index is a way of measuring market performance over a period of time. It is 
calculated grouping equities, indexes or other factors combined in a standardised way.   
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exchange figures. This is almost a public space: everyone chats loudly, some might 
have a smoke, others take a nap, some play cards, and women usually knit while 
watching the trend of the stocks on the screen. At the back, there are the private VIP 
rooms of the dahu, like those of Mr Feng. The dahu go in and out of the open room 
and are distinguishable from the rest of crowd because they often wear slippers and go 
to the bathroom to water the plants they keep on their desks. In general, these brokerage 
houses provide a space for the daily occupation of both small- and large-scale 
investors. 
Despite the unpretentious aesthetic, the services provided are considerably advanced. 
Investors can access an electronic trading platform: efficient software that offers 
metrics such as indices, disclosure, real-time price dissemination, and corporate 
notices (Walter and Howie 2007, 147). Furthermore, in the last few years, China has 
enabled the dissemination of the most updated new financial software (previously 
possessed only by wealthy players) to smaller investors, who can now invest from the 
most remote part of China using their smart phones. Yet, practical issues 
notwithstanding, the effect of this seems to confer on even the most unassuming sanhu, 
a suit of “advanced” financial professionalism. This spreading of new software appears 
to be a decisive move to encourage as many people as possible to adhere to the stream, 
and adopt an outwardly financialised appearance. As Walter and Howie (2007) 
emphasise: “Despite this infrastructure, the data and money raised, China’s stock 
market is the triumph of form over substance” (147).  
At the root of the first “stock fever” it is possible to identify a strong link between the 
establishment of a “socialist market economy” and the reduced interest of the state in 
labour management and social security. The opening of the financial market has 
coincided with the state’s gradual withdrawal from its role as guarantor and 
administrator of labour-relations, beginning with the 1983 suppression of the renmin 
gongshe (people’s communes) in the Chinese countryside. Prior to the Deng Xiaoping 
era, social and individual life in China was played out within “collective units” 
(danwei). Through them, production was organised and, furthermore, each and every 
kind of collective and personal activity was arranged from housing, canteens, medical 
care, kindergarten, leisure trips, and even marriage. Danwei were, for many decades, 
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the key reference for Chinese people in nearly all life events, acting as both a resource 
and a constraint.  
In the gradual process of dismantling the danwei, all these traditional social safety 
nets—such as state work allotment, fixed salaries, medical assistance, retirement 
funds, council houses, social security, and funeral fees—were also eroded. 
Furthermore, the process that attempted to provide an alternative space to the now 
dismantled danwei was tortuous. In the first instance, the opening of the stock market 
served as a motor for the entire process of transforming state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). The stock market was conceived as a way of providing funds to the SOEs 
undergoing privatisation, and concomitantly to “re-activate” workers’ enthusiasm by 
allowing them to invest in their own enterprises. After the dismantling of the danwei, 
the new labour management that was implemented—with the intention of streamlining 
the previous arrangement—represented a final withdrawal of government intervention 
from the everyday work of enterprises.  
The attempt was successful—huge amounts of private savings were converted into 
stock. 74  This process of absorption of household savings recalls the process of 
“privatised Keynesianism” (Crouch 2009, 382) as well as the privatisation of welfare 
(Marazzi 2011), which have been recognised as the basis of “mass financialisation.” 
Similar to what has occurred in the West, ordinary people started using financial means 
to react to social insecurity by individualising risk. Gradually, savings were turned into 
financial “products” and working people became shareholders investing their 
insurance and pension funds. Even indebted workers with small share portfolios 
accede to consumer choice as the main criterion of success. The dominant ideology 
supported the dream that every desire could become true: “every ‘I want X’ and ‘I 
have a right to X’” became the order of the day (Douzinas 2013, n.p.). 
                                                 
 
74 After the reform, the central government’s revenues declined steadily relative to GDP (falling from 
31.1% in 1978 to 15.7% in 1989), while private household savings surged, with deposits in state-owned 
banks increasing from 21.06 billion yuan in 1978 to 519.64 billion yuan in 1989. Shareholdings from 
these large amounts of household savings provided the government with a lucrative opportunity to 
collect taxes from the banking sector to finance investment in SOEs (see Wong Man Lai and Yang 
2009, 412). 
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In China, the economic transition that started in the late 1970s was guided by the state 
that, while heading towards decollectivisation and gradually withdrawing from the 
satisfaction of common needs, started to encourage people’s desire for self-
enrichment. As a result, new sets of social practices were insinuated into the previous 
socialist order. In the context of the general dismantling of the danwei, subjectivities 
that had previously been constructed within the previous social and political fabric 
were extracted and transformed into new subjects. In the brokerage rooms, the way 
financialisation violently imposes the social relations of capital over existing social 
practices became explicit. The brokerage rooms soon represented new spaces in which 
people looked to fulfill social and economic needs, tasks which the danwei were 
previously entrusted. In this way, the state created a sort of “promised land” or 
“defenceless people,” but also a “clearing house” for individual and social 
resentments. Thus, the foundations of the new Chinese financial markets were laid in 
a new social era of particularly vulnerable individuals—people who are looking for a 
new life substitution, new forms of social guarantee, and further enrichment. For parts 
of the population (retirees, laid-off workers and precarious workers preferring to buy 
shares rather than hold bank accounts) investment in the stock market became a 
possible escape from the minimum wage and a social welfare system that was looking 
increasingly untenable. Suddenly, finance affected everyday life and, for Chinese 
citizens looking for fast money, it gained the “power of romance,” of “wish fulfilment” 
by “transforming ordinary reality” (Jameson 1981, 110).  
By evoking this visionary and utopian scenario, I mean to suggest here that speaking 
of financialisation in China prefigured the framework of the “Chinese dream” 
(zhongguo meng): a crystallised formulation propagandistically created by the state in 
2013 in order to deliver and sustain belief in a Chinese renaissance—an ideal made 
possible by the union of capitalistic satisfaction with a nationalistic revival of China’s 
past imperial splendour. Many investors who I interviewed for this study witnessed 
such a radical turn. For example, Mr Xu, like many other sanhu I talked with, started 
investing after a career as a skilled worker in his danwei (a machinery plant). Forced 
into early retirement when the factory shut down during the general reform of SOEs, 
he decided to move to Shenzhen from his less economically-developed province of 
Hubei. Mr Xu explained that, after a long period of depression during which he felt he 
was “a non-entity,” an outcast from society, and experienced nostalgia for his past 
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occupation in the danwei, he started investing in the stock market. This provided him 
with a new reason for getting up in the morning. He had a new occupation, and started 
to feel actively part of society again. It gave him a new purpose for engaging with 
culture, stating that whilst watching the news on the TV or reading the newspaper, he 
considers the possible effects of the new government policies on the stock market 
trend. He stated that, even if he never earned a significant amount of money, the 
process would always afford him hope.75 
Mr Xu’s testimony suggests that the activity of investing in the stock market acquires 
a value that not only replaces previous work, but also transcends it. For him, investing 
became an activity that occupied his life. It encompasses private and social spheres, 
affective function, and is a defining determinant in the formation of his current 
subjectivity. In this sense, the activity of investing appears to have overcome the 
traditional condition of the alienated worker and therefore offers a form of release. The 
process of investing became the perfect occupation; conferring a social role and 
legitimate space of socialisation, as well as being—at least from his perspective—
dedicated to his personal gain rather than a contribution to public funds.  
This was a feeling shared by others I interviewed. Zheng, a haigui graduate from 
Queensland University (see chapter 4), had just arrived home from Australia, and 
while waiting for a better job in Shanghai he decided to invest around 10,000 yuan (the 
equivalent of AUD 1,200) in the financial market. For him investing in the stock 
market represented an opportunity both to “get more money” and “to gain expertise, 
knowledge, a better understanding of how the market works.”76 In Australia he would 
have never been able to “play” the market with so little money. Now he was so excited 
he could have first-hand experience of the market, he told me with his eyes wide open 
and a dreaming gaze. His “dream job” was to work for an investment company in order 
to keep his eyes on the stock market. As a result, he moved to Shanghai. 
                                                 
 
75 Interview with Mr Xu, 17 August 2013, Shenzhen. 
76 Interview with Zheng, 22 June 2013, Shanghai. 
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Organising the Chinese stock market  
As demonstrated in chapter 4, a historical analysis of the Shanghai financial market 
and its popularity—defined by the spread of the qianzhuang—could provide further 
insights for analysing the foundations of the current stock market in China. It is 
probable that this popular dimension was one of the reference points in the mind of the 
Chinese technocrats of Deng’s administration who, in order to accommodate the 
potential social risk left by the reforms, conceived the stock market not just as an 
instrument of the economy but also as an instrumentum regni. The Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock markets, since their opening, have been organised in two distinct 
markets for company shares, one for domestic investors denominated in yuan (“A” 
shares) and one for the foreigner denominated in USD (“B” shares). If the latter aimed 
to attract indirect foreign investments, the “A” shares market has instead always 
constituted a very distinctive market, operating according to purely domestic rules and 
a different ideological approach. This division strategically put the government in the 
position of creating a Chinese “zona franca” where foreign investors could have a role 
in participating, observing and exchanging information within the Chinese stock 
market, while at the same time the government still preserved an exclusive Chinese 
space, only for Chinese investors, and for a new form of domestic deposits. At the 
same time, this division had also prevented outflows of domestic capital abroad.  
Evidence of this pro-state ownership circuit can also be confirmed by the additional 
division into untradeable and tradable shares that characterised the Chinese stock 
market until 2008 and which is still active. This categorisation was implemented in 
order to allow previous state-owned enterprises to become joint-stock companies in 
1994. That year, the on-going SOEs reconversion envisaged a tripartite allocation: 
one-third owned by the state, one-third owned by the legal representatives of the 
reconverted company, and one-third available for trading. This led to the situation 
where fully two-thirds of the shares in the Chinese stock market were non-traded 
(Rooker 2008, 4). 
Later, with the “non-tradable share reform” in 2005, non-tradable shareholders (such 
as SOEs) commenced moving towards privatisation by way of a process that staged a 
bargain with tradable shareholders in order to gain liquidity: non-tradable shareholders 
had to pay tradable shareholders a price defined as “compensation.” This process led 
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to a huge imbalance and a lack of liquidity in the market. The largest non-tradable 
shares previously owned by the state basically remained as such. Clearly, these 
represented the key large SOEs the state wanted to keep control of by preserving its 
ownership. The transfer of large numbers of non-tradable shares was to occur without 
the flow of information on enterprises that would allow individual investors to make 
their offers. This resulted in a general stagnation of the market because these sales 
were blocked and this subsequently created a fall in prices, which in turn led to a lack 
of liquidity. In general, the whole process remained under state control, as there were 
no market regulations granting individual investors the right to vote on and receive 
compensation.  
These reforms signalled the rise and fall of the market over the last few years, with 
constant arm-wrestling between the individual investors and the state occurring all the 
while. As demonstrated by the cycle of events that led to the 2015 financial turmoil, 
Chinese domestic investors have enthusiastically traded in a two-year bull market 
since 2013 spurred on by fresh injections of government capital. The first sign of 
“adjustments” (the interest rate cut by the PBC, People’s Bank of China, at the end of 
June 2015) produced a wave of sanhu sell-offs that could not be contained anymore. 
After that, “any other relaxations in margin trading and other ‘stability measures’ have 
done little to calm investors” (Duggan 2015a, n.p.). 
Both historical and recent overviews show that the Chinese financial machine operates 
according to a set of distinctive structural and functional features. In-depth analysis by 
many economists has abundantly and consistently highlighted this “Chineseness” 
(Green 2003, 2004; Walter and Howie, 2011; Thomas 2001). However, what I want 
to further insist on here is the way this distinct structure (shares divided into foreign 
and domestic, state ownership of the majority of the stock, and state control over the 
financial regulatory commission) is influencing, while also being influenced by, the 
Chinese social and political context. This is not a new claim; important insights from 
Ellen Hertz’s ethnographic work The Trading Crowd (1998) have already described 
the Chinese stock market as a “social arena” where individual investors ultimately 
appear to have the main influence on the market. Moving irrationally and 
unpredictably, with their large numbers, they seemed to always be the real 
protagonists, with the power to disturb the state’s attempts to control the market. Here 
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and elsewhere I have suggested framing this relationship as a form of arm-wrestling 
between the state and individual investors: while the former retains the largest 
percentage of ownership and the power to regulate and release vertical information 
through its controlled channels, the latter receive nothing but the crumbs of 
information overheard by a few with access to backroom politics. Within the 
conditions in which Chinese financialisation first emerged and continues to develop, 
the small investors are topical subjects, which do not just “respond to” or “bear” 
market regulations; but through their movement and behaviours are actively shaping 
its distinctive assets. The state, which may have preferred to consider the small 
investors as a mere reinforcement or ballast to jettison at any moment, is currently in 
a situation that will reveal—contrary to predictions—that limiting information to 
individual investors and allowing only a small space to help stocks to flow is not 
sufficient. By restricting the presence of individual investors, China’s ability to 
conform to market forces would shift from the social space of mass financialisation to 
a more limited financial space, and thereby risk depriving a significant portion of the 
population of the positive narratives necessary for “getting rich” and being part of the 
“Chinese dream.”  
The Chinese government’s attempt to “derail” or “divert” the people’s potential 
discontent through the stock market in a series of multiple episodes—after Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms, the 2006 rural protests and mass “incidents,” and also after the 
housing market crisis—have acted as a powerful governmental instrument, a 
technology of control to which individual subjects, through their participation, have 
responded in a both performative and resistant way. As I will explain below, the 
presence of the Chinese “dream” and the state’s capacity to maintain the stock fever 
are just two of the features defining the distinctiveness of Chinese financialisation. 
Distinctive financialisation: the West and China facing financial 
crisis 
In China as elsewhere, the question to be asked is how financialisation acquired the 
power of promising to deliver of a better future (Arrighi and Zhang 2011). This section 
first follows the multiple facets of the concept of financialisation in the West, and then 
contrasts them with Chinese logics in order to clarify the distinctiveness of the latter. 
In the West, the term “financialisation” first came to attention in Marxist political 
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economics in the mid-1980s (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987). Its initial scope was to 
denounce the general problem of the absorption of surplus and the consequent rise of 
monopolies that was, at the time, affecting the American economy. In this sense, 
emerging financial activities were seen as a way to substitute production activities that 
were no longer profitable (Arrighi 1994), or as a way to support them in a more 
integrated system with no further clear-cut distinction between production and 
financial sectors (Harvey 1999; Leyshon and Thrift 2007).77 Later, the term was used 
to refer to the general process wherein world financial institutions (banks and financial 
intermediaries both in Europe and in the USA) started turning their financial assets 
(including housing, pensions, education loans, and health insurance) over to 
households and everyday workers (Aglietta 1995; Lapavistas 2011, 613). This trend 
has also been explored through a Foucauldian perspective on governmentality, by way 
of the identification of a process of financial subjectification (Martin 2002; Marazzi 
2010; Lazzarato 2012). Finance, previously the reign of an elitist group with shared 
exclusive expertise, was gradually made more accessible on a popular level and 
insinuated into everyday practices. 
In the introduction to Randy Martin’s book Financialisation of Daily Life (2002), this 
change is described as “fun” entertainment: “suddenly finance is fun” (1). However, 
this positive outlook altered as the change culminated in the financial crisis. Ordinary 
people went from being called on to master their own finances (including mortgages 
and educational loans) to having debts and being unable to pay them. Christian 
Marazzi (2010) identifies the crisis as “the capitalist way of transferring to the 
economic order the social and potentially political dimension,” where the dimension 
of the resistances “ripened during the phase leading up to the cycle” (85). 
Undoubtedly, the GFC was unprecedented in generating popular distrust of financial 
markets, in terms of the accountability of their institutions and expertise. Tragically, 
the financial markets failed to control the drift towards economic crisis and its 
consequent risk to the population. From 2008, protests developed (from Occupy Wall 
Street to Occupy Frankfurt), questioning the state’s role in controlling the financial 
markets and the policies produced by states within this scenario. As major weekly 
                                                 
 
77 For a further analysis of the rise of finance and financialisation, see Krippner 2011, 4. 
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newsmagazine Der Spiegel declared: “There is widespread support from politicians in 
Germany and Europe, who are currently wrestling with banks to increase the 
participation of private creditors in the debt bailout currently being planned for states 
like Greece, together with the frustration of the same politicians by their inability in 
recent years to push through tougher regulations for financial institutions” (Lindsey 
2011, n.p.). 
This “frustration” within the political versus the financial sphere was also manifest in 
a reciprocal estrangement of the two spheres. For instance, George Monbiot, writing 
in the Guardian (2011), refers to the financial core, “the City” in London in these 
perpetual terms: “Over and over again we have seen that there is in this country another 
power than that which has its seat at Westminster.” He goes on to describe the city as 
a form of offshore and autonomous state within England’s borders in the position of 
“laundering the ill-gotten cash of oligarchs, kleptocrats, gangsters and drug barons.” 
This triggered a shift of responsibilities over the crisis that opened up an “in between” 
space to be filled by a new post-crisis rhetoric. I argue, in this interstice, it is possible 
to witness the complicity of the market and the state—recalling the one between the 
Cat and the Fox in Collodi’s Pinocchio—in maintaining the current order (in the form 
of state bailouts) and at the same time experimenting with a new rhetoric of the post-
crisis period.  
Since the financial crisis of 2008, both states and financial institutions are embedded 
in a system that, shaken in its foundations, is being sustained through what Marazzi 
(2008, 2014) has defined as a financial turn toward the “linguistic performative.” 
Particularly in the post-crisis period, the powerful use of the word “recovery” has 
emerged in the form of a new weapon. Janet Yellen, the head of the US Federal 
Reserve, has declared a strategy that pushes for forward guidance (Marazzi 2014). 
Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank, offered a similar approach when 
he identified an aim to nurture future expectations for recovery through financial 
rhetoric (Marazzi 2014). Concomitant with bland social investments (expressed, 
moreover, in decreasing interest rates and labour costs, rather than effective policy-
focused welfare), this communicative weapon acts as a strategy to sustain an unaltered 
financial post-crisis environment, while feigning an intervention to rescue the 
population. This is in sharp contrast to what mass financialisation and its materiality 
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are actually demonstrating: the increasing impoverishment of people that exposes “the 
limits of financialisation itself as a self-sustaining strategy” (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2013a, 4). Despite this evidence, on-going financial post-crisis rhetoric is preventing 
governments from making any decisions, while normalising the post-crisis situation as 
indefinite.  
Moreover, the austerity measures deployed by the European Union with Germany at 
the helm have prevailed over formal political processes to the point of overriding 
Greece’s electoral voice and thus compromising the political principle of 
representation. Embodying the exclusive role of financial creditors (as just one vertex 
of the troika) the European Commission has terrorised and driven fear (in the words 
of the previous Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis) through a population 
already strangled by the extensive, failed monetary policies produced by the same 
establishment (2012). Yet the authority of political organs has been imposed through 
the financial dictate of repaying “their” (national) debt.  
In China, the situation is very different. There is no manifest dichotomy between 
political and financial agents. Therefore, it is not possible to appeal to two separate 
entities by “passing the buck” between them. The state is strongly preserving its 
monopolistic financial intervention and therefore can’t appear as a neutral arbiter that 
re-establishes the order after a speculative wave is generated in a “separated financial 
sphere.” Furthermore, the state is also able to modulate once more the leitmotif of 
“richness at hand” in order to muffle resentment from the population. The powerful 
weapon, in the Chinese instance, has been a variatio rhetoric: “getting rich is glorious” 
(during the 1980s), the “three Represents” (during the 1990s), the “harmonious 
society” (in the early 2000s), and the current rhetoric of the “Chinese dream.” After 
the global financial crisis, the explosion of a Chinese consumer culture and its 
spectacularisation (the ostentation of wealth by the middle class and the new rich) 
further promoted faith in the stock market among the ordinary people looking for rapid 
enrichment. 
Despite the brutal effects of China’s financial crisis, culminating in the 2015 “Black 
Monday” that spread fear all over the world, fears and anger from the sanhu were 
controversial. While the days subsequent to the crash saw many protesting in the 
brokerage rooms, claiming their money back, the majority of the sanhu and dahu 
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seemed unwilling to give up any sense of “romance,” “fun,” or “dream.” Instead, they 
considered the inability of the stock market to maintain the promise of a privileged 
channel to wealth to be solely attributable to the state’s mismanagement in its attempt 
to establish a more “competitive market.”  
In July 2015, as the first hit of the market was felt, and panicking at the prospect of 
further losses, the Chinese government took their first action. The government-
controlled China Securities Commission called “the national team” (the twenty-one 
largest state-owned brokerage firms) to “set up a fund worth at least 120 billion yuan, 
or USD $19.4 billion, to buy shares in the largest, most stable state-owned companies 
(two thirds of the total), and to stop selling shares from their own portfolios” (Bradsher 
and Buckley 2015, n.p.). At the same time, the central bank lent money to brokerage 
companies to buy shares totalling USD $365 billion. Meanwhile, on the other side, the 
Xi Jinping government hurriedly attempted to represent this purely monetary move as 
a reform measure towards building a “more competitive,” “more global” market by 
lowering the interest rates, relaxing restrictions on buying stocks with borrowed 
money, and imposing a moratorium on initial public offerings. However, even if, 
initially, the Chinese government devaluated the yuan—leaving it to fluctuate with the 
market and in compliance with the Intarnational Monetary Fund—soon after, afraid of 
a rapid rate of currency depreciation, it decided to push it up again (Pascucci 2015, 
n.p.). 
Such transparent and modernising measures seemed not to have had any “reassuring” 
effect on Chinese investors, but rather a counter effect.78 After the announcement of 
these measures, the “panicky” behaviour of investors worsened, as they suddenly 
apprehended the changing of skin of a government that had formerly encouraged them 
to behave as looters. One should in fact recall how the Chinese stock market 
“rationale” is at odds with the liberal and competitive accountable logic of expertise, 
which justifies the “market faith” of Western and liberal enthusiasts. As I have shown 
                                                 
 
78 Historically, this kind of move could recall the wages reform (launched by the Chinese state at the 
beginning of the eighties with the aim to liberalise the job market), which triggered mass protests all 
over China and culminated in the Spring 1989 Tiananmen sit-in. This could be taken as an eloquent 
example of how opening policies, pushed by a market rationale, often displace the population instead, 
in an elusive search for the state as guarantor. 
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above, since its opening, China’s economic engineers have frequently engaged in 
heavy-handed interventions in trading, resulting in both wins and losses for 
participants in the market. Joe Zhang, chairman of China Smartpay Co. and author of 
Party Man, Company Man: Is China’s State Capitalism doomed? (2014), in an article, 
describes the relationship between the state and the market context in the form of a 
“saga.” “The government blatantly encouraged a stock market rally and then when a 
spectacular collapse took place, it immediately came to the rescue. This saga can 
appear confusing and even shocking, but only to the outside observer. Believe it or 
not, most Chinese are either supportive of the government’s actions or are 
understanding. Only a small minority is overtly against them” (Zhang 2015, n.p.). 
One could argue that the government’s steps to reform the market are beholden to the 
reactions of the sanhu. This binding highlights how the government communicates a 
series of ballons d’essai to the public, in order to gauge the potential for market 
intervention. As a consequence, the financial attitude in China remains one of “rush” 
and “fever” as this maintains a people-driven momentum. From the perspective of 
these “investing” subjects, Chinese financialisation must survive, even if that means 
retaining the belief that its destructive and fraudulent aspects are due to the state. 
Multiple sources of data indicate growing numbers of investors are not simply 
withdrawing their money from the market, but are instead diversifying their 
investments and buying new wealth management products (WMPs), principal-
protected funds, and gold (Shen and Takada, 2016). In their most recent measure, the 
government has opened the bond market to individual investors (Shanghai Daily, 
2016). 
That the country has relied on propaganda as well as government economic stimulus 
to encourage the public to hold onto their shares for patriotic reasons is not recent news 
(Wertime 2015). In 2008, as falling exports threatened trade amidst a growing climate 
of distrust of international finance, the state promptly intervened to maintain eight per 
cent growth, and boosted the economy through an extensive economic stimulus 
package based on public finance and borrowing. The massive stimulus of 4 trillion 
yuan (USD $586 billion) formed part of the official rhetoric that promised support for 
major industrial sectors, investment in infrastructural projects, consumer spending, 
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education and housing (Naughton 2008). However, in later practice it was clear how 
this package produced very socially and locally uneven impacts (Sum 2011).  
The largest fraction of this spending went into investments in SOEs and their capital 
assets (land development and infrastructure). The package was also organised to 
reinforce a previously consolidated economic model and political status quo, in which 
(taking into consideration how the other strong Asian economies responded to the 
crisis) China could have better shifted these benefits towards services and domestic 
demand. However, this didn’t necessarily benefit the workers. The power of SOEs was 
evident when they “made use of the crisis for a suspension of the New Labour Contract 
Law to defend their interest in the manufacturers’ sector hit by the crisis” (Hung 2012, 
229).  
In 2009 and 2010, a wave of labour unrest and resistance, including strikes and 
collective suicides, swept through China’s industrial Sunbelt in the most industrialised 
part of the country (Friedman and Kwan Lee 2010; Hung 2012, 229). Well-known 
foreign companies (such as Honda and Foxconn) were profiting from their foreign 
capital, taking advantage of low Chinese labour costs and the lack of regulation. 
Protests in the countryside grew and discontent from large numbers of migrant workers 
exploded in many parts of China. Instead of undertaking effective measures in 
response to the workers (Sum 2011, 199), state reactions were concentrated in other 
directions. The state elected to strengthen their cultural hegemony, choosing to 
demonstrate a “growing China,” with new shopping malls springing up almost 
overnight, promising an extensive choice of new Western leisure products. Since the 
economic reform, this has been a strategy of the ruling class to perform and retain 
power “Using the back door to gain access to official circles, it directly occupies the 
front stage of a political economical and spectacular power, directing mass desires and 
constructing the public imagination, numbing and postponing a social awareness of 
crisis” (Wang 2003, 604).  
The stock market was thus one of the means for strengthening hegemony and in this 
setting the sanhu occupied an interesting position. On one hand, they could share the 
feelings of general discontent expressed in the protests because of the impoverishment 
of their social condition; on the other hand, they still related to the stock market as an 
alternative space for gaining their individual redemption. The individual investors who 
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continued to invest during the crisis benefited after the stimulus because state support 
for the main listed companies caused the market to rise again.79  
Through the state’s continuing intervention—both through the regulatory commission 
and financial injections—there has always been a prompt rescue of the market. The 
Chinese market continued to experience exceptional swings during its 2007 boom, 
2008 bust, 2009-2010 resurgence and then ultimately in the 2015 crash (Irwin 2015). 
However, even if such big swings were damaging for Chinese investors, it did not 
prevent financialisation from being used to recall a powerful myth of positive change. 
In China, distrust of finance capitalism cannot be traced to an offshore kleptocratic 
reign alternate to the state, nor to any separate entity that the state was called upon to 
rescue with a bailout. Financial subjectification in China remains one of “rush” and 
“fever.” The rise in investor protests after the crisis has generated an undeniable 
distrust towards the state (as the main financial manager), and is certainly widespread. 
However, while nurturing such distrust, at a subjective level people still seek to 
preserve the promises financialisation provides in their everyday life: a future 
valorisation of money by means of money. 
The state, the dahu and the scattering power of the sanhu  
During my conversations with Yimou and Jiang, two financial analysts at one of 
China’s biggest capital fund companies, it emerged that the presence of the sanhu in 
the stock market is seldom welcomed.80 These holders of what would be considered 
formal financial knowledge, supposedly in line with that of the state, all expressed 
negative feelings towards the sanhu. My impression was that this was not just because 
the sanhu were considered to be a hindrance to the process of conventional 
negotiations, but also because the presence of the sanhu was considered an 
abnormality in the global financial landscape, one which rendered the Chinese stock 
market backward in appearance. Such was their disdain that when I asked them about 
the general condition of the market, the presence of the sanhu was something they did 
not even want to mention. Instead, they repeated firmly how China would soon be 
                                                 
 
79 Both the SSEC and SZSC indexes suffered a 70 per cent drop from their historical high during the 
period from October 2007 to October 2008. 
80  Interview with Yimou and Jiang, 24 August 2013, Shanghai. 
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required to increase investors’ fair information and knowledge of financial ethics. By 
doing so, they implied, the sanhu’s presence was contingent on on-going corrupt 
practices in the marketplace. They told me that their hope for the development of a 
mature market was inevitably to remove the sanhu. Thus, it appears the sanhu are 
considered to be a threat both by state officials and by their competitors, the dahu 
(large-scale individual investors).  
The sanhu are considered to be the largest and most active community of individual 
investors in the world, amounting to ninety million members. According to the official 
statistics registered by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC 2014), 
in late 2013, ninety-seven per cent of the capital market was represented by the sanhu, 
of whom eighty-five per cent were investing less than one hundred thousand yuan 
(approx. USD $80,000). The dahu’s profile is ambiguous. Most dahu are longstanding 
investors. They all come from the first generation of investors, and it appears the way 
they access the market is directly correlated with their previous position: they could 
become rich because of their personal connections (friends, relatives, or acquaintances 
in the CCP). In some cases, they have access to classified information and can 
therefore act as insider traders. Their role is particularly evident within securities 
companies whose employees provide services to clients on the basis of orders from the 
CSRC, and therefore cannot play the stock market. Chinese securities companies—60 
per cent of which are still controlled by the state—continue to receive regular 
information from the CSRC, which is also a state organ and provides updates on new 
regulations. Often a loyal client, a dahu invests on behalf of the companies’ employees, 
while taking advantage of special information (insider trading) from the latest 
government updating. 
As Hertz (1998, 129) has pointed out, the dahu are both despised and admired by the 
general population. In a way, the dahu have developed unique rules, professional 
standards, codes of conduct, and perseverance. They follow a rigorous schedule and 
are confident in their role and authority within the market. Among the dahu I 
interviewed, a 76-year-old woman who had worked for the local educational ministry 
described her daily activity as marked by the very disciplined schedule of many dahu. 
This involved research, constant news updates, and deep insight into government 
legislation in order to perform her role and cultivate her guanxi. This disciplined and 
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regular schedule was quite different from the one practised by younger sanhu, like the 
haigui I interviewed. Both Mei and Zheng told that they invest when they have time. 
Mei invests mostly during her lunch break or whenever she has time in the office. 
Zheng invests from home while browsing the computer searching for employment 
opportunities and updating his resume.  
In contrast to the sanhu, the dahu have attitudes that resemble what ethnographic 
studies in Western market have described as typical trader and broker behaviours—an 
unquestionable attachment to and faith in the market and its authority is consistently 
evident (Zaloom 2006, 2009; Marazzi 2008; Callon 1998). Caitlin Zaloom (2008) in 
her ethnography of the Chicago stock exchange notes that “the movements of the 
market represent financial truth. It is not surprising that traders’ attitude to the market 
takes on a quasi-religious aura. Discipline is, therefore, both a technique of the self 
and a technique of the sacred. Practicing discipline allows traders to attain a proper 
state to engage the overwhelming force of the market. Traders speak about the market 
in religious ways that make this analogy appropriate” (265). 
Dahu in Shanghai demonstrate the same attitudes towards the market and sustain the 
same discipline. Nevertheless, in China, this apparently solid behaviour is actually 
triggered by faith in the party and not in the market. It is, in fact, through their respect 
for the status quo and their guanxi (personal connections) that the dahu have gained 
sufficient authority to be successful in the market. In addition to this, their personal, 
private, and detached private rooms in the brokerage houses attest to their status as 
well represented. They have to be authoritative and command respect from the sanhu.  
As others have demonstrated (Gamble 1997, Hertz 1998, Rooker 2008), and as I 
observed during my fieldwork in the brokerage rooms, most Chinese individual 
investors are lay people: they do not know how the stock market works and are 
incapable of obtaining or putting to use any substantial financial news or reports. 
Furthermore, the stock market —which is the main ground in which both experts and 
common people are called by the Chinese state to operate—is characterised by an 
extreme volatility and quick turnover, allowing little time for informed decision 
making. In the face of this information deficit, formal and informal expertise collapses 
into the same pit of uncertainty. In this void, the main modus operandi that emerges is 
mimesis, an imitation of others. “Imitation begins where information ends”, as it is 
185 
precisely the end of information which points to the “lack of pre-established order” 
(Vähämäki 2005). In this sense both dahu and sanhu seek to navigate the market 
condition of uncertainty, by undertaking mimetic action, with this being theorised as a 
key driver of investor behaviour by some proponents of behavioural finance. Christian 
Marazzi (2002) and Andre Orléan (1999) argue that financial markets function on the 
herding behaviours of investors, which are often predicated on a deficit of information 
(Marazzi, 2002). If the dahu rely on those information sources unanimously 
considered trustworthy, the sanhu invest keeping an eye on the choices of friends and 
foe, viral tv programs or “how to” manual suggestions. Indeed, the herd mentality and 
primal fight or flight adrenalin rushes appear to overwhelm neoclassical assumptions 
of human beings as perfectly rational animals. 
The terms commonly used by Chinese investors when playing the market are revealing 
in this context. For example, chao (literally “stir fry”) refers to playing the market 
when it is in a “bull phase,” so it means playing and winning. Tao (“being stuck”) 
expresses the impossibility of re-selling a stock after it falls (Rooker 2008, 13). These 
are popular terms that are especially used by sanhu—who play fast, instinctively, and 
with no long-term substantial information. The terms almost assume a value per se, 
making it unnecessary to have any rational explanations that determine what they 
indicate. In general, the interviewees expressed that they were waiting for the market 
to enter a bull phase again so they could chao.  
During the 2007 bear market, a significant number of individual investors closed their 
accounts (3.59 million). However, at the same time, the number of new accounts 
opened by new investors rose from 2.92 million to 23.66 million between June 2007 
and June 2012. Moreover, from 2009 to 2011 the number of accounts holding stocks 
worth less than 10,000 yuan and between 10,000 yuan (USD $1,580) and 100,000 
yuan (USD $15,800) grew, while the number of accounts holding stocks worth more 
than 100,000 yuan (USD $15,800) in market value declined; those holding more than 
10 million yuan (USD $1.58 million) were the smallest in number (WantChinaTimes 
2012). The dahu investors have been decreasing in number, while the sanhu have been 
growing. In this way, despite their subaltern position and the increasing awareness of 
their tendency to lose, the sanhu continue to flourish in numbers if not in stock-
holdings.  
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If many gave up during the crisis because of their losses, for many others the worsening 
economic conditions and the threat to their jobs worked as an incentive to give the 
market a try—although most knew what little chance they had of winning. (Statistics 
for the last few years in Shanghai show that the 80 per cent of the sanhu are 
unsuccessful in the market.) When asked why they continued to invest, their answer 
was invariably along the lines of: “You know Chinese people, we all believe in being 
smarter than others.” In general, they were certainly open and waiting for a bull market. 
Sanhu financial expertise 
On first impressions, the sanhu I met (both young investors like Zheng and Mei but 
also older dahu like Feng and Xu) appeared uncertain, self-effacing, suspicious, 
troubled, and cynical. They were very aware of the government-party role and control 
of the market, connections, and insider trading. Sometimes they seemed scared, other 
times I could glimpse they were excited by the idea of experimenting with a new 
technique or some new secret expertise they could apply to the market. The sanhu 
seem to behave like a multitude that remained powerless—unable to elect a 
“convention.”81  One of the reasons for their attitude can be retraced through the 
multiplicity of sources from which they gain their information. It is enough to enter a 
Chinese bookshop and discover piles of works, specifically “how to” manuals on 
millionaires, how to becoming a millionaire, and the so-called jinrong wenxue 
“financial literature”: an entire body of literature characterised by its overzealous 
praise and “encomiastic tone” that nurture the dream of many sanhu. These sources 
are not just paper books but also blogs, magazines, and television channels addressed 
to a public made up of investors eager to learn winning techniques in the stock 
exchange. 
Such a multiplicity of literature reflects the heterogeneity of the sanhu and, 
accordingly, these players develop techniques that often contradict each other. In my 
analysis I found it was very difficult to recognise a pattern as everyone was 
                                                 
 
81 In a linguistic financial regime, a universally accepted convention is a process in which a multitude 
of economic actors becomes a community by selecting/electing a supra-individual convention in order 
to turn it into an interpretative model valid for all players in the game of the market. By electing the 
convention, the multitude makes itself into a community (Marazzi 2008).  
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simultaneously using varied and multiple sources. The older sanhu were mostly 
following popular beliefs, while younger sanhu were more likely to look for their 
information on the Internet, in particular blogs. To give an example, one of the 
financial manuals most in vogue when I was in Shanghai contained mostly suggestions 
based on popular “common sense” such as: “You should always swim against the 
tide,” “It is never wrong to listen to your wife when buying stocks,” and “Pay attention 
to the potential when your stocks go up, while paying attention to the quality when 
they go down” (Hu 2009, 49; my translation). Moreover, for many investors, including 
dahu, it was considered good practice to consult the Tung Sing annual almanac for 
indications of the good or bad days to invest. At the same time, they also followed the 
numerology beliefs of the Fengshui, according to which every number in Chinese has 
a meaning. This is based on the homophony of number pronunciations with Chinese 
words. The number 8, for instance, is a homophone (in Cantonese pronunciation) with 
the Chinese word meaning “wealth,” and good luck, while the number 4 is the 
homophone for the word “death,” thus representing very bad luck. The combination 
of the numbers could also give shape to entire sentences with different meaning: 158, 
for instance, means “I want richness” (Arduino 2008, 66). 
Among the most popular and followed bloggers is Ye Rongtian. At the time of writing, 
his blog in weibo had attracted 309,743,654 visits. His real name is Hu Bin but he goes 
by the pseudonym Ye Rongtian which literally means egoist and egocentric, and is 
also the name of the successful main character of a Hong Kong based detective 
television serial from the late 90s, who is well known for his audacity and ego. In fact, 
his way of commenting on the market resembles the tone of a gangster movie: “Violent 
June! The A’s share masters ready their guns” or “The stock exchange list is going to 
kill the victims.” Hu Bin was a student enrolled at the Yunnan University of Finance 
and Economics who abandoned his study. His father was a low ranking officer in the 
army and his mother was a shop assistant in a department store who invested in stocks 
in the early 1990s. Bin also wanted to become an investor. Initially he borrowed 80,000 
yuan from his family as a start-up fund; half a year later, only 8,000 yuan remained. 
So he started working at the Chinese Bank of Communication, first in Guangzhou and 
then later in Shanghai. Meanwhile he kept monitoring the stock market and writing his 
opinions on his blog. He achieved fame in 2008 when he predicted the fall of Chinese 
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stock market, and the Chinese stock market undoubtedly hit a real bottom; so in the 
last crisis he regained popularity.  
Of equal popularity, a short video circulating on weibo portrays the stock market 
through a “fighting mode.” As reported by Emma Yang, “the stock market appears an 
army under siege, being attacked by short sellers and foreign forces.” The video ends 
with a picture of China’s flag and a statement that says: “A victorious red flag will 
definitely hang above the A-share battleground.” Then, during the 2015 market crisis, 
a LED screen was placed above the entrance at Changsha Railway Station flashing a 
sign that read: “Safeguard the A-share market, those who can join in the fight, fight, 
those who have no ammunition also scream” (Yang 2015).  
Those popular representations of a complex, figuring skein of beliefs and information 
provide an idea of the kind of chaotic environment and unpredictable behaviours that 
drive the sphere of the sanhu. On the one hand this represents the strength of the 
sanhu—as an irrational and ungovernable and disturbing mass, which the state cannot 
tame. At the same time, it also represents their weakness, as they seem incapable of 
forming a united position. They gather in common trading rooms where everyone is 
noisy, chatting and arguing. However, despite the fact that one of the motives for 
investment is sharing space and time with others for socialising, when it comes to 
money and earnings, everyone goes into business for themselves, and is very cautious 
to avoid sharing important secrets with potential competitors. This attitude was even 
more evident in younger sanhu such as students or aspirant financial workers. For 
them, investing in the market almost becomes an opportunity for experimentation, to 
put their “financial skills” on trial. In their view, stock value falls are often temporary, 
and don’t jeopardise their faith in the market—as both a source of monetary gain and 
a school in which to become more qualified in the financial job market. Interviewed 
by Emma Yang, Zheng Qi, 21, of Northeast Normal University in Jilin province states: 
“No matter how the overall market is, in the long run there will always be some rising 
stocks. So I will keep following the market.” The family also supports such an attitude: 
“My parents don’t care how much I’ve lost,” said Zheng. “Every time I lose money, 
they send me WeChat messages saying ‘don’t be sad’ and ‘just count it as the learning 
fee’” (2015, n.p.). 
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Driven by similar expectations, even Hong, one of the haigui I spoke with, who 
worked as a financial analyst with a Chinese American consulting company, told me 
that he was sure that sooner or later the market would reward him. “China needs to 
take measures to become more competitive” and “I am here to help. I hope I can help 
to reform the market; I think there are many things we can do to make the Chinese 
market one of the biggest markets in the world.”82 Hong was investing himself; at the 
time of the interview in 2013 he had made a small loss, but now his shares were rising. 
His unshakable faith in the market was supported by the formal financial expertise he 
acquired abroad, and inspired by the neoliberal mantra that hoped to see the future 
China in a “reformed” market. 
Investors’ feelings towards the market are far from being “pacified.” Since the last 
plunge of the Shanghai stock market, many protests have taken place. In 2015, 
hundreds of investors gathered outside the headquarters of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission in Beijing, shouting slogans: “hundred of thousand assets 
evaporate within a few hours,” “years of work in vain” and “return my blood and sweat 
money” (Reuters 2015, p.n.). In the eyes of Chinese stock investors, “market 
manipulations, rumour mongering, foreign meddling, and frauds” (to quote the words 
of official Xinhua News Agency) and a malicious shorting of stocks, have produced a 
contentious landscape. Yet, even if we consider the attitudes of protesters to have been 
“patient,” as one blogger puts it, “the government should not trust this patience will 
hold out indefinitely” (Minter 2015, p.n.). The spread of rumours about suicides related 
to the stock plunge are evidence of a growing discontent, and some commentators have 
ventured to say that even “sell orders are a form of protest” (p.n.). Thus, the prevailing 
attitude of investors seems still to cling to belief in the security provided by a state’s 
interventionist hand, and a lack of appetite for the risks associated with the invisible 
hand of the market.  
So far the sanhu have been considering the state’s massive investments in stocks as a 
secure pathway to earnings, understanding the stock market mechanism as a state 
pledge and promise. Consequently, the refusal to tackle state responsibility and to 
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invalidate its authority can be easily discerned. Ultimately, the “financescape” 
occupied by the sanhu appears to be a tempestuous sea, in which many contrasting 
waves clash and interact: the individual’s fervent desires for further enrichment, the 
need to be part of a social space, the satisfaction derived from contributing to the 
development of the Chinese nation. Thus, current Chinese financialisation appears to 
be particularly relevant for exploring financialised subjectivities through post-crisis 
attitudes: despite the sanhu’s stubborn refusal to question their social bond with the 
state, the performance of state authority is at risk precisely due to its appeal to 
increasingly insubstantial and evanescent elements. The “Pandora’s box” that is 
Chinese financialisation—where the scattered investors deploy their financial 
expertise (whether formal or informal) seeking their own interests—could lead to more 
strenuous conflicts between state representatives and small investors. Whereas Deng 
Xiaoping’s comforting rhetoric (“richness is at hand”) offered tangible outcomes, 
subsequent approaches have been characterised by their intangible qualities: 
“harmony” in Wen Jiabao’s era and “dream” and “renaissance” in Xi Jinping’s. In the 
previous three decades, the leakage of political and economic content has led towards 
increasing disenchantment. The process of emptying out political meanings that have 
defined the post Mao era onwards, seems to have reached an impasse—presumably 
due to the impossibility of formulating any substantial assurances to the people given 
the uncertainty of financial capitalism in constant crisis. So, what can come after this 
“dream”? Nothing but delirium, marasmus, or inebriation: all terms that offer no hand 
to political utility. 
Conclusion 
The mass presence of the sanhu as “scattered player” individual investors in the stock 
market is a distinctive feature of Chinese financialisation. Since the opening of stock 
markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1993, the Chinese state has directly encouraged 
mass participation in the stock market so that people can convert their savings into 
stocks. This “mass financialisation” has been strategically deployed by the state to 
produce new financial subjectivities such as the one embodying “stock fever” 
(gupiaore). In this chapter, I have suggested that the state deploys mass financialisation 
as a mode of governmentality that compensates for social outcomes resulting from the 
dismantling of the collective urban work units (danwei). During the transition from 
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public welfare to individual self-management, the state provided the mass of 
disoriented and distressed citizens with an opportunity to make money through 
investing in stock—a strategy that quickly altered the city landscape, studding it with 
brokerage rooms. This strategy was aimed at preventing the rise of individual and 
collective resentments, potentially unleashed by the Chinese state’s redirection. 
However, despite being reliant on the state’s ability to maintain “stock fever,” Chinese 
investors have gained a performative and autonomous power that has affected the 
state’s control of the market; ultimately this has compromised the people’s trust of the 
Chinese state over its financial complex.  
In the next chapter, I will identify in this distrust—and in the modified relationship 
between the Chinese state and its population—a threat to the sustainability of the 
“Chinese dream.” The dream of individual enrichment, as a pillar of contemporary 
Chinese hegemonic power over its population, appears undermined by the vipers in 
the very bosom of mass financialisation. Multiple tensions reveal inherent 
contradictions in the Chinese state’s attempt to govern through financialisation and to 
foster new financialised subjectivities. Firstly, the state’s effort to raise financial 
experts abroad—which arises in a relation of continuity with the modern tradition of 
the sovereign Chinese state—collapses the moment the haigui’s financial expertise 
fails to yield the coveted status of “formal expert” within the Shanghai financial market 
upon which its whole appeal is based. Secondly, when the haigui plunge into the ocean 
of mass financialisation, the borders between formal and informal expertise fade. As 
bearers of formal expertise, the haigui become disappointed and disillusioned by their 
exclusion from financial institutions, and merge into the crowd of informal stock 
gamblers. Thirdly, the tension between sanhu scattered players and dahu insider 
traders jeopardises the people’s trust in the state’s competence to maintain a 
functioning stock market. This weakens the loyalty of the population. They see the 
party-state no longer as their defender but as a privileged player in connivance with 
the richer segment of stock players, the dahu. This in turn makes not only the haigui 
increasingly sceptical towards the value of their financial expertise but also 
undermines their patriotic commitment and their willingness to be employed at lower-
end positions within state financial institutions.  
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Once they reach this stage of disillusionment, many haigui opt to partly discard their 
foreign acquired expertise and experiment in the market as sanhu, or independent 
brokers. In the following chapter, I will highlight how their initial wish to be employed 
by state financial institutions gradually dissipates. Even waged-labour is losing its grip 
over an increasingly financialised population, despite the fact that such labour has been 
a bedrock of the People’s Republic’s social agreement between the state and the 
population, and the primary means of providing guaranteed money. I move to discuss 
specifically how money obliterates and supplants other loyalties, in particular the 
loyalty to the state as a labour dispenser. Thus, I stress how, in this relationship, money 
acquires a subjective self-fulfilment, which—by levelling off the differences between 
financially skilled and unskilled labour—places the state in the midst of complex 
political subjects. The discontent of these subjects makes them potentially unruly but 
their subjection to the money relation ensures that their energies continue to be directed 
through the financial market rather than into solidarities with other social subjects that 
could yield a genuinely revolutionary class. 
 
Chapter 6 
The precarious ecology of Chinese financial expertise  
Introduction 
From the moment the Chinese state opened up and welcomed financial capital into its 
social and economic milieu, it has not only globally re-positioned itself but also shifted 
its relationship with its population. In this chapter, I highlight firstly how China has 
developed an “ecology of financial expertise.” This indicates the emergence of a 
financial technocratic governance that is increasingly changing the Chinese economy, 
reducing the state’s administrative and fiscal functions and increasing state assets 
according to a new shareholder logic. In this shift, the creation of the stock market acts 
as the main fulcrum. Secondly, I show how, by reorganising its economy via the 
channels of financialisation, the state is also changing the terms of its social and 
political legitimacy. While withdrawing from its role as the primary labour dispenser 
and labour guarantor, the state has encouraged the population to participate in a 
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financial “rush.” Thus, the stock market is conceived not only as a new redistributor 
of wealth but also as a “clearing house” for social discontent (see chapter 5). However, 
in view of the multitude of “scattered players” (sanhu) who rely on earnings generated 
from stocks to compensate for the precarity of their positions, both socially and in the 
job market, the stock market may prove to operate less as a social security buffer and 
more as a focus for cynicism and disaffection toward state policies. A contradiction 
develops between the state’s unleashing of mass financialisation—as it urges sanhu to 
take part in the “stock fever”—and the emergence of the sanhu as potentially 
uncontrollable subjects. I discuss the drivers of this latter potential and identify likely 
obstacles to it.  
As the 2015 financial crisis has shown, investors’ sources of dissatisfaction with the 
market proliferate; while the haigui, as professionally trained financial experts, 
complain of the lack of market transparency, other lay investors lament the lack of 
market protections. Nevertheless, this heterogeneous mass of investors agrees on the 
necessity for the state to “intervene” to safeguard their actions in the marketplace. This 
desire for the state to jiushi (a popular term for “rescuing the market”) emerges as a 
crucial characteristic of the way China is constructing financial capitalism (Lin 2015). 
The financialised masses’ reliance on the state playing this role is not only motivated 
by their acknowledgement that their investing in “A” domestic shares is exclusively 
due to the state’s hold over the market. Their expectation that the state will intervene 
to rescue them when the market goes wrong is also motivated by the state’s on-going 
invocation of the traditional symbols of communist prestige—the state as the people’s 
saviour and builder of the republic, its old signifiers—as the cornerstones of its 
continued legitimation. At the same time I stress that, while seeking to foster finance 
capital operations within its borders, the Chinese state has inevitably undergone a 
transition from being the “state for all the people” (the communism period) to become 
a champion of economic efficiency.83 In this shift, the once supposed “masters of the 
                                                 
 
83 Quanmin guojia is a label attached to Soviet Communism by the Cultural Revolutionaries to stress 
the obfuscation of the class criterion, which nevertheless officially remained a definition of the Chinese 
state (He 2001). 
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state,” the peasants and workers, have lost their defender.84 I illustrate how this path 
the Chinese state has embarked on is risky, and results in a reconfiguration of the 
relations between capital and labour marked by uncertainty and instability. 
I argue that new subjectivities emerge out of this relationship. This is particularly 
visible when observing the financial practices of the haigui deployed in the ecology of 
Chinese financial expertise. Though the hegemonic global culture of finance demands 
accountable, reliable, entrepreneurial and transparent skills as necessary assets for 
undertaking any form of financial career, I will show that, once the haigui find that the 
expertise they acquired abroad cannot be leveraged to deliver status as a technocrat, 
many of them sound out other options in the “social arena” of the Chinese stock market 
(Hertz 1998). Their expectations “soften” and they seek social prestige and wealth 
through active involvement in the stock market. This trend is also influenced by the 
presence of a mass of lay investors who play the market. In this move, the haigui tend 
to merge into the mass of sanhu. 
Ultimately, I discuss how China’s opening of the stock market is shaping a new 
“redistributive model,” where financially skilled labour—such as that of the haigui—
ceases to be productive labour in the classical waged sense. In the current moment, the 
state appears unable to maintain its standing with the people through labour guarantees 
or by simply raising salaries. Where once there was typically a contractual dependency 
with the state acting as labour dispenser, the new financialised subjectivities are 
gaining increasing autonomy. The “stock game,” the dream of making money above 
all else, has come to occupy that space and monopolises the imaginary of these subjects 
as it obliterates and supplants people’s loyalty to the state as the ultimate workers’ 
representative. In this relationship, money acquires the power to even out the 
differences between financially skilled and unskilled labour, placing the state at the 
head of a mass of potentially unruly subjects.  
                                                 
 
84 Guojia zhuren (“master of the state”) is a much-used expression in the Chinese political lexicon, 
referring to the role of the “mass of the people” as “the creators of history” and holders of ultimate 
authority (He 2001).  
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Ecology of financial expertise  
The financial rationality of the Chinese state mirrors what Aihwa Ong has defined as 
an “ecology of expertise”—taking China as a major example in referring to the East 
Asian states’ involvement in financial markets. For Ong an “ecology of expertise” is 
built when “strategic interactions among flows of capital and technology 
(re)territorialise and (re)code complex interrelationships between governments and 
companies, venture capital and research institutions, economic growth and social 
good” (Ong 2013, 55). The creation of this ecology defines the relationship between 
global financial flows and state policy through the lens of a specific knowledge and 
expertise. Under financial logic—and its associated goals, ideas, and practices—states 
have been compelled to negotiate their role vis-à-vis financial institutions, agencies, 
protocols, financial algorithms, and monetary regulations in order to pursue the growth 
of their new global financial power (Mezzadra and Neilson 2014). However, in China, 
such pressures have resulted in the proliferation of a new set of agents in the form of 
state asset “supervisory agencies, state holding corporations or state asset management 
and investment companies, to represent state ownership as well as manage and 
appreciate the value of state assets” (Wang Yingyao 2015, 604). 
The omnipresence of the state as the major stakeholder in the Chinese financial market 
has shaped a financial apparatus in which “state-controlled reserves have become 
critical players in shifting global financial flows and markets” (Ong 2013, 55). The 
Chinese “ecology of financial expertise” has determined the insertion of Chinese 
investments and markets into the global capital market. Some prominent examples 
include the sovereign wealth fund, CIC (China Investment Corporation), constituted 
in 2007, which shortly afterwards became the world’s fourth largest sovereign wealth 
fund; and one of its subsidiaries, the Central Huijin, an investment company owned 
and created by the Chinese state to capitalise and become the major shareholder in 
China’s state-owned commercial banks.85 “Central Huijin has now “snowballed” its 
assets to nearly twenty three times that of USA’s largest financial holding companies, 
like JPMorgan Chase & CO” (Wang Yingyao 2015, 603). Yet another is the China 
                                                 
 
85 Through its initiatives and entanglement in the global circuit of capital, China has become the holder 
of the largest foreign exchange reserves in world history and has now gained the power to heavily 
condition US debt.  
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International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), a financial organisation 
established in 1995 to stimulate the inflow of foreign funds into the country, and which 
has now become a fully-fledged banking institution. As suggested by Wang Yingyao, 
the configuration of this state asset management system not only confers new and 
additional abilities on the state, but it has “fundamentally altered the state structure and 
orientation, resetting the ways in which it has managed the economy” (604).  
As a state “alters” and “resets” the economy, a recalibration of its role relative to its 
own population and of the terms of its legitimacy will follow; as stressed by Michel 
Foucault, “the economy produces legitimacy for the state which in turn guarantees the 
economy” (Foucault 2008, 84).86 By increasingly transforming its economy via the 
channels of financialisation, the state is changing the terms of its legitimacy. As I have 
already underlined in this thesis, and as the ecological metaphor suggests, amid 
interconnected though unpredictable, contingent and ever-evolving financial capital 
flows, the state is in retreat as the main labour dispenser and labour guarantor. 
In its place it is instead encouraging the population to participate in a financial rush, in 
which the stock market not only acts as a new financial redistributor but also as a 
“clearing house” for social discontent. On one hand, Chinese state vehicles for 
financial investment are multiplying and expanding, requiring financial market 
reforms and capital account liberalisation; on the other, China’s GDP is declining, 
producers’ prices continue to fall, and various other indicators of economic activity 
have weakened, including growth in industrial production (Prasad 2015). This 
reshuffling translates into a risky trade-off for the state, with each step towards reform 
requiring gradual and selective procedures. As I will show, amidst the subjectivities 
fostered by this trade-off, we find both formal and informal experts.  
In the words of Jing, a haigui working as a financial analyst in a security company: 
“You know, it is unclear if the state wants financial reforms; one day you read that 
they want to implement new measures, the other they make a step back. This is not 
good—investors get confused.”87 As indicated in chapter 5, when the Chinese state is 
                                                 
 
86 See my analysis in chapter 1. 
87 Interview with Jing, 8 November 2013, Shanghai. 
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compelled to respond to the dictates of a global financial environment, it proceeds by 
fits and starts. For instance, the state’s initial announcement of an opening campaign 
aimed at fostering a more competitive and internationally integrated market—which 
included the inclusion of the yuan in the IMF Special Drawing Rights basket—
triggered panic among individual investors, which escalated into the Chinese financial 
crisis of summer 2015. Such a move was initially celebrated in Beijing as one of the 
first steps to “fulfil China’s ambition to crown the yuan as a global reserve currency” 
(Hui 2015). But the panic this declaration generated among the sanhu shows that if 
Chinese financial monetary policy is to align with the global market, Chinese financial 
policymakers must take a measured approach in matters that provoke the eccentric 
logic of the mass investors.  
Since 2010, the Chinese Security Regulation Commission has sought to equal the US 
market, finally releasing index futures in 2012 and, during the same year, approving 
the development of high frequency trading (HFT) as another measure to advance and 
internationalise the market. However, while such “advanced measures” nowadays 
account for almost seventy per cent of the global stock trading volume and have, in 
the words of Michael Lewis in the book Flash Boys (2014), rigged the US market, the 
same “rigging” could never occur in the Chinese market. HFT has been conceived to 
serve institutional investors and not individual investors in the capital market and is 
therefore less decisive in a Chinese market that is dominated by the latter (the sanhu). 
Despite the risk of volatility due to the distinctiveness of the Chinese market, the state 
initially undertook the adoption of HFT indirectly, through one of its agencies. The 
state-owned CITIC Security Company, the largest broker in the market, bought 
algorithmic trading technology from StreamSoftware, an American Nasdaq-based 
company. The acquisition of the same foreign technology and expertise used in the 
United States served as a scapegoat for an about-face: with the first signs of 
destabilisation in 2015, the Chinese regulators stepped back and started “[targeting] 
high-frequency traders as part of an attack on price manipulation, which they blame 
for the turmoil that has seen the Shanghai composite index fall by nearly 40 per cent, 
since hitting a seven-year high on June 12” (Waldmeir 2015, n.p.).  
Soon after, the arrest of CITIC Security’s main executive functioned as an act of public 
shaming that allowed the state to face the multitude of individual investors and 
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disavow all responsibility for the financial turmoil. To some extent, the dedicated 
space the state had guaranteed for individual financial investors appears to be at odds 
with the state’s attempts to advance financial reform according to global standards. In 
early 2015, the final year of the five year plan, Bloomberg reported that the “premier 
was pledged to press on with “wrist slashing” reforms” (Bloomberg News 2015). In 
this tangled array of financial measures and financial market “restructuring,” 
abandoning a mass of investors would threaten not only the domestic market but also 
social stability. The reforms had been intended to create more competitive, global, 
market-oriented standards. The state’s initial approach was to run it up the flagpole in 
order to check the reactions of mass investors. In response, the investors appeared to 
perceive such hesitancy as a deficiency in the state’s performance. The Chinese state’s 
moves to align to global standards seem to represent a dangerous and precarious 
ground for investors. 
While seeking to shape its own endogenous financial ecology, the state’s behaviour in 
swallowing up financial assets to its own advantage—borrowing, investing, and 
risking new capital—has “inexorably introduced chained financial risks to political 
entities” (Wang Yingyao 2015, 605). Notably, within the ecology of financial 
expertise, the fostering and role of state asset managers has been based more on their 
political ability to leverage their state or para-state status than on their financial 
expertise, harking back to the “red and expert” debate of earlier decades that I 
described in chapter 2. In particular, at the provincial level, these state-affiliated 
financial managers have been involved in the creation of new funds, whereby capital 
borrowing and lending was under the umbrella of the state. In the following section, I 
will show how the result of such a configuration of power opens up ground to 
investigate “the collusion between the power of the state and the magic of finance” 
(Wang Yingyao 2015, 605) where the mass of financial investors are parked in the 
middle.  
A common denominator in the discontent of investors that preceded the crisis and 
continued beyond it was the government’s inability to ensure a profit from shares the 
sanhu had invested in. Among the most indignant investors were those who had 
invested in state-backed companies, feeling they had been duped by what they were 
led to believe was a safe investment. For instance, in Henan, the Tengfei Investment 
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Wealth Management fund collapsed in 2014. Since then, protesters demanding a 
refund have regularly gathered outside the local government building. As expressed 
by one Mr. Yang, interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, “without the government’s 
assurance, no one would have dared to believe Tengfei” (Yap 2016, n.p.). Another case 
erupted in Guangzhou in May 2015 when Fanya Metal Exchange, a rare metals trading 
platform, was exposed as a fraud after being caught up in a giant Ponzi scheme. 
Investors first protested in Guangzhou, then, feeling ignored by the local government, 
they organised rallies in Hong Kong hoping to gain the attention of the Western media. 
Investors were particularly angry as the company had been launched and had grown 
thanks to direct government support. Not only the Guangzhou provincial 
administration approved the setup of Fanya, but also “state banks aggressively sold its 
flagship products, which promised ‘zero risks’ and high returns, to their clients; 
China’s national broadcaster regularly endorsed the exchange” (Huang 2015, n.p.).  
It is clear that official recognition of the company by the government blinded investors 
to the possibility that things could go wrong. When the market collapsed in August, a 
wave of protests spread from Kunming to Xi’an to Beijing. After equity markets 
collapsed, crowds gathered in the capital outside the offices of the securities regulators. 
“These indignant investors add to unrest among a broader swath of Chinese who are 
openly challenging authorities, including migrant workers, coal miners and 
demobilised soldiers angered by job losses. A common thread: protesters are 
convinced government officials and the ruling CCP encouraged their investment of 
money and labour in ways that helped build modern China, and now they feel 
betrayed” (Yap 2016). 
Anger and growing disappointment towards the state’s expectation in managing the 
market increased even among the haigui, who initially seemed the most willing to 
place their hope in the state’s capacity. In the eyes of Jun, a graduate from Macquarie 
University who returned home with a strong desire to be part of the state’s technocratic 
power, the hope and promise of the new “Chinese dream” which had hitherto driven 
him forward, is now evaporating: “China sooner or later will have to change; it cannot 
keep going this way. This financial market is too provincial, underdeveloped and too 
volatile. It needs reforms and transparency, there are too many people jumping [into] 
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it with the hope of making money, speculating. … The government has to sort this out. 
Most of Chinese investors cannot understand the market, how it works.”88 
Jun, after facing multiple disappointments, defines the “distinctive” characteristics of 
the Chinese financial market as inefficiency and backwardness. His disillusionment 
led him to downgrade expectations of the potential for success there. His reasons 
though were different, even in opposition, to those of others who were angry at the 
lack of state “protection” of the market. Jun’s perspective, as an educated-abroad 
aspiring financial expert, was instead that the state had to intervene to regulate and 
reform the market in order to dampen the volatility caused by the irrational moves of 
the sanhu.89 Furthermore, in contrast to the mass of investors, Jun was expressing his 
criticism using “the jargon of money.” Talking about adjustments, indexes, 
multiplayers, rates, and so forth, he was employing the jargon of his financial 
discipline, which the average sanhu would struggle to understand. In deploying this 
jargon he was wielding a potentially powerful tool, which he hoped would help him to 
scale the ladder of success.  
As aspiring financial experts, the haigui feel competent to debate the matter of 
government regulation of the market. In How to Speak Money (2014), John Lanchester 
describes the qualities of financial jargon as both “exclusive and excluding” and 
underlines how these “qualities are intimately linked up” (8). Jun was feeling part of 
an exclusive group of financial experts who could claim a voice because they 
understood the market. However, his frustration was double: he was unable to gain a 
position and provide technical advice on policy matters due to his low status within 
the ecology of Chinese financial expertise; and his exclusive belonging to both the 
world and words of finance was also excluding him from a Chinese financial market 
that was dominated by informal scattered investors.  
The informal experts, as improvised investors, lean on the state’s paternalistic 
measures over the market; the haigui, confident in their formal expertise, consider the 
state a hindrance to the free exercise of their abilities, though they still call for state 
                                                 
 
88 Interview with Jun, 28 November 2013, Shanghai. 
89 As I explain in chapter 5, if China aligns with global international standards and regulation, it will 
need to eliminate “A” shares, the ones the sanhu can invest in.  
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intervention to reform the market. If the former are aware of their weakness and 
recognise their need for a defender, the latter, eager to valorise their technical skills, 
are in need of a neutral arbiter, and believe they might be employed and valorised 
within a system of mature and developed market rules. The haigui criticise the 
government for its lack of reform and control over speculative activity. They also find 
the state unable or unwilling to ensure “healthy,” transparent, and fair competition 
among investors, through reforms that would prevent conflicts of interests, institute 
supervisory authorities, and get rid of speculators. But, as bearers of formal expertise, 
the haigui expect their professional skills to be put freely to work in optimal 
conditions. On the other side, the older and financially uneducated sanhu expect state 
protectionism to shield them from the harshness of free competition. Broadly 
dissatisfied with the state’s mismanagement of the market, they have escalated protests 
against the market after the crash. But due to their heterogeneity, their different 
ambitions, aspirations, backgrounds and their pervasive competitiveness, the sanhu 
have been unable to build an organised and unified protest against the government.  
Nonetheless, many Chinese investors applauded the state’s adoption of a “circuit 
breaker” measure to halt the risk of further market turmoil. As some of them stated, 
they could see “the government’s good intentions” (Duggan 2015b, n.p.). In their many 
protests and laments, their expectation that the state should be prompt in “rescuing the 
market (jiushi) figures as a crucial component of the Chinese way of constructing 
financial capitalism” (Lin 2015, n.p.). I argue that the shaping of a Chinese ecology of 
financial expertise struggles to be effective where the state has secured a domestic 
milieu that retains its ownership over capital and control of labour. Although 
financialisation has been deployed to sustain a mass “stock fever” allowing people to 
engage in state-supervised financial operations, the creation of a domesticated mass 
financialisation, which has encouraged, inter alia, the rise of both formal and informal 
financial experts (the haigui and the sanhu), might ultimately prove self-defeating. 
From the fall of the people’s state to the rise of a financialised state 
“China’s ‘open door’ at the beginning of the twenty-first century was so utterly 
different from that of a century earlier because this time global capital entered by 
invitation” (Panitch and Gindin 2013, 151). One could say that through this opening 
China participated in the historical turn that accompanied the global rise of 
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financialisation elsewhere, as the door-opening reforms meant the gradual dismantling 
of state welfare guarantees to workers. As theorised by Greta Krippner, on the basis of 
studies by Marxists and world systems theorists from Harry Magdoff and Paul Sweezy 
to Giovanni Arrighi, financialisation should be placed “on a firm historical foundation 
where the state is no longer treated as exogenous, but as fully internal to the analysis” 
(Krippner 2011, 13). However, while Krippner argues that state policies created the 
conditions for financialisation, this very same process allowed the state to avoid a 
series of economic, social, and political dilemmas after industrial profit started to 
decline in the late 1960s (14). The “dilemma” faced by the Chinese state was of a 
different nature: the booming profits of industrial capital flowing from an export-led 
economy based on a sizable reserve army of labour required investment in a new 
system of accumulation while also maintaining social order. 
The Chinese process of financialisation was not initiated, as in the West, by capital’s 
drive to find new pathways for growth after the industrial crisis of accumulation.90 
Rather it was a process of profit capitalisation from the industrial sector that carried 
China to integration with financial capitalism. As indicated in my analysis in chapter 
5, this situation was enhanced by the flow of foreign investments in search of cheap 
labour to be exploited, and by the restructuring of the SOEs into joint stock companies. 
China became involved in wide-scale restructuring, and the state was the prime mover 
in that transition. Among other measures, it guaranteed an efficient division of labour, 
converting China into the “factory of the world.” While this gave rise to a frantic 
urbanisation (and land speculation) the state embraced financialisation as the key 
driver of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics.” In China, it was the political 
structure, the party-state, and not the formal re-structuring of laws, which guaranteed 
a safe environment for foreign investment. 
Relying on the reserve army of labour, China’s central and local governments have 
controlled and skilfully manipulated investment, employment, tax, labour, pollution 
                                                 
 
90 This pathway was generated as Fordist capitalism was no longer able to suck surplus value from 
living working labour (Marazzi 2010, 32). This initiated a process of massive delocalisation of 
production to countries with cheaper labour costs, the casualisation of labour, precarity, de-unionisation 
and in turn a process of financialisation through which capital’s search for profit was carried out of 
productive processes by means of a new shareholding value.  
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controls, and land use policies to attract industry and to nurture it. For instance, 
Andrew Ross has shown how American managers, who he defines as the addled minds 
of the free market, seem not to realise that the triumph of free market capitalism in 
China they expect (fomented by Chinese success in building a highly competitive 
environment) comes in fact from effective government planning that was promoted 
and guaranteed by the party-state (Ross 2006). Moreover, the state’s ability to embrace 
foreign investments and import new technology also ensured the influx of management 
and expertise from abroad, resulting in the emergence of a new professional labour 
force.  
Marking continuity with its “anti-modernity modernity” (Wang 2008a, 114), the state 
shaped foreign expertise to its agenda, including and excluding knowledge, skilled and 
unskilled labour, pursuing in this way a new process of valorisation. On the strength 
of a legacy and economy of self-reliance (zili gengsheng, literally meaning “reborn 
through their own power”), China has often preferred a cautious gradualism. In this 
way, China equipped itself to engage in transnational capitalism, whilst experimenting 
with its autonomous role by performing what Wang Hui has defined as a “dialectic of 
opening and autonomy” (2011, 237) (see chapter 1). Thus, through a process of 
entangling and disentangling, accepting, and refusing global capital’s dictates, the 
Chinese state presents a domestic dream. While embarking on the path of a neoliberal 
rationale, the state preserves its old political signifiers, and exerts control through 
symbolic and cultural production.  
As I previously underlined in chapters 1 and 2, it is undeniable that the Chinese 
communist party has eroded its value system through a process of “depoliticisation” 
(Wang 2006a). However, one should note a striking contradiction in this process: the 
success of the Chinese transition is precisely due to the ability of the state to 
strategically maintain its old signifiers—the CCP and the recurrent call for socialism 
and Marxist doctrines. One of the strongholds of the state’s symbolic and cultural 
production is public education. Xi Jinping’s call for Chinese universities to implement 
stronger “ideological guidance” could be considered evidence of this. In 2013 the 
government issued guidance that Chinese students should “shoulder the burden of 
learning and researching the dissemination of Marxism,” and Chinese universities 
should “cultivate and practice the core values of socialism in their teaching, as well as 
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strengthen and improve the ideological and political work” (Associated Press Beijing 
2014, n.p.). While in China, I heard on many occasions that the majority of the Chinese 
professors of Marxism—who account for most of the scholars providing social and 
economic analysis—comment using the rhetoric of the establishment, offering 
opinions along the lines: since the start of the opening and the reforms, the relationship 
between labour and capital has reached a balance thanks to the state party intervention. 
In other words, they claim the state is playing a virtuous role, limiting the power of the 
private capitalist to exploit the labour force.91 
The state boasts of being the heir to a glorious past of national liberation and of a 
“developmentalist” version of communism, which strongly rejects the egalitarian 
“socialism of the poor” that Mao Tse-tung took from the former Soviet Union. Rather, 
the state acts “virtuously” to limit the private capitalist’s power to exploit the labour 
force, and the merits of a balanced relationship between labour and capital are 
attributed to intervention by the party-state. What counts here is the state’s claim to 
centrality in crucial moments of social life. For instance, by order of the central 
government the state intervenes to force all enterprises to increase salaries and new 
job contracts—the symbolic value of this move is far more important than its real 
content, which is often disregarded. One should remember that ninety per cent of all 
migrant workers in the construction sector work without any formal contracts (Chan 
et al. 2010) and often suffer industrial accidents and injuries and are left with no 
compensation (Pun and Lu 2009). 
This recalls the plans of the Russian Mensheviks that were introduced to China by 
Chen Duxiu, the first Secretary General of the CCP. Their program envisaged a two-
step development as essential to progress: entrepreneurs, the urban bourgeoisie, and 
so forth, would be enriched first in order to drive development for the rest of the 
country. 92  In the Menshevik model, a free hand is bestowed upon the rich who, 
burdened by a moral commitment, promise the impending flourishing of the economy 
                                                 
 
91 These conversations were heard when attending conferences and talks while studying for my Masters 
dissertation in both Qinghua University in Beijing and at the Shanghai Academy of Social Science. 
92 Mutatis mutandis, in the eyes of Chinese reformers this doctrine seems to perform in a similar pattern 
to one of the pillars of neoliberal doctrine, the “trickle down” economic effect. 
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will eventually translate into an advantage for “everybody.” Consequently, workers 
and peasants should wait for the general enrichment of society before expecting their 
personal status to improve. 93  This imaginary basically rests on an “unspoken 
agreement” between the Chinese state and its population: the first guarantees social 
order, national unity and development; the second swallows the propaganda in 
exchange for an eventual rise in individual incomes. Undoubtedly, the past communist 
track record of “serving the people” helps to prevent a breach in the covenant. In this 
frame, the imaginary is never required to become a reality: the elite abhors the past as 
a hindrance to consumption and social polarisation, while the masses look back with 
nostalgia, seeing communism as defender and equaliser. In any case it remains latent 
in the background, with no one wanting to resurrect it.94  
For thirty years—from its foundation in 1949 to the Opening and Reform Policies of 
1979—the Chinese state had represented itself to the people as both employer and as 
dispenser of work, wages, and consumer goods. In a system far removed from any 
legal rights and obligations between employers and employees, a division of tasks 
between the state and its people was activated, based on moral obligations and 
common political aims such as the construction of a better society. The state was 
required to provide the people with the means of living, and the people had to provide 
the state with their labour. In what perhaps sounds astonishing nowadays, Maoist 
China never considered money a crucial factor. In order to obtain the desired goods 
and services, what counted more than money were the coupons of the planned trade, 
distributed by state offices; money was an accessory and seldom gave direct access to 
consumption. Moreover, it could never be openly displayed. Communism was 
                                                 
 
93 For instance, the policy of the first secretary of the CCP, Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) was based on an 
alliance with the bourgeoisie as the driver of the economic development. See Feigon 2014. 
94 Pun Ngai speaks about the “denial” of communism: in China, through the negation of the collectivist 
model of the past, subjectivities enthusiastically reposition themselves within an exalting competition 
and individual skills in a “free” market, with the belief that such a market could guarantee individual 
freedom (Pun et al. 2010). In a different approach, the unreality of communism is linked to the absence 
(for the moment) of a proletariat as a class per se. For instance: “Among the new workers, it hardly 
seems to be an awareness of being a subject. When it comes to their identity, just a few of the new 
workers identify themselves as such, most of them seem to identity with who oppress and exploit them. 
As an Opium, the developmentalist ideology has imposed a dominant position and it makes even more 
difficult to free the subjects it oppress with new values to free themselves” (Guo 2015).  
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attractive precisely because it offered an undifferentiated and egalitarian means of 
subsistence, regardless of perceived standards of quality of production.  
The introduction of a contractual system into the relationship between state and 
workers with the gaige kaifang was indubitably a cultural shock of unparalleled 
magnitude. As suggested by Chris King-Chi Chan et al., “the paradox is that this state-
driven process of economic globalisation has been accompanied by a state withdrawal 
process in the areas of social reproduction and social protection” (2010, 213). In other 
words, the socialist principle “each according to his craft” was thrust into a neoliberal 
frame: the call for a fair wage was inculcated in the people’s minds as a push to work 
hard and make money as individuals. In parallel with the party process of 
depoliticisation, which strategically emptied out the political weight of class 
categories, the party-state became even more empowered to exploit a population no 
longer able to recognise the “signified” expressed by the “signifiers”—the values and 
the meanings of the previous foundational social order of communism. As suggested 
by Wang Xiaoying, these subjects became trapped in “a mismatch between the official 
moral code, which continues to invoke communist and collectivistic values such as 
‘serving the people’” whilst, at the same time, they were encouraged to pursue 
individual interests and competition in an increasingly capitalistic economic order 
(2002, 3).  
This dichotomy presents a clash between forces in a contest for the minds of the 
population, and thus points to the rise of a schizophrenic subject. However, referring 
to a “mismatch” or a “disjunction” should not imply in any way the existence of a 
linear and unique correspondence between ideological values and capitalism such as 
the association with a single and unique liberal ideology. On the contrary, the global 
hegemonic expansion of the order of capital demonstrates its capacity to colonise a 
wide array of territorial and political settings, and impinges on heterogeneous forms 
of social relations. Thus, when looking at the power of China “constructing a new 
capitalism” (Keith et al. 2013), what is at stake is capital’s devious capacity to match 
rather than clash with the old political and ideological façade of the CCP and its old—
although perhaps never fully achieved—declared identity as the vanguard of the 
working class.  
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The Chinese version of financial capital is empowered by the party-state and by its 
symbolic communist prestige: the people saver, the builder of the republic. In his latest 
work, China’s Twentieth Century: Revolution, Retreat and the Road to Equality 
(2016), Wang Hui suggests that with the shift toward financialisation, what was 
formerly functioning as a workers’ state began to play the role of dual representative 
of both labour and capital. “The increasingly close alliance between capital and power 
has made the state’s representation of the rights and interests of labour increasingly 
hollow, but its formal role as the representative of labour has not undergone a 
fundamental change” (396).  
Called to respond to the logic of capital, the state drifts from its role as people’s 
representative, losing the consistency of its communist and republican values, yet 
evoking them at the same time. Wang notes that, in comparison to the communist 
period, the number of workers has effectively increased in today’s China. Wang 
defines the Chinese “new workers’ as a category which far exceeds China’s twentieth-
century working class in number and scale and which encompasses the vast majority 
of labouring people in China—those who are “neither industrial workers in the 
traditional sense nor farmers in the traditional sense, but half-worker half-farmers, 
people with rural residence permits who are both workers and farmers” (357).95 In 
addition, Wang also discusses the existence of a further category, which, as I will 
explain in the next section, he calls the Chinese “new poor”—people like the haigui, 
who are involved in immaterial and financial labour. The point is that, overall, despite 
their scale and numbers, and because of their casualisation and diversification and in 
part because of their heterogeneity, these workers have lost their capacity to be 
                                                 
 
95 In Chinese xin gongren, a recently proposed substitute for the outdated term nongmingong “workers 
of peasant origin,” indicating migrant workers of rural origin. The Chinese language clearly 
distinguishes between gongren (manual workers in the industry, blue collars) and laodongzhe (workers 
in any field, paid with some kind of wage), as French and Italian also do (respectively 
ouvrieurs/travailleurs; operai/lavoratori), though not English. Besides, xin “new” here is xin-, a prefix 
like “neo-,” deprived of any temporary connotation, as a link to contemporaneity or to “modernisation” 
of the job market could be. Perhaps a better translation could be “neoworkers.” As it sounds in Chinese, 
this term clearly stresses the distance between this new form of migrant with their precarious condition 
and the old workers (in industry, mines, etc.) with a secure job for life, normally in the same company 
or unit. See for instance Lü 2013.  
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structurally organised. The process leading to this impasse has been far from smooth—
the discomfort of tens of millions of workers has resulted in China becoming “an 
emerging epicentre of world labour unrest” (Silver and Zhang 2009). “Suddenly 
subject to layoffs, increased precariousness, reduced wages and benefits, and 
‘subsistence crises’ (Chen 2000), workers in the state-owned sector began actively and 
explicitly drawing on the concepts and ideology of Maoism in defence of their 
suddenly impinged upon livelihoods (Lee 2000, 2002). … Even if worker protests may 
have had the effect of slowing down the process of privatisation and convincing the 
state to hold on to a significant number of large enterprises (Cai 2002), none of these 
episodes have been effective in arresting the processes of commodification and 
casualization” (Lee and Friedman 2010, 518).   
What Eli Friedman has defined as an “insurgency trap” (2014) shows that real 
instances of autonomous political activity are difficult to develop under the strong 
paternalistic and police powers of the state. As explained by Chan et al., we are faced 
with a process of “proletarisation of Chinese labour, driven by the state but at the same 
time crippled by it” (2010, 136). For instance, the introduction of new legal rights 
through the 2008 labour law succeeded in empowering workers with individual legal 
rights without granting the collective right of freedom of association. Claims for higher 
wages are satisfied through state decrees and not through negotiations. As put by Wang 
Hui (2016): “Unlike the class struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
direct conflict between the workers and the state is not developing toward the 
formation of a workers’ state, but toward the formation of a nineteenth-or early 
twentieth-century economic system—that is, utterly abandoning its character as a 
workers’ state, and instituting legal rights based on the right to own property” (396). 
These new generations of workers are indeed radically different from previous ones. 
However, one should note that even the articulation of “legal rights” is to be 
understood within a specific Chinese political discourse in which the state acts as both 
a coherent and a fragmented entity. The new “rights” are framed as economic, social, 
and cultural “concessions” that the state offers to its citizens. Therefore, these rights 
stem from the state programmatic idea of nation-building and cultural development, 
which is linked with the idea of a “new quality” of population that I discussed in 
chapter 2.  
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Furthermore, as I argued in chapter 4, in this new state rationale, the creation of a self-
governed, calculating individual can be viewed in a Foucauldian sense as emerging 
through a “technique of the self” that exists at the intersection between “public 
morality” and “individual interest” (Foucault, 1997). The characteristics of this new 
generation of workers include greater disaggregation, casualisation, individualism, and 
attraction to urban consumer culture (Davis 2000; Pun 2003, 2005; Chan et al. 2010). 
The entry of foreign capital and subsequent “contamination” by foreign investors have 
introduced new desires and new ways of living to a population exposed to more 
frequent contact with the rest of the world. These new workers employed in both the 
material and immaterial sectors—involved in the education-migration circuit are a 
major example of the latter—are driven by competition, personal interest and freedom, 
and are accustomed to higher job turnover rates and less loyalty to their work (Lee 
2007; Ross 2006).  
Financialisation of the new (poor) discontents  
As I have underlined several times in this thesis, the rise of a new entrepreneurial 
Chinese rationale has been encouraged by the state: subjects have been left to become 
increasingly competitive, entrepreneurial and risk-taking, and to respond to the 
excitement of entrepreneurialism and hedonism. On one hand the state has 
remorselessly delivered its skilled manpower to ruthless foreign and domestic 
capitalist exploitation; on the other hand, it expects to control its population firstly 
through mass financialisation, and secondly by a jumble of disparate measures: 
urbanisation, making China the “factory of the world,” nationalism, and finally with 
recourse to the corpse of the values of communism. But the emerging subjectivities—
delivered to a non-guaranteed work environment by the same state that portrays itself 
as a champion of the working people—are questioning its legitimacy. In this 
hodgepodge—which characterises the contemporary Chinese configuration—a 
functional system of exchanges among different knowledge, codes, entities and 
disparate ingredients impact and collide with each other like bumper cars in a dodgem 
arena. 
As discussed in chapter 5, both the state and the population now refer to the stock 
market as a golden goose, and everyone is excited to xiahai (“put out to sea”) and 
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metaphorically “jump into the sea (of business).” 96  However, under such a new 
rationale, the strategies of the new mass of investors have taken really different 
directions and no solidarity or organisational capacity has so far emerged. On one 
hand, the old generation of sanhu—whose livelihoods were previously protected by 
the old “iron rice bowl”—feels particularly threatened because of the withdrawal of 
the state from its role as labour guarantor (see the discussion in chapter 5). Through 
the opening of the domestic stock market, the state was able to ensure a process of 
capital conversion (from private savings to financial securities), and to mitigate the 
risk of popular social unrest. On the other, new haigui investors like Jun, driven by the 
myth of further individual enrichment, instead see the government as provincial and 
backward.  
In order to defend his position as a financial expert, Jun aligns with the main foreign 
and domestic media interpretations of the crisis (it escalated in the summer of 2015), 
which attributed responsibility to “financially illiterate and uneducated” investors 
who, by acting irrationally, had triggered volatility and chaos. Despite the potential for 
the financial crisis to generate a widely shared distrust, the heterogeneity of the mass 
of investors I have described so far appears incapable of being united in a common 
cause. The haigui, as a new generation of workers produced by financialisation, 
resemble the features of what Wang Hui (2016) defines as “the Chinese new poor:” 
A separate group, different from both the traditional working class and 
the new workers, is far more active within the realm of politics and 
culture: those who can be called the “new poor.” This group, too, is the 
product of the industrialisation, urbanisation and spread of information 
technology brought about by globalisation, but unlike the rural migrant 
workers, they are victims of a consumer society lacking in “internal 
demand.” They have often received higher education, work in various 
fields and live on the outskirts of the large cities. Their income, though 
similar to that of blue-collar workers, is insufficient to meet the 
                                                 
 
96 This term came into use especially after Deng Xiaoping’s early 1992 tour of China’s southern 
provinces, after which a business fever erupted. This business fever was often described with the saying: 
“One billion people, 900 million businessmen, and another 100 million waiting in line.” “Jump into the 
sea” (from a word used in imperial China to mean “turn professional,” said of an actor or actress who 
starts a career as a prostitute), was re-interpreted in the sense of “bravely sail offshore,” as a call to those 
in every profession (from researchers and academics to civil servants) to discard the security of public 
sector employment and adventurously try to make money.  
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consumptive demands stimulated by consumer culture. Aside from 
their material poverty, scholars often describe this group as “spiritually 
impoverished” and having “lost their social values” (even though those 
using these concepts have spiritual lives no more rich than those they 
describe). …They are discontented and restless. … the composition of 
these new workers implies a “political potential” which has yet to be 
explored (360-363).  
 
Like these “new poor,” the haigui in Shanghai, who are shaped by the process of 
financialisation, and living on the periphery of Pudong, aspire to unachievable 
consumer practices and spaces (see chapter 4). Even if in many cases the haigui didn’t 
directly express their un-satisfaction and frustration regarding their job positions, they 
felt excluded by the domestic financial elite. In our conversations often evasions, 
detours, moments of omission “interluded” their answers. Initial attempts of lamenting 
their present life and job conditions were often interrupted by hesitations that then 
turned in an aporetic silence. As stated in the introduction, drawing from a feminist 
methodology, I take it as my responsibility to read these silences as resistance 
(Visweswaran 1994). The act of not saying or unsaying reflects their unwillingness to 
be subjected to power relations in which they were subaltern, as excluded from the 
inner sanctum of technocrats that characterised the Chinese ecology of financial 
expertise. It is thus credible to suggest that the haigui are among the social groups, 
which, as hypothesised by Wang, are forging a new and markedly unstable 
configuration of relationships between capital and labour. They are “discontented and 
restless” and, in this sense, may harbour a political potential. By infiltrating the direct 
relationship between the state and the people, finance as a substitute for previous state 
guarantees of social welfare has increasingly blurred other channels of 
communication, as heterogeneous pressures are directed along more nationalistic, anti-
corruption lines. As a result, the state is losing its grasp on these subjects. Furthermore, 
like the “new poor,” the haigui, a generation born under the wave of “depoliticisation”, 
can be described in Wang Hui’s terms as “spiritually impoverished” and unmoored 
from any political and social commitments. Instead, investing in the infiltrating the 
direct relationship between the state and the people, finance as a substitute for previous 
state guarantees of sir financial education abroad, they commit to a financial career in 
which promissory, speculative, manipulative practices will reign supreme and a 
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wavering, cynical, mocking attitude is both applauded and considered necessary to 
survive.” 
I had to contact Xun several times before he agreed to be interviewed. Xun can be 
considered a model Chinese professional, with his clean aesthetic and smart, clean-cut 
image. He holds a PhD in applied finance from Macquarie University (Sydney) and is 
a member of the government’s “10,000 talents program” that encourages high-
achieving students to return home after study abroad. Xun was also the winner of the 
Australian China Alumni Association (ACAA) Award, which I described in chapter 
3, and was named the second most successful returnee of the year. Soon after he arrived 
in Shanghai, he got a job as a senior analyst within the Chinese hedge fund industry, a 
nascent industry in China, with a company backed by the government. He told me that 
the industry is performing really well, and he knows a lot of foreigners trying to get 
valuable information from him as they seek new avenues for profit: “You know, 
foreigners like you. They always ask me how managers and funds perform here in 
China. They want to know our strategies, the way we operate, but this is just something 
you can’t get if you are not Chinese.”97 In this regard, not “being Chinese” for him 
equated to not being a possible interlocutor with whom to share the Chinese market 
“culture.” 
Xun’s job was deeply speculative. He was aware his industry was depicted as the 
culprit of the Chinese financial market. From insider trading to Ponzi schemes and 
shadow banking practices, hedge funds are among the primary tools used for 
speculation. One particular case of speculation had recently been denounced in Ningbo 
just a few weeks before our interview, and attracted both Chinese and international 
media focus. The practice, described as zhangting gansidui (limit-up kamikaze), 
consists of the following: “managers would get a small group of friends to buy into a 
stock then talk up its prospects to a wider group of friends. The second group, who 
were in fact being duped, would rush to buy the stock and the manager would reap his 
                                                 
 
97 Interview with Xun, 15 August 2013, Shanghai. 
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profits by offloading his holdings when the stock hit its ‘limit up’—the maximum it 
could rise in a single day” (Davis and Rabinovitch 2014).98 
When I brought up zhangting gansidui in conversation, Xun stopped being so 
defensive, though he kept exhibiting a certain sense of superiority, holding that there 
is no form of investment that is safe in China: “Strategies like these are just part of the 
agenda; they are pervasive and it’s just the way it works.” In general, he was aware 
that the common practice of insider trading was making the job of analysts like him 
opaque in the eyes of foreign investors who ask him for advice. But, in China, while 
everyone was blinded by the desperate desire for a high return, the practice of shadow 
banking and high-risk investing somehow became a de facto payment, with everyone 
expecting to “make yields irrespective of drought and flood.”99 However, what struck 
me about Xun was that he was extremely elusive and cynical about the environment 
in which he has been able to “re-adapt.” It was precisely this cynical attitude (and his 
inclination to get his hands dirty) that helped him to climb the career ladder. His role 
was tailored to play within that ecology of financial expertise established by the state. 
In fact, when it came to talk about his expertise, he expressed a kind of faith in it as a 
form of “applied science,” a scientific truth. He explained to me that the concrete 
knowledge with which he operates comprises both fundamental analysis—values 
measured by market performance, balance sheets, cash flow, and so forth—and 
technical analysis—predictions on market and stock price patterns for a broad range 
of companies and industries, irrespective of their current state of financial health. 
Through his ability to produce graphs, indices, and charts, he could affirm his 
distinctive position as technically superior within the local environment, and put this 
to work when undertaking negotiations with foreign clients. When talking in technical 
terms, he was performing the hermeneutic discourse of his discipline, without 
questioning the possibility of its misapplication. 
                                                 
 
98 Literally zhangting (stop the growth), an abbreviation for zhangdie tingban (limit-growth-and drop 
lists), a system to stop the explosive growths and drops and limit the speculations on the share markets. 
99 The term is used to cover all financial intermediaries that perform bank-like activity but are not 
regulated as one. These include mobile payment systems, pawnshops, peer-to-peer lending websites, 
and mostly hedge funds, the industry Xun was working for. 
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Xun seemed nonetheless unable to directly use his expertise as a main tool for his 
career. His expertise, instead of providing a sound financial knowledge basis to 
legitimate and justify his actions, was too often restricted to providing a mere façade, 
or “cover,” for speculative activities and arbitrary/unregulated interventions by the 
state, and in particular state-owned enterprises, when dealing with international 
clients/observers. This “cover” was aimed to justify the very language of money, 
which insinuated a direct relationship between the state and its subjects, and which 
formed a common ground for a rough “predatory” psychology to emerge. In other 
words, faced with the opportunity for making money, some of the haigui were happy 
to abandon the implementation of the knowledge they learned abroad on market 
commitments—not in playing a fair game and guaranteeing a fair competitive 
environment, nor in advancing their career profiles—and instead to cement their role 
as a necessary intermediary in practices like insider trading and shadow banking. They 
were not masters of their own work; even if just employees, they were the servant of 
a pattern based on “shadow” money creation. Xun, working for a hedge fund, had to 
hone his skills to generate, cover up, participate in, and even legitimise forms of 
speculation that in turn generated income for him. As Melinda Cooper (2015) notes, 
the emergence of shadow money creation represents an on-going response to the 
evolving risk profile of financial labour which, by engaging in contingent, 
nonstandard, and uninsured forms of labour, has offered a solution of sorts to social 
insecurity.  
Cai is a graduate from an MBA course in Brisbane and works in a mutual fund 
company that pools money from individual investors to purchase securities. Mutual 
funds are in fact a form of investment companies acting as intermediaries between 
individual investors and the stock market. These companies offer the client a set of 
products with different rates of return according to their risk. In China mutual 
companies like the one employing Cai, along with many other securities companies, 
operate under the supervision of the state and the restrictions it imposes, which are 
issued regularly, almost monthly, by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). The service this company provides to its clients is often based not on its own 
market research and analysis (the job Cai is supposed to do), but mainly on CSRC 
company listing supervision and prospects. This latter in fact, while being centrally 
managed, establishes market parameters that financial institutions have to follow. 
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Cai’s job was thus to interpret this data and report to his clients. In his mind, this was 
ensuring his clients were more “protected” than other investors. Expressing some 
frustration, however, he told me that ultimately the clients (such as the sanhu) always 
want to make their own choices. He remarked angrily that the general behaviour of 
Chinese investors is crazy. As with many other haigui he explained to me how the 
market in China is not like in other countries, such as Australia or the United States, 
where people like him actually play a crucial role as intermediaries and proper brokers, 
and seek the best deal for their clients. He told me that in China the clients all think 
they “know” what they are doing. In addition, there are no filters; anyone possessing 
the equivalent of 20 dollars can actually buy stocks. He said: “Of course it’s very 
dangerous; people actually do not see the risk and they could actually lose a lot of 
money. The problem is that investors here are just financially illiterate, they don’t 
understand the market, plus they are constantly fuelled by false information.”100  
He was discounting Chinese popular enthusiasm for the market in order to defend his 
professionalism and upgrade his role. He was supposed to provide clients with 
guidelines for investment and prevent them from making unduly risky and 
irresponsible decisions. However, it was hard to say precisely what kind of advice and 
service his company was providing to individual investors. In the end, after showing 
me his portfolio and the different options from which an investor could choose (from 
low risk 5 percent profit, to very volatile up to 20 per cent profit), he told me that the 
best and safest investment a Chinese person could make, if they had the credentials, 
was on the Australian stock exchange or the US-based Dow Jones. He was investing 
there himself. But what about his special access to the information from the CSRC? 
His expertise? His capacity to forecast the Chinese stock market? After all, I had heard 
many times that in China investors who want to avoid risk are advised to invest in 
state-owned banks or other state-owned companies, as there is a guarantee they’ll 
never go bankrupt. But even this was not so straightforward; accessing reliable 
information, such as which are the “right” state-owned companies and when is the 
“right” time to invest, was something reserved for the secret rooms. Certainly, regular 
anti-corruption intervention from the CRSC served to maintain or restore public 
                                                 
 
100 Interview with Cai, 12 May 2013, Shanghai. 
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confidence in the state as super partes. But, ultimately, even with this intervention the 
state was acting rather arbitrarily. If, on one hand, the CSRC was denouncing and 
threatening to prosecute local banks and provincial companies under its own control, 
on the other it was also bailing out institutions involved in shadow banking practices 
in a bid to guarantee more liquidity in the market.  
In the Shanghai financescape, it is often assumed that haigui bring expertise in 
accounting or financial analysis to tasks such as auditing, data disclosure, or tax returns 
for private and foreign corporations, for the purpose of making both Chinese and 
foreign companies “accountable” to be listed in the domestic or international market. 
However, upon investigating the nature of haigui expertise, it is clear that the technical 
skills that make someone “qualified” are insufficient. Besides econometrics, statistics, 
accounting and management, a financial worker should also be acquainted with local 
relational rules. In order to achieve this, she must simultaneously deploy two different 
skill sets: a formal one covering knowledge of the market regulations; and a more 
substantial one, bridging the gap between multiple “financial cultures,” and facilitating 
and responding to the brazen improprieties of her employers, up to and including the 
covering up of illegal practices.101 However, the haigui, even if not formally educated 
to perform this second task, seem at ease. After all, their ultimate aim, like that of their 
employers, is to present as a chenggong renshi (winning personality), a key 
anthropological figure in Chinese reforms. They have to play the game, however 
remote that is from the environment in which they had been trained to succeed.  
In the pursuit of these trajectories, the haigui seem bound to discover the quicksand of 
the Chinese ecology of financial expertise. In most cases, the “winning personality” 
turns out to be an empty fetish, out of their reach. At the same time, the need to set 
aside their professional skills for the sake of the job market appears in their eyes to be 
not so much evidence of personal deficiency as a waste of resources caused by the 
state—a squandered opportunity for them to aid China’s entry into global capitalism. 
In some ways, they seem to unconsciously re-embody the “silent soul” of the main 
                                                 
 
101 These practices are indeed not to be referred to as just “Chinese.” Investigations on financial experts 
acting in Western markets have shown how embracing a cynical attitude towards and distance from 
formal financial training, is a crucial part of the development of the financial system and financial policy 
making (Holst and Moodie, 2015, 44).  
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character of the Lu Xun’s novel The true story of Ah Q. Ah Q is a nobody who pretends 
to be somebody. To maintain his precarious pretence, he elaborates on the “art of 
psychologically winning unfair games” whose pillars are self-deception and 
forgetfulness, the only weapons left to the common people under a yuminde zhuanzhi 
(“autocracy and numb people”), living in an era of bingtai guominxing (“rotten quality 
of the people”).102 Yet, in the case of the haigui, such self-deception acts as a mask of 
the moment to test the ground of a Chinese ecology in which they were initially keen 
to work and to learn the rules of the environment.  
The haigui were called on to deploy the capital of their prestige on behalf of the local 
agencies and companies for which they were working, qualities including their 
international visibility, their apparent high-class demeanour and perceived familiarity 
with high-ranking foreigners (company staff, state officers, and so forth). Not only are 
haigui such as Xun or Cai asked to connive, whether legitimately or not, in deals from 
which they may not even receive a financial cut; in these deals their financial expertise 
is made redundant and devalued. Instead, their contribution is reduced to cosmetics, 
the sole purpose of which is to make speculative practices “respectable” at the very 
moment these are offered to the other party. However, cosmetics—something intended 
to embellish what cannot be substantially changed in order to mask it (rather than deny 
or ignore it)—are only skin deep, and thus a metaphor for the non-acceptance, and 
disengagement, of the haigui in the control room. The result is that once they realise 
that their skills and expertise are going to be undervalued, the haigui begin conforming 
to the new rules of the game in force in the Chinese ecology of financial expertise. 
Here “finance” goes beyond the rigid and technical regime of the “economic 
discipline,” and becomes an abstract, indefinable, and malleable means to a “dream of 
self-enrichment.” The dream reflects the haigui’s hopes and desires for a better future. 
As stated by Max Haiven (2011), “finance is … always a volatile and fundamentally 
inaccurate reflection of (and projection onto) the real world—one clouded by 
narcissism, desire, fear, and power” (96). 
                                                 
 
102 Information about this text is taken from an online review by Wang Xiaoming “Sick soul and 
deformity Revolution— Lu Xun’s ‘Story of Ah Q’” (n.d., http://www.eywedu.com/luxun/pl005.htm). 
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This volatility recalls the characteristics of financial labour. Because of its biopolitical 
management and its tendency to follow a mimetic rationality (Marazzi 2008), financial 
labour is particularly adept at reconfiguring to the historical and local environments 
that constitute the heterogeneous and uneven space of finance capitalism. Moving from 
China to Australia and then back to China, the haigui are contingently moulding and 
remoulding their skills, attitudes, and behaviours according to the context in which 
they are acting. The potential of living labour is that it can deploy itself not just as the 
container of financial expertise and financial practices—where these are embodied in 
immaterial practices that also concern subjects’ consciousness, resistance, 
coordination and communication—but also as the container of different cultures of 
finance.  
In line with Anna Tsing’s observation that “circulating finance reveals itself as both 
empowered and limited by its cultural specificity” (Tsing 2011), I argue that living 
labour does the same: while circulating among multiple financescapes, labour emerges 
both empowered and disadvantaged. Thus, the haigui appear as enigmatic figures. 
They navigate between the lateral forms of knowledge production in the uneven spaces 
of multiple financial capital configurations. Their enigmatic feature also lies in the 
décalage they could potentially exploit as subjects “in between” different financial 
ecologies.  
Overall the Chinese ecology of expertise proves to be a “high tension zone,” where 
conflicts among formal and informal financial experts, state institutions, local 
authorities, provincial banks, and individual investors, once unleashed, become 
engrained and difficult to tame. However, in this indefiniteness, the multitude of 
financialised subjects are flattened into a single role, that of “money hunter,” in a 
reductio ad unum that sweeps up the haigui as well. The financial language gradually 
gains prominence and becomes the preferred language these subjects are willing to 
hear, undermining the grip of any political or ethical code. 
Money: a social intruder 
According to the conversations I had with Fei and Zheng (see end of chapter 4), 
together with the one which follows with Wei (a haigui working as an advisor in a 
mutual trust fund), investing in the stock market was considered a playful activity, 
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something not to be taken too seriously: “Why not? It is always worth risking and 
trying … even if people think this market is just a farce, you never know, you might 
win and get rich.”103 Yet, despite being financial experts and viewing the Chinese 
stock market as a playground in which money could just gush out, some of the haigui 
were investing in their free time, like any other everyday lay investor. Even if 
apparently conceived as a side activity—something that the haigui were doing as a 
gesture of defiance to challenge the anomalous market which they have been trained 
to criticise from the perspective of formally fostered financial expertise—gradually 
their involvement in such a market anomaly seemed to produce a powerful attraction. 
In contrast to Jun’s attitude at the beginning of this chapter, a haigui like Wei ended 
up seeking whatever financial expertise he could garner—like lay investors, who act 
mimetically and rely on informal sources such as blogs, television programs, and 
magazines. How was it possible for him to put aside elitist and high-flying career 
expectations fostered through a foreign-acquired expertise? The attitude he had been 
compelled to adopt in the Shanghai financial market is that this was a playground at 
his service. Given the preference in contemporary China for making money regardless 
of the means, he was consequently able to adapt without a problem. 
The common drive for “money at all costs” is the ground that unifies both financialised 
subjectivities observed so far—the haigui and the lay investors—flattening out their 
differences. Accordingly, the option to invest in the stock market appears as an easy 
solution to the precariousness of both labour and social conditions. Despite not 
necessarily physically encountering each other, a mutual knowing and recognition of 
the operation of the others was shaping a powerful inter-subjective ground between 
them, and resulted in a displacement of both subjects from their original positions. 
This shared ground was made even more productive through the use of similar 
technical devices, such as the freely and easily downloadable software on the 
investors’ computers or smartphones that enable any operator to directly buy and sell 
stocks. On one hand, the haigui, like the young sanhu—frustrated and disappointed by 
a salary and duties below their expectations—were seeing other financially untrained 
sanhu having luck and making easy money. In turn, these mostly unemployed or 
                                                 
 
103 Interview with Wei, 12 August 2013, Shanghai. 
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retired lay investors, operating at the margins of society and thus in search of a social 
space and social recognition, were seeing in the haigui a structured and socially 
recognised group of experts, worthy of emulation. In this instance, the gap in financial 
expertise did not factor significantly. Gui, a Chinese returnee working as financial 
advisor in a security company, told me that some of the sanhu are better than him at 
understanding the market, as they have more experience.104 He seemed to have a great 
respect for them and he wanted to learn their techniques. Consequently, the expertise 
he acquired in an Australian university appears diluted and no more than on a par with 
the informal expertise of the sanhu, to the point where its value risks becoming 
downgraded. In this sense, the proximity between these two financialised 
subjectivities, despite the differences in environment, specialist language, existential 
needs, and aesthetics (encapsulated in the contrast between the sanhu’s messy 
brokerage rooms and the haigui’s shiny offices) was made even closer given their 
common drive for money.  
In China’s financialised society, “make money at all costs” is facilitated by the state 
as a powerful device to control the finance experts. In addition, it is also internalised 
by the haigui as a drive—in the sense of the German Trieb (Freud 1915), an 
unconscious motivation, or pulsion—to justify and take pleasure in their status. The 
fact is that, as I already emphasised in chapter 4, “enrichment” and “making money” 
are stripped of any pejorative meaning that might hint at greed or dishonesty. As 
observed by Cai Xiang, attitudes towards personal enrichment in Chinese 
contemporary society mean it is no longer condemned but rather emulated; the Chinese 
ignore the choufu or “hatred against the rich” (Cai 2014, n.p.).  
I argue that the language of finance, perceived by the mass as “money fallen from the 
sky on everybody (who is active and entrepreneurial enough),” a biblical manna 
courtesy of the state rather than god, acts to blur and iron out the gap between rich and 
poor, preventing the latter from becoming aware of their condition and feeding their 
delusion of omnipotence. We might observe, paradoxically, that within such a 
perspective each investor feels close to the real rich as part of the Menshevik project 
                                                 
 
104 Interview with Gui, 25 May 2013, Shanghai.  
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of the enrichment of few as the driver of the development of all. This “closeness,” 
indeed, remains in potentia; however, it opens a further dimension of money, 
overpassing its role as “medium of exchange” as theorised by Marx. The wealth 
produced from financial transactions requires particular attention, because it does not 
involve productive labour, yet represents a novel site for the extraction of surplus from 
society as a whole, with no determined structure based on labour and the hierarchy of 
skills specialisation it encompasses (such as dividing haigui and sanhu). This money 
in fact originates from totally immaterial elements. It is created by behavioural 
conventions and by common relational activities that are consequently commodified 
and subsumed by the functioning of the financial markets (Fumagalli and Lucarelli 
2011).  
As analysts of contemporary capitalism have observed, the process of financialisation 
has increasingly implied a gradual appropriation/privatisation of the commons, that is 
to say, the social conditions for production and welfare state services, and their 
transformation to produce financial returns to the advantage of private corporations 
(Vercellone 2007). However, while elsewhere this process has been gradually 
deployed in line with a neoliberal rationale, under the justification of a free market 
ideology predicated on the withdrawal of the public in favour of the private, in China 
the same process was arranged through an appropriation of the social inheritance by 
red political families. Through an analysis of the concept of “rent” in financial 
capitalism, I will show how this process adds a further element of instability to the 
Chinese financial ecology of expertise.  
One of the characteristics of financial capitalism is the return and spread of the form 
of “rent” as a primary locus of value. As put by Vercellone “since its historical 
inception during the process of enclosure, capitalist rent has been the other face of the 
common, as it has started through a process of expropriation” (Vercellone 2010). As 
the enclosures, caging the land, allowed the rise of ground rent on the base of an 
artificial scarcity of land, even in cognitive capitalism the rent to be produced requires 
an artificial rarefaction, a political and administrative process of enclosure of 
knowledge and information that otherwise will be remain uncontrollably abundant. 
“Rent presents itself as a credit title or a right to the ownership of some material and 
immaterial resource that grants a right to drawing value from a position of exteriority 
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in respect to production” (Vercellone 2010, 95-96). Finallly, the condition for rent to 
be produced is an artificial scarcity of a resource “a logic of rarefaction of such 
resource, as in the case of monopolies” (2008).  
Along the thirty-year journey commenced by Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, the 
luggage of the travellers (the national wealth), which at the outset was in the hands “of 
all people” (as the Chinese state described socialist public property), appears at 
journey’s end to have been surreptitiously passed into the grasp of a minority of 
tycoons. The surplus value extracted from the labour force, which was once re-invested 
in public projects by state five-year plans during the socialist economy, became a 
private, monopolised form of rent. At the beginning of the nineties an epochal turning 
point occurred in China. “A feeling that excessive decentralisation had caused the 
centre to lose control over key macroeconomic levers of the economy” called for a ‘a 
prudent recentralisation’” (Saich 2011, 285). The role of the People’s Bank of China 
as the ultimate decision-maker in matter of loans together with the turning of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) into “a variety of non-state forms through the 
expansion of a shareholding system” (285) were the main devices. What counts here 
are two points: first, this transition, a mammoth transfer of public wealth into private 
hands, happened with no bloodbath but quietly, in the notary offices, through 
signatures on the transfer of the possession of state enterprises by communist party-
state officials into the hands of their friends or family members. These successor-
owners could boast no aptitude for ownership other than unshakable loyalty to the 
status quo. The result is that, in today’s China, the top one per cent of Chinese families 
—the red aristocracy (taizidang)—control 41.4 per cent of the country’s wealth, and 
are making money with no obligation at all to work, and no need to demonstrate merit 
or competence (Lam 2015, 24). 
Public ownership was silently expropriated, leading to a logic of scarcity/rarefaction, 
a monopoly on public wealth by the CCP which, as underlined above, provided a sine 
qua non condition for the rise of rent. At the same time, a series of measures ensured 
a marked increase of rent, privatising not only the past or existing wealth, but also that 
of the future. The introduction of per capita taxation with the 1991-1994 fiscal reforms 
opened a new way of centralising resources in the hands of the state and was coupled 
with the opening of the stock market and a new distributive process based on a new 
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shareholding value. Via the dispositifs of financialisation, the party state was able to 
systematically increase the value of this rent, extracting profits from outside the 
production process like an insatiable sponge —absorbing the savings and profit of 
hundreds of thousands people in order to put them at rent for the future.  
As I have underlined in the previous chapter, in China everyday people were 
interpellated, asked to invest in stocks. In the form of a governmental project, the 
shareholding function of interests over bonds, securities and promissory notes that are 
issued from firms, extended across a vast web of credit and interest. In this process, as 
personal savings and labour profits were invested into shares to assure welfare and 
security “capital production and reproduction as well as that of labour, no longer 
operates into separate schemes” (Martin 2008, n.p.). 
Here, the valorisation process is “no longer confined to the place dedicated to the 
production of goods and services, but extends beyond the factory gates, so to speak” 
(Marazzi 2011, 48). It enters directly into the sphere of the circulation of capital 
through financial means, whereby the search for ever-higher shareholder earnings 
generates the increase in profits in the “autonomisation” of financial capital. This is 
not to say that capitalism has substituted a new productive base. It is in fact still relying 
on machines and the bodies of the workers for the transformation of raw materials and 
the generation of surplus value. This is especially true in China, which remains the 
factory of the world. However, in addition to this the country increasingly resorts to 
the biopolitical dimension of the social body of society as a whole, seeking to generate 
surplus value while capitalising on the diffused desires of sociality, expression, and 
relation (Terranova 2015). What occurs is a “biopolitical production of social life” 
whereby subjectivities not only generate new value in the service of capital 
accumulation, but also end up “empowered with,” so to speak, “the whole complex of 
social relations” as a new means of production.  
The subjects of Chinese financialisation respond to a logic that surpasses their 
individual skill; together with knowledge and expertise, the subject valorises her/his 
beliefs, motivation, interpersonal aesthetic, and informational expertise. Transposed to 
Marxist terms—as Marx elaborates in the Grundrisse—these functions become “the 
epicentre of social production and preordain all areas of life: ‘general intellect’” (Marx 
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1973, 706).105 Thus, while in Marx’s industrial mode of production, general intellect 
was incorporated into fixed capital, the machine, within the financial mode of 
accumulation, and functions previously fulfilled by fixed capital are now transposed 
into the body of labour power.106 In particular, the characteristic of financial capital is 
to extract value from social cooperation and from the social relations in which it is 
enacted. As pointed out by Stefano Harney, “general Intellect is about itself” (2013) 
precisely because it incarnates the knowledge in which it is performed. It is, in primis, 
generated by the subjectivities of the historical and local environment in which these 
are shaped. 
In this sense, the haigui gain “autonomy” at the very moment in which their “social 
life [no longer depends] only on the disciplinary regulation imposed by economic 
power, but also depends on the internal displacement, shiftings, settlings and 
dissolutions that are the process of the self-composition of living society” (Berardi 
2003, n.p.). Finance itself becomes a code of self, disciplining everyday life. Thinking 
about this relationship from a governmental perspective also leads to a rethinking of 
the way state power has shifted and generated new forms of conduct to produce new 
financialised subjects. In China, the sanhu, through investing their own savings and 
free time as well as applying their own knowledge and aspirations to financial 
“shares”—including those of state owned enterprises—remove themselves from a 
relation of production previously organised along the lines of a “productive outcome” 
(either material or immaterial) and based mainly on profit (labour exploitation as a 
generative form of surplus value). Given such dynamics, the role of wages is reduced, 
labour is made precarious and investments in capital stagnate. The problematic 
realisation of profits (that is, selling the surplus-value product) is “forcibly entrusted 
to a consumption by means of non-wage incomes” (Marazzi 2011, 37). This routing is 
                                                 
 
105 “The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a 
direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself 
have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it” (Marx 
1973, 706). 
106 Once again, the emergence of financialisation and the shift of capitalist accumulation from material 
towards more immaterial forms of production does not mean that what went before has ceased to exist; 
on the contrary, it signals the rise of a mutual existence—as the surplus gained by the labour cost in the 
production labour regime is invested and valorised in the latter, which in turn corresponds to another 
labour regime. 
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largely through the stock market, which acts as a financial redistributor and, “although 
in a strongly unequal and precarious way” (37), transforms retirement savings, or a 
part of the still precariously earned wages, into rent. Unhitched by contractual 
relations, the money of this rent disrupts any relation of dependence, transforms its 
capacity to emerge “not simply as a mediator, medium or means of exchange, as it was 
through wages, for instance, but as a pervasive object of exchange in its own right” 
(Amato et al. 2010, iii). Within financialisation, an iconoclastic process transformed 
money, as a physical economic emblem made of paper or metal into a ubiquitous idol 
that can have much larger applications. In this case, money can more easily become 
an ersatz of any other language, and a common ground for a rough “predatory” 
psychology to emerge. As stated by Luciano Gallino, within financial capitalism 
money gained the upper hand over the criteria that lead to economic action. Money is 
any item or verifiable record, a handful of bits (Gallino, 2011). What follows is that 
under financialisation, making money by financial means also presumes “a 
disconnection between the wages paid and the labour performed” (Adkins 2015, 331). 
In this new path “earning more money” doesn’t follow “working more” and disrupts 
the “structural complicity” that binds the worker to capital via waged labour (Gorz 
2008, 133).  
As a result, for both the haigui and the informally trained sanhu, playing the stock 
market also entails increasing their labour autonomy from their contractual position 
with the state as it was conceived during the socialist period. By resorting to the stock 
market and to its redistributive function, investors vacate the wage labour position. 
These subjects, who are cut off from a satisfying wage labour relationship, seek money 
outside the workplace—whether this be the haigui employed in financial companies, 
or the retirees and the precarious workers I have described in chapter 5. In this way, a 
weakening of the direct relations of “dependence” occurs between the workers and the 
owners of the means of production.  
Faced with such a renewed dynamic, the increasing marginalisation of waged labour 
in China’s financialised society means that the state might potentially realise that 
“employment is no cure for other kinds of social ills” (Adkins 2012, 638). It may no 
longer be open to the state to retain popular support just by increasing salaries and 
labour guarantees. In chapter 5 I have argued that while risking, investing, borrowing, 
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winning or losing their money on the stock market—in particular when buying and 
selling shares in state-owned enterprises—the sanhu also engage in a form of 
resistance, reclaiming a sphere of social wealth, their share of total wealth. These 
subjects desire for money is for money liberated from its associated functions, 
employment, class, and contracts. As I have already underlined, under the pervasive 
“stock fever,” while formally trained investors such as the haigui become influenced 
by the enthusiasm of informal players for their investment activity and its potential to 
make “fast and easy money,” these other players see in the haigui “successful, 
internationalised and self-made subjects” who lend further legitimacy to their own 
activity by participating in the same financial rush. Thus, despite their differences, 
their inter-subjectivity becomes a mirror, which ruthlessly reflects their subjection 
through the power of money, even though each takes a different path. Despite the 
sanhu sharing the same search for money through financialisation, in a common stock 
rush, competition and a growing discontent with the state’s inability to maintain—and 
possibly increase the profitability of the rush—the segmentation among them greatly 
reduces any potential for collective solidarity. In this crowd of Mammon’s 
worshippers, the haigui need to affirm their identity and distinguish their status as 
formally-trained experts. As I have shown at the beginning of the chapter, in its 
adjustment to the will of capital, the state repeatedly finds it difficult to respond 
adequately to the needs of the very subjects it has fostered—the mass of investors 
gripped by stock fever, among who are a significant proportion of the haigui.  
New analytical approaches are required in order to grapple with such political and 
social configurations. Most of the discourse on contemporary Chinese capitalism 
focuses on the omnipresence of the Chinese state in both the resistance to and adoption 
of financialisation as part of the so-called neoliberal dogma. It is not the case, for 
example, that the concept of “Chinese revolution” as a model of emancipation still 
receives much attention from those in search of an alternative to neoliberalism, the 
“Chinese new left.”107 Some of the distinctively Chinese features appear in the attempt 
                                                 
 
107 A school of intellectual thought that is critical of capitalism and aspects of the Chinese economic 
reforms and in favour of elements of Maoist-style socialism, which includes significant role for state 
planning, the preservation of state-owned enterprises, and a renewed spirit of collectivism 
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to involve the so-called “large mass of the people” at every step of each socio-
economic transition.108 In other words, what has traditionally been constantly rejected 
in China appears to be the idea that both the imperial as well as the republican state 
represents only a segment of the population: ecumenically, the Empire has always 
included the whole people “living under Heaven,” whilst in Mao Tse-tung’s thought 
the concept of people embraced the “vast majority” and the exploiting classes were 
only “a very small minority.” At every stage of the so-called “Chinese road,” in both 
success and failure, huge masses of people were in play—from guerrilla warfare to the 
Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the de-collectivisation of the 
eighties.  
This leads me to argue that even nowadays the turn towards financialisation has 
involved a huge mobilisation of people. Thus, the question is: how to reconcile the 
neoliberal appeal to individualistic self-management and autonomy with the 
omnipresent mass scale of Chinese participants. The answer could be oxymoronic: a 
“socialist market” and a “mass autonomy,” that is, the autonomy of a mass of self-
managing individuals. Chinese political subjects still respond to the mass mobilisation 
appeal of the state to get rich through means of financialisation but, in doing so, they 
develop opportunistic and cynical attitudes that have the potential to obfuscate their 
dependency on the state. Within this perspective, the subject of Chinese 
financialisation is produced at the intersection between a crisis of the social and work-
contract system—with the state emptied of its political and moral values—and a new 
system of valorisation where the subject is compelled to behave autonomously from 
the state, despite being unable to escape from its grip.109  
                                                 
 
108 For instance, Wang Xiaoming returned to the examination of the works of Chinese thinkers of the 
first wave of modernity who were engaged in defining an anti-capitalistic modernity for China based 
on the spiritual values of “great unity,” “universal peace” etc. 
  
109 It has to be remembered that the redefinition of the social contract between the state and the people 
was already a key theme in China in the sixties, when the CCP formulated the theory of “modern 
revisionism” whilst accusing the Soviet Union of having changed its political colours. Two themes, the 
“peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism” and “a state of the entire people,” were considered 
the core of this criticism. Regarding the latter, according to Khrushchev, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat “had ceased to be indispensable in the USSR” and “the state, which arose as a state of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, had, in the new, contemporary stage, become a state of the entire people.” 
The Chinese considered this a betrayal of Marxist-Leninism, in other words, as a shift from a contract 
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In Chinese financialisation, access to the social means of production, apparently 
withheld from the subjects I analyse, is replaced by the hope for direct access to money, 
which carries with it a whole set of psychological, emotional, affective, and existential 
forces. Both the formal and informal financial experts, despite being fostered by the 
state to advance its financial project—through education, or through the promise of 
enrichment—coexist in the common desire for autonomy through money. The search 
for stock money, acting as an implicit bond between them, provides an autonomous 
self-reproducing pattern that substitutes, exceeds, and resists the one of the state. In 
such a unified tension, these financialised subjectivities might emerge as potentially 
unruly subjects.  
Conclusion 
Starting from an exploration of the ecology of Chinese financial expertise, this chapter 
has explored the recent transformation of the Chinese state under financialisation. In 
this transformation, I have underlined not only the proliferation of new state financial 
assets that serve the financial interests of the state, but also a new knowledge regime 
in which the production of new subjectivities, those of both formal (fostered abroad, 
the haigui) and informal experts, is at stake. Observation of these experts in the stock 
market has revealed that they are in equal measure dissatisfied with their investing 
activities and dissatisfied with the state, holding it responsible for the financial turmoil 
that manifested in the 2015 financial crisis. What the investors want is a state that will 
guarantee the “stock fever” continues. 
Thus, I have indicated how, by embracing financialisation, the state is undermining 
the contract at the base of its legitimacy. Despite still adorning itself with communist 
symbols and invoking its old signifiers—the state as the “people’s saviour,” the 
“builder of the republic”—as the basis of its legitimacy, its social agreement with the 
people—once based on the bedrock of waged labour—is clearly undermined under 
financialisation. Under this new Chinese financial regime of accumulation, the stock 
                                                 
 
signed by the state with one part of its people, i.e. the working class, to another contract in which the 
contractor is much wider and subsumes its working class and its combativeness. 
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market acts as a financial distributor, providing the population with new financial tools 
to supplant work casualisation, wage repression and a lack of social welfare. 
The Chinese population faces a new way to access money. Money becomes liberated, 
untethered from its social function and unbound from its wage dimension. This 
dimension opens a new potential for the aspiring financial experts such as the haigui 
who, disillusioned by their career failure in state financial institutions, cynically resort 
to autonomous stock market practices to make up for their “dream” of enrichment, 
undermining their loyalty towards the state and subjection to its technocratic power. 
Finally, I have observed how, given that it still largely owns and controls the Chinese 
stock market, the state has also become the primary representative of capital, and 
therefore the site of the struggle between capital and labour. By accessing that market, 
the mass of investors fiercely claims their share of the national wealth. In this 
relationship, the state faces an inherent contradiction and risks losing its grip over the 





Four years have passed since I decided to undertake this PhD project. My interest in 
investigating the way Chinese financialisation works began while working and living 
in Shanghai from 2010 to 2012. I was struck then by the way everyday people were 
playing the stock market with such nonchalance and normality. For me it was quite a 
novelty. However, when asking my Chinese colleagues and friends about such “stock 
fever,” they just shrugged, often seeking to diffuse my curiosity with a dose of 
cynicism: “This is just China.” Indeed, for them, there was nothing strange in this. 
Some of them had grown up in a house in which the Caijin TV channel (the main 
Chinese financial TV channel) was always on, typically in the background, hosting 
Chinese financial commentators discussing the trends of the stock market—even while 
they were preparing for school or work or eating dinner. A running discourse on the 
stock market formed a part of people’s everyday life. As an outsider, this phenomenon 
of financialised life as a routine condition and experience was remarkable. 
Despite my anxiety about the risk of being naïve and, worse, of “orientalising” a 
Chinese “phenomenon” from my foreign perspective, I began the research for this PhD 
thesis. In 2013, the time of my fieldwork, China was in the spotlight for many other 
reasons. Xi Jinping was appointed to power. A cycle of scandals unfolded: from the 
“shadow banking” sector, to municipal debt, to the housing bubble. An anti-corruption 
campaign followed. Yet, at that time, not much attention was placed on the Chinese 
stock market and its mass popularity. In the academic context, I could only rely on a 
limited number of publications that looked at Chinese financialisation from an 
interdisciplinary and anthropological perspective and which had stressed the sanhu’s 
(“scattered investors”) participation (Hertz 1998, Gamble 2003 and Rooker 2008). For 
the majority of scholars (both Chinese and international), studies on individual 
investors are mostly conducted within the disciplines of economic management or 
cognitive behaviour economics. In their view, individual stock market participation is 
taken as an indicator for either a “healthy” or “unhealthy” market (Gao 2002; Ma 2004; 
Valukonis 2014; Ng and Wu 2010). Microeconomic models, universally accepted, are 
often applied to the Chinese case with little or no analysis of the socio-political 
dimension of financialisation. According to these models, financial knowledge is not 
only unquestioned in its applicability, but there is little or no attention to its 
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ontological, historical and local foundations. Investors are portrayed as simple profit 
seekers, pursuing their choices made on the basis of the supply and demand equation, 
along with full and homogenous access to information, usually generated by other 
shareholder-actors in the market.  
However, if the mobility of financial capital has led to the rise of a new financial 
economic order across nation states—the rise of financial technologies such as HFT 
and the new financial interest they have generated have enabled a vast influence over 
the political process and have in turn produced “the financialisation of everything” 
(Martin 2002)—the modalities in which these processes were generated, the role of 
market actors and the responses of “everyday” people did not necessarily follow 
homogenised, market-driven principles. The critical perspective I adopt in this thesis 
to examine the Chinese case, characterised by “stock fever,” stems from the 
understanding that financial expertise is exploitable, disciplined and determined by 
systems of power and information within a specific production system (Thrift 2005; 
Mitchell 2007). As such, financialisation is a non-linear, porous and hybrid concept 
that can be generated, applied, assimilated, embodied and performed in different ways 
and by different actors across the uneven spaces of global capitalism (Pike and Pollard 
2010; Riles 2011; Miyazaki 2013; Hertz 1998). In this thesis I seek to investigate 
Chinese financialisation by observing one of those actors and their particular ways, 
namely Chinese haigui (“returnees”) who, holding acquired financial expertise from 
an Australian university, seek to position themselves in the Shanghai financial market, 
and consequently experience its everyday frictions and tensions. My initial idea of 
investigating issues of financial expertise within the Shanghai financial market 
developed while observing its “everyday” actors. However, considering that the 
everyday is not necessarily “identical with itself” and can be “the source and the target 
of change” (Tsianos and Papadopoulos 2006, n.p.), I was eager to narrate the mundane 
practices of Chinese finance and the potential “changes” arising from within its 
operations.  
In recent years, critical and interesting discussion concerning the political and social 
sides of finance and the financialisation of society has developed alongside and in the 
wake of the experience of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement. However, the Chinese 
financial world has often been portrayed only via the formal operations of finance: 
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from the management of sovereign wealth funds, to capital investment in infrastructure 
and currency reserves. The core of Chinese finance appeared impenetrable and 
inaccessible. Then, in June 2015, while drafting the fifth chapter of this thesis, which 
concerns my 2013 interviews and observations of sanhu activities in brokerage rooms, 
the crisis struck. Suddenly, the Chinese stock market became an object of discussion. 
Media coverage around the world started portraying images of a Chinese stock market 
in free fall. These differed from images seen during the 2008 Wall Street and Frankfurt 
crashes. The pictures from China were remarkable because they revealed the mundane 
face of Chinese finance, which had until then been little known around the world. 
These weren’t investors wearing suits or frenzied brokers in despair and panic. Instead, 
these were ordinary people—retirees, housewives, and young workers without job 
security—who were handling mostly personal and private savings, as a way to add 
some extra money to their family budgets. These were the subjects who suffered 
losses. People around the world suddenly came to know of the existence of the sanhu, 
the mass of Chinese lay investors who amount to hundreds of millions, the most 
numerous class of investors in the world. Soon after, these investors became the 
culprits of the crisis. They were blamed for triggering market volatility due to their 
lack of financial expertise and market “mis-information.” Whether this was true or 
false, global commentators promptly started speculatively employing the tired old 
doctrines on the Chinese market’s lack of “openness” and “transparency” (Rapoza 
2016; Trivedi 2016). Once more, the reproduction of the dominant economic 
narratives failed, in the first place, to recognise the “political” dimension of the crisis 
and, second, to provide analysis beyond a Western-centric view of capitalism. This 
commentary continued to rely on the universal claim of a “market-bound financial 
expertise” able to postulate “market-based measures of risk” that the sanhu lacked. In 
turn, further speculations circulated regarding the Chinese one-party system and the 
absence of a “neutral” financial supervisory authority.  
In the preceding chapters I have sought to provide a description and analysis of some 
of the distinctive features of Chinese financialisation, which I argue emerge in parallel 
with the production of two key figures in the making of modern China: respectively 
the Chinese graduate returnees and the mass of stock market investors and day traders. 
However, while detailing these distinctive features, I have aimed to transcend corollary 
narratives that take “culture” and “economy” as separate domains that rehash, for 
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instance, a debate about culture as a variable of economic growth (in view of the 
growing literature on “Asian values” in manuals of corporate governance). Rather, 
drawing from my ethnographic observations in Shanghai, the main site of the Chinese 
financial market, I have focused on those subjects that are simultaneously acting in 
and shaping the singular milieu of the Chinese financial market.  
On the other hand, while claiming these distinctive features, my observation also 
converges with the argument made by existing research on financialisation elsewhere, 
which has seen financialisation as a process of risk shifting from the state to citizens 
and from employers to workers whereby the subjectivity this risk shifting has produced 
is normalized within the risk management requirements this new model entails. 
Particularly in the wake of the GFC, I have observed how in China—as elsewhere—
the building up and the effects of global finance cannot be simply explained by a “new 
regime of financial accumulation” characterised by chronic instability and speculative 
bubbles. Rather it has relied on a system that has heavily depended upon, and impacted 
upon not the savings of the wealthy but the mundane payments and activities of the 
masses. Still I argue that while, particularly in the West, this has been described as a 
relatively recent phenomenon, originating in growing household debt and a subsequent 
wave of mortgage foreclosures debt, which amounts to a form of extraction (primitive 
accumulation) or akin to a (one-off) process of expropriation.  In China this is a longer-
term process, occurring with on-going historical momentum, which does not rely only 
debt relations and where the GFC certainly does not represent a terminal point.  
Thus, the genealogy of the shaping of Chinese expertise—as a key factor for the 
making of modern China—as well as the observation of subjectivities of the returnees 
with an expertise acquired in Australia provide a privileged lens through which to look 
at the multiple forces shaping Chinese financialisation within the contemporary 
capitalist juncture. From my analysis of the conflicting and ambivalent practices, 
desires and ambitions experienced by the haigui, financial expertise emerges as a 
disputed object between the formal and informal financial experts (haigui and sanhu, 
respectively) and the state. Financial expertise is initially sought by the state in ways 
that encourage students to study abroad and then return, but once financial expertise 
becomes embodied in the haigui as they seek to pursue their careers, it is confined to 
a subsidiary and marginal role. I have made the case that an analysis of the figure of 
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the haigui, as holders of expertise “fostered abroad” which is then disputed, reveals 
the tensions characterising the role of the Chinese state within global financial 
capitalism. 
The obstacles the hagui encounter in looking for a job once back in China define a 
“high tension zone” for these subjects: instead of being promoted and valued, the 
haigui’s expertise is viewed as “alien” and “external” to the state financial ecology of 
expertise. Once returned, the haigui’s expertise clashes against a predominant 
domestic system based on state-led interpersonal connection (guanxi). The haigui are 
subjected to a combination of both marginalisation and suspicion. Financial expertise 
becomes the trigger of a power struggle between the returnees, who turn into outsiders, 
and the dahu, the players with the right connections, the ultimate insiders. The haigui’s 
position in the financial market is reduced to a façade: they have to perform the role 
of the “expert” but cannot exert any executive or managerial power. Throughout this 
thesis, I show that in many cases their positions are relinquished to tasks that consist 
of either “covering up” bankrupt Chinese companies whilst seeking to perform IPOs—
as their attempt to go “public” is nothing but a drive to make profits through the 
speculative nature of the financial market—or performing an accountable façade to 
help, again, Chinese companies on the brink of the abyss looking to resuscitate 
themselves through merging with and acquiring foreign companies.  
The Chinese financial market emerges as a space of redemption for companies with 
good connections and alliances in a protected domesticated area. However, if the 
Chinese financial market figures in the form of a zona franca or even an ivory tower, 
to preserve state power over the economy, for the haigui this is not an assurance but a 
motif of anxiety. Their role as experts, at the same time both fostered and jeopardised 
by the state, springs from the financial education they received at the university they 
attended in Australia, which in turn bestows them with both technical skills and a drive 
to become global managers. The haigui experience an on-going internal struggle. On 
one hand, encouraged by their discipline of study, they seek to recast their expertise in 
the attempt to upscale their positions, thus proving their value as globally-trained 
experts. On the other hand, when their expertise cannot be valorised and their attempts 
are failing, they are ready to discard the same expertise to refurbish motivations, 
interpersonal behaviours and aesthetic values that instead constitute the Chinese 
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financial market milieu. Under financialisation, the signifiers they experience are 
disconnected, discontinuous and contrasting. Often the haigui are caught up in a form 
of schizophrenic confusion. However, it is precisely from the diversity and contrasting 
points within the prevailing conditions—which are in tension as breaks and “frictions” 
in the circuit of capital (Tsing 2005)—that their subjectivities develop in novel ways. 
I have therefore suggested that the points of tension embodied by the returnees trying 
to affirm themselves in the Chinese financial market mirror the pressures pulsing in 
the veins of the Chinese ecology of financial expertise. I draw the conclusion that by 
navigating through and producing new scales of financialisation, the returnees 
complicate and disrupt the state’s control and fostering of financial labour. The way 
the Chinese state has accommodated the entrance of global financial capital is marked 
by an unresolved relationship of continuity and discontinuity with the process of 
modernisation.  
In chapter 1, through a historical excursus, I show how the figures of the returnees 
have always been strategic for the Chinese state process of modernisation. Fostering 
Chinese talents abroad and bringing them back has become a key technique for the 
state to empower itself in a transnational scene. To support this claim I draw from a 
historical narrative that informs the making of the modern Chinese state: here the 
dialectic of foreign and domestic expertise is what constituted the ontological 
standpoint for the birth of the modern Chinese state. At every stage of the process of 
modernisation, the motto of one of the most prominent modern reformers, Zhang 
Zhidong (1837-1909), is re-purposed: Chinese culture/knowledge as a basis, Western 
culture/knowledge as a tool. This is exactly what happened fifty years later with Mao 
Tse-tung’s you hong you zhuan (“red and expert theory”), communist knowledge in 
the service of the state’s political goals.  
On the basis of this historical narrative, chapter 2 and chapter 3 explore how current 
state policies of migration and education, deployed by the state to control and generate 
new financial labour for its agenda, suggests a continuity with the way experts were 
fostered in the past. However, after the Chinese state’s accommodation to financial 
capital, the rise of an increasingly self-entrepreneurial, rational subject within the 
process of financialisation marked a definite change. Programs of education and 
migration started to be re-shuffled within a new configuration of sovereignty and 
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governmentality. What initially was conceived as a state project, in which the 
population had to be regimented and controlled mainly through specific laws and 
orders, was under financialisation recast and intersected with a new way of governing 
“at a distance.” This encompassed new forms of conduct and discourses that emerged 
as a way of governing the self.  
Under the pressure of a newly financialised society in which profit making shifts 
increasingly toward cognitive and immaterial skills, Chinese students see education as 
a “tool” of the entrepreneurial self which makes them responsible for welfare choices 
based on an actuarial rationality as a form of social security (Peters 2005, 124). In 
order to position themselves within the competitive financial market context, the 
haigui are pushed to invest their savings, and their families’ savings, into education in 
Australia and other countries. Under financialisation, knowledge, which also 
encompasses a set of communicational skills and interpersonal behaviours, defines the 
new conflicting relationship between capital and labour. In this regime of 
accumulation the worker is called to valorise her human capital, which must be 
capitalised. Thus, the haigui’s labour power figures as a form of capital which needs 
to be valorised under the same regime. As financialisation demands, any work, product 
or service has to become a flexible and exchangeable financial asset.  
This process is investigated by recalling Marx’s theorisation of the circuit of capital: 
in order to acquire their expertise the returnees undertake a metamorphosis through 
their migration and education circuit in Australia. Through this circuit—which is 
similar to processes of production—their knowledge is transformed into a more 
valuable mode of expertise. In order to explore the constituency of such a circuit in 
chapter 3 I provide empirical evidence from Chinese returnees who have studied in 
Australia and returned to Shanghai in search of a financial career. A regional circuit 
connects Shanghai (both the “Chinese global city” and the city which receives the 
highest number of returnees) and Australia and offers a contemporary perspective to 
explore how a new cartography of knowledge and skills, linking China and Australia, 
has developed in parallel to a new division of labour under financial capitalism. Here, 
higher education becomes a device in the filtering, selection, and return of the 
population according to national and transnational borders based on knowledge. In this 
configuration, Australia, supposedly a destination for many students yearning for an 
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English-speaking education, an Anglophone business environment and a modernised 
and globalised setting, is a “make-do” choice for many Chinese students. Here 
financial education consists of a system of coding, composed of language, relational 
and aesthetic practices that constitute the hegemonic culture of a newly financialised 
globalised world. In addition, after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, there arose 
the moral and ethical claim that, under the name of “financial literacy,” such 
educational exchange would teach best practices to students wishing to become 
responsible financial traders.  
I argue that, once back in China, the haigui cannot utilise their increased “capital.” The 
China-Australia-Shanghai circuit of economic, social, and cultural capital valorisation 
in which the haigui are embedded is clogged by the specificity of the Chinese ecology 
of financial expertise, dominated by the domestic network of guanxi. An established 
pattern of social networking and social privileges, based on guanxi, dominates 
financial institutions, which are mostly controlled by the state. These mechanisms, 
aimed at reproducing the domination of a party-led technocracy, appear 
insurmountable. I highlight how this impasse reveals an intrinsic and contradictory 
split of the unitary nature of the state. Rather, “fragmentation” defines the relationship 
among the state’s various apparatuses: the state education-migration nexus which 
shapes the policies encouraging the haigui to migrate and return—policies made by 
ministry of education, local education offices, and universities—conflicts with the 
state-finance nexus, which is a financial ecology that cannot easily accommodate 
expertise learnt abroad.  
Chapter 4 explores the haigui’s experiences of the Shanghai financescape. In this 
initially coveted space, the haigui cannot fully enjoy a favourable atmosphere to 
pursue what their career and aesthetic aspirations suggest to them: a global, ordered, 
cutting edge, sanitised environment of the elite. Here, I show how the city’s dark sides 
buffet the haigui and their strategies for building careers. Shanghai’s multifaceted 
fascinations often dazzle the returnees, who become constantly distracted and 
incapable of prioritising which aspects of ambition, career, social life and economic 
strategy they wish to pursue. The haigui’s goals often dissolve into mirages, minefields 
and projections. As their career attempts are obstructed and they increasingly feel 
marginalised in the Shanghai financial job market, many of them resort to self-funded 
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investments in the stock market. In this Chinese financial ecology of expertise, where 
foreign expertise is dismissed and contested, the haigui emerge as cynical and 
pragmatic subjects. They seek to extricate themselves from the forces that obstruct 
their career promotions, to re-translate their social skills, and to shift from one identity 
to another, in order to fit into a local Chinese context overwhelmed by stock fever and 
mass financialisation. It is through this move that they mimic the behaviours of the 
sanhu—the everyday investors who play the market equipped only with an informal 
expertise in order to counter precarious conditions in both social and labour contexts. 
Once the haigui plunge into the ocean of mass financialisation, the borders between 
formal and informal expertise begin to fade. 
Chapter 5 describes the features of a Chinese financescape crowded by a highly 
heterogeneous mass of investors, with contrasting investing strategies, who are in turn 
upset by growing instability. Thus, the thesis develops a theoretical framework that I 
draw from the existing literature on the “financialisation of everyday life” (Martin 
2002; Aitken 2007; Lucarelli 2010), which has emphasised the way financial markets 
are increasingly emerging as devices for the provision of people’s basic needs. In turn, 
I make the claim that Chinese mass financialisation began as a governmental device, 
adopted by the state in its attempt to direct/redirect a society deeply shaken by earlier 
economic reforms. I show how the opening of the Chinese state to global capital erased 
not just the guarantees that were disciplining the population within the socialist order, 
but also compromised the bond of the state with its population, previously embodied 
in a political commitment to emancipation and liberation of the masses of common 
people. Through a description of this mass financialisation and the subjectivities 
involved, I argue that the state has sought to arrange financialisation as a substitute for 
its role as a social labour guarantor.  
Historically, the opening of the stock market in 1994 generated a stock fever that gave 
the Chinese state the opportunity to extend the impact of financialisation in a crescendo 
over the whole society: by re-engineering financialisation as an ersatz of state welfare, 
and creating the condition for financial values to become hegemonic at the subjective 
level, but stressing in the meantime its Chineseness and insulation. Even in the case of 
the sanhu, the notion of financial expertise appears to be a powerful analytical tool to 
grasp the conflicting relationship between their subjectivities and the state. Through 
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the use of vignettes resulting from my fieldwork observations, and the examination of 
a widespread “financial literature” found in “how to” financial manuals and blogs, as 
well as national TV channels broadcasting economics analysis and market predictions, 
I examine how this mass of investors developed practices of self-learning and 
digitalisation that the state encourages but also seeks to tame. The sanhu’s condition 
of success depends on their ability to perform within a system of accumulation 
characterised by debt, risk, uncertainty and speculative practices. For these investors, 
the coding and decoding of information and financial expertise is constantly lived and 
informed by the “bio productive” regime in which they are “embedded,” to use 
Polanyi’s term (1944). The notion of financial expertise seems to fade when embodied 
by the mass of investors who contingently transform their practices in a heterogeneous 
and often irrational way. The complexity, diversification and unpredictability of their 
practices of investing elude measurement and exceed the state’s attempt to tame them.  
 In this sense, the haigui gain “autonomy” by codifying and generating new trends of 
investment that, added to and contrasting with the multiple trends generated by the 
sanhu, quite regularly displace government strategies and predictions of their 
behaviours. My observation of these investors in the stock market has revealed that, at 
the very moment they become dissatisfied with their investing activities, they also 
become dissatisfied with the state, charging it with the responsibility for financial 
turmoil, as happened in the 2015 financial crisis. However, what investors want is a 
state guaranteeing that the “stock fever” can continue. I have stressed the risky nature 
of this governmental regime. The state’s reliance on financial capital, which is volatile 
and risky per se, to rearrange its position of labour guarantor and preserve its political 
and social legitimisation, can only result in a precarious equilibrium.  
Through investing their own savings and free time in “shares”—including those of 
state-owned enterprises—as well as applying their own knowledge and aspirations of 
achieving financial wealth, the scattered players remove themselves from a relation of 
production previously organised along the lines of a “productive outcome” (either 
material or immaterial) and mainly based on profit (labour exploitation as a generative 
form of surplus value). Given such dynamics, the role of wages is reduced, labour is 
made precarious and investments in capital stagnate. The problematic realisation of 
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profits (that is, selling the surplus-value product) is “forcibly entrusted to a 
consumption by means of non-wage incomes” (Marazzi 2011, 37).  
Specifically, the subjectivities explored in this thesis are faced with a shift that has 
encompassed what Marazzi defines as “a perverse process of autonomisation of 
financial capital from any collective interest”. This involves, for instance, wage and 
occupational stability, and the collapse of retirement savings into stock (43), where 
money overpasses its role as means of exchange (in exchange of labour) and becomes 
a pervasive commodity or a product (Lash 2007, quoted in Adkins 2015).  Thus, the 
resort to the stock market by haigui and sanhu harbours the potential to unhitch them 
from a relation of dependency with the state, borne of a collective contractual 
disciplinary model based on waged labour.  
Their access to money opens a new possibility for the haigui as aspiring financial 
experts who cynically engage in autonomous stock market practices to make up for 
their “dream” of enrichment, softening their loyalty towards the state and lessening 
their subjection to its technocratic power. The Chinese stock market, which directly 
and explicitly originated as a state device to control and discipline its citizens, has 
become a potential source of social disorder. In saying so, however, and in line with 
what scholars of financial markets and financialisation have underlined (Ho 2009; 
Leyshon and Thrift 2007; Zaloom 2006), my empirical observations confirm that 
subjectivity does not necessarily conform or “follow ideological lines of a political 
project” (Hoffman 2010, 147), and financial globalisation has not led to the de-
personalisation of financial activity. Rather, by experiencing a lack of access to power 
and information, micro-oppressions, exploitation, and precarity within the Chinese 
financial ecology of expertise, these emergent financial subjectivities exceed the 
conditions of production of financial wage labour and become “potential political 
subjects” (Wang 2016, 360).  
In conclusion, the rise of a new Chinese financialised subject, through the dismantling 
of public services like welfare and education, is of particular interest for analyses of 
contemporary global capitalism and its manifestation within China. The Chinese case 
lacks the camouflage offered by concepts such as free market, free trade or 
deregulation that have haunted narratives of financialisation on a global scale. Instead, 
Chinese financialisation problematises the boundary between state and market as well 
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as the forces at play in the shaping of a new financial self. This research has shown 
that the shaping of the subjectivity of the haigui does not mirror the process of national 
and transnational forging of financial labour under financialisation. On the contrary, it 
is within the fractures that emerge from this process that new subjectivities develop. 
Indeed, in this case, “subjectivity is not a facticity, it is a departure” (Tsianos and 
Papadopoulos 2006, n.p.). Such a departure represents fertile ground for the critique 
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